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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COLD WAR

By HERBERT APTHEKER

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By HERBERT APTHEKER

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To:

Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois, Who Personifies
The Noblest of the Past
The Purest of the Present
The Best of the Future

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Preface

The greatest question confronting Mankind is: War or Peace? For a citizen of the United States—of that mighty country whose policies and acts decisively influence that question—there is no more urgent duty than to inform himself as best he can on its every aspect, and to act, on the basis of that information, in such a way as to contribute to a peaceful future.

The volume now in the hands of the reader reflects the writings of its author for the past fourteen years. In it will be found data and opinions concerning the origins of World War II, its conduct, its conclusion and, especially, the diplomatic history of the United States from 1946 to the present. The matter is not only most urgent; it is a continuing one, as indicated in the recent appalling proposal by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara—in his Ann Arbor, Michigan, speech of June 16, 1962—that the United States adopt the strategy of counter-force and limited nuclear warfare, to be waged, if necessary, for an unlimited future.

The urgency and continuing character of the problems analyzed in this volume are shown, too, in the article published in the *New York Times*, July 25, 1962, by Mr. Homer Bigart, upon his return from an extended stay in South Vietnam. There, Mr. Bigart reported that the regime of Diem is tyrannical; that it is marked by "senseless brutality" and is detested by the vast majority of its subjects. He stated that though Diem had 300,000 troops and about 9,000 U.S. "advisers" and the most modern equipment—planes, artillery, trucks, etc.—and was opposed by about 25,000 guerrilla fighters—who had "only basic infantry weapons"—still, Diem was as far from victory as ever, and most of the country was not in his control. Homer Bigart concluded by remarking that—even with full American assistance and with Diem's overwhelming superiority in firepower—the military outcome was extremely doubtful; he added that Americans may not only lack the endurance, but also the motivation for continuing this "dirty war" since abandoned by a defeated French imperialism.

Withal, the grounds for confidence are great. Just as the good sense of the American people has forced an abandonment—so far—

of the shelter hoax, so it may be believed that the same good sense will force the Administration to deflate McNamara's trial balloon and abandon its search for a way to fight a nuclear war and still "survive," into a search for general disarmament and peaceful co-existence.

Similarly, it may be believed that finally this Administration will be forced to let the American people as a whole know what scientists have known for months, namely, that effective means for detecting underground nuclear tests over distances of thousands of miles do exist and that, therefore, insistence upon international, on-the-site inspection teams reflects a desire to prevent agreement, rather than a condition for achieving agreement on the complete banning of nuclear-weapons testing and production and use. In any case, it will have a very hard time explaining why the proposal put forth by the neutral nations for the immediate banning of all above ground and space tests may not be reached immediately, since as to these the capacity for immediate and unfailing detection is admitted by all.

Above all, grounds for confidence exist in the fact that the movement for peace has grown mightily in the United States in the past two years; should the same rate of growth continue, the demand for peace will be a main force in the presidential elections of 1964, and the elections thereafter. Objectively, there is every reason to believe that such growth will occur. If the present volume contributes in any way to this vital result, its author will be overjoyed.

* * *

As already noted, the chapters in this book appeared in substantially their present form, in several magazines from 1949 to 1962. The magazines are: *Masses & Mainstream*, *Mainstream*, *International Affairs* (Moscow) and *Political Affairs*. Dates of original publication follow each chapter; the actual writing was done at least one month prior to publication. Editing has consisted very largely of cutting and certain factual corrections and stylistic alterations. Substantially, however, each chapter appears as it was written in the heat of the moment and as an act of political engagement and affirmation; it is hoped that with the heat there is also some light.

The writer has done nothing to keep his point of view from the

reader. Let it be stated explicitly, that the author finds the Marxist-Leninist outlook the most satisfactory; it makes more sense of the world as it is today than any other generalization known to him. Within its framework, the data may be most meaningfully assembled and perceptively analyzed; this is the writer's conviction and so long as he holds to it, conflicting rulings by Boards and contrary statements from policemen are all quite irrelevant.

* * *

The writer has tried, within the body of the book itself and in its footnotes, to indicate the sources for all data and to convey some sense of his indebtedness to other authors and scholars. His indebtedness, however, to the writings of R. Palme Dutt—the distinguished Editor of *The Labour Monthly* (London)—is so great that it is a pleasure to particularly acknowledge it here. The beginnings of the writer's memory are crowded with Dutt's analyses; his writings have permeated the present author's mind and so the debt is that of a pupil to his teacher.

The publisher of this book, Mr. Joseph Felshin, has gone far beyond the call of duty in the assistance offered and interest shown.

The author's gratitude to his first and most challenging reader, to Fay, as always is profound; and our Bettina, too, has become increasingly helpful. Both have manifested extraordinary patience in the course of the fourteen years that have gone into this book; and what with McCarthy and McCarran, those years have not been marked by the serenity usually associated with scholarly labors.

No doubt, despite all the assistance, failures and errors remain; responsibility for them, as for all opinions herein expressed, remains, of course, only the author's.

HERBERT APTHEKER
July 31, 1962

PART ONE

Realities of Today's World

I. DISARMAMENT AND THE REIGN OF VIOLENCE

Within our country there is a widespread and rapidly growing uneasiness about U.S. foreign policy. Some of this is generated for narrowly political reasons and to a degree is fraudulent; yet, I think, most of it reflects a profound and very real process of "agonizing reappraisal" going on in the minds of millions, if not in that of the Secretary of State.

Evidences of this reappraisal are abundant. The distinguished scientist, J. Robert Oppenheimer, for example, writes that he has waited in vain for someone in authority to speak out "in a way that suggested complete integrity, some freshness of spirit and a touch of the plausible." "The United States," he continues, by which he must mean those presently conducting the country's affairs,

has not developed an understanding of its purposes, its interests, its alternatives and plans for the future in any way adequate to the gravity of the problems that the country faces. There is a widespread impression that we live from astonishment to surprise, and from surprise to astonishment, never adequately forewarned or forearmed, and more often than not choosing between evils, when forethought and foreaction might have provided happier alternatives (*Foreign Affairs*, Jan., 1958).

Geoffrey Barraclough, a professor of international history at the University of London, assessing the impact of American foreign policy among its friends in Western Europe, finds that it "has provoked a crisis of conscience" (*The Nation*, Jan. 4, 1958). The former banker James P. Warburg, now director of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science, charges flatly that "U.S. foreign policy is bankrupt" because of "an unwillingness to seek peaceful settlements through patient diplomacy and an obsessive reliance on obsolete military power" (*N. Y. Post*, Jan. 3, 1958).

Walter Lippmann, rigorous realist serving the Economic Royalists, who has been raising warning signals anent the failures of Wall Street's diplomacy for many months, has never written more sharply than he does in the April [1958] issue of *The Atlantic*. Here he expresses full agreement with George Kennan's call for "disengagement"—itself a major instance of rifts in upper circles because of manifest failure. "The Western allies," writes Lippmann, "had come to a dead end on the road which they had been following in the post-war years." In fact, "the underlying premise of our post-war policy has been shown to be false"; that underlying premise, says Lippmann, was the superiority of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. But the fact is, and he italicizes these words, that when it comes to the USSR, "*we are dealing with an equal power, not an inferior one.*" Hence, the conclusion must be, for Lippmann, an agreement between the two powers mutually protecting their vital interests; this he takes to be the principle of disengagement.

Here, too, there is much of the traditional; and it is not possible for Walter Lippmann to move out of the old-fashioned balance-of-power framework, characteristic of capitalist diplomacy. Nor is it possible for him to base his analysis on the class-conflict reality that dominates that diplomacy. Yet even within these powerful restrictions, the reasonableness of co-existence is compelling—a tribute to and a promise of the necessity of co-existence, given the world as it is today.

Fundamentally similar findings, arrived at from quite another standpoint, are offered by Norman Cousins, editor of *The Saturday Review*. In a series of editorials, April 1958, Mr. Cousins, who writes from a World Federalist, near-pacifistic view, sees the dominant line in American foreign policy to have been "a fantasy in which security was compounded at least partially of self-serving legends and myths of invulnerability and superiority"; he thinks persistence in such a path may produce "a moral disaster for the United States"; in any case, he finds as a fact that "there has been a steady and costly shrinkage of American influence in the world, especially among peoples of darker skins, which is to say, the preponderance."

Similarly—and as a final instance—the *N. Y. Post*, voice of the Liberal Party in New York City and important weathervane of liberal and petty-bourgeois influences within the Democratic Party, has never written more impatiently than in its editorial of April 20, 1958, entitled “The Last Brink.” The editorial had reference to the charges brought by the Soviet Union against the United States in connection with the Strategic Air Command “alerts.” While it was liberally spiced with the anti-Sovietism that the *Post* finds indispensable, it nevertheless, in fact, accepted the justice and the seriousness of the charge and demanded alteration in the policy which produced such practices. It denounced “our national stupor”; the State Department’s “smugness [which] has alienated so much of the world from America”; and “the insanity of the Administration’s nuclear policy.” At the same time, while it was not new to find this paper excoriating “the footdragging summitry of Dulles,” there was to be noted, when the *Post* paid its compliments to “the frozen formulae of Mr. Acheson,” a weariness with ineffectual “bi-partisanship” in foreign affairs that *was* something new. Since Acheson and Dulles have been responsible for foreign policy under Truman and Eisenhower, one can see that the *Post*’s evenhanded slaps do indeed herald a process of “agonizing reappraisal.”

* * *

What are the essential features of the foreign policy, denounced in such strong terms by the varied staunch friends of capitalism whose words we have just quoted?

The Truman-Eisenhower foreign policy starts from the position that the Soviet Union is the enemy whose destruction would redound to the benefit of the United States. Ever since it appeared possible that the release of atomic energy might be transformed into a deliverable weapon, that weapon—thought of as the ultimate one—was looked upon as the instrument with which that fundamental aim could be accomplished.

Thus, the atomic bomb project really started when General Leslie Groves was placed in command of the Manhattan Project, in September, 1942. When Gen. Groves was questioned, in 1954, at the Oppenheimer hearings, he testified:

I think it important to state—I think it is well known—that there was never from about two weeks from the time I took charge of the project any illusion on my part but that

Russia was the enemy and that the project was conducted on that basis. I didn't go along with the attitude of the whole country that Russia was a gallant ally. I always had suspicions and the project was conducted on that basis. (*In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, Washington, 1954, p. 173.)

It was the desire to demonstrate to the Russians the invincibility of this weapon that formed an essential reason for the atrocious decision made by Truman to drop it on two Japanese cities, without warning, despite the fact that he knew that Japan had started surrender negotiations in July, 1945—that is, one month before the first bomb was dropped. The incineration of 300,000 Japanese men, women and children was done, too, to hasten that surrender and to assure that in the Japanese peace settlement the USSR would not have a hand. Despite these facts, Mr. Truman persists in justifying this horror; he gets away with it in this country because the victims were Japanese, because the knowledge of the actual truth is not widespread, and because the nature of that truth is simply too shattering and too terrible.*

Complementing and supplementing the American government's dedication to the destruction of the socialist Soviet Union is its support to colonialism. This support derives in part from the relationship of colonialism to the strength of its allies—Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Belgium; but it is ambivalent, largely because of the simultaneous desire to strip those allies of much of the loot they obtain from their colonies. It is this ambivalence which is at the heart of what Matthew J. Kust has called "The Great Dilemma of American Foreign Policy" (*Virginia Quarterly Review*, Spring, 1958). The author, a former associate in the Dulles' law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, for years Legal Adviser to U.S. Embassies in Asia, and now practicing law again in Washington, acknowledges that today, in the world generally, "America is considered the champion of Western colonialism and imperialism." This is not difficult to understand since, as the author himself declares, ever since the end of World War II, "the United States has been on the side of the colonial powers." The "dilemma" appears

* Substantiation will be found in Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford University Press, 1954); and in P. M. S. Blackett, *Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1956).

because our allies "are vitally dependent on the economic advantages colonialism gives them in Asia and Africa"; wherefore "we support European colonialism in order to keep our European allies strong"; but this tends to "alienate the people of Asia and Africa."

Of course, Mr. Kust, while counting up the economic spoils that England and France derive from colonialism, fails to mention that the United States is in this game up to its neck, and that the spoils taken by the American investors far exceed in value those appropriated by the French and the British put together. The failure to acknowledge this and probe it and oppose it allows Mr. Kust to lament and deplore, but not to eliminate and cure; hence, he is indeed left with a "dilemma"—that is, a problem with equally distasteful solutions.

With these motives and intentions, the masters of our country see their own concocted Cold War as plainly antecedent to, if not really part of, actual war, conducted when, how, and under the circumstances they hope they will be able to choose. The war may take the form of one enormous engagement or—and there is a growing tendency towards this view—it may take the form of more or less "limited" conflicts. If it takes the latter form, they know there is no assurance that this may not burst forth into a full-scale global conflict; in any case, when projecting "limited" warfare, they project its recurrence for an unlimited time.*

The assumption of being at war, albeit in the preparatory stages, permeates the various confidential papers prepared for the Committee for Economic Development at its recent 15th annual meeting. These papers—coming from experts attached to the government, like Edward L. Allen, in charge of economic research for the CIA, or from others frequently consulted by government, like Professor J. Sterling Livingston of Harvard—are filled with such terms as "adversary," "antagonist" and "opponent" when referring to the Soviet Union. The matter is made altogether explicit by the introductory remarks offered by Vice-President Nixon who, noting 1942 as the founding year of the Committee, said: "Just as surely as we were in a war then, we are in a war today." (The papers are published in a volume entitled, *Soviet Progress vs. American Enterprise*, Doubleday, N. Y.)

Given these ends and this view, it is not surprising that official

* The present writer examines the arguments of and some of the literature dealing with "limited" war, elsewhere in this volume.

policy rejects the possibility of effective disarmament. It is important that this rejection be pinpointed, because it illuminates the actual practice, tortuous as it is, of Dulles-diplomacy. Dr. Edward Teller, for example, in charge of major governmental weapons projects, and described by Nixon as "a man who perhaps has as keen an understanding of the whole world struggle as any man to whom I have talked," has flatly stated that in his view "effective disarmament" schemes "are doomed to failure" (*Foreign Affairs*, Jan., 1958). Henry Kissinger, in his quasi-official and extremely influential study *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (p. 208), argues that "a meaningful [disarmament] agreement is almost impossible."

On the basis of such statements from such people, it is no wonder that thoroughly responsible individuals have charged that the United States government, as presently administered, is opposed to disarmament. For example, Norman Cousins writes:

There is no point in fooling ourselves. The State Department has been willing to talk about arms control for propaganda purposes. But its basic position, well known to close observers in Washington, is that it does not believe that arms control is *desirable*—even if a foolproof system of enforcement could be achieved (*Saturday Review*, April 19, 1958).

Surely, one of the "close observers" in Mr. Cousins' mind must be the Washington correspondent of the *New York Times*, E. W. Kenworthy, who declared in that paper (April 13) that the "real reason" for United States opposition to halting its testing of nuclear weapons was because of its "opposition to a total ban on atomic weapons"; it did not avow this "real" reason, wrote Kenworthy, because it feared the reason was one which "it would be difficult to explain and justify."

The present official policy, furthermore, is not only to reject the desirability and the possibility of real disarmament; it also is one directed towards the fullest use, at its own discretion, of any and all weapons, no matter what their destructiveness. In fact, American official policy is based upon the use of nuclear weapons in particular.

Quite recently, Henry Kissinger has affirmed that "our whole strategy is dependent on nuclear weapons" (*Foreign Affairs*, April, 1958). This is the meaning of the phrase in the original Baruch

Plan of 1946, "instant and condign punishment"; it is the meaning of Dulles' declaration of policy in January, 1954: "massive retaliation at the time and place of our choosing."

Nothing can be plainer than this statement made by Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery in October, 1954:

I want to make it absolutely clear that we at S.H.A.P.E. are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons in our defense.

In October, 1957, Dulles threatened atomic annihilation against the Soviet Union, should its troops enter Turkey; in January, 1958, the Defense Minister of Great Britain stated that an advance beyond their own borders by Soviet troops carrying conventional arms would bring into instant play the full arsenal of the Allies' thermo-nuclear weapons.

Dr. Teller drops the pose of "defensiveness" and simply writes: "Our announced policy is that in case of war we shall use the most effective weapons available to us. This is plain common sense" (*Foreign Affairs*, Jan., 1958). The common sense of this we shall examine later; at the moment we point to what is stated as announced policy.

True it is, as I have noted, that there has been a tendency in official circles to move towards the "limited" war theory; it is said, as by Professor Blackett, for example, that the "action" policy of the Allies is now "limited" warfare, while its "declaratory" policy remains "massive retaliation" envisaging global warfare. Concerning this, it must be pointed out that so important a figure as Defense Secretary McElroy confines his concept of "limited" wars to those not fought between the major powers, and even there he envisages the use of smaller nuclear weapons. But he states that if the Soviet Union and the United States, or any of its major allies, come into combat he does not see how that can be kept on a small or limited level (*U.S. News and World Report*, April 25, 1958).

Common Sense or Nonsense?

It may be well at this point to return to Dr. Teller's idea of "common sense." This is in line with his whole emphasis playing down the horror features of nuclear weapons, and minimizing or

denying their awful power. It is in line, too, with State Department efforts, by use of such words as "clean" and "discriminating" to accomplish the same purpose and to accustom people to the employment of nuclear weapons. In fact, today, NATO considers the smaller, or so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons to be part of its "conventional" arms. Kissinger, in his book already cited (p. 311), specifically set out as "one of the chief tasks of U.S. policy" that of "overcoming the trauma which attaches to the use of nuclear weapons."

The indubitable fact is that nuclear weapons have added a new quality to war-making; they have rendered possible the utter annihilation of all life on this planet. The further fact is that warfare conducted with nuclear weapons, even if on something like the "limited" scale projected by Kissinger, would carry with it casualties that would make the two World Wars appear as minor forays.

It is worthwhile to spell out, even if quite briefly, the facts on this matter. George W. Rathjens, Jr., a member of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group under the Secretary of Defense, writes that were nuclear weapons to be used today in warfare the "destruction of at least 50 percent of the population of each antagonist is quite likely" (*World Politics*, Jan., 1958)—in a war confined to the United States and the Soviet Union that adds up to two hundred million people killed.

Professor Blackett, Nobel Prize Winner for Physics in 1948, in his cited book, declares that a standard H-bomb—that is, one of ten million tons of TNT equivalent—would destroy an area of 400 square miles, somewhat larger than all of Greater London. He finds that a maximum of ten such bombs would utterly cripple Great Britain, and thinks about fifty would do the same to the United States. It is his opinion that the stockpile of all kinds of nuclear bombs in the possession of the United States as of 1955 came to about 30,000; of the Soviet Union, possibly as many as 6,000. And: "There is no effective defense at present, nor is there one in sight against a large-scale and determined atomic attack on cities and centers of population."

The Australian physicist, Professor M. L. Oliphant, puts the truth in three stark sentences:*

* In an essay in the very useful book edited by V. H. Wallace, *Paths to Peace* (Cambridge University Press, N. Y., 1958).

Atomic weapons have so increased the destructive power of modern push-button warfare that the complete destruction of the industries and cities of both sides in any world combat is inevitable.

There is no effective defense against atomic weapons and it is very doubtful whether any defense is possible.

The effects of radioactivity produced in all-out war with atomic weapons might be disastrous for the human race.

As to radioactivity and fall-out, mentioned by Prof. Oliphant, much obscurantism and down-right lying has been forthcoming from officially blessed American quarters. Yet the fact of real danger is indubitable; how pressing is in question. And the fact of real harm is indubitable; how extensive is in question.

The most useful and readable book on this matter that I have yet seen is by Ralph E. Lapp, *The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon* (Harper, New York, 1958). Dr. Lapp was leader of the scientific group at the 1946 Bikini bomb tests, and was head of the Nuclear Physics Branch, Office of Naval Research. His volume is a careful study of the facts concerning the radiation poisoning suffered by Japanese fishermen in 1954 when their ship came within one hundred miles of an H-bomb explosion. All of the men became severely ill and were hospitalized for more than a year; one of them perished. The life-expectancy of the survivors was cut by five years. As a result of the five explosions conducted in that 1954 series by the U.S., fish were contaminated over an area of one million square miles in the Pacific Ocean; 8,000 square miles were dusted with a lethal dose of radioactivity; and the inhabitants of Rongelap, an island in the vicinity, who had been arbitrarily moved by the United States, were not returned to their homes, for fear of contamination, until 37 months after the explosions.

Dr. Lapp declares: "What happened to those aboard the ship was a very small sample of the radioactive peril which would be unleashed in a nuclear war." He continues:

Three years after the explosion, officials of the U.S. Government still refused to acknowledge the type of bomb detonated at Bikini. Instead, they promoted the virtues of a "humanitarian" bomb—a label they soon regretted and for which they substituted the adjective "clean." The semantic non-

sense about the "clean" bomb continues. Perhaps it is more dangerous than mere nonsense, for it implies a kind of aseptic war, seeming in some way to remove an element of terror and hence deterrence from the use of nuclear weapons.

What is "common sense" to Dr. Teller is "nonsense" to Dr. Lapp. For me, when one enters the realm of promulgating policy which can only have as an end result the annihilation of hundreds of millions of people, he has passed out of the zone of sense altogether and into the area of criminal insanity.

Accident and Provocation

Official U.S. policy is based not only upon the use of these monstrous weapons; it seeks to spread their availability to its allies as widely as possible. It insists that West Germany accept nuclear weapons, and the rulers of that country have obliged; it desires to set up bases for the launching of nuclear-armed missiles in half a dozen countries and is going ahead with this; it is encouraging France in its nuclear-weapon program. And the Eisenhower Administration is pressing vigorously for the enactment of legislation that will enable it to give fullest assistance to numerous "reliable" countries so that they may develop their own capacity to make nuclear weapons. "We want to keep our allies strong," says the President of the United States at his press conference on April 23. "We want them to have the use of just as modern weapons as we do." Mr. George W. Rathjens, Jr., in the already cited article—and he is now in the service of the Office of Defense—admits: "Of course, there is implicit in the widespread distribution of nuclear weapons a greater risk of irresponsible usage." Yet, that is official American policy—urgently and vigorously pushed.

So, of course, is the entire fantastically dangerous policy of instant and constant alert practiced by the Strategic Air Command from hundreds of bases throughout the world ringing the Soviet Union. This has been highlighted by the demand made by the Soviet Union that this practice cease. What it means is that hundreds of crews, trained in the performance of a particular mission—as the destruction of Odessa—move to the accomplishment of this

mission, in planes flying seven to nine hundred miles an hour, when radar screens pick up images showing objects apparently moving from the direction of the USSR outward.

These planes, armed with H-bombs, not only fly all about the world, but actually take off regularly on combat missions for half a dozen places within the Soviet Union. That the same act is not performed by the Soviet Union—that it is not, was stated by Gromyko—appears to be all which up to now has prevented irretrievable disaster, for if flights from both sides set out at these speeds, armed, towards each other, it is difficult to know what would then prevent Armageddon.

Claims of a foolproof system advanced by the U.S. government are absurd. One of the bases for this claim is held to be the fact that the final order to carry through the attack must come from the President himself. Meaning no disrespect to so exalted a figure, I must protest that having a decision rest in the lap of Mr. Eisenhower is far from a foolproof arrangement. We are told elaborate code systems are in force; code systems have been read incorrectly and have been sent wrongly. One may point out that the Nazi destruction of Rotterdam was carried through because a coded message sent from the Luftwaffe to an officer reading: "Do not attack," was read by that officer as "Attack."

Further, in addition to the ever-present possibility of error, one has the problem of provocation. Here several considerations appear. First is the fact that the advocacy of "preventive war" is still heard in highest circles. It is not only that in 1950 the Secretary of the Navy called for this; as recently as the spring of 1955, in the *Yale Review*, Henry Kissinger published an article entitled "American Policy and Preventive War"; there he stated that preventive war was being seriously discussed in responsible quarters. Furthermore, how responsible need the quarters be, if an officer in charge of a plane can himself decide whether or not he is to obey a coded message—that does arrive and that he does read correctly—telling him to turn back? Suppose he decides not to turn back? Lloyd V. Berkner, president of the International Council of Scientific Unions, has remarked about the pressing dangers arising because "critical command tends to devolve to lower and lower echelons" (*Foreign Affairs*, Jan., 1958). Now, critical command is not only devolving to lower and lower levels, but with the policy of spreading possession of nuclear weapons, it is encompassing more

and more countries and lower and lower levels within their responsibility!

It is also necessary to state—without intending to indict any individual—that the phenomenon of provocation exists. It is, for example, now admitted by the late Admiral Horthy in his recently published *Memoirs* that while Hungary went to war against the Soviet Union, in 1941, charging that the Red Air Force had bombed a Hungarian border town, the bombing actually had been done, by prearrangement, by Nazi planes. According to the American magazine *Missiles and Rockets* (Jan., 1958) there have been “numerous and continuing SAC flights over the sovereign territory of the USSR. . . .” The *New York Times* (March 20, 1958) reports that a former officer of the British Royal Air Force published an article in an Oxford University magazine describing his own participation in deliberate aerial incursions over Soviet territory, undertaken in order to test the tactic and speed of the Soviet response. So glaring was this that a Member of Parliament demanded in Commons: “Could not this kind of crazy provocation spark off a new war?”

Most serious is the report made by Paul Johnson, in the internationally respected London weekly *New Statesman* (March 8, 1958), which I have not seen commented upon by the American press. Mr. Johnson states that on November 2, 1956, the National Security Council—the highest strategic body—met in emergency session in Washington, and that throughout the night intelligence reports reached it of “Soviet military overflights” in Turkey and Iran. Mr. Johnson continues:

Mr. Dulles wished to respond to these moves by alerting SAC and deploying its squadrons in a manner which would provide “ocular evidence” of America’s will to resist. But the air force chiefs explained that such an action would be tantamount to war; that the size and nature of SAC meant that it could not get all its aircraft airborne, and begin the complex process of aerial refueling, without revealing to the enemy its axes of attack, knowledge of which would undermine the deterrent *unless it was really intended to use it this time*. [Italics in original.] Moreover, they added, once it became clear that SAC was getting into position, the Russians would be bound to do the same, and then a conflict would become virtually inevitable.

This, then, was one of Mr. Dulles' brinks that has not been publicized here. Happily, while the Council was still sitting and pondering, writes Mr. Johnson, "further intelligence reports revealed that there was no radar evidence of Soviet overflights." One rejoices that the Council hesitated, and that the screens found what they did, and that they were read correctly and that the intelligence reports were dispatched promptly and arrived in time. But there is an actual example; there is something that, we are responsibly informed, really happened—who would say that the arrangements here were "foolproof"?

Deception

It is necessary also to remind readers of a well-authenticated occurrence which demonstrates that on the highest levels there appears at times outright deception; that such deception is practiced in pursuit of policy; and that this policy carries with it commitment to the use of nuclear weapons and therefore opposition to anything which induces the cessation of weapons-testing, let alone progress towards actual disarmament.

On September 19, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission, in order to demonstrate that one could produce atomic explosions, under proper conditions, which could not be detected from any considerable distance, detonated an atomic bomb one-tenth as potent as that which destroyed Hiroshima and did this within a 2,000-foot-long tunnel dug into a mountain. AEC thereafter reported, with the full weight of its official position behind it, that the explosion had been detected at a *maximum* distance of 250 miles. The U.S. Government did not fail to announce that this confirmed its view of the impossibility of effectively banning atomic weapon-testing.

The terrible fact is, however, that *a station of the U.S. Government* in Alaska, over 2,500 miles away, had recorded the blast. This was not made known; rather the contrary report was made public and was used, though known to be false, in support of a policy furthering the atomic arms race. It was only the revelation made first by Harold E. Stassen, in February 1958, after he had been fired by the President, that the blast had been picked up at distances greater than stated by the AEC, and after further inquiry by Senator Humphrey, that the full truth about this became public.

Root Causes

Why is it America's policy which induces among Europeans "a crisis of conscience," and here a "moral crisis"? Why is it America's policy which is "obsessed with military power"; that is "at a dead end"; that produces "a national stupor"; that the world "identifies with colonialism"? Why is it American policy to disguise nuclear destruction with words about "cleanliness"; to lie about the results of its own experiments; to practice a brinkmanship that terrifies humanity and identifies to the vast majority of mankind the name of our country with the main obstacle to disarmament?

The idea is gaining ground that the very horrendousness of modern war makes war impossible; that in these new terms it is not really important to inquire into the cause of the war danger; it is enough only to point to the annihilating quality of modern weapons to insure their not being used. There is nothing in the experience of humanity to justify this view; on the contrary, everything that has gone before points to the extreme dubiousness of such a position. One of the values of Louis J. Halle's book, *Choice for Survival* (Harper, N. Y., 1958)—with the main thesis of which, an argument for "limited" warfare, I disagree—is that it brings forward something of the past illusions that the frightfulness of weapons assured the elimination of war.

No, weapons—of any kind, even so qualitatively new as thermonuclear weapons—remain instrumentalities of policy. And that policy remains the function of organized states, and those states remain the expressions of particular social systems, and are themselves, ultimately, the instrumentalities of those ruling such systems.

Thus, despite the enormous and insistent propaganda here to the effect that the Soviet Union threatens war and aggression, it is a fact that leading figures repeatedly have admitted, to their confidants and under private circumstances, that this was not true. Forrestal, for example, before madness befell him, confided to his diary in June, 1946, that he did not believe the USSR would attack "at any time." In June, 1948, General Walter Bedell Smith reported to the Security Council that "the Russians do not want war"; a military report to the NATO Council in 1951 found that there were "no serious indications that the Soviet Union is preparing for hostilities"; Eisenhower's Chief of Staff in 1952, General Gruenther,

reported to him he saw no such preparations and felt certain the Russians were not going to war.*

To the degree that one is serious in his efforts to contribute to wiping out the scourge of war, he will seek to comprehend its source. For, of course, effective therapy depends first of all upon accurate diagnosis. Then, one can seek to apply the means to overcome the disease; but first one must know, with as much accuracy as possible, exactly what disease he is combatting.

In the modern era, the great, central cause of war—that cause without which the effect would not appear—has been imperialism. To know and prove this truth today, with what is at stake in war or peace, is of transcendent consequence. And for an American, for one who lives in that country representing the apex of monopoly capitalism's power, for him the duty of exposure is all the more urgent.

An Australian scholar, Dr. Frederick E. Emery, of the University of Melbourne, finds that the basic source of World War I "lies in the inherently unstable and highly explosive balance of power, arising from and spurred on by the imperialist demands of the dominant financial and industrial monopolies of the major powers." He finds that the process leading to World War II "was basically similar"; and study convinces him that these basic war-driving attributes of imperialist systems are absent from socialist ones.**

The impact of these forces on American foreign policy today is also decisive. This encompasses ideological hatred and economic fear of socialism; the enormous profits to be made from war and war-preparations***; the internal necessity to seek areas for investment of excess capital at higher rates of profits; the drive to assure cheap and abundant raw materials; to undercut or eliminate competing imperialisms; to repress colonial liberation movements; to foment chauvinisms and jingoisms that divert from domestic exploitation and insecurity; to pay off components within the potentially dangerous sectors of society with excess obtained from overseas; to buy "permanent prosperity." These are all living realities in American life that one may find documented in any issue of the

* Documentation for this and other instances will be found in the essay by Geoffrey Sharp in the volume edited by V. H. Wallace, and already cited.

** Emery's essay is also in the Wallace volume.

*** The late Harold Laski, in his *Liberty in the Modern State* (1949) quoted a French general as saying in 1908: "The corporations believe that it is the government's duty to make war so that they may be assured of their profits." And fifty years later?

Wall Street Journal or *Business Week* or *U.S. News and World Report*; one may find it in naked form in the reports made to the Committee for Economic Development, published recently by Doubleday in a volume already cited—all this quite apart from the work of Marxist scholars as Victor Perlo, Hyman Lumer, Paul Baran, Alphaeus Hunton, James S. Allen, to cite only a few of the more recent contributors from our own country.

I have referred to monopoly capitalism's power, and to dominant financial and industrial monopolies. This is decisive in comprehending the modern drive to war. Its existence in our country is unmistakable, though its denial, in mass media of circulation, is continual. But here is a study, *Economic Power and the Free Society*, by A. A. Berle, Jr., a former Assistant Secretary of State, a leading attorney and an authority on the nature of the modern corporation, in which these words occur (p. 14)*:

Today approximately 50 per cent of American manufacturing—that is everything other than financial and transportation—is held by 150 corporations, reckoned at least by asset values. If finance and transportation are included, the total increases . . . about two-thirds of the economically productive assets of the U.S., excluding agriculture, are owned by a group of not more than 500 corporations. This is actual asset ownership . . . in terms of power, without regard to asset positions, not only do 500 corporations control two-thirds of the non-farm economy but within each of that 500 a still smaller group has the ultimate decision-making power. This is, I think, the highest concentration of economic power in recorded history. Since the U.S. carries on not quite half of the manufacturing production of the entire world today, these 500 groupings—each with its own little dominating pyramid within it—represents a concentration of power over economics which makes the medieval system look like a Sunday school party. In sheer economic power this has gone far beyond anything we have yet seen.

Mr. Berle draws conclusions from his observations about "the free society" with which I sharply disagree; and politically he feels

* Obtainable from The Fund for the Republic, 60 E. 42nd St., N.Y.C.

it necessary to acquiesce in this domination of the economy of our country. But the point here is the influence of this economic power over politics; and more specifically the influence of this economic power over the shaping of American foreign policy and over the conducting of American diplomacy.

For a Disarmament Race

The capacity to give every human being a good and abundant life has been achieved by mankind; with that capacity has come also the capacity to annihilate all mankind. The development of these capacities has gone hand in hand with and been the product of that social development which has made capitalism senile and brought socialism to ever-increasing millions of people. The disintegration of the system of exploitation and its replacement by a system of collectivity and fraternity offer the possibility in our era, for the first time, of eliminating war.

Hence, everywhere, the struggle for peace is taking on dimensions and urgency and militancy that are exhilarating. This is organized and fully conscious and enormously potent among Socialist nations; the leadership in the struggle against World War III by the Soviet Union has been as magnificent and as decisive a contribution to mankind as was the same Socialist country's leadership in the defeat of fascism in World War II.

The developing movement for peace in the colonial world and in the countries recently liberated, constitutes an additional reinforcement of the greatest importance. And in the major European capitalist nations the opposition to war is spreading and deepening; the same is occurring, so far on a smaller scale, in our own country.

Harrison Brown, renowned American scientist, in a closely reasoned appeal for disarmament and coexistence, concludes (*The Reporter*, April 3, 1958):

I realize that it is a long way from cessation of nuclear tests and the assignment of the control of space to the establishment of a truly peaceful world. But it seems to me that we have got to start some place, and we have got to start soon. We are rapidly approaching the time when it will be too late.

Let us have a new race—a disarmament race. Let us overtake and surpass the Russians in this! Let us test the Russians and not the bombs!

Can we not at last say, with Longfellow:

*The reign of violence is dead,
Or dying surely from the world.*

May, 1958

II. FOREIGN POLICY AND PEACE

Back in the sports section of a recent issue of the *New York Times* (Feb. 5, 1959, p. 40, to be precise) appeared an item that seemed to me quite out of place; I didn't even find it sporting. It consumed two inches, was datelined Ciudad Trujillo and read, in its entirety, this way:

Two U.S. Representatives delivered words of praise for Generalissimo Rafael L. Trujillo today at a joint session of the Dominican Republic's Congress.

Gardner R. Withrow, Republican of Wisconsin, said the country had been fortunate with a Government that had brought peace and prosperity. Donald L. Jackson, Republican of California, referring to the strongman label given to General Trujillo, said the history of all nations was the history of men who were strong. He said the people of the United States venerated the strong men of their history.

There are several puzzling matters connected with this news item, in addition to its being put in the sports section of the paper. For example, with the United States Congress in session what were Representatives from Wisconsin and California doing in the Dominican Republic's Congress? Had they gotten lost, wandered in, and decided that one Congress was as good as another? Who paid their travel expenses down to Trujillo-land? Were Withrow and Jackson representing the U.S. Congress; were their speeches delivered in some sort of personal capacity, or were they official greetings?

In what school of democracy did Congressman Jackson learn that history was made by Strong Men; does not Congressman Jackson take an oath to uphold the Constitution, whose opening words

are: "We the People . . ."; does he think this is a misprint for "We, a few Strong Men . . ."? It was somewhat inappropriate, I thought, to speak with moderation, for a U.S. Congressman to stand within earshot of a murdering and plundering and torturing Generalissimo, just one week before the birthday of Abraham Lincoln, and tell him that the American people have always venerated strong men.

The timing of the Withrow-Jackson visit was interesting, too. It followed by a few months the greetings brought the same Dominican Congress and fuehrer by Senators Eastland and Jenner; while Jenner has since retired, Eastland remains, and heads the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate. It occurred as all Latin-Americans were hailing the overthrow of Batista, at that very moment in refuge in the Dominican Republic. It came as Trujillo was reinforcing his borders and buying new death-dealing instruments from Free World operators. And it came as the press was announcing the existence, since 1947, of an America-wide mutual assistance pact, including the United States and the Dominican Republic, whereby all signatories pledged the use of their navies to withstand attempted landings or invasions upon the coasts of any one of them. Folks on the East Coast and Gulf Coast of the United States may rest easier now—Trujillo's fleet is pledged to assist ours in warding off an invasion; and Trujillo has been pledged the assistance of the United States Navy! That is a sporting arrangement if I ever saw one!

While praise for Trujillo was reverberating in the halls of the Dominican Congress, the rafters rang, in the halls of our own Congress, with impassioned denunciations of the "barbarism" of the revolutionary justice being meted out in Cuba. Others, especially Joseph North in *The Worker* and Carleton Beals in *The Nation* and *Christian Century*, have made the necessary and valid comments on this: the silence in Congress while Batista's regime was slaughtering twenty thousand patriots; U.S. diplomatic, military and financial support to the Batista-torture regime; the one-billion dollar investment in Cuba by U.S. Big Business which dominates as it exploits that nation's economy.

I would add a thought that I have not seen others express. Just as the law is fundamentally an expression of class rule, so the extreme penalty of the law—capital punishment—has been applied with careful regard for class relationships. In the Middle Ages "pleading clergy"—i.e., literacy—made one immune to execution,

for the very good reason that the poor were illiterate. Since then, wherever class-exploitative societies have existed, this pattern has appeared; Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis are unharmed and later beatified, but Nat Turner and John Brown are hanged and later labelled insane. The gallows, electric chair and gas chamber in the United States have taken the life of not a single millionaire, but they have claimed their victims among the poor, despised—and, especially, the non-white—by the thousands.

It is this point, in a way, that Milton emphasized when he hailed Cromwell's execution of Charles; the King's head is no better than another man's and if it tops a treasonous body, let it be removed. With the stroke of the axe, felt Milton, would be uprooted the idea of the King's divinity, an idea that had cost humanity oceans of blood. And now, here in Cuba, stood in the dock the captains and the majors, the high and mighty ones. For them to smash the skull of a peasant and rape his wife were routine matters necessary to the maintenance of "law and order"; besides, what was the worth of a peasant's head and who was concerned with the feelings of a poor woman? Now to have the major and the captain in the dock and to have the peasant's son and widow point accusing fingers and demand justice and to get it is analogous to, but more important than, having Cromwell behead Charles and having Milton hail it as a stroke for human freedom.

That is why Honorable Gentlemen in the U.S. Congress and leading editorial writers of the Free World press, who kept mum when Batista turned all Cuba into a human abattoir, now cry havoc when the butchers are stopped in their bloody work and are made to suffer the extreme penalty for their viciousness. That is why Luce's *Life* magazine gloried in the pictures showing victims being shot down in cold blood and being hanged by their ankles and being burned alive in the streets of Budapest by "Freedom Fighters"; and why that same magazine was horrified at the executions by firing squads, after summary trials, of Batista's Bloody Boys.

"Preventive" War

Two notes have crept into the reports from Washington concerning arms policy that are of the gravest consequence. One indicates that serious thought again is being given at the highest level to "preventive" war; the other is the calm assumption that atomic

and nuclear weapons now constitute conventional weapons so far as the U.S. government is concerned. As for the first, *Newsweek* of February 5, 1959, under the heading "Inside Story," said these thoughts were circulating in the Pentagon:

Stop promising piously that the U.S. will not strike the first blow and never start a war. Make it clear that we will do just that if forced to by the Soviets. That startling switch in policy is being urged behind closed doors by top Air Force strategists.

This trial balloon is not as "startling" as *Newsweek* says; in Truman's Administration, Secretary of the Navy Matthews openly advocated the launching of a preventive war against the Soviet Union. Moreover, in September, 1958, the President of the United States stated that he did not believe it was U.S. policy necessarily to wait for the first blow in the next major war.

The remark concerning alteration in weapons policy was not made in the form of a rumor and did not come from unnamed sources. It appeared, on the contrary, in testimony offered before the House Armed Services Committee by Secretary of Defense McElroy. The Associated Press dispatch from Washington, dated Feb. 4, conveyed the heart of Mr. McElroy's testimony in these two paragraphs:

Mr. McElroy said conventional forces suitable for limited conflicts are being maintained, but he went on to say that a conflict on the scale of the Korean one would not be considered today as a limited war.

Reminded that American forces in Korea operated under orders not to use nuclear weapons, he said: "It was limited to weapons, but I think there is some doubt as to whether it would be so limited today."

The Defense Secretary of the United States is stating that a future Korean War would not be considered a limited one, that it might be fought, so far as the United States is concerned, with every weapon at its command. In this, he is altering drastically the scope of what was hitherto generally held to be a limited war; he is dropping practically all limitations upon the use of all

weapons, and he is sliding over the distinction hitherto made not only between conventional weapons and atomic weapons, but that made between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. The Eisenhower Administration moved slowly and without public preparation to adopt the view that atomic weapons were conventional ones; it has reorganized the armed forces into pentatonic divisions for the employment of atomic weapons and the tables of equipment of U.S. divisions have been altered in accordance with this change. But the Administration seems now to have dropped the distinction between atomic and nuclear weapons—a distinction in destructiveness as great as the difference between TNT and atomic weapons.*

If this is added to the renewed "preventive" war talk, the press conference of the President where support was offered to such talk, and the remark by the President at that same press conference that he did not "think" the use of atomic weapons had to wait on the personal authorization of the President but that theatre commanders were now empowered to use such weapons if they felt their command was in danger—if all this is added together, one has a development in State Department and Defense Department policy of the most dire portent for humanity.

Increasingly one notes discussions of the techniques of launching "preventive" wars, with military experts considering not whether this should be done, but how it should be done. There was, for example, the long article by Colonel Richard S. Leghorn in the *U.S. News and World Report* some time ago (Jan. 28, 1955) urging that, in a preventive war, our initial assault be directed not at major cities, but rather at the retaliatory forces of the USSR.

Very recently, Bernard Brodie—Senior Staff Member of the RAND corporation, the civilian, strategic-planning arm of the U.S. Air Force—noted for two very influential studies (*The Absolute Weapon*, 1946, and *A Guide to Naval Strategy*, 1958) in a preliminary report on "The Anatomy of Deterrence" (*World Politics*, Jan. 1959) wrote the following paragraph, of some length and of greater consequence:

The philosophy of deterrence also takes account of the enormous American cultural resistances to hitting first in a

* For data explaining the difference between atomic and nuclear weapons see Linus Pauling, *No More War!* (N. Y., Dodd, Mead), especially pp. 14-31.

period of threatened total war. This is not to say that it is out of the question that we should do so. It is possible that we will build so much automaticity and sensitivity into our retaliatory response that it could be triggered by an "indication of hostile intent" rather than a hostile act. Such a development would probably be attributable more to absent-mindedness on the part of our political leaders than to design, but such absent-mindedness is commonplace in peacetime in the area of strategic decision. Also, we must not forget that there is likely to be a threshold of "intolerable provocation" short of direct attack upon us, even though we cannot determine before the event where that threshold is or ought to be.

These general considerations, moreover, must be placed within the context of the mounting tension relative to Berlin and the entire German question, where the State Department seems intent on maneuvering the United States into the position of occupying forever a split Germany, half of it directed by rehabilitated Nazis, and dotted with missile bases pointing east and manned and loaded with hydrogen-bomb war-heads. And in the midst of this delightfully peaceful posture, eminent figures calmly discuss "shooting our way" into Berlin; Admiral Burke of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tells the Charleston, S. C., Chamber of Commerce on Feb. 19, 1959, that "we can utterly destroy" the USSR; and Professor Henry A. Kissinger, director of the International Studies Institute at Harvard, and author of the very influential study, *Nuclear Weapons and Limited Warfare** announces, in Hamburg on Feb. 9, that he would favor total war if necessary in order to protect "the freedom of Berlin."

The CIA and War

The power of the advocates of such a fate for mankind happily is far from unlimited; which is why such a fate has not yet befallen mankind, and may be averted altogether. Yet their power continues immense and their tempting of the fates goes on. Enough

* Reviewed elsewhere in this volume.

of this is made public—tardily, of course—to prove the critical need for the sharpest reversal of U.S. foreign policy.

Stewart Alsop, the syndicated and reactionary columnist, writes in the *Saturday Evening Post* (Dec. 13, 1958) on "The Story Behind Quemoy." He states that the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States played a major role in almost precipitating war between the United States and China. Alsop declares that since 1950 the CIA has supported and directed armed raids upon the Chinese mainland repeatedly and that these were sometimes of battalion strength. Alsop writes that a CIA cover operation under the name "Western Enterprises, Inc." has been in charge of raids upon the mainland from Quemoy and the Tachens, and that these raids were a basic stimulant of the "brinks" which almost brought the world to the ultimate catastrophe.

Charles Edmundson, former Washington correspondent of *Fortune* and at various times in the employ of the U.S. Foreign Service, writes in the February, 1959, *Progressive* not only of the CIA activities against China, but adds:

Not long ago I asked a distinguished career ambassador, "When CIA operatives are at work in the country to which you are accredited, don't the incidents which they create shape policy in such a way as to take control largely out of your hands?" "I couldn't agree with you more," the ambassador replied. He told of CIA activities in his country which have damaged American prestige and influence over a whole continent.

In view of such charges and such data, from writers of this type—and the abundance of additional, fully documented material*—is it not the duty of those who value the good name of the United States, who favor the democratic process in government, and who do not want war to protest this scandal and to demand a thorough investigation of the CIA, a revamping of its policies, and its subordination to the control of the Congress of the United States, from which today it is entirely, though unconstitutionally, free?

* Readers will find much of this in this writer's *Truth About Hungary* (N. Y., 1957), especially pp. 69-119; a news report from Taiwan on this type of activity appeared in the *N. Y. Times*, Nov. 14, 1958. See also the very moderate account by Harry H. Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Harvard University Press), especially chapter IV.

Democracy and Diplomacy

In the United States there is a continuing and developing tendency to deny the postulates of democracy and to insist that the whole idea of democratic government is a myth for children or a facade to hide from the naive the basic realities of social order. The material root feeding the development of this ideological trend is the mounting pressure generated by capitalism in crisis. Within the United States, because of the relatively high standard of living still possible, the trend shows itself most clearly in efforts to rationalize United States foreign policy, which increasingly serves as the bulwark of ultra-reactionary regimes and the chief obstacle to efforts at social progress.

While the effectiveness of the whole democratic apparatus within our own country has been severely undercut in recent years—by militarization, bureaucratization, the spread of secrecy, the corruption of regulatory agencies,* etc.—it is in the crucial areas of military and foreign policy that effective control has been taken out of the hands of the people and, in fact, out of the hands of the Congress. An excellent account of just how this has been done, going back to 1946 and carrying the story to mid-1957, will be found in the study of *Arms and the State*, by Walter Millis, with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein (Twentieth Century Fund, N. Y.).

One level of the rationalization—the daily newspaper level, as it were—is typified in a recent column by C. L. Sulzberger, in the *N. Y. Times* (Jan. 5, 1959). Mr. Sulzberger says that “Washington and other democratic capitals are disturbed by a world trend toward military rule.” He continues: “We must consider the paradox that, although we instinctively dislike military dictatorship, our own foreign policy tends to encourage its spread.” The paradox arises from the fact that though the United States government allegedly favors democratic government and freedom generally, yet in order to assure the military capacities of states neighboring on the Socialist world and in order to maintain internal order within those states we pour enormous quantities of arms into their hands, build up their armies, and thus lay the groundwork for the seizure of power therein by naked and brutal military dictatorships. “We

* “The moral rot” corroding federal regulatory commission is laid bare by Bernard Schwartz in his *The Professor and the Commissions* (Knopf, N. Y.). The quoted words are the author’s.

are hoist," writes Mr. Sulzberger, "in a sense, with our own petard." Nevertheless, Sulzberger's conclusion is that "we should not be too distressed at its [democracy's] ugly substitute in inexperienced lands"—and one of the cold war's costs is this undercutting of democracy, something Mr. Sulzberger labels a "truism."

There is another reading of the admitted facts which eliminates the paradoxical and makes for the logical explanation of U.S. foreign policy and its results. Basic to that policy is alliance with reactionary regimes because the policy is a reactionary one, and basic to a pursuit of that policy is the undercutting of democratic processes because that policy is anti-democratic in intent. "We" are not hoist upon our own petard; "our" petard is aimed at the heart of world-wide movements for national liberation, economic progress and social advance.

An argument against democracy upon a somewhat more sophisticated level than that enunciated by Mr. Sulzberger was forthcoming recently from the brother of the Secretary of State—that is from the Mr. Dulles—Allen W.—who heads the Central Intelligence Agency, whose democratic activities we have touched on earlier. This argument was made public in a Washington dispatch by Dana Adams Schmidt, published in the *N. Y. Times*, December 8, 1958. Mr. Schmidt, as Mr. Sulzberger, reported concern in Washington over the appearance throughout the Free World of military dictatorships; he added there was questioning as to "why the democratic system is ailing in so many parts of the world."

The CIA-Dulles discussed this matter, stated Mr. Schmidt, at a recent meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Practicing Law Institute in New York City. In his address, Mr. Dulles recalled a letter written one hundred years ago by the English historian Thomas B. Macaulay to an American, wherein the Englishman had warned that the real threat to liberty and to civilization lay in democracy itself; that this threat had not seriously materialized in the United States as yet because most of the people there were not yet hungry; but that when that condition did appear, when the New World too was overrun with an excess of population in terms of possibilities of production and of distribution, then the supreme test would come and then either some dictator would take power or the masses themselves would plunder the land and lay it waste as was the Roman Empire laid waste some fourteen hundred years before.

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Macaulay is restating the riddle of riddles for bourgeois political thinking—how to reconcile the theory and the condition of popular sovereignty with the fact that the means of production are the private possession of a minority class; how to keep the masses from exercising that political power to transform the nature of the state from an instrumentality for the protection of the private ownership of the means of production into an organ for the elimination of such private ownership and its replacement by social ownership and social appropriation.

With these alternatives, monopoly capitalism usually has in the past chosen the path of naked dictatorship—that is, of fascism—and this again is a fundamental explanation of the developments of the past fifteen years in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy. Of special interest is the assumption by the elite that there are but two alternatives—their system of elitism enforced by brutal dictatorship or some kind of mass barbarism, a period of sheer chaos, which obviously must be highly temporary and will last only until the natural and immutable superiority of the elite reasserts itself.

This is at the heart of all “demonstrations” of the impossibility of democracy. It really is nothing but an insistence or assumption that the rich are rich because they are “better” and the poor are poor because they are no good. It really is the insistence or the assumption that those who rule do so because of a superior capacity; and that, in fact, exploitative social orders reflect nothing but natural adjustments to inherent qualities of the classes themselves. This idea of the “natural” quality of any existing status quo is particularly significant for the capitalist order, coming as it does in protest against the regulatory features of feudalism and bringing with it the concepts of modern science, of the Age of Reason as contrasted with the preceding Age of Faith.

A good example of the statement of this idea is in a recent essay by August Heckscher, now Director of the Twentieth Century Fund, and lately chief editorial writer for the *N. Y. Herald Tribune*. Writes Mr. Heckscher:

In every great society the decisive element has been very different from the rather pitiful individuals who produced and consumed the necessities of life. What has been decisive has been the men who lived by action; the users, the possessors, those who have availed themselves of what is

at hand, creating out of durable things new combinations and possibilities of the spirit (*The American Scholar*, Winter, 1958-59, pp. 18-19).

One must be grateful to Mr. Heckscher for placing the question squarely. I am reminded of the protests of the slaveowners in our own country one hundred years ago that they could not free their slaves for if they did "who would take care of them?" And by "them," the slaveowners meant the slaves, not themselves. They meant that they had been caring for their slaves all the years of slavery. The slaves had cooked their food, raised their crops, nursed their children, heated their homes, driven their carriages, and *they* had been taking care of the slaves. As the spokesmen of the slaves said—those who had themselves been slaves—Douglass, Bibb, Tubman—"We've been taking care of ourselves and of you and we've been doing it with you riding on our backs. We'll be able to manage very nicely, thank you, if we don't have to carry you around, too; we'll take care of ourselves very well, indeed, though we're not so sure about you."

This argument for the necessary nature of elitism, no matter what the form or the name of government may be, bases itself upon the assumed incapacity of the masses. In what consists this incapacity? What is it that "the rather pitiful individuals," who are "only" responsible for producing life's necessities—what is it that they are incapable of? Can they not make bread and shoes, build roads and bridges, roll steel and tend the sick? What is it, after all, that the "users and possessors" have been capable of that the others have not? *Is it not the capacity to rule?*

Does not the negation of democracy, the declared necessity of elitism, come down to the assumption that the masses are incapable of ruling? Is it not true that they have in fact *done* everything else and kept the world spinning about? They have not ruled, for most of history and over most of the globe; but that is surely no proof that they are incapable of doing so. On the contrary, it is proof that societies have been arranged hitherto in such a manner that they were in fact ruled. And this was based, ultimately, upon the fact that the "possessors" were exactly that; but suppose they are dispossessed? Suppose masses become the possessors as well as the producers? Might they then not learn how to rule and will not

rule then be infinitely easier since its essential task will be direction and guidance rather than misrule and deception?

It is a fact that in the Soviet Union, and now among seven hundred million additional peoples, the era of the full implementation of popular sovereignty, in all spheres of life and increasingly in full reality, is established and well advanced; it is this fact which is the great historic meaning of the Bolshevik Revolution, of the endurance for forty years of the Workers and Peasants State, despite intervention, boycott, and war; despite human failings, errors and crimes.

There is an answer to Macaulay's riddle that so distresses the Dulles Brothers. And I mean an answer cast within the framework of the riddle itself, not one that seeks to find resolution by shifting the base of the problem or by delaying its urgency, notably through overseas investment and exploitation and wars which, historically, have been the "answers" of maturing capitalism.

In the riddle's own terms, the answer is that the logic of popular sovereignty does not represent barbarism; it represents the fullest flowering of rule by, for, and of the people. For this the people are fully "capable"; in fact, for this only the people are capable. There is no alleged ill of democracy that cannot be overcome—by more democracy, not less. There is much to learn in the proper exercising of this new kind of rule, which really isn't rule, particularly since it represents an effort altogether unique in human experience. But great advances have already been made; and the failures and errors in this endeavor are as nothing compared with the failures and errors—and the fundamental antagonism of interests—represented in class-exploitative rule.

March, 1959

III. THE SUMMIT SMASH-UP

On May 18, 1960, the *New York Times* entitled its lead editorial "The Wrecker." Here the decisive organ of the United States ruling class presented the thesis almost unanimously being offered the American people:

The extraordinary feature about this conference-that-never-had-a-chance is that responsibility for its failure can be laid objectively, uniquely and unequivocally on one man and one nation, the very man and nation that have most loudly promulgated the idea of a "summit" as a panacea for the ills of humanity.

The *Times* then proceeded to prove its assertion in this way: the Soviet Premier was hypocritical in his passionate denunciation of U.S. espionage, for he knows that the seeking for intelligence is an activity pursued by all sovereign states; the USSR also has violated the territory of other states by unauthorized and secretive flights; in any case, the USSR knew such American flights were being conducted for several years in the past and had not hitherto complained; and the Soviet Premier placed impossible demands before the American President which practically constituted an ultimatum and that he knew, therefore, in advance, that the demands could not be acceded to by any self-respecting Power. So much to buttress the assertion.

This line, typical of the dominant American press, from the staid *New York Times* to the gangster-like *New York Daily News*, recalls Thomas Jefferson's assessment of the American press, written in a letter, June 11, 1807, towards the close of his two Administrations:

It is a melancholy truth, that a suppression of the press could not more completely deprive the nation of its benefits,

than is done by its abandoned prostitution to falsehood. Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle . . . that man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them; inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer to truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehoods and errors.

The *Times*' assertion that the USSR has been guilty itself of similar violations of others' territory—which has been repeated in many American publications—is simply false. The President, himself, when asked at a press conference whether or not the Soviet Union had engaged in such practices replied that to his knowledge it had not. In fact the *New York Times* itself (May 11, 1960), in a story written by Jack Raymond, began by saying that such violative flights had been made by the USSR, but the substance of the account said there had been no such flights over the continental United States, none over Alaska, none over Hawaii or the Philippines, and none in Western Europe, except in connection with checking of military flights by the Allies on their way to and from Berlin. The story added that violation of American naval waters also had been scrupulously avoided by the Soviet Union.

The *Times*' chiding the USSR for restraint in terms of other violative spying flights is a strange kind of argument. *This* flight occurred just before the Summit; in *this* flight the pilot miraculously survived; moreover, even in this flight, the original response of the USSR left wide open loopholes for conventional disavowals and regrets. Furthermore, it is not true that the USSR had not previously protested such flights; on the contrary, the *New York Times* itself published, May 6, 1960, a list of 14 previous incidents, going back to April 8, 1950, involving U.S. flight violations of Soviet territory and all of them drew official diplomatic protests and correspondence.

These flights and protests in fact were so common that they are mentioned in Harry H. Ransom's study, *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Harvard University Press, 1958, pp. 25-26).

A plane or sea craft crosses the Iron Curtain line. The purpose of such provocations is to obtain intelligence about the nature of Russian military defenses, tactical behavior, and communication procedures and secret codes. Such

provocations allegedly occur on land and sea and in the air. Thus it becomes clear that many of such incidents, often reported in the press as "unprovoked" Russian attacks upon Western forces "accidentally" encroaching on Soviet territory, are incidents deliberately provoked for intelligence purposes.

It is true that Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence work is and has been conducted by all sovereign Powers throughout recorded history; where discovery is made or is alleged, denial normally follows, or, if this is not possible or considered unwise, then apology is rendered, those involved are punished and the chapter is considered closed by mutual agreement. The central thing involved here, however, was not the existence of Intelligence work. Involved were: 1) the question of timing, in that the flights of April 9 and May 1 came as final preparations for the Summit were being made; 2) the question of violation of territorial integrity in such a way and with such means that the victim might well have read them to involve attack rather than surveillance—both the violation and the means could only be considered as grossly provocative and since this was the only possible view, the intent must well have been deliberately provocative; 3) that the intent was provocative was demonstrated by the response of the U.S. Government which, when finally exposed as lying, compounded the felony by justifying the act, and affirming that it intended to continue the policy of invading the territory of the Soviet Union with airplanes whenever it desired to do so and could get away with it. In fact, the U.S. Government stated that, in effect, the violation of the sovereignty of the USSR was a matter not only of state policy but of state necessity. That is, it said that it would continue to violate the territory of the Soviet Union exactly because the USSR was so careful to protect that sovereignty!

This position, absolutely without precedent in diplomatic history, could only be viewed by the Power against which it was taken as being but an inch short of an ultimatum of war. It is impossible that the authorities of the U.S. Government expected for a second that the head of the government of the USSR would sit down and negotiate about anything—let alone about lessening international tensions!—with the head of the Government which had just boasted of violating its sovereignty and affirmed that it would continue doing this, as a matter of state policy, for the future.

This was all the more true in that the fantastic American position was taken after very careful public speeches by Premier Khrushchev—completely distorted and falsified by most of the American press. It is this that led Victor Zorza, the Moscow correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, to write (May 12, 1960):

The most remarkable feature of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in the Supreme Soviet has been their studied moderation, and his readiness to absolve Mr. Eisenhower of any guilt or even knowledge of the actions he complains about.

It is this that must now be seen as a good omen for the Summit, for it bespeaks a determination to let nothing mar the atmosphere in which at least some agreement could be reached.

Hence it was that the editors of this same journal, writing in the same issue—though pursuing a line quite hostile to the Soviet Union—still were constrained to label the U.S. publicly-announced position of continued violation of elementary international law as “grossly irresponsible and inflammatory.”

When Premier Khrushchev arrived in Paris one day early with the obvious purpose of conferring with President de Gaulle on the astonishing position taken by the United States, he at once presented to him, and then to Prime Minister Macmillan, a copy of the statement that he intended to read at a preliminary conference of the Four Heads of Government, demanding a retraction by President Eisenhower of a position which amounted to a denial of Soviet sovereignty, and reiterating the normal diplomatic insistence upon a statement of regret for past infractions and the punishment of those directly responsible for their occurrence. De Gaulle and Macmillan conveyed the substance of this declaration to the President—as the President later acknowledged; the President yielded, publicly, not an inch. He came, then, to the preliminary conference knowing what the Soviet Premier would say and had to say; he made him say it, and then—for the first time—affirmed that he had, six days before, ordered the flights halted; but he refused to apologize and again put the onus for the violation upon the insistence of the USSR to guard its own territory not only well, but too well!

This news the President not only had not shared with de Gaulle and Macmillan; he had not shared it with Vice President Nixon who,

the day before in a nationwide television appearance, had defended the incursionary flights and stated that they would continue.

At the same time—in an act Walter Lippmann correctly characterized as even more incredible and inflammatory than the U-2 flight—the President's Secretary of Defense, with him in Paris, issued a global alert to the American Air Force, an act one step removed from instituting full-scale general thermonuclear war!

This series of acts could only mean that, to paraphrase the *New York Times*, one government alone was decisively responsible for wrecking the Summit Meeting, and it was that Government which had most tenaciously resisted holding the Meeting in the first place, and had most consistently played down the possibilities of anything positive eventuating from a Summit Meeting.

"War by Mistake"

The full horror of these provocative acts and this inflammatory course becomes clear when one bears in mind that it is thermonuclear war that may be provoked, and that this can mean worldwide incineration. Thus, Arthur Krock, in his calculatedly cool way, noted in a recent column (*N. Y. Times*, May 10, 1960) that the spy-plane fiasco indicated that "coordination of policy has not yet been attained . . . even in connection with procedures involving the peril of initiating nuclear war"; personally I am less concerned about the failure in coordination than I am about instituting procedures threatening to initiate nuclear war! Mr. Howard Green, Canada's Minister for External Affairs, likewise noted on May 9 that the spy-plane incident brought vividly forward the need for Great Power agreement, for without it he feared that such incidents might recur "and one like it might just one day trigger off a nuclear war." On the same day, Senator Mansfield made the identical point: "This incident or any other of this kind might well have accidentally set off the holocaust of nuclear conflict." Finally, it led Adlai Stevenson, in his May 12th address at the University of Chicago, to ask whether it were possible for the United States to "do the very thing we dread: carelessly, accidentally, trigger the holocaust?"

It is this potential—noted by people as varied as Arthur Krock and Adlai Stevenson—which indicates something of the difference between "just another instance of espionage" and the aerial penetration of another's territory for purposes of military surveillance

and target finding. It is this potential—as well as the studied and flagrant insult to his country's sovereignty—which must help explain the passion and vigor of Premier Khrushchev's denunciation of the action, a passion and vigor caricatured and misrepresented by such "free-press" pundits as Max Lerner and Joseph Alsop.*

In this connection it is important to bear in mind that as the numbers of nuclear weapons mount, the possibility of accidental catastrophe increases. Quite recently, Congressman Charles O. Porter, of Oregon, wrote in *The Nation* (March 5, 1960):

The facts can be stated in a few words. First, thousands of nuclear weapons, many of unthinkable power, exist today. Second, almost all of them are ready for instant detonation. Third, their custodians are human beings.

Congressman Porter went on to say that he had discussed this matter with Herbert B. Loper, the Assistant Defense Secretary for Atomic Energy, and that Mr. Loper "agreed that . . . an accidental nuclear explosion is probable." Presumably, this estimate was arrived at quite independent of regular aerial incursions by U.S. military aircraft within the Soviet Union!

General Maxwell D. Taylor, lately retired as Army Chief of Staff (1955-1959), in his *The Uncertain Trumpet* (Harper, N. Y., 1960) warns that "the possibility of general war by mistake or miscalculation is constantly growing . . . enhancing the mathematical probability of disastrous accidents which might be misinterpreted as hostile acts" (p. 135). Surely any responsible discussion of the U-2 incident and any sober consideration of the Soviet reaction to it must take these estimates fully into consideration, for *after such a mistake there will be no second chance*.

"Impossible Demands"?

Typical of one aspect of the more liberal response to the Summit smash-up is this paragraph from a *N. Y. Post* editorial (May 18):

Whatever the detailed background of the tragedy, what-

* Unfortunately for these pundits, the press conference at which Premier Khrushchev allegedly "ranted and raved" was televised, and people could see for themselves a man deeply provoked and passionately sincere—feelings held to be passé by the Madison-Avenue sophisticates. Leslie Gould, the TV editor of the *N. Y. Times*, himself commented (May 20) that "Khrushchev in person did not seem as frightening as some of the more extreme headlines had suggested" and that "he could hardly be described as an image of incoherence."

ever the big blunders of Washington, it is Khrushchev who at the critical moment demanded that Mr. Eisenhower crawl to the conference. He must have known that the conditions he set—not merely an apology for the reconnaissance flight but the punishment of “those responsible”—could only be accepted by a nation that had been beaten to its knees in war.

What the *Post* neglects in this comment is the fact that President Eisenhower had insisted that the Summit begin after he had upheld the “right” of the United States to violate the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union; for Premier Khrushchev to have met under such circumstances—and without an unequivocal withdrawal of this impermissible and outrageous condition—would indeed have been explicable only if the Soviet Union “had been beaten to its knees in war.” It neglects further the fact that while Mr. Eisenhower had ordered the suspension of such flights, he had not told this to Premier Khrushchev—nor, for that matter, to Macmillan and de Gaulle.

It is for this reason that the *Post*’s own Paris correspondent, Joseph Barry, wrote (May 17) that:

Consequently Mr. K. came armed with stiff and—to impartial observers, who include many of our allies—understandable conditions: disavowal and apology for past spy planes, punishment of those responsible in the latest incident and a guarantee of no more.

Adlai Stevenson, in his May 19th speech, placed another emphasis on essentially the same point as the *Post* editorial made. Mr. Stevenson stated:

Premier Khrushchev wrecked this conference. Let there be no mistake about that. When he demanded that President Eisenhower apologize and punish those responsible for the spy plane flight, he was in effect asking the President to punish himself. This was an impossible request, and he knew it.

But as Joseph Barry reported from Paris, as we have seen, he did not think the Soviet Premier had made an impossible request, nor did many other observers in Paris, as Mr. Barry also reported. Surely this casts grave doubt on the accuracy of Mr. Stevenson’s

characterizations of the demands, let alone his confident reading of what the Premier "knew." Furthermore, Mr. Stevenson is quite wrong in saying that the Premier, in demanding punishment of those responsible, was demanding the punishment of the President, by the President—and that *would* be absurd. The Secretary of State and the President, in their original note admitting the reconnaissance mission and affirming that they meant such missions to continue, nevertheless added that the specific incident complained of by the USSR had not been authorized by the President or the State Department. Furthermore, even in his prepared statement of May 11, where the President again affirmed his intention to continue military surveillance of the USSR (and that is what he said on that occasion, of course, although at the Summit confrontation he told Mr. Khrushchev that he had "allegedly" said this), he still noted that such operations were conducted "under broad directives" and that particular operations "were supervised by responsible officials within this area of secret activities."

Of course, it is those "responsible officials" that the Premier had in mind, and of course he was not asking the President to punish himself. Indeed, Hanson Baldwin, in the *N. Y. Times* of May 9, noted from Washington that in that city "the demand for the scalps of the 'guilty officials' already has started." What was demanded in the perfectly normal diplomatic request for punishment was that action be taken—for example—against what Walter Lippmann called "the forgotten Colonel on that remote Turkish airfield" from which Lt. Powers took off.

Apology and punishment are characteristic diplomatic demands, made a hundred times by the United States upon other powers in the course of its history, and acceded to many times by the United States at the demands of other governments. Indeed, as Premier Khrushchev correctly pointed out, the United States had but recently apologized to the Cuban Government for the unauthorized flight over its territory of an American plane; and, in 1952, the United States recalled its own military attache in Moscow, General Gerow, when incriminating documents were released proving his espionage activity—and *on his return General Gerow was court-martialed, found guilty and punished!* Everyone knew, of course, that the General's spying was more than a personal whim and that he was acting as an intelligence agent for the Brothers Dulles, but no one expected the Secretary of State or the Director

of the Central Intelligence Agency to be punished, and no one then thought the USSR was demanding that.

The insistence that the perfectly normal demands of Premier Khrushchev were something extraordinary and were raised deliberately in order to be rejected itself indicates a policy of smashing the Summit and of persisting in a bankrupt and untenable policy. Adlai Stevenson does not help his correct critique of basic U.S. foreign policy by providing these "outs," in the mistaken notion apparently, that American nationalism requires the concession. All obstacles to clear thinking and proper remedy—and nationalistic feeling can be a major obstacle—should not be compromised with, but staunchly and forthrightly opposed.

Secrecy and Freedom

The United States Government, in the person of the President and the Secretary of State, bases its defense of aerial penetration of the Soviet Union on the grounds that its excessive secrecy makes this necessary in the interest of national defense and specifically for the purpose of preventing surprise attack. We shall examine each of the components of this argument in due course; now we wish to focus on this matter of secrecy and openness. First of all, the United States is in an altogether untenable position from the viewpoint of law and diplomatic usage in demanding internal and institutional changes having to do with matters of defense from another government as the price of its—the United States'—desisting from violating territorial integrity.

In the second place—and more important—the argument of secrecy versus freedom is being developed in such a way as to put the blame for the U.S. fiasco on its alleged "burden" of freedom; and one is asked to believe that it is this "burden" which explains the fiasco. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The fact is that the U-2 incident highlights a most serious trend that has been developing in the U.S. government ever since the Cold War was begun right after World War II. This trend—present in all capitalist societies, as witness in particular France, Italy, Japan, etc.—is one which moves towards vitiating democracy and democratic institutions. The trend shows itself in increased ideological attacks upon democratic theory and increased actual assaults upon democratic institutions.

The U-2 incident highlights the growing role of the military in American government; it especially emphasizes the mounting consequence in government and in the making and carrying out of policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Pentagon—none of them subject to any popular accounting and all of them enshrouded in monumental secrecy and bureaucracy.

Our whole governmental apparatus today is enveloped in what Harold L. Cross—counsel to the American Society of Newspaper Editors—called “The Barricade of Secrecy” (*Atlantic*, December, 1956). This very significant process, whereby democratic functioning is being undercut, is analyzed at length in *Freedom or Secrecy* (Oxford University Press, N. Y., 1956) by James Russell Wiggins, Executive Editor of the *Washington Post and Times Herald*. Mr. Wiggins concludes his careful examination of this process with these paragraphs:

The democratic process is in danger in a country the office-holders and public servants of which exhibit a contempt and doubt as to the judgment and stability of the rank and file of the people. If such contempt and doubt persist it will drive a fatal wedge between the governing and the governed and carry all our democratic institutions down to destruction.

The trend toward secrecy in government, inspired by such fears and doubts about the safety with which information for the people can be given to the press, is pushing us farther and farther away from the concept of a free people that is the master and not the servant of its government.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, in his already cited book *The Uncertain Trumpet*, criticizes the growing bureaucracy and irresponsibility in the military area of our government; in particular he calls attention to the intensifying power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and especially of the Chairman thereof. He writes: “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has come to assume much of the power of the dreaded single Chief of Staff who has been the bugbear of Congress and of some elements of the public in past discussions of defense organization. This power is not bad in itself, but it is concealed power unaccompanied by public responsibility—which is

bad." (p. 110) One may reject the General's view that the power itself is not bad; his holding that view only strengthens the need for alarm at what even he labels bad—namely, a strengthening of that power with no check on it so far as the public is concerned and with its exercise blanketed in secrecy.

The Central Intelligence Agency—created in 1947—is a prime example of the anti-democratic developments in our governmental structure in the recent past, and it is, of course, the agency most responsible for the U-2 scandal. The Hoover Commission itself, in 1955, raised "the possibility of the growth of license and abuses of power where disclosure of costs, organization, personnel, and functions are precluded by law." The Senate Rules Committee, in 1956, after study, denounced the CIA set-up as excessively secretive, operating with no outside control or guidance of any kind and as dangerous to democratic government. Professor Ransom's study of *Central Intelligence and National Security*, though carrying a very friendly and respectful tone, is filled with expressions of concern over the eroding of democratic functioning that the CIA threatens. He finds its influence growing with the Executive and with Congress; he notes it already employs more people than the State Department; that its expenditures—absolutely unchecked and unaccounted for—run into the hundreds of millions and probably the billions every year; that it operates not only as an intelligence and espionage agency but also as an arm of the government in sustaining and in attacking other governments throughout the world; that its whole organization and power and functioning "are incompatible with representative government." (p. 208)

The lesson of the U-2 incident is not one pointing to the deficiencies of democracy; it is rather to drive home again the fact that such incidents and the aggressive policies which lead to them are part of a whole policy of reaction which aims, in the first place, at the destruction of democratic institutions. *The cure for what U-2 represents is more democracy, not less.*

"Open Skies" and Devious Lies

The United States Government holds the spy-plane policy to be justified because it had proposed a system of "open skies" inspection and this had been rejected by the Soviet Union; it holds, too, that it proposed the "open skies" as a means of preventing

surprise attack, and that, with modern weapons being what they are, the Government is justified in employing any and all means to assure itself against such attack. Quite apart from the almost incredible arrogance implicit in this position—"we asked you and you won't, so we did anyway, so there . . ." — the whole matter not only eventuated in forcing the government into a series of lies that shamed every American; the whole proposition is a lie from beginning to end.

First of all, the "open skies" proposal was accepted by no government. Second, the proposal was made in the casual way befitting its fantastic nature; it was offered in such a way that it is impossible to believe that anybody intended it to be taken seriously. Hugh Thomas, writing from Geneva in *The New Statesman* (London, May 7, 1960) and commenting on the present U.S. sabotage of the Geneva conference seeking an arms-test agreement, remarks that it may lead to the producing of "some 'new' and irrelevant document." He continues: "In 1955, remember, President Eisenhower introduced the fatuous 'Open Skies' plan without telling either Eden or Edgar Faure he was going to do so—even though the three of them met a quarter of an hour before the conference began!"

And, thirdly, the Open Skies proposal has nothing to do with disarmament; it is rather a proposal for gathering intelligence concerning what armaments and fortifications exist. If one wants some form of inspection—from the skies or from the ground—then he should agree to some process of disarmament which can then be subject to inspection, whether the inspection be via open skies or open ground. But if—as has been true of the U.S. position—one insists first on the forms of inspection and wants these implemented first, he is seeking not disarmament, but rather a controlled armament race, which is a contradiction in terms and a self-evident absurdity.

And, fourthly, aerial reconnaissance seeks to pinpoint targets for attack; *it is of no use whatsoever—especially with modern technology, including mobile bases and submarine launching devices, etc.—in terms of preventing surprise attack.* It is conceivable that aerial reconnaissance would be used by a Power wishing to gather significant target information prior to *its* launching surprise attacks upon such targets! Since the United States boasts that it has been guilty of this vis-à-vis the USSR for at least 5 years—Representative Cannon of Missouri said it had been going on for fourteen years!—

the victim of such boasts might very well view the procedure as highly provocative.

On this matter, we have the authoritative opinion of Thomas C. Schelling, formerly a Harvard professor, and now a member of RAND. Professor Schelling, after making the point that "the original open-skies proposal was unorthodox in its basic idea that arms themselves are not provocative so long as they are clearly held in reserve—so long as their stance is deterrent rather than aggressive," *i.e.*, after pointing out that the open-skies proposal had nothing to do with disarming, then went on to write:*

The technical problem of devising a practical inspection scheme that could yield each side adequate warning of an attack by the other has probably become not only much more difficult to discuss, but much more difficult to solve, since the first open-skies proposal was made. With hydrogen weapons reducing the number of aircraft that might be needed in a surprise attack, with missiles promising to reduce the total time available between the initial actions in readying a strike and the explosion of weapons on target, and with mobile systems like missile submarines to keep under surveillance, it looks as though pure inspection unaccompanied by any limits on the behavior of the things to be inspected would be enormously difficult or enormously ineffectual. *The idea of examining photographs for strategic indications of force movement and concentrations is simply obsolete.*

The fact is that the basic formal commitment of American governmental strategy in the field of arms and war or peace is to the view that only technological development has any chance at all of avoiding a thermonuclear war. This is stated most clearly by Oskar Morgenstern, professor at Princeton, consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission, to the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and to the Convair Corporation. He concludes his recent *The Question of National Defense* (Random House, N. Y., 1959) with these words:

The impossibility of war has to be of a technological

* In a chapter called "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security* (Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 176, 191.

character. Moral and religious considerations have failed to stop wars. . . . As it is, the probability of a large themonuclear war occurring appears to be significantly larger than the probability of its not occurring. Will at least these probabilities be reversed?

It is because of this technological commitment that he places in italics the following two sentences (pp. 75, 77): "*In view of modern technology of speedy weapons—delivery from any point on earth to any other, it is in the interest of the United States for Russia to have an invulnerable retaliatory force and vice versa. . . . So the task is to find suitable methods for building invulnerable forces.*"

This is unadulterated madness: the avoidance of war is to depend upon the mutual building of greater and greater machines of destruction. Peace is to depend upon the construction of more and more terrible systems of annihilation—and this must be a mutual process that must go on forever. Then and only then can mankind avoid extermination! And to this, mankind is asked to say, Amen!

Among the Pentagon-Atomic Energy-CIA forces—employed and backed by the biggest monopolies as they are—differences appear only as to which weapons enhance invulnerability, and, increasingly, as to whether or not it would be "wise" for the United States to use its weapons first, in what is now called "pre-emptive" war. We have in these pages called attention to the growing chorus of atom-maniacs calling for our "striking the first blow"; we indicated that even the President recently stated that he saw no reason why the United States had to be in the position of accepting the first blow.

Time Magazine, in its issue dated May 9, 1960, raises the question: "Must the United States always plan to take the first blow in future wars?" It goes on to point out that explicit rejection of this position is becoming more and more common in Washington, and then quotes Congressman George H. Mahon (Tex., D.), Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, as saying:

In the final analysis to effectively deter a would-be aggressor, we should maintain our armed forces in such a way and with such an understanding that, should it ever become obvious that an attack upon us or our allies is imminent, we can launch an attack before the aggressor has either hit us or our allies. This is an element of deterrence which the

United States should not deny itself. No other form of deterrence can be fully relied upon.

In seeking to understand the response of the Soviet Union—surrounded as it is by hostile military bases—to the U-2 incident and the subsequent actions and statements of the U.S. Government, it is necessary that the facts of a Schelling, the analyses of a Morgenstern and the blusterings of a Mahon be borne in mind.

“Pre-emptive” War

The theory behind this phrase is that the United States must not take the “first blow” in a thermonuclear war, but must rather stand ready to deliver that first blow; delivery is to be contingent upon the decision that the Soviet Union is “about to” or “almost ready to” launch an attack upon the United States or decisive allies of the United States. Theoretically, it is supposed to differ from straight-out preventive war—widely advocated in the United States ten years ago—in that preventive war was to be engaged in prior to apparent Soviet commitment to an actual attack; “pre-emptive” war is, in other words, in theory, a later-stage preventive war.

We quoted Congressman Mahon as directly and explicitly supporting “pre-emptive” war. Congressman Mahon is not pioneering in this view; on the contrary, he is summarizing and publicizing—as a “trial balloon,” no doubt—well-developed official opinion.

Thus, General Maxwell D. Taylor in his book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, writes that U.S. policy is to resort to massive retaliation—i.e., all-out thermonuclear war—should there be “an atomic attack on the continental United States, or the discovery of indisputable evidence that such an attack was about to take place” (p. 145; italics added). What is “indisputable evidence”? Discovered by whom? What is the time interval? Who decides upon launching the massive retaliation prior to the “enemy’s” attack? Since what is involved here may well be the continued existence of mankind, is it asking too much that these questions be faced publicly, and that they be subject to democratic discussion and process?

The Rockefeller Report on Foreign Affairs, issued in 1958, remarked that “the world knows [?] that we would never fight a preventive war.” It went on, however, immediately, in these terms:

"But we and the rest of the free world must be prepared to resist any one of three types of aggression: all-out, limited war, and non-overt aggression concealed as internal takeover by *coup d'état* or by civil war." And, then, "In order to deter aggression, we must be prepared to fight a nuclear war either all-out or limited. . . ." With this definition of "aggression," and with what we "must" do in the face of it, one has, in fact, plenty of scope to wage a preventive war or a pre-emptive war, no matter what the verbal gymnastics. The point is, this is a war program and it has had decisive influence in highest military and governmental circles.

In 1959 both the (then) Defense Secretary McElroy and the President pointedly withdrew the "impression" that the United States was committed to accepting the first blow in any possible nuclear war. This followed the repeated affirmation, both by Secretary of State Dulles and by the President, in 1958, that while the United States might not do too well in the Cold War, it most certainly would emerge the victor in a hot war. The President's statement on this matter—in a letter to Senator Green (published in the *N. Y. Times*, Oct. 5, 1958)—was as follows: "I feel certain, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that if the United States became engaged in hostilities on account of the evil and aggressive assaults of the forces of Communism, the American people would unite as one to assure the triumph of our effort." The horror of this statement is enhanced when the reader bears in mind that the President here was replying to Senator Green's hint that it might not be the wisest thing in the world to become involved in a major war against the Chinese-Soviet Alliance on the basis of seeking to retain possession of Quemoy and Matsu.

One sees, then, that former Governor Harriman spoke with moderation when, in testifying on June 3, 1960, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he, as paraphrased by the *N. Y. Times*, "rejected an opinion that the Soviet Union felt safe on the assumption that the United States would never attack it." And then the *Times* quoted Mr. Harriman directly: "Unhappily some of our military men have been indulging in loose talk creating the impression we might try a preventive war."

As we have insisted, this is not merely "loose talk" by "some military men." We repeat, the evidence establishes that "pre-emptive war" is now a dominant line in the highest military and governmental circles in the United States. The latest and clearest

assertion of this occurs in a series of three articles, "Strategy for Survival," by Richard Fryklund, which appeared in the *Washington Star* in May, 1960. "The present [Pentagon] policy," wrote Mr. Fryklund:

is to build a bomber and missile force which can drop a nuclear warhead on every major Soviet air defense installation, airfield, missile site, bomb factory, communications center—everything that makes up the Soviet military threat to the free world.

Then occur these two central paragraphs:

How will our weapons survive the first attack? A careful reading of Administration statements shows that a "pre-emptive attack" by this country has not been ruled out. For instance, if the Soviets invade one of our Allies, we reserve the right to blast Russia without waiting for missiles to fall on SAC bases. Also, the President has said that if this country's survival is clearly threatened, he will order done whatever needs to be done.

So the Air Force believes that when war clearly is starting, *this country will beat Russia to the draw*. (Cited paper, May 8, 1960, italics added).

It is in the light of this policy that the incursions by U-2 reconnaissance planes over the territory of the Soviet Union (and China, North Korea and the People's Democracies of Europe, too) are to be weighed. The last thing in the world these flights are meant to do is to prevent surprise attack upon the United States; they were and are meant to collect locations of prime military and industrial targets, to make more effective the implementation of a policy of "pre-emptive war."

And now these flights, *which continue in Asia*, and were "suspended" so far as the USSR is concerned, are to be undertaken again if powerful forces in the Pentagon and State Department have their way. A major propaganda campaign for this absolutely illegal and insanely provocative course is now developing. Appropriately, the *Wall Street Journal* (June 17, 1960, p. 1) was the first to report on this in its "Washington Wire" feature. It began: "Pentagon leaders itch for eventual revival of spy flights over Russia." Serious consideration is being given now, says the paper, to "lend-

ing' reconnaissance planes to friendly nations, Britain, Turkey, Nationalist China, which could carry on flights for the U.S., or 'volunteers' could do the job without any recognized national sanction." Some do object, continues the paper, citing "the extraordinary risks" of precipitating a world-wide holocaust in such a policy.

Nevertheless, *U.S. News and World Report*, a favorite organ of Big Business, in its issue of June 27, 1960, publishes a 6-page interview "representing the viewpoint of important groups in the military services of this country and in the U.S. Department of State." The substance of the "interview" is in its title: "The U-2 Must Fly Again."

Legality Chokes Imperialism

The bourgeois system of law developed in large part out of the struggle against feudalism. In that progressive effort many humanistic elements became part of that theory of law, and mass democratic efforts conducted since the appearance of capitalism also furthered the potency of such elements. But with the maturing of capitalism, it has found increasingly obstructive the forms and ideas and traditions developed in its youth; not least among these obstructive forces—as Engels pointed out some eighty years ago—were the traditions of objectivity and righteousness in the law. Indeed, the whole concept of "rule by law" becomes more and more distressing to capitalism as it becomes more and more monopolistic and imperialistic. Internally, the ultimate manifestation of this process is fascism; its domestic program of unbridled reaction made it the enemy of all "legality"—even the system developed by the young bourgeoisie. And its foreign program of aggression made it contemptuous of international law—made outlaws, in fact, of the fascist powers.

This abandonment of "rule by law" is an increasing pattern in the United States, domestically and internationally. This is one of the most dangerous elements in the unprecedented American policy of vindicating "spying," and justifying actual physical aggression into another's territory. As the *New Republic* stated editorially (May 30, 1960), "this country acted in defiance of well-understood international law." Sir Claude Corea, Ceylon's UN representative, and president of the Security Council, in his speech of May 25, "agreed with the Soviet contention that the United States by send-

ing the U-2 over Soviet territory had violated international law, the UN Charter and the Treaty of the International Civil Aviation Organization, signed by the United States and other countries in Chicago in 1944." He said, further, that the original violation of law was bad enough, but that the effort to justify such violation and the threat to persist in it as a matter of State policy were absolutely impermissible and dangerous to the highest degree.

The developing policy of contempt for international law is documented in no less a source than *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden* (*Full Circle*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston). Here in connection with U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1954, Eden tells of how Mr. Dulles informed Great Britain that the U.S. Navy was blockading Guatemala, though neither war nor any formal blockade had been or was to be declared. And Mr. Dulles refused assurances to Great Britain that its own ships, if carrying munitions, might not be boarded and/or attacked on the high seas by ships of the American fleet. Eden replied that, "The rule of law still obtained in this country, and it was of great importance to us as a maritime nation that it should also obtain on the high seas." Nevertheless, Mr. Dulles replied that while he would regret very much an incident involving Great Britain, still the assurances requested by Mr. Eden could not be given. Furthermore, Mr. Dulles "went on to remark that in the cold-war conditions of today, the rules applicable in the past no longer seemed to him to meet the situation and required to be revised or flexibly applied."*

Mr. Eden, for all his noble words, acquiesced in American policy and domination, here as everywhere, and told his naval authorities to abide by the undeclared and altogether illegal blockade. Eden adds that in the United Nations, "though Honduras kept protesting innocence, the arms and incursion by land and air [against Guatemala] originated from there."

For all of Eden's moral tone regarding illegality and Guatemala, he is proud of Great Britain's role in overthrowing the legal and liberal Iranian government of Mossadegh; and as for the bombardment and attack upon Egypt, in connection with the Suez, he writes:

* Of course, the formal character of bourgeois law has always been present, and the easy way bourgeois leaders have of ignoring or violating law when it constitutes an obstacle is notorious. One is reminded that even in the heroic days of our Republic, Alexander Hamilton seriously proposed an illegal scheme by which the presidency might be kept from Jefferson in 1800—also, as in the case of Dulles, on the plea of "emergency" and a barbaric threat to "civilization," this time presented by the French Revolution and Jeffersonianism. It is to the point, however, that Hamilton's scheme was rejected; Dulles' was not.

"We should not allow ourselves to become involved in legal quibbles about the rights of the Egyptian Government to nationalize what is technically an Egyptian company. . . ."

More serious are the revelations—substantiating and elaborating on other accounts—in Eden's *Memoirs* concerning U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Indo-Chinese crisis and war of 1954. He makes clear that the Dulles policy co-opted for war and that the minutest details—for example, how many planes were to take off from where (in this case, Manila) and when, with how many bombs and how many sorties, and exact dispositions of naval carriers, etc.—had been attended to; Eden shows that it was only the fear of public opinion, plus the worry by French and British leaders of American intentions to "take over" in South-East Asia, that prevented the Eisenhower-Dulles team from precipitating war in one area with the full knowledge that this might very well result in the Third World War. He makes clear, too, that the "team" proceeded in secret and with complete contempt for American democratic processes; that it envisioned the creation of war and the presentation of conflict as an accomplished fact to a terrorized Congress which would then have no alternative but to acquiesce in what had been done. Contempt for legality was rife. Eden in reporting to his chief, Winston Churchill, records the latter's evaluation:

Sir Winston summed up the positions by saying that what we were being asked to do was to assist in misleading Congress into approving a military operation, which would in itself be ineffective, and might well bring the world to the verge of a major war (p. 117).

Surprise Attack

The movement towards embracing "pre-emptive war," the growing contempt for legality, the palpable decay in ethics characterizing ruling circles in the United States, the mounting sense of desperation in such circles, as (in the words of the *Wall Street Journal*) its laboriously-built system of alliances "falls apart at the seams"—among other forces—are producing in certain of the highest circles in the United States an increasing tendency towards surprise attack as the necessary tactic to accomplish the strategy of destroying Socialism.

We may first note that the opposite is true in the Soviet Union. In that country, there does exist deep concern over the impact of sudden attack, particularly in the era of thermo-nuclear weapons and missiles; Walter Lippmann reported, for example, that Premier Khrushchev had voiced these fears (*The Communist World and Ours*, Boston, 1958, pp. 21ff). The whole military policy of NATO, of placing preponderant reliance upon strategic nuclear weapons, points also towards surprise as a tactic. Furthermore, as Professor M. W. Hoag has suggested, the very vulnerability of the military installations surrounding the Soviet Union suggests reliance upon surprise; they are, as he writes,* "physically designed for initiating attack" and this is, of course, "a provocative move from the point of view of the Soviets."

But in the Soviet Union, military theory and disposition represent repudiations of surprise attack. Even outstanding and authoritative Western sources have admitted this and it has not been successfully contested. J. M. Mackintosh, Advisor on Soviet Military Affairs to the (London) Institute of Strategic Studies, states: "There is no evidence that the Soviet Union considers starting a preventive war against the United States. Everything they write and say is against it. . . ." Asked specifically if there was anything to indicate, in theory or practice, a move towards surprise attack, Mr. Mackintosh unequivocally said: "Definitely not." (*U.S. News and World Report*, Feb. 15, 1960.) Just a few days prior to the announcement of the U-2 incident, the U.S. Army published "An Analysis of Soviet Attitudes on the Use of Military Power." Its basic content is summed up in this sentence from the report on this analysis made by Jack Raymond in the *N. Y. Times* (May 5, 1960):

The Army published today an analysis of Soviet military strategy in which it said the Russians were not undertaking to build the force needed to carry out a surprise nuclear attack on the United States.

Buried in a long story in the *N. Y. Times* (May 20, 1960) was another paragraph that also knocked into a cocked hat the entire concocted State Department justification for the U-2 flights. It read:

* In an essay in K. Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security* (Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 14.

There were also many comments, none for attribution, that high Navy officials, including Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, had some time ago opposed the U-2 flights as not necessary as a means of protection against surprise attack. An official Army analysis of Soviet Policy asserted that the Soviet Union was not bent on surprise attack.

But in the United States, matters are quite different, and along with the idea of "pre-emptive war" grows insistence on the "advantage" of surprise attack. Much of this is done by experts who do not themselves advocate it; rather they conclude on the basis of the existing strategy and equipment of the United States and of NATO, that a policy of surprise attack would "pay off." This is true of the writings of Albert Wohlstetter, associate director of RAND, Thomas C. Schelling, of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, Henry A. Kissinger, Associate Director of that Center, and many others in equally responsible positions.

When to all of the foregoing is added the fact that developing technological trends and the spreading possession of such technology acutely increase the danger of worldwide catastrophe through accident, one becomes keenly aware of the criminal irresponsibility manifested in such undertaking as the U-2 aggressions. Even in past wars, "accidents" have been consequential. As noted earlier, the accidental fouling up of signal transmission accounted for the Nazi destruction of Rotterdam in the Second World War. While the dropping of the atomic bomb by the United States on Hiroshima was done as the result of prolonged discussion and came from the decision of the President, the fact is that the dropping of the second bomb (and the United States most fortunately then had only two bombs) upon Nagasaki—for which no "justification," no matter how specious, has been offered—was the decision of operational military commanders, not of the President, and both the time and the place for dropping the awful thing were decided in the field. In this sense, the annihilation of scores of thousands in Nagasaki—after Hiroshima had driven an already devastated, encircled and ruined Japan into a state of total shock—was something of an accident, an accidental expression, as it were, of military men exhilarated with an awful power that the foe did not possess.

Very recently, in March and June, 1960, we in the United States

have had accidents involving three separate and decisive elements in modern warfare. In one case, the radio alert for attack went out over the Santa Barbara radio system, and for a prolonged period of time, people were being informed that "This Is Not a Drill," "This Is Not a Drill"; this happened because of human and mechanical failings. Later a Bomarc burned and what degree of radiation danger resulted has never been fully clarified; one week later a missile blew up, loaded with a nuclear bomb, but happily it was not in flight and the bomb itself did not explode.

Consider this paragraph from Thomas C. Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, 1960):

The thought that general war might be initiated inadvertently—through some kind of accident, false alarm, or mechanical failure; through somebody's panic, madness, or mischief; through a misapprehension of enemy intentions or a correct apprehension of the enemy's misapprehension of ours—is not an attractive one. . . . It seems likely that, for both human and mechanical reasons, the probability of inadvertent war rises with a crisis. (p. 188)

Consider further, in view of the clear truth of that paragraph, what is at stake in the "brinkmanship" whose essence included the deliberate risk-taking of precipitating World War Three. Indeed, the heart of the policy is to convince the "foe" that you are willing and ready for the ultimate horror and, in fact, that you are so ready that you may be driven over the brink accidentally. In other words brinkmanship carries with it the deliberate assumption of a precarious stance; logically, the more precarious the stance, the better for the "success" of the policy. Unless there should be war. But in this age and under the circumstances of what war means now, such a playing with the lives of hundreds of millions of people and the accumulated treasure of mankind's efforts throughout history is simply insufferable.

Here is Professor Schelling's quite expert summarization of "brinkmanship":

Brinkmanship is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable threat of war, a risk that one does not completely control. It is the tactic of deliberately letting the situation

get somewhat out of hand, just because its being out of hand may be intolerable to the other party and force his accommodation. It means harassing and intimidating the adversary by exposing him to a shared risk, or deterring him by showing that if he makes a contrary move he may disturb us so that we slip over the brink whether we want to or not, carrying him with us. (p. 200)

As Professor Schelling says, in the preface to his volume, 'it falls "strictly speaking . . . within the theory of games"; but the theory is dubious and this is not a matter for games. It is not a matter for gambling; for mathematical projecting. One is not tossing up playing cards here; *one is tinkering with the fate of all mankind!*

Cold War can become hot war through accident; but Cold War cannot become peaceful co-existence through accident.

Peaceful Co-existence and Struggle

No; peaceful co-existence can come and will come only through struggle. And that struggle must be basically a Leninist one—one founded on the mass line. It is not one that gives up any source of strength or reinforcement, including that deriving from splits among the bourgeoisie, both on an international scale and a domestic one. But the main resource is popular will for peace. Imperialism breeds and needs war; but never has imperialism been so weak and never have its principled foes been so powerful. And never has war been so horrendous. The intertwining of these facts of the post-World War Two period makes the struggle for peaceful co-existence a necessary one and one that can be conducted successfully.

Most important—indeed, absolutely decisive—is the struggle against war incitement in our own country, bastion as it is of the imperialist system. The present rulers of the United States are ruining the country; they are making its name a hissing in the ears of humanity, instead of what it was, something whispered in dreams by the oppressed and the downtrodden.

What Shall the Future Be?

In 1958 the National Planning Association, in Washington, pub-

lished a study of what 1970 might be if neither arms control nor disarmament had been achieved. Under such circumstances, by then, said the Association, the Pentagon and its scientists—God save the word!—would be working on “the ‘push-button for the dead man’s hand’ sort of device. . . . Such a device could be set off by blast, heat, explosion, or radiation levels.” The idea here is that even if the “enemy” succeeded in one awful explosion in wiping us all out and we were all dead, still this dead-man’s device would remain and would set off “our” weapon and it would annihilate them; then all of us, presumably, would be happy little ghosts, rejoicing in our vengeance!

On the other hand, here are the projections of a Communist leader and poet, the beautiful Czech, Julius Fuchik. Tortured by the gestapo, telling them nothing, soon to be decapitated, he writes:

Can you imagine, people, how we shall live if we ever meet after all this is past? To meet again in a life of freedom, beautiful with creative liberty? When we have achieved what we longed for, and worked so patiently for, and for which we now go to die? Even though dead, we shall still live in a bit of your great happiness because we have invested our lives in it. That gives us joy, even though it is hard to part.

One is the logic of imperialism gone mad; the other of Socialism triumphant. It is to repulse the former and make real the latter, everywhere, and in the United States, too, that we must fight all the harder as participants in the now realizable vision: Peace on Earth.

June-July, 1960

IV. WHO WANTS DISARMAMENT?

Examination was made in an earlier chapter of the responsibility for the smash-up of the May 1960 Summit Conference. It is not usual to find the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate in substantial agreement with the analysis offered by this writer; the rarity, however, in no way decreases the pleasure derived from this experience.

Senator Fulbright (D., Ark.), Chairman of the Committee, in submitting its majority report, said on June 28, 1960:

Historically, the deliberate and intentional assertion by a head of state of the right to violate the territorial sovereignty of another nation has been considered an unfriendly act of the utmost seriousness.

It is quite unacceptable to any state to be put in the position in which this Government put the Soviet Union last month . . . it is difficult to see how anyone could have been expected to act substantially different from the way Chairman Khrushchev acted under the circumstances which confronted him in Paris.

In adjudging responsibility for aborting the Summit, then, the Committee and this writer were in general accord. But in seeking the cause for such conduct, disagreement appeared. Senator Fulbright emphasized the need, in acknowledging the fault of the U.S. Government, to "examine the causes thereof"; in seeking these, however, the Senator could discover nothing more fundamental than a lack of co-ordination in various levels and agencies of government and an absence of close and effective leadership in that government.

But, we think that matters of technique and personnel cannot explain satisfactorily the roots of behavior that results — in the

course of a protracted period—in the disruption of a Summit Conference that was months and even years in the creating and planning. No, as we stated and tried to demonstrate in earlier pages, U.S. governmental responsibility for smashing the Summit resulted from the triumph of Cold War forces in that Government; the Summit was smashed before it got under way because its promised convening represented a victory for the peace forces of the world and its successful—even moderately successful—conduct would have been a resounding triumph for those forces.

* * *

One of the main items on the agenda of that projected Summit Meeting was to begin the "complete and general" disarmament so dramatically proposed by Premier Khrushchev before the United Nations General Assembly—a proposal subsequently endorsed, unanimously, by the UN. The Paris Meeting was to represent the culmination of two international conferences already under way in Geneva, in which the major capitalist and socialist states (with the great exception of the Chinese People's Republic) were considering means toward such disarmament and towards guaranteeing the cessation of nuclear-weapons testing.

Since the smash-up of the Summit, the Geneva disarmament conference has terminated, quite abruptly, and the meeting on test cessation is experiencing stormy weather. Nothing is more consequential than the cause of peace, and for the enhancement of that cause nothing is more important—we shall argue—than that a real program of general and complete disarmament get under way. In that connection, immediate priority must be given to the stopping of nuclear-weapons testing forever, the banning of the continued manufacture of such weapons, and the destruction of the existing enormous stockpiles of those instruments of catastrophe.

It may, then, be worthwhile to examine the disarmament question; the value of such examination may be enhanced since developments in connection with it have appeared so quickly and in such numerous forms, and the reportage concerning it has been so one-sided, that the whole matter is befogged in confusion.

Stated summarily, study leads to the conclusion, I think, that the United States Government, since 1945, has resisted all efforts and proposals looking towards effective disarmament and has been opposed especially to limiting or prohibiting the production of

nuclear weapons. Study also demonstrates that the leadership in disarmament efforts and proposals since World War II belongs—as it did during the period between the two World Wars—to the USSR. Such study also shows that the Soviet Union has led in our era—as she did in the 1920's and 1930's—in urging general and complete disarmament.

This leadership has borne fruit, for the first time in history, in the unanimously affirmed commitment to this policy by the United Nations, but the U.S. Government has persisted in opposing that aim; it has never, itself, proposed its implementation and, in fact, stands today severely opposed to it. This—plus the Truman-Eisenhower opposition specifically to nuclear-weapon prohibition—has been the major cause for the failure of disarmament efforts in the past fifteen years and was the immediate cause for the breaking off of disarmament negotiations this summer [1960] at Geneva. True it is that the opposition to disarmament mirrors a deeper policy of imperialist expansion, hostility to national liberation movements, and fierce antagonism to Socialism. There is, however, a dialectical interplay between cause and result, and when the result is the colossal proportions and fearful potential of modern arms, it takes on, within itself, a monstrous dimension.

All struggles must be waged in specifics, and this applies to the struggle against imperialism. Hence, while tremendous armaments flow from imperialism, a central tactic of the anti-imperialist battle is the fight for disarmament. And, in this nuclear-energy era, the character of weapons and of war has so altered that the struggle against those weapons takes on a breadth and an urgency which enormously enhance the power of the anti-imperialist forces. The more consciousness in these forces, the more effective their efforts; however, no matter how elementary such consciousness is, or even if it is altogether absent, the unprecedented burden armaments today represent and the quite new dangers they entail, offer opportunities for mass involvement which, in the last analysis, will make possible a world without war and free of monstrous devices for mass murder.

Who Has Sabotaged Disarmament?

We have placed the blame for the failure of disarmament efforts since World War II upon the United States Government. Many

people—certainly most Americans—would find that an extraordinary position. Americans, in particular, would think of the immediate post-war years when, as they recall, swift and massive demobilization of the Army occurred (spurred on, it is worth remembering, by tremendous demonstrations of thousands of GIs). It is to this image that President Eisenhower was appealing, on February 21, 1960, when he said that “for the first five years after World War II, we in the United States . . . pursued a policy of virtual disarmament.”

But, for the United States, army demobilization has little in common with “virtual disarmament.” As the Quakers stated, in 1951, in their *Steps to Peace*:

Another inaccuracy widely believed is that the United States disarmed unilaterally after World War II, thereby weakening itself and opening the way for Soviet expansion. The fallacy in this is in its frame of reference, for while it is true that we demobilized our army to a much larger extent than did the Russians, the military strength of the United States has never been measured by the size of its standing army. For geographic reasons we rely primarily on sea and air power, while the Soviet Union is primarily a land power. *If all categories of weapons are included, as they must be in any fair analysis of military strength, the theory of America's unilateral disarmament collapses.* In the years since the war, our production of Atomic weapons has proceeded at an increasing tempo, accompanied by the maintenance of a far-flung network of air bases and the bombing planes necessary for their delivery. Our navy, by far the largest in the world, has been maintained on a standby basis.

Far from disarming after the War, with our monopoly (until 1949) of the A-Bomb, and our feverish production of that weapon, and then our monopoly (until 1953) of the H-Bomb, plus the establishment of hundreds of naval and air bases around the USSR, the United States greatly intensified its military might. Coincident were the Truman Doctrine pledging the United States as the guarantor of capitalist relations in the “Free World”—like Metternich's guarantee of monarchical legitimacy a century earlier—and the first implementation of that policy when the United States replaced Great Britain as the annihilator of the Greek people's bid for an

advanced democratic state. With this, the U.S. Government, graced by Churchill's rhetoric, launched the Cold War and multiplied its military might.

With the fervor of wartime US-USSR friendship still warm, and with the reality of 17,000,000 Soviet dead and one-third of the Soviet Union devastated, it required considerable effort to drum up any kind of public acceptance of the myth of Soviet "aggression" and the Communist "menace." But, with years of diligent effort, this was accomplished and McCarthyism at home reflected and bulwarked "emergency" abroad.

The cold-blooded deliberation with which this "emergency" propaganda was disseminated is not well understood even by many on the Left. Thus, Colonel William H. Neblett wrote of the 1947 Pentagon-inspired campaign to secure Universal Military Training that this aimed at persuading the people "that we were living in a state of undeclared emergency; that war with Russia was just around the corner; and that the safety of the nation was dependent upon the speedy" up-building of the country's armed might. Colonel Neblett added: "I know from my own knowledge of the men who worked up the fear campaign that they do not believe what they say." (*Pentagon Politics*, N. Y., 1949, Pageant Press, p. 101.)

Early in 1948, Army Intelligence informed President Truman, quite falsely, that Soviet troops were being mobilized and that war was only a few weeks off. President Truman called Congress into special session and, on March 17, 1948, asked for the immediate enactment of the draft and of the Marshall Plan. Although it is now known that the CIA informed the President that the Army Intelligence report was false, Mr. Truman chose not to announce this fact and as late as June, 1948, the Army's Chief of Staff told Congress that war with the USSR was then a matter of "plausible possibility."*

It is following this special session of 1948 that Congress began to pass truly colossal arms appropriations that continued thereafter to mount year after year. In fact, the appropriations soon became so large as to embarrass even the Pentagon. Said *U.S. News and World Report* (May 14, 1949):

War scares, encouraged by high officials only a few

* John Swomley, Jr., of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, gives these facts in *The Progressive*, April, 1960, p. 37.

weeks ago, so alarmed the U.S. public that top planners now are having to struggle hard to keep Congress from pouring more money into national defense than the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard as wise or necessary. It is proving more difficult to turn off than to turn on a war psychology.

The Past Five Years

For the past five years, with the Soviet Union showing the way and most of world public opinion backing her in this, disarmament efforts have reached the stage of highest level international negotiation. Participation by the U.S. Government has been halting and marked by ill-concealed hostility to the whole matter: specifically, time after time, the USSR has exercised initiative, world public opinion has responded, neutral governments have shown keen interest, certain of America's allies — especially Great Britain — have pressed for some show, at least, of U.S. concern, and then, most belatedly and with reiterated words of cautious pessimism, the U.S. Government has responded. Then, typically, has followed a prolonged period of preparation, then confrontation. The confrontation always has been accompanied by a risingly hostile U.S. press and damaging "leaks" from the Pentagon and/or the Atomic Energy Commission. Then, again typically, have come acts of accommodation and concession from the USSR, shifts in the U.S. position, and more hostility from Madison Avenue and more worried voices from the AEC and the Pentagon. This process then is terminated—until the next round—with American withdrawal, so far as substance is concerned, announcements lamenting Soviet "intransigence"—and we are ready for the New Year's Battle of the Budget, with the momentous question being: Shall Defense get 39 billions this time, or 43 billions?

Let us recall to the reader some of the details of this process. In the Spring of 1955, the Western powers refused serious consideration of disarmament touching nuclear weapons. Instead, the United States proposed drastic reductions in conventional arms and armies, firm in the belief that these would be rejected since they aimed at the area then of the Soviet's greatest relative strength. But—to the open chagrin of the U.S. delegation—the Soviet Union informed the U.N. disarmament subcommittee, on May 10, 1955, that it was prepared to accept the Western proposals, in substance.

Indeed, a British delegate announced with somewhat premature joy, that Western ideas "have now been largely, and in some cases entirely, adopted by the Soviet Union." Weeks of stalling followed; on September 15, 1955, the Western powers, led by the United States, withdrew the proposals accepted by the USSR.*

The same tragic farce was repeated at the London arms-control talks in 1957 when Harold Stassen headed the American delegation. Governor Meyner recalled this in a speech he delivered March 18, 1960. "At London," Meyner said, "Governor Stassen made considerable progress . . . But as soon as he was on the point of concluding what could have been an historic agreement, he was pulled out . . . and given a new set of instructions . . . to attach other conditions which it was certain the Russians would not accept." Soon thereafter Stassen was recalled; the press turned against him; Dulles excoriated him; and Eisenhower dismissed him.

In 1958 and 1959, the Soviet Union pressed hard for a suspension of nuclear weapons testing as one step in the direction of disarmament and as important in itself in view of the dangerous radiation resulting from such testing. Worldwide pressure for this became irresistible. Early in 1959 Prime Minister Macmillan visited the United States for talks with the President; it was an open secret at the time that his purpose was to press for an agreement on a suspension of such tests.

Coincident with his arrival, there was an AEC-sponsored "leak" to the *N. Y. Times* of the so-called "Project Argus," the 300-mile-high explosion of three small atomic bombs, which allegedly made impossible the detection of other tests of more powerful nuclear weapons. As Marquis Childs reported (*N. Y. Post*, March 24, 1959): "The news of Project Argus was leaked in such a way as to make it seem that tests would have to continue and the British compromise, therefore, would have to be rejected."

What was "leaked" to the *Times* and published by it was — at the time of publication — "top secret"; nobody, however, was punished for this real security break. U. S. testing continued until it was forced to desist by a storm of public opinion after the USSR — agreement or no agreement — announced unilaterally its decision to stop such testing for a year and thereafter not to resume if no other nation meanwhile conducted testing.

* Details and documentation of this may be found in: Philip Noel-Baker, *Arms Race: Program for World Disarmament* (N. Y., 1958, Oceana Pub.).

After the Khrushchev "general and complete" disarmament proposal was endorsed by the UN in the Fall of 1959, a Ten-Power disarmament conference was scheduled to begin in Geneva in March, 1960, charged with the responsibility of considering *how to implement that endorsement*. Simultaneously, in the same city, and at the same time, experts from both East and West were to meet to consider suspension of nuclear-weapons testing.

The Khrushchev proposal — for a phased and internationally controlled four-year program of general and complete disarmament — constituted the Soviet delegation's contribution, in March, to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The American proposals, cleared with Adenauer when he visited Eisenhower earlier in 1960, were summarized, correctly, by *The Nation* (March 26, 1960) in these words: "They do not contain a single new item, and the very fact that the West Germans approve them indicates that the possibility of a rapprochement by the route the West has chosen is remote." In essence, these proposals did not even envisage general disarmament — the purpose and mandate of the Conference, remember — but rather suggested forms for *controlling the process of arming*, including the re-introduction of President Eisenhower's "open-skies" espionage proposal.*

Meanwhile, at the sister Geneva meeting on atomic testing, experts were approaching agreement, and the AEC-Pentagon clique became worried, especially since agreement in this area would make difficult the sabotaging of the Disarmament Conference and would be an auspicious launching for the then-pending Summit Meeting. These considerations illuminate two paragraphs in the *N. Y. Times'* military analyst's dispatch, dated March 30, 1960. Hanson Baldwin then wrote:

Most observers, however, are less worried about the possibilities of undetectable violations of the projected test ban and the technical slowdown it may cause in nuclear arms development than they are about the psychological and political consequences of such an agreement.

An agreement to halt nuclear testing, signed with a flourish at the Summit Conference, could lead to the same sort of psy-

* The original genius who concocted this proposal was Col. Richard S. Leghorn of the Air Force Reserve, who promoted it as part of his selling job in the employ of Eastman Kodak!—see *The New Republic*, June 20, 1960, p. 9.

chological relaxation in the West as occurred after the summit conference in Geneva in 1955. Western military defenses might suffer. It might be difficult to maintain the strength and unity of the West if another era of "sweetness and light" were initiated by the agreement.

In this area of nuclear-test banning, where joint experts have moved so close to agreement and where one stands only at the threshold of the infinitely more complex problem of disarmament in general—not to speak of a real and lasting *detente*—American opposition has been persistent and potent. Dr. Hugh C. Wolfe, a distinguished physicist, declared on the NBC television program "The Open Mind," on February 7, 1960, that these objections would continue even if a detection system ten times more exact than the remarkable one already in existence should be developed. This was because, said Dr. Wolfe:

there are people in the AEC and in the Pentagon who are awfully anxious to continue the American program of nuclear weapons development involving the setting off of small nuclear weapons. And these people have always been opposed to any kind of agreement with the Soviet Union which would stop their program. They will continue to be opposed to it no matter how good the inspection system is.

Six weeks after Dr. Wolfe's remarks, the Soviet representatives at the Geneva weapons-testing conference "enormously narrowed" remaining areas of disagreement—to use the words of a *New Republic* editorial (March 28, 1960)—by agreeing to a ban on high-yield explosions, to be monitored by a multi-national inspection team, and by deferring to the U.S. view that techniques for detecting smaller, underground blasts need study, pending which, however, tests of all sizes were to be suspended.

How was this momentous advance received by the United States? A day after its announcement, James A. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense, told a nationwide television audience that "from a defense point of view there are many good reasons for wanting to continue testing." Following this came Hanson Baldwin's "trial balloon" in the *Times* of March 30, already quoted.

Then, in April, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy held four days of public hearings in which witnesses such as the notorious and fanatical Dr. Edward Teller were given the

center of the stage and the newspaper headlines to explain that no detection system could ever work, that no test ban should be approved and that salvation lay only in more and more devastating weapons dispersed widely in reliable hands — like those of the West German government. William H. Stringer, chief of the Washington Bureau of *The Christian Science Monitor*, reported in that paper (April 26, 1960) that the Committee members “were remiss in their questioning and never asked the scientists why the ‘art of detection’ of underground explosions should not move forward as fast as the ‘art of concealment.’”

Mr. Stringer might have added, what Walter Lippmann noted at the time, that the Committee failed to ask the Pentagon scientists why they felt that renewed testing would place the United States at an advantage. Mr. Lippmann went on to point out that during the period since World War II and up to the moratorium on testing, while the United States had started out with a monopoly on atomic weapons, it had ended up only on a par with the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons, and behind the USSR in means of delivering such weapons to their targets.

At any rate, Mr. Stringer, having the May Summit in mind, thought that “the test ban is a first step, an index of intentions, an exercise in Soviet-West cooperation”; hence he was distressed that the attitude of the Joint Committee of the AEC was “to build more bombs, don’t take the risk of test banning, negative, negative, negative.”

In May, after murdering the Summit Conference, the United States Government intensified its sabotage tactics against the test-cessation conference in Geneva. On May 7, 1960, the President announced—without giving his own representatives in Geneva any forewarning, not to speak of the British and Soviet delegates there—that the United States would begin a series of eleven underground nuclear blasts, during the next two years. This, coming after U-2 and the President’s unprecedented justification of U-2 procedure and after the Defense Secretary’s world-wide air alert, seemed a further indication of American desire to re-freeze the Cold War at its lowest possible temperature. Little improvement resulted when the President, belatedly and after world-wide expressions of astonishment, announced that the tests would be entirely peaceful in character and invited the Soviet Union to send representatives, reciprocally, to the American tests; the latter invitation was re-

jected and the USSR announced that since it did not plan such tests, it could hardly accept a reciprocal invitation.

This series of acts by the U.S. Government led Marquis Childs to write two scorching columns from his post in Geneva (*N. Y. Post*, May 10 and May 12, 1960). Childs noted that the Soviet Union had made concession after concession to the American objections in the course of eighteen months of tortuous negotiations; but, added Childs, throughout these negotiations, Mr. Wadsworth, the chief of the U.S. delegation, "has constantly been fighting a rear-guard action with those in Washington who have been determined to block any treaty." Childs reported that "opinion" in Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries and even in West Germany unanimously held "that it would have been possible to get a treaty with adequate guarantees any time during the past nine months if it had not been for America's delaying tactics." It seemed clear to that world-wide opinion, Childs continued, that the United States does not want a treaty and wishes "to continue nuclear testing." "The question," he concluded, "written large across the sky would be: Why, if you did not believe in a treaty, did you go so far in the negotiations, and, having had your way in instance after instance, why do you now pull back?"

Two days later, Childs noted that as the Conference approached agreement, the propaganda campaign against Wadsworth as being "soft" and an "appeaser" reached a crescendo; and that now he found himself "perched precariously at the end of a forgotten limb." "What is most damaging," wrote Childs, "to America's prestige is the wriggle and wobble of American policy from one side of the road to the other."

Wadsworth was Stassenized.

The U.S. Government does not want disarmament and it does not want an end to nuclear-weapons testing and production. But, the humanity of the world wants both, and so do mighty Socialist states; pressure from both induces the United States grudgingly to yield to the point—if it must—where it agrees to meet and discuss—enveloping the agreement in the most pessimistic appraisals of the meeting's possibilities. Strong positions are assumed, and impossible demands are raised. As concession follows concession from the USSR and as world opinion becomes more and more hopeful of success, the U.S. Government becomes more and more uncomfortable, tries increasingly shifty tactics, then produces a

demand or an objection of a clearly impossible or wholly provocative nature, assassinate the meeting, and turn loose Madison Avenue to "explain" how everything was a resounding victory for the "Free World" and that Soviet deceptiveness once again showed that the only recourse of God-fearing Washington is to keep its powder dry, pass the ammunition and build up greater stockpiles for slaughter.

The experiences at the test-cessation conference in Geneva were being duplicated simultaneously at the ten-nation disarmament conference in the same city. Said Hugh Thomas, the Geneva correspondent of the *New Statesman* (May 7, 1960): "Even the experts up in the Foreign Office think that the Russians are 'interested' in disarmament." But:

The position of the U.S. has been made perfectly clear: control must be proved to be working well in certain limitations of arms (e. g. in outer space) before any actual disarmament *can even be negotiated*. Mr. Herter has declared that he wants above all not disarmament but 'a more stable military environment' . . . U.S. military chiefs insist that while the Iron Curtain stays, it would be mad to make disarmament effective (*italics in original*).

This, the reader is reminded, was the U.S. position at a Conference called as a result of a United Nations unanimous resolution endorsing a policy of complete and general disarmament. In accordance with that purpose, the Soviet delegation first introduced, as we have mentioned, the proposal made in the Fall of 1959 by Premier Khrushchev for such disarmament. After this was considered and debated at the Conference, and after the killing of the Summit Meeting and the "wriggling and wobbling" by the U.S. delegation at the nuclear-testing conference, the Soviet delegation still, on June 2, 1960, introduced another careful and very full plan for general and complete disarmament, which plan took into consideration several of the proposals made by the West, and particularly by the French delegation.

The Latest Soviet Proposals

This June 2 Soviet plan called for complete and general disarmament within four years, or some other agreed-upon span of

time. It proposed that, "All disarmament measures from beginning to end shall be carried out under strict and effective international control." It then proceeded to detail a six-point system of international control appropriate to each of the three different major stages of disarming.

In the first stage, the following were to be scrapped: all rocket and missile weapons; all war planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons; all submarines; all surface vessels capable of carrying nuclear weapons; all artillery capable of firing such weapons. All foreign bases were to be abolished; all foreign troops wherever stationed were to go home; all space devices capable of military use were to be banned; nuclear know-how was not to be dispersed to any other countries; rockets for peaceful and scientific purposes were to be launched only under international control, with inspection conducted at the launching sites; arms expenditures of all countries were to be cut in accordance with implementation of these proposals.

In the second stage, all nuclear weapons were to be banned; their production was to stop, and stockpiles of them were to be destroyed. Chemical, biological and all other mass-destruction means were to be banned, production was to cease, stockpiles were to be destroyed. Armed personnel were to be reduced; those of the USSR and the USA not to exceed 1,700,000 each. Conventional weapons made surplus by such cuts were to be destroyed; arms budgets to be reduced in accordance with these policies.

In the third stage, all armed forces were to be scrapped; limited police forces to remain purely for internal purposes; all remaining conventional weapons, except small firearms, to be scrapped; military production of all such arms to be discontinued; war ministries, general staffs to be abolished, conscription to be banned; military training to stop; military education to be banned by law in each country; budgets for military purposes to be abolished; funds released through disarmament were to be used to cut or abolish taxation, to provide assistance to poorer or under-developed countries, and to help support vast public assistance and welfare programs throughout the world.

As we have stated, the plan called for detailed systems of international control appropriate to each of the stages, not excluding aerial inspection and photography in the third stage, where this might help to check on actual disarmament, and not as a

source of information about existing armaments. The control plan called for an international board of control under UN auspices, on-the-spot inspection teams, with factories, docks, platforms, etc., open to the scrutiny of such teams.

The plan introduced the West's idea of *simultaneous* disarmament and control thereof; it accepted the West's idea that the plan *start* with the scrapping of means of delivering nuclear weapons, including rockets and missiles, because it is well known that in this the USSR leads the world, and it accepted the West's insistence that on-the-spot inspection teams be present throughout the implementation of the program. These were the three main stumbling blocks so far as the Anglo-French delegations were concerned; and when these had been raised the United States in all cases expressed "grave" concern lest they not be taken care of; in the Soviet proposal of June 2 all of them are provided for almost exactly in the way proposed in discussion.

The reaction to this Soviet proposal in the press of the world was not made available to the American people at all—most of whom to this day have no idea themselves of the actual content of that proposal. It is important to note that there have been very few occasions in the history of the world when a nation's proposals in a critical area of policy have evoked such unanimous approval. Indian, Japanese, Latin-American newspapers hailed the June 2 document; the Scandinavian press dealt with it as irresistible and marking the beginning of a new era for mankind. The French, Italian, Belgian and English press—with rare exceptions, made up of the neo-fascist and extreme Right—expressed pleasure at least, and some could ill restrain their enthusiasm. This included the London *Sunday Times*, *Reynolds News*, *News Chronicle*, *Manchester Guardian*, *Daily Herald*, the Brussels *La Libre Belgique*, and the Catholic *La Cie*, the Paris *Combat*; even Fritz Erler, Secretary of the Social Democrat Bundestag Group in West Germany, hailed the proposal as making possible real headway in the area of disarmament.

Response of U.S. Government

What was the response of the U.S. delegation? Nothing; literally nothing, absolute silence for days and then for weeks. The matter became an international scandal and absolutely im-

permissible. French and English pressure on Washington grew, as the *N. Y. Times* discreetly reported; the head of the U.S. delegation in Geneva flew back to Washington, begging for some word, any word. Nothing came until June 26, and then the U.S. proposal reiterated all the old American positions seeking not disarmament but the control of armament programs.

As a matter of fact, this position is reiterated in the letter of resignation as head of the U.S. delegation submitted by Mr. F. M. Eaton to the President, where he expressed his regret that he could not get the Conference to move "in the direction of halting the *build-up of armaments*;" it is repeated in the President's letter to Mr. Eaton accepting his resignation, dated July 22, 1960, where the President thanked him for his efforts "to find an agreement which would halt the *building up of armaments*." But this was not supposed to be a conference, like the Conferences of the 1920's, where imperialist powers mutually agreed upon relative levels of permissible armaments; it was called for the purpose of *disarming*, and specifically in response to the United Nations Resolution favoring complete and general disarmament.

The matter may be summed up in the words of the *New Statesman*, in an editorial entitled "Why Zorin [chief of the Soviet delegation] Walked Out" (July 2, 1960): "What is known is that the Communist delegations agreed to the Western insistence on an elaborate inspection system, provided it was accompanied by radical disarmament; the western powers, on the other hand, were determined to see an inspection system working properly before they were willing to consider detailed disarmament. The Russians made several concessions to the West since the conference resumed after the Summit. The West was very slow in responding."

The essence of the record of the United States Government, relative to disarmament efforts, was stated correctly by Senator John F. Kennedy in a speech at the University of New Hampshire on March 7, 1960:

We pour our talent and funds into a feverish race for arms supremacy, by-passing almost entirely the quest for arms control. This gap has been apparent, to our enemy [sic] and to the world, at every arms control or related conference since the close of the Korean war. Our conferees have lacked both the technical backing and the high-level policy support and guidance necessary to make their mission a success.

Mr. Kennedy's current proposal that we spend three billion dollars *more* for armaments seems a strange way to repair this glaring deficiency; this does not negate, however, the correctness of his analysis of U.S. participation in disarmament conferences during the past five years.

Somewhat more forcefully than Senator Kennedy, Adlai Stevenson also put the onus where it belonged, in terms of answering the question: who wants disarmament? At the University of Chicago, on May 12, 1960, Mr. Stevenson said:

It seems to be both sad and ironic that the Communists have so largely succeeded in pre-empting and exploiting the cry for peace—which is surely the loudest and dearest sound in this war-weary, frightened world . . . We have emphasized military containment, and for years it appeared that we didn't want to negotiate with the Russians, either to test their intentions or to call their bluff.

Meanwhile they stopped nuclear testing unilaterally; they reduced their army unilaterally; they proposed summit talks about reducing tensions and the dangers of war; they proposed total disarmament. Whatever the motives, cynical or sincere, they have constantly taken the initiative. They have answered the cry for peace, while we have quibbled and hesitated and then finally given in.

The record proves Mr. Stevenson to be correct except that "we" have not—yet—"given in." The history of the struggle for disarmament since the end of World War II makes clear that the Soviet Union has striven persistently for the adoption of a program of significant disarmament, and that the U.S. Government has been the chief stumbling block against its realization. The fact is that both in words and more decisively in action, the U.S. Government has thwarted disarmament and has made impossible the elimination of nuclear weapons; it has been, in fact, the main source for the back-breaking armaments race that has plagued the world in the present epoch and which threatens momentarily the destruction of most of mankind.

This role of the U.S. Government reflects its dominant ideology which, in turn, reflects its class character.

One of the most naked manifestations of dominant imperialist ideology as it manifests itself in the areas of war and disarmament

is an article entitled "Victory Without War?" by Dr. Hans Karl Gunther, one of Adenauer's "experts"; it appeared originally, in German, in the *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* (Military Science Review) for June, 1958. It was published in the *Military Review*, June, 1959, which is the organ of the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (itself issued also in Spanish and Portuguese so that, no doubt, the freedom-fighters of Franco and Salazar can keep up with developments).

Dr. Gunther writes of war and preparations for war in terms directly reminiscent of Mussolini and Hitler. We summarize, using in most cases direct quotation:

After establishing to his own satisfaction that no system of disarmament could really be established, Dr. Gunther says:

The armament race must continue, therefore, until one of the systems [socialism or capitalism] collapses or — perhaps in order to avoid a collapse — has recourse to war as the only way out. A continuation of armament does not exclude the possibilities of future war, as some high officials maintain, but it clearly points to the possibility of a preventive war. Furthermore, the West is given a chance at victory by continued arming, whereas a general disarmament would take this chance away.

War has stimulated the noblest creative efforts of man, and been responsible for his greatest scientific advances, Dr. Gunther insists. Furthermore:

From the viewpoint of the classic school of national economy, armament is equal to senseless squandering and all things related to warfare 100 percent unproductive . . . But during the last century in all those countries where governments spent large sums for armed readiness the national economy prospered accordingly.

This, continues Dr. Gunther, was directly proved by "national socialism"—here it was seen "that expenditures made by the state for armed readiness raise the living standard of a people by revitalizing industry and facilitating the credit system"—whatever that last phrase may mean.

Only "dreamers" think of using the money spent on arms upon public welfare needs; moreover, it is doubtful if the latter expenditures really help anyone:

On the contrary, it probably would create . . . a constantly increasing class of parasites, ending the old willingness to sacrifice for the common good and thereby causing the end of the Republic.

The secret of Prussia's "greatness," the Doctor holds, was that its main business was that of war and war preparation. This is because, "The armed forces are the most productive industry of any national economy." He concludes, "there exist almost insurmountable obstacles to a general disarmament and honest outlawry of war"; therefore, "the safety" of the world "lies in the hands of the soldier."

Only in the brutality of the language and the directness of its barbarism does this differ from what is being asserted with more and more frequency in powerful circles of the American ruling class.

This adds intense urgency to the sober words uttered by Premier Khrushchev on July 12, after announcing the shooting down of the latest U.S. reconnaissance plane infringing Soviet sovereignty:

On behalf of the Soviet government and all the Soviet people, I wish to call with all seriousness the attention of all the countries of the world to the fact that the ruling quarters of the United States with the connivance of their allies in aggressive blocs, are obviously provoking a serious military conflict. Their actions cannot be assessed otherwise.

The Soviet leader went on to promise continued dedication to the struggle for peaceful co-existence, but he concluded by warning those who quite literally are playing with fire that the Socialist nations "will be able to rebuff any aggressor."

The leadership of the "aggressive blocs" resides right here in the United States. It is for us, the American people, in the first place, to understand that, and to make up our minds to change it. We can — certainly no one else can. We must measure all political considerations and actions on this greatest test of all: Is the cause of peace and of disarmament served or harmed? If peace is preserved, all things become possible; if not . . .

August 1960

V. IMPERIALISM AND THE BOMB

When World War II began, and prior to America's entry into it, President Roosevelt addressed a note to all the belligerent powers pleading with them not to bomb unfortified targets and to take care that casualties among civilians be kept at a minimum. In fact, however, indiscriminate and terroristic bombings became a major element in nazi and fascist warfare as practiced in Poland, Greece, Holland and elsewhere; and was indulged in also by the British and their allies in Germany, Italy, and the Balkans. As the war enveloped the U.S.S.R., the slaughter of civilians from the air and by ground forces became a systematic preoccupation of the nazis. Meanwhile, in Asia, the Japanese imperialists long had bombed indiscriminately the Chinese mainland. The United States, when joining the war, entered at once into the practice of indiscriminate bombings of occupied centers in Europe and in Asia, especially employing fearful fire-bomb raids upon great cities like Tokyo and Dresden.

There was one Power — and only one — which throughout the war made it a practice to confine its fire to military targets, and that was the Soviet Union. Its air force, in particular, devoted itself almost entirely to direct support of its ground troops; what strategic bombing the Soviet planes did was aimed at knocking out major military installations.

It is an ironic and tragic thing that the culminating horror in this catalogue of atrocities fell upon the American Republic which, in visiting two Japanese cities with portable crematoria, consumed in their flames thousands of men, women and children.

No argument is needed to establish the fateful quality of the decisions to bomb the two Japanese cities. This is of great interest in itself; it has, furthermore, important lessons applicable to com-

prehending the world today and useful for guiding current struggles for peace and disarmament.

Although all the archives concerning these decisions have not yet been opened and although the whole matter has been shrouded in the "top secret" category, certain highly significant matters appear to be established. First, it is certain that Japan was near surrender by the summer of 1945; this point is documented thoroughly in Michael Amrine's very useful book, *The Great Decision* (Putnam, N. Y.). It is reaffirmed in the interviews with James F. Byrnes, then Secretary of State, Lewis L. Strauss, later head of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Leo Szilard and Dr. Edward Teller, leading scientists connected with the bomb's development, and Ralph Bard, then Under-Secretary of the Navy, published in the *U.S. News and World Report* (Aug. 15, 1960). The editors wrote: "As these men look back, there is broad agreement that . . . at the time the bomb was dropped, Japan was already beaten." By early July, 1945, the United States had intercepted and decoded messages from the Japanese Foreign Ministry to its Ambassador in Moscow indicating a clear desire to sue for peace; as the weeks went by, and before August, 1945, these messages became more and more desperate.

At the Yalta Conference, held in February, 1945, the Soviet Union had agreed to enter the war against Japan and had set its date as August 8, 1945. On July 16, 1945, the first atomic bomb was tested, successfully; from July 17 to August 2, the Potsdam Conference, involving Stalin, Churchill and Truman, met. Here Soviet entry against Japan was reaffirmed and the date firmly set; but the Soviet Union was told nothing about the A-bomb, except for a highly cryptic remark made by Truman to Stalin (according to Truman), which Truman himself admits that Stalin probably did not understand.

Japan having sought, with desperate urgency, surrender terms early in July, 1945, and with the Soviet Union pledged to enter the war on August 8, it was perfectly clear that the end for Japan was imminent, and that the Soviet entry would be the finishing blow. The bomb on Hiroshima, however, was dropped on August 6; and then, after the Soviet Union made her move in accordance with agreement, the bomb on Nagasaki was dropped on August 9. In other words, the two atomic bombs were hurled so that their falling bracketed the date upon which the USSR entered the war.

Professor P. M. S. Blackett, the distinguished British scientist, in his book *Fear, War and the Bomb* (N. Y., 1949, pp. 135-39), elaborated on this point of the time coincidences and concluded that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima marked the opening salvo of the Cold War. Given the fact that Japan was at her last resources in July, that she was suing for peace, and that the entry into combat of the massive might of the Soviet Union would have had to be decisive in forcing her to early and complete surrender, it would seem that the atomic bombs were hurled at Japan not in order to "save American lives" in an "invasion" projected for the following Fall or Winter, but in order to intimidate the Soviet Union and to keep Japan and as much of the Asian complex as possible as the exclusive preserve of American surveillance.

That which appears likely from the mere chronology and basic data offered above seems to be confirmed by the explicit statements of American officials directly involved.

Henry L. Stimson, Truman's Secretary of War, in his own memoirs (*On Active Service*, N. Y., 1949, pp. 637-38), called the atomic bombings in Japan "a badly needed 'equalizer' in the diplomatic struggle with the U.S.S.R." Professor Richard N. Current, in his careful biography of Stimson, concludes with obvious regret that the evidence shows that Stimson at the time "did indeed hint that Russia and not Japan was the real target of the atom bomb" (*Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft*, Rutgers University Press, 1954, p. 237).

James V. Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, stated in his diary, under date of July 26, 1945 (p. 78 of the *Forrestal Diaries*), that he had spoken to Secretary of State Byrnes, then at Potsdam, and "Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in, with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur. Once in there, he felt it would not be easy to get them out."

Dr. Leo Szilard, in the *U.S. News and World Report* interview to which reference has already been made, recalls that when he projected the idea of demonstrating the power of the atomic bomb in a publicly-announced experiment, rather than through the devastation of Japanese cities, "the first thing that Byrnes told us was that General Groves [head of the Manhattan District, which developed the A-Bomb] had informed him that Russia had no uranium." Szilard found this highly dubious, but he makes

clear that on the basis of this idea, the highest U.S. authorities thought they had in the A-Bomb a permanent hold upon a monopoly of effective power. Hence, Szilard stated, "Byrnes thought that the possession of the bomb by America would render the Russians more manageable in Europe." For this, apparently a "little slaughter" would be the clincher; at any rate these considerations were put forward by way of refuting the Szilard idea of a demonstration of the bomb arranged in such a way that human life would not be taken.

It was President Truman, of course, who made the ultimate decision as to when and how to use the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima, but the policy-making body that recommended its use against a Japanese city, without prior warning, was an eight-man committee, consisting of Byrnes, Stimson and Bard, Stimson's Assistant, George L. Harrison, Byrnes' Assistant, William L. Clayton, and three scientists—Drs. Vannevar Bush, Karl T. Compton, and James B. Conant. Only Bard urged an alternative course, and this he put in writing on June 27—almost a month after the committee had filed its recommendation. This, too, is published in the *U.S. News and World Report* of August 15, 1960; it urged that "before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use." Bard said that a sense of "humanitarianism and fair play" was behind his proposal; but he, also, had in mind the Soviet Union, and in this very proposal seems to be advocating a course that might be taken without letting the USSR know of it, while posting Japan—that is, a course to be taken unbeknown to an ally and known to the foe. Specifically, he urged that: "Following the three-power conference [at Potsdam] emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China coast and *make representations with regard to Russia's position* and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender." (*Italics added—H.A.*)

It is to be noted that most of the scientists connected with developing the Bomb did not want it to be used on a living target; they desired that a demonstration of its power be made and that in this way, the bomb might possibly save lives rather than destroy

them. On July 12, 1945, Dr. Farrington Daniels, Director of the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, polled 150 scientists, then working on the A-Bomb project, as to how the bomb should be used. Results showed that 124 of them favored some kind of demonstration of the weapon, prior to its use against human beings. Scientists, led by Drs. James Franck and Leo Szilard, formed a Committee on Social and Political Implications; they drafted a formal memorandum urging that the bomb be demonstrated publicly first and that then, after its awful power was clear to all, a final ultimatum be served upon the Japanese Government. But this was rejected; indeed, Dr. Szilard remains doubtful to this day that the President ever saw this memorandum.

Professor Blackett is supported by all available evidence—the Cold War's first blows were very hot ones; that they consumed the lives of thousands of Japanese was purely incidental to the requirements of *hochpolitik*. The story is of some consequence also, not only in revealing something of the reality of "Western humanism"; it is of basic importance in demonstrating who was responsible for beginning the Cold War.

A further point needs adding. Efforts at "justifying" the destruction of Hiroshima always leave out Nagasaki. But while one city was destroyed on August 6, the other was done to death on August 9. No one, however, has affirmed that there was any doubt after Hiroshima on August 6 and after the USSR entered the war against Japan on August 8th that Japan's surrender impended. What possible reason, then, can there have been for bombing Nagasaki on August 9?

Michael Amrine, in his book, tells us that even Air Force generals were shocked at the slaughter of women and children that marked the Hiroshima atrocity, but in terms of responsibility it is at least to be noted that this bombing was weighed for many weeks, and was taken at the decision of the President. But the Nagasaki bombing, as Amrine also shows, was done on the responsibility of operational military commanders; it was not the result of top-level decision. It seems to have been a kind of "frightfulness" reflective of militarism gone mad and of an anti-Sovietism reaching the point of utter fanaticism.

From this point of view, it is relevant to note that the President has hinted that he leaves to area commanders the decision as to when and whether to use nuclear weapons; more explicitly, the

New York Times, October 7, 1958, quoted General Earle E. Partridge, in charge of the North American Air Command, as stating that his command was authorized to use nuclear weapons in combat without specific authorization from the President.

In all the writings on "The Great Decision" no mention is made of the decisive role that white chauvinism played in launching the bombs. But surely the fact that one was slaughtering tens of thousands of colored peoples—as a way of impressing the Soviet Union—weighed heavily in the minds of the U.S. rulers.

From what is already known about the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is clear that nothing but the might of the socialist world, the developing strength of the national liberation movements, and the gathering will for peace among the vast majority of mankind in general has restrained and can continue to restrain imperialist rulers from doing again what they did in 1945. Hence, again one comes to the great lesson of our time: our epoch is one in which the popular forces seeking peace and freedom can gain their aims and can thwart imperialism's drive for war and reaction.

"By the Sweat of the Blacks"

Not very long ago, this country's leading professional Sociological Society produced a fifty-year index of its *American Journal of Sociology*, covering the years 1895-1947. In this stout volume there were three references to Marx and Marxism, and no reference at all to Lenin or Leninism.

Since all sociology has been a continual dialogue—or debate—with Marx—the founder of the *Journal of Sociology*, himself, Albion W. Small, referred to Marx as "the Galileo of the social sciences"—three references to him and his work in the course of fifty years would seem to be few enough, even for the Un-American Activities Committee. But no references at all to Lenin in five decades of professional writing on social questions is a striking reflection of the timidity and aridity characterizing so much of that writing.

Even in the best of that writing, currently being produced, one finds this same ignoring of Lenin—including the work of C. Wright Mills, for example. Mills, being among the very best in this

country, by no means ignores Marx, but in all his published books so far, he mentions Lenin exactly once, and then quite parenthetically and not accurately.

One of the results of this omission is that the body of respectable and professional writing by U.S. social scientists—again, not excluding Mills*—ignores the realities of American imperialism, or, in the worst instances, denies the existence of so subversive an entity.

In particular, one has extended discussion of “under-developed” countries, by which is meant areas and peoples long subjected to colonial domination—in one guise or another. The choice of such a descriptive phrase neatly ignores the fact that these areas have been and are over-exploited, and therefore remain “under-developed”; the phrase also hides the fact that the metropolitan powers, with their highly developed industries and techniques, owe much of this development, where their systems are based on the private ownership of the means of production, to the exploitation of the rest of the world, and especially the colored peoples of that world.

The United Nations informs us that yet today six out of every ten human beings in the world are habitually hungry, and that about 50 per cent of the world's adult population remains illiterate. It adds that the problem of the especially exploited and deprived majority of mankind has been intensifying since World War II, for the richer countries are getting richer and the poorer countries are getting poorer. Hence, on a “free world” scale, one has continuing confirmation of Marx's observation concerning the law of intensified impoverishment of the masses, given the existence of capitalism.

As the year 1960 dawned, an editorial in the *New Statesman* (Jan. 2, 1960) indicated that among the British liberal intelligentsia this exploitative relationship is comprehended. Said that journal:

Few tears will be shed for the Fifties. Cynical, materialistic, selfish, the decade made the rich richer, the poor poorer. To the advanced countries of the West, it brought unprecedented

* This was written, of course, prior to Mills' work on Cuba.

prosperity, achieved largely at the expense of the vast and growing proletariats of Asia and Africa (italics added—H.A.).

Occasionally one will get this kind of admission directly from the masters themselves, although this was more common in the literature of dawning colonialism and imperialism, during the 18th and 19th centuries. Still, there are occasional slips of the pen even in our own more sophisticated and demagogic century. Thus, in the autobiography of Frederick Jesup Stimson, that former U.S. Ambassador to several Latin-American countries admitted: "But we Nordics are all living on the cheap labor of the tropics—we whites by the sweat of the brow of the blacks" (*My United States*, N. Y., 1931, p. 203).

More recently, when President Eisenhower returned from the Paris Summit Meeting that he had torpedoed, it will be remembered that he stopped off in Portugal; the press here reported that the atmosphere in fascist Lisbon refreshed the General and gave him added zest as the First Soldier in the Free World. Understandably, the fascist dictator, Salazar, was concerned about the African possessions of Portugal—what with all the "trouble" on that continent; the First Soldier reassured him, therefore, that the United States government viewed with the "greatest sympathy" Portugal's desire for continued undisturbed control of its vast African empire. Reporting this from Lisbon, the *New York Times'* correspondent, Benjamin Welles, noted that the viability of Portugal's economy—what there was of it—depended overwhelmingly on its continued feeding upon the labor of Africans.

The latest developments in the Congo Republic have forced similar confessions concerning the sharp dependence of the Belgian monopolies upon the super-exploitation of the wealth and the peoples of that former colony.

This relationship was analyzed classically, of course, by Lenin in his *Imperialism*. In that work, Lenin emphasized particularly: "Under the old capitalism, when free competition prevailed, the export of goods was the most typical feature. Under modern capitalism, when monopolies prevail, the export of capital has become the dominant feature."

As monopolization has intensified, this process has multiplied, and the United States holds a pre-eminent position in its development. This is one of the deepest realities of U.S. imperialism

and is of decisive consequence to the economy of our country and to the nature of the Government's foreign policy. It may be of some service to readers if the latest data on capital outflow and related phenomena are brought together.

True it is that the volume of U.S. foreign trade, in merchandise, is enormous; it is, indeed, greater than that of any other country in the world, and has more than doubled since the 1930's. Its dimensions will be indicated in appropriate figures for the last two full years: in 1958, imports totalled \$12.9 billions and exports, \$16.2 billions, or a combined total of \$29.1 billions; in 1959, imports equalled \$15.3 billions and exports \$16.2 billions, or a combined total of \$31.5 billions. (*Survey of Current Business*, Dept. of Commerce, Feb., 1960.)

The scale of U.S. investments abroad, however, has more than quadrupled since 1939; moreover, *the volume of business done, in terms of sales, by foreign-based United States corporate subsidiaries already is greater than the combined total of U.S. exports and imports in any one year.*

Of the greatest significance is the fact that U.S. long-term foreign investments far exceed the *combined totals* of all other countries in the world. According to U.S. Government figures (always very conservative on this matter), the growth of U.S. direct investments abroad has been as follows: 1940, \$7.3 billions; 1950, \$11.7; 1955, \$19.3; 1958 (latest year for which full figures are available), \$27.0 billions (*Survey of Current Business*, August, 1959; *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.* 1959, p. 871).

The government declares that the average *yearly* net outflow of private capital from the U.S., in the decade 1946-55, came to \$1.6 billions; according to the government, this jumped, in 1956 and 1957, to a yearly average of \$4.3 billions. These figures are gross underestimations, based purely on book value. *Fortune* magazine (January, 1958) stated that the true value of annual foreign investments in 1956 and 1957 was \$6 billions, rather than the \$4.3 given by the government. This means, of course, that the real value of foreign investments is much more than that stated in the official figures cited above; but how much more is not known.

The increase in the *rate of profit* from foreign investments since World War II, has been *five times greater* than the increase in the rate of profit from domestic investment; hence, according to the government, profits from foreign investments constituted

8 per cent of all U.S. corporate profits in 1950, and 15 per cent of all such profits in 1957. The lion's share of overseas investments is held by the 200 largest corporations; because of this, according to Victor Perlo in his invaluable book *The Empire of High Finance*, about 25 per cent of their profits comes from foreign investments.

Recent data on export of U.S. capital made up a front-page story in the *Wall Street Journal* (May 11, 1960). Headlined, "Yankee Firms Channel Rising Share of Funds into Factories Abroad," the story said: "The trend toward larger U.S. business outlays overseas is bound to continue and perhaps accelerate, most authorities agree." An official at the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. asserts that his bank "receives five inquiries about foreign operations today for every one it got five years ago." The Commerce Department stated that there had been, ever since World War II, a steady rise in the percentage of total capital outlays sent overseas by American corporations; that this reached 15 per cent of total capital outlays in 1957 and 17 per cent in 1958. And: "It is probable that the proportion continued to increase in 1959, but a figure is not yet available."

Such overseas investment, said the *Wall Street Journal*, was done almost entirely, of course, by the very large corporations; and the largest corporations invested even greater proportions of their capital outlays abroad than did relatively smaller firms. Thus, Goodyear planned to spend almost 50 per cent of its capital outlay in 1960 overseas; General Motors about 60 per cent; Firestone, about 30 per cent; Kaiser Aluminum, about 80 per cent; Parke, Davis, about 55 per cent; etc. Clearly, too, this is a development of the greatest direct consequence to American workers and the trade-union movement.

These past realities and present conditions tempt monopolists in the United States with vistas of even greater power and more fantastic profits in the future. In the diplomatic field, the result may be summed up in the words of Big Business' most glamorous magazine—*Fortune* (February 1957):

The U.S. has had a hand in making and unmaking several governments since World War II. U.S. ambassadors are today "running" more countries than the record will ever show. Through USIA, Americans are laboring not only to "make friends" but to mold the group and individual minds of millions

to U.S. ends. Officially and unofficially, Americans around the world are working to build anti-Communist unions and smash pro-Communist unions. They instruct and indirectly command foreign armies. They manage and sustain national economies.

Quantitatively, this is new—and particularly for the United States it is, historically speaking, rather new. But in quality, the new thing in the world is not poorly-disguised colonial domination; qualitatively, the new thing in the world, so far as this matter is concerned, is the fact that the peoples of so many of these “made and unmade” governments are and have been actively taking a hand in determining who runs their own countries. This is what is really new and decisive in our truly New Day; the money-changers are being driven out of the last temples.

September, 1960

VI. THE UNITED STATES AND COLONIALISM

Dialectical development, which characterizes all history, often produces supreme ironies. A prime illustration of this fact is the relationship of the United States Government towards colonialism.

For here is a government created in the fires of bourgeois-democratic revolution against colonialism, and a government whose success in revolution served as inspiration for scores of similar efforts in many parts of the world in subsequent years; at the same time, this very government, as the U.S. economy became monopoly capitalist—towards the close of the 19th century—itself entered upon a career of colonialism and in our own day stands as the main bastion of what still remains of colonialism.

The anti-colonialist nature of U.S. beginnings and the inspirational character of the American Revolution have been among the elements helping the American ruling class obscure the pro-colonial and therefore anti-popular essence of its foreign policy.

The fact, also, that the great North American Republic represented until about 1870 the most advanced form of bourgeois-democratic society then in existence—always with the notable exception of the barbaric treatment of the Negro people—gave its ruling class, when monopoly capitalism fastened itself upon the country, greater opportunities for effective employment of demagoguery.

Until the latter decades of the 19th century, it had been possible for ruling elements in the United States to confine their expansionism largely within acknowledged territorial limits. True, such expansionism had been conducted with the ruthlessness always characterizing capitalism so far as the Indian peoples were concerned, and repeated wars and extermination campaigns were

launched upon them. True too, there were occasional exceptions to the rule, especially with the dominance of slave-owners and their rapaciousness towards Mexico, with the rape of a considerable part of that nation's territory in the war of the 1840s. Yet, even with these considerations, it was a fact that compared to the classical colonial Powers—England, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Germany—the United States remained a continental Power—more or less in its own very extensive “back yard” while the heyday of colonial expansion in Asia and Africa was occurring.

Hence, entering relatively late into colonialism, with the likeliest areas already appropriated or divided up among the other Powers, the tactic and approach of U.S. monopoly capitalism had to be quite different from the orthodox. This was true even in the one area of the world not divided up by the Great Imperial Powers, when the United States entered the competition, namely, Latin America. Its national revolutions had been modelled on that in the United States, and the United States, in the Monroe Doctrine, formally had foreclosed this area to European colonialism. True, even when the Doctrine was first announced, the United States had mixed motives, including the desire to hold Latin America as its own exclusive preserve for future growth and domination.

And as the decades passed after the Doctrine's original promulgation, this exploitative and dominating element, never absent from it, became more and more central to it. Even there, however, one was dealing with recently created and universally acknowledged sovereign states, and one was dealing with them within the context of having pledged the exclusion of colonialism; true, it was the colonialism of others, but, nevertheless, the pledge and the existing political circumstances required again ingeniously contrived demagoguery and colossal hypocrisy.

Not least in the forces inducing such demagoguery and hypocrisy were the beliefs and assumptions of the American people themselves. Most of them took very seriously and held very dear the democratic ideology and the revolutionary pronouncements so central to their own history; in this sense the very success of the ruling class' demagoguery was further reason for its constant employment.

At the same time, especially as reality departs more and more from mythology, the danger of the casting-off of the hold of demagoguery gives the ruling class nightmares. These nightmares

intensify as the gulf between myth and reality widens to the point where the failure in life of official foreign policy becomes so glaring that it cannot really be hidden, no matter how often Mr. Eisenhower announces that resounding set-backs and defeats really represent stupendous advances and victories.

The essence of U.S. diplomatic conduct and maneuver, during the stage of monopoly capitalism, has been in periods of crisis to use its advantages of distance, relative non-commitment, and enormous size and resources as devices on the basis of which it may enter imperialist embroilments at a moment most suited to itself and thus reap absolute gains for itself and multiply these by relative losses for its competitors—including its "allies."

During relative periods of calm in the generally stormy history of imperialism, the U.S. policy has been to overcome the dominance of its rivals—gained through early appearances in the world arena—by the use of financial, commercial, and industrial means. With these means, the aim always has been to undercut another's domination and finally to reach dominance itself. There have been exceptions, where territory was seized in the old-fashioned way—through war, as was the case with Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Okinawa.

From the main line of U.S. diplomatic development has come its three most notorious phrases: the Monroe Doctrine, where the device of excluding competitors and asserting its own domination was employed; the "Open Door," most notably in Asia and the Arab world, where efforts by other Powers to exclude the United States were countered by demands for "equal rights"—i.e., equal opportunities to exploit the victimized nations; and "Dollar Diplomacy," coined by President Taft's Secretary of State, and defined by Taft himself thus: "This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets."

These policies are complementary and the tactic of Dollar Diplomacy in particular is at the heart of the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door; it is today the central form of U.S. implementation of its foreign policy.

While, in general, it prefers, as President Taft indicated, to use dollars rather than bullets, its objective is profit and domination, and if dollars alone will not assure these, the United States has not hesitated too long in the past to employ bullets, whether it be in the suppression of the Filipino people's insurrection of 1899-

1903 or the overthrow of the democratic Arbenz Government in Guatemala in 1954. That in the first example the United States Army was directly and massively used and that in the second fascist-like mercenaries and traitors were financed and armed by the United States indicates the significant shift in the relationship of forces between the pro- and the anti-imperialist sectors in the world; but in both cases the imperialists did not fail to use force.

A relatively new emphasis in U.S. foreign policy is the effort to use Dollar Diplomacy as an instrument of hegemonism, i.e., as a way to gain significant influence, even if not domination, in not only the colonial and semi-colonial world but also in the rival metropolitan Powers themselves. Thus, there has been an enormous expansion in U.S. monopoly investments in England, France, West Germany, Japan, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Australia, and Canada, as well as within the colonial holdings of those Powers, where such still exist. In this direct way, U.S. imperialism becomes tied to the maintenance of present colonial systems—for instance, Portugal's domination over Angola—not only in terms of its own investments within the colonies, but also in terms of its own investments within the economy of the home countries.

This is in addition, of course, to the basic commitment of the United States in its alliance systems—NATO, SEATO, etc.—where it finds itself impelled to support the colonial interests of its allies. But this does not rule out simultaneous efforts by the State Department and U.S. economic giants, such as the Rockefeller and Du Pont concentrations, to undercut the allies' positions, at least economically speaking, as shown in South-East Asia and in Western Asia.

It may be in order at this point to offer some specific data demonstrating the various forms by which the United States has become the central bastion of the colonial system. Closest to home and most nakedly revealing is U.S. policy *vis-à-vis* Latin America.

The classic confession came during the New Deal days from the pen of no less an authority than Major-General Smedley D. Butler, of the United States Marine Corps. Recalling his more than 30 years of active duty, as, in his own words, "a racketeer for capitalism," General Butler went on: "I helped make Mexico

and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenue in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street.”*

This confession may be extended into the present period with a somewhat similar one, though less brutally worded, appearing in an editorial in the *New York Times*. Developing its theme for the need of a more flexible and more imaginative U.S. foreign policy, the paper went on to say: “When Guatemala threatened to go Communist [*sic*] we intervened to overthrow the Arbenz regime. On the other hand, our relations were notably friendly with Peron of Argentina, Perez Jimenez of Venezuela, Somoza of Nicaragua, Batista of Cuba, Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. . . .”**

What was at stake in the intervention in Guatemala and what was behind the friendliness towards the fascist butchers may be indicated in the boasts made by the State Department itself celebrating the third anniversary of the overthrow of Arbenz—the “liberation” of Guatemala, in State Department language. In its Bulletin No. 6465, April 1, 1957, the State Department summarized the glories of this “liberation” under four headings. They were:

(1) “The conclusion of an agreement with a United Fruit Company subsidiary providing for the return of property expropriated by the Arbenz Government” (i.e., 234,000 acres);

(2) “the repeal of laws affecting remittances and taxation of earnings from foreign capital”;

(3) “the signing of an Investment Guarantee Agreement with the United States”;

(4) “the promulgation of a new and more favorable petroleum law” (since which 27 U.S. oil companies have obtained exploration concessions covering all of Guatemala).

United States domination of Cuba—until the revolution led by Premier Fidel Castro—was complete and notorious. Threatened as the United States is with the success of a basic revolution right at its own doorstep, in a country wherein it possesses a naval base, and where its economic domination was unchallenged, the case of Cuba is a decisive one in terms of American commitment to

* *Common Sense*, November 1935, p. 8.

** *New York Times*, Aug. 21, 1957.

colonialism and in terms of demonstrating the fundamental shift in the relationship of forces in the world today. The importance of this revolution is enhanced, too, because the Cuban way exerts enormous attractive influence on the rest of Latin America, and that area is the homebase of U.S. imperialism and a dominant source of its super-profits.

The U.S. Department of Commerce boasted, in 1956, that in Cuba: "The only foreign investments of importance are those of the United States." It went on to spell this out in the fact that U.S. capital owned over 90 per cent of the telephone and electric services in Cuba, half the railroad lines, 40 per cent of the raw sugar production, while U.S.-owned banks accounted for 25 per cent of all Cuban bank deposits.

Furthermore, as of that date, practically all the shipping, financing, and marketing requirements of the Cuban economy were owned and directed by U.S. monopolies. The latifundia system dominated Cuba. In the country as a whole, in 1959, 1.4 per cent of the farms, i.e., the largest ones, controlled 47 per cent of the land, while American-owned plantations accounted for three million acres of land.

Investments by such giants as Standard Oil, Texas Oil Co., International Telephone and Telegraph, Republic Steel, etc., in Cuba totaled \$1,000 million in 1959, an investment exceeded in Latin America only by U.S. capital in Venezuela and Brazil. In Latin America as a whole, U.S. corporate investments totaled, in 1959, the colossal sum, according to official sources, of almost \$11,000 million, while the income—i.e., the actual amount of earnings transferred to the parent U.S. companies as dividends, interest, royalties and fees, totaled in the period from 1946-1958 over \$7,500 million. And in the same period the annual gross national income per person amounted to \$2,079 in the United States and \$250 in Latin America.

If one moves from Latin America to Africa, he finds that in the North, where the heroic Algerian people have been fighting for national independence for over six years, the decisive bulwark of colonialism is the United States. For it is not only American napalm that has scorched that earth, and it is not only U.S. planes which have hurled that napalm, and it is not only U.S. technicians who have maintained those planes.

Since the Second World War, the United States Government has given (not loaned) over \$4,000 million for French military might in Europe; over \$1,500 million for the late war in Indochina; and almost \$3,500 million for military commitments in North Africa; in addition, the U.S. Government has loaned France for military purposes over \$2,500 million—or a total of over \$11,000 million for war purposes, and to a large degree for purposes of colonialism, since 1946.

Not only has there been this governmental activity. In addition, U.S. corporations have invested nearly \$1,000 million inside France and additional millions in her colonies. Joint U.S.-French investment directly in Algeria is growing. Details concerning this are offered elsewhere in this volume. (See page 232.)

In Central Africa, the efforts of the Belgian colonialists to undo the liberation struggle of the Congolese people has had the strongest backing of the United States. By 1955, exports to the United States from the Belgian Congo had totaled almost \$110 million, while 15 per cent of the colony's imports came from the U.S. By that year, the United States had clearly been second only to Belgium in terms of ownership of the vast resources of that land. American capital had bought into Tanganyika Concessions, which shared in exploiting the mineral resources of the Belgian Congo with Belgian capitalists.

Moreover, in 1955, the United States signed an agreement with Belgium which gave the Combined Development Agency, a joint Anglo-American outfit, an option on up to 90 per cent of the Congo's uranium and thorium output for the following two years, and up to 75 per cent for 1958 and 1959. Other U.S. firms—the International Basic Commodity Corporation (controlled by Rockefeller), the Pacific Iron & Steel Corporation, the U.S. Plywood Corporation, International Business Machines and Singer Sewing Machine—all have considerable interests in the Congo.

The colonialism that persists in that vast continent and the efforts to undo the advances that have been made by the African masses against enslavement find as their strongest support the ruling class of the United States and the Government.

The domination of Western Asia—a center of semi-colonial and colonial conditions—by the international oil consortium is a matter of notoriety; of the seven corporations constituting that cartel,

five are American: Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Socony-Vacuum, Gulf, Texas. The profits from this business are simply fabulous; one example will do: from its Middle East holdings, the Standard Oil Company of California admitted net profits from 1948 through 1954 totaling \$645,000,000.

The data above are offered only as examples of the reality of U.S. interest in, and commitment to, the continuance of colonialism.

They may be repeated for additional areas in the world; thus, the U.S. domination of the Laos Government and of South Vietnam was universally admitted; the puppet character of the late and unlamented Rhee clique in South Korea also is now universally confessed. The continued reality of the control of the economy and basic policies of the Philippines by the United States is equally notorious.

In Taiwan, in fact, the United States is a naked aggressor, holding on to territory universally acknowledged to be part of the Chinese nation; it has made a colony of this territory as part of its fantastic dream of undoing the Chinese Revolution and hurling back to colonial bondage the 650 million people of China.

In the recent history books produced in the United States and in the editorials filling the monopoly press, U.S. imperialism has been wafted out of existence. Thus, Professor Dwight Lowell Dumond in a book called *America in Our Time* (N.Y., 1947) devotes neither section nor page nor paragraph to American imperialism. He mentions German imperialism and finds the alleged desire of the United States to protect peoples "against the imperialistic ambitions of other nations" an important reason for "our unwillingness to shirk a responsibility" and even appropriate the territory of the peoples "we" are "protecting." But, of course, this is American idealism, not imperialism!

Professor Julius W. Pratt produces a stout volume, delicately entitled *America's Colonial Experiment* (N.Y., 1950), dedicated to the proposition that American imperialism was especially benign and, in any case, is obsolete. Back in 1948, indeed, Professor Allan Nevins, a true pioneer in astonishing historical discoveries, announced that American imperialism "has been almost completely abolished" and that "where it exists it has taken on a greatly

improved character.”*

A somewhat more subtle defense of imperialism than omission also has come to the fore. This is reflected in the writings of one of the most influential intellectual figures in the United States, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr. In his book, *The Irony of American History* (N.Y., 1952), Niebuhr finds it more illuminating to refer not to colonialism or imperialism, but to invent a new and less charged vocabulary. Thus, he refers to the colonial world as “the non-industrial” or the “non-technical” world. He finds that nations of that world “held in tutelage” (!) by the “industrial” or “technical” nations become “obsessed with the idea that all of their ills flow from the imperial occupation.” This is quite ridiculous, we learn. The ills in the “non-industrial” world flow from—non-industrialization! It is “the low efficiency” of such an economy which produces the people’s poverty.

You tear out a man’s tongue and then explain that his dumbness is his own fault—the man is tongueless! Imperialists conquer peoples; turn their lands into dungeons; prevent industrialization; shore up all feudal and other reactionary elements; distort the whole economy by forcing concentration upon particular crops or strategic minerals needed by the colonialists; super-exploit the working population; grow fat on the wealth stolen from the colonies, and then—shame on you non-technical and non-industrial peoples for your “backwardness”!

In reading such transparently absurd efforts to rationalize the irrational and justify the unjust, one is reminded of Marx’s comment to the effect that the greater the development of antagonisms between the growing forces of production and the extant social order, the more does the ideology of the ruling class become permeated with hypocrisy, the more does the language used by the dominant class become sublime and virtuous.

Despite the propaganda and the monopoly of the means of communication exercised by the imperialists, the fact is that a foreign policy based upon the interests of a handful of multimillionaires is so contrary to the real interests of the majority of the population that more and more widely the suspicion grows, in the United States, that “something is awfully wrong in Washington.” Furthermore, in the world as it is today—in the world of declining

* *New York Times Magazine*, May 2, 1948.

imperialism, rising Socialism, and the mounting sweep of the national-liberation movements—foreign policies seeking to implement the desires of the imperialists meet more and more telling resistance.

Such foreign policies are bankrupt in the fullest sense of that word; they simply have no real applicability to the world as it now is, and so their future vista is as incapable of realization as it is foul in conception.

February, 1961

VII. THE PRESIDENT'S PROFESSOR AND MORALITY

President Kennedy, in his address of April 20, 1961, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, denounced Communism as bestial and alien to the Western hemisphere. On this basis he promised that the strength of the United States would be dedicated, "regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril," to the task—unilaterally, if necessary—of seeing to it that the foreign, devilish theory and practice never gained ascendancy in any part of this Hemisphere.

President Kennedy has evinced some interest in history, and one of his leading advisers is a professional historian of some renown; one might think that he would know, therefore, or would be advised, that half the world is quite a mouthful, and that forever is an awfully long time.

At the moment, however, I wish to examine briefly, the President's view of Communism as horrible and "alien"—*i.e.*, as not only un-(North) American, but also un-Cuban, and un-Laotian, and un-Congolese; really, pursuing the logic to its full, as un-Human, not to say in-Human.

The President of the United States should be told that his view of Communism is identical with the views on that subject held by Thiers, Bismarck, Mussolini, Hitler, Hirohito, Franco, Chiang Kai-shek, Al Capone, and other "free-world" statesmen. The President is not too young to be able himself to recall the condemnations of Hitler's "Big Lie" that filled our Armed Forces "orientation" lectures and publications during World War II; but I'm afraid that many of these lectures and publications turned the profound insight to be gained by understanding the content of that "Big Lie" into some more or less vague denunciation of Hitler as an awfully big liar.

What was *the* Big Lie of Hitler? The Big Lie of nazism was its depiction of Communism; it was not anti-Semitism, racism, eliteism. The latter were peripheral "adornments," the better to trap victims by *the* Big Lie. That—the Lie itself—was one which pictured Marxism, Socialism, Communism, as the incarnation of evil, as anti-human, as threatening civilization, and therefore concluded that any and all means were to be used for the destruction of this monstrosity. In particular, Hitler's Big Lie held Communism, Socialism, Marxism was so awful that its threat to national security could not be tolerated; hence, it was something to be outlawed, extirpated. *That* was the main content of Hitler's Big Lie; on that basis, Jews—allegedly the carriers of Marxism—were to be annihilated; on that basis, democracy—allegedly the ally of Marxism—was to be suppressed; on that basis, trade unions—allegedly the creation of and the training ground for Marxism—were to be prohibited; and on that basis, the Soviet Union—lair of the Marxist monster—was to be destroyed.

Anti-Communism was the rationale of fascism; pursued as a policy of State it can result only in the fiercest reaction at home and war abroad—that is, it can result only in fearful national catastrophe. This was proven to be true even in the 1930's—when the forces of Socialism, national liberation, and anti-fascism were not nearly so strong as today; certainly, in the 1960's, such a policy can result only in utter and swift catastrophe.

The President not only makes Communism monstrous, he makes it "alien," he makes it intolerable, almost as though it were some foul disease. Probably it is possible only for an American politician to take this position, in this day and age, and not be hooted from the platform. With such an analysis, what shall one say of Italy, where almost two million belong to the Communist Party; or of Indonesia, where 1,600,000 are Communists; or India, where 300,000 are; or France, where 500,000 are—this quite apart from the Socialist countries themselves? In fact, with such an analysis, what is one to do with the world, wherein today about *thirty-seven million people* are members of Communist Parties? I fear that the logical reply to this question—given the position which provokes the question—would seem to be: Destroy the World!

How is one to explain—if Communism is this loathsome thing—that many of the most penetrating minds have embraced it? Not to leave Latin America, how does the President reconcile his view

of Communism as something awful and alien to our hemisphere, with the fact that the greatest living artist of Mexico is a Communist, that the national poet of Chile is a Communist and the national poet of Cuba is a Communist?

Americans have been told very little about the realities of nazi history; had they a firmer grasp of that history—I make so bold as to say, if the President had a firmer grasp of that history—they would better understand—and so would he—that the path of anti-Communism is the path of anti-democracy and national disaster. When Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor, early in 1933—prior to a nazi majority in the Cabinet—the first proclamation of the new Chancellor, issued February 1, 1933, was one denouncing the Communist Party. The proclamation justified this act in these words:

If Germany is to live and see this political and economic recovery, and if she is conscientiously to fulfill her obligations towards the other nations, one decisive act is required: to overcome the disintegration of Germany by Communism.

For many Germans—too many—the aim of outlawry seemed proper, among other reasons because: “The Supreme Court had frequently enunciated that the Communist Party was illegal in its aims, that it was preparing for the overthrow of constitutional government by violence, and that its plans were sufficiently substantiated to justify outlawing the party whenever the government should choose to do so” (Arnold Brecht, *Prelude to Silence: The End of the German Republic*, Oxford Univ. 1944, p. 84).

New elections were set by Hitler for March 3, 1933; on February 27, the nazis burned the Reichstag, let loose a reign of terror, but *still did not get a majority in the election*. Charging, however, that the Communists had burned the Reichstag, the Party was officially outlawed, and all Communist deputies were arrested or otherwise barred from the Parliament; Hitler then had a full majority and proceeded with his “fulfillment”—in April the Social-Democratic headquarters were raided, its presses confiscated; on May 10, the Social-Democratic Party was illegalized.

Observe the extension of anti-Communist logic to foreign affairs under Hitler, and see how familiar the reasoning—even the words—appear. It is March, 1937; the Spanish Civil War is raging. The

interference by nazi Germany is notorious; this act, plus Mussolini's intervention, and the refusal by the Western democracies to assist the legitimate and recognized government are strangling the Spanish Republic. The United States Ambassador to Germany, William E. Dodd, confers with Baron von Neurath, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and asks about the Spanish situation. In *Ambassador Dodd's Diary* (N.Y., 1941, Harcourt, Brace, p. 389) is the result: the Baron bluntly said:

"We shall never allow the present government of Spain to win the civil war. It is Communism and we shall never allow that in any European state." That contradicted the peace idea with which he began the conversation. I said: Do you feel that no other nation has a right to govern itself, even foolishly? He said: "No, not when it involves Communism." . . . These Germans, even those who are considered liberal, seem to me never to think about the rights of smaller nations.

Quite apart from the fact that Baron von Neurath was wrong in calling the Spanish Republic a Communist government, in what way does the substance of the statement of the nazi Foreign Minister made on March 4, 1937, differ from the substance of the statement made by the President of the United States on April 20, 1961?

That intervention, in the name of anti-Communism, was the prelude to World War II; our Ambassador to the Spanish Republic at the time—Claude G. Bowers—warned his chiefs that the United States government's attitude, which in fact assisted in murdering democracy in Spain and in crucifying its people for a generation, might well lead to general war. The Left of the entire world joined in that warning; some years later President Roosevelt confessed to Bowers that his policy in regard to Spain was perhaps his most serious failure.

Present intervention, in the name of anti-Communism, in Cuba can have even more disastrous results; at the least it can bring our nation only shame and harm. Certainly, a foreign policy that favors Franco over Castro, and does this in the name of freedom, under the guise of "fighting Communism," is a foreign policy that exudes hypocrisy and promises catastrophe.

Blindness: A Class Affliction

All who have visited the New Cuba have reported the population overwhelmingly pro-Castro; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., visited some Latin-American countries, detoured Cuba and returned with the report that Castro's popularity was fading. This should have persuaded the President that the eye-witnesses were correct and the Pulitzer-Prizer was wrong, but apparently the President does not yet know Junior well enough.

Evelyn Irons, a correspondent for the *London Sunday Times*, completing a six-weeks tour of Cuba early in April, reported: "Solidly behind Fidel was the massive legion of the underprivileged." She notes the expectations in Washington of popular uprisings to follow the landings by CIA-freedom-fighters; that there were none came as a "shocking surprise," she notes, and ascribes this to "delusions" among officialdom.

Yes, there are delusions and these kinds of delusions mark all history. The rich do not know the poor; the oppressors do not know the oppressed; the masters do not know the slaves. The ignorance is one-sided; it is not reciprocated. The slaves know the masters very well. They study them and must know them—each foible, each weakness, each strength, each desire. The knowledge is needed for survival. But the master knows not the slave; for him the slave is a dog, an object, a "hand," a something from whose labor come profit and ease.

To the masters, the slaves, to the "elite" the "masses," are faceless, without will, stupid; they treat them like animals and decide they are like animals. This is a central weakness of exploiters; time after time it has been their downfall. They can do nothing about it for they are constitutionally, socially, by class position and function and by every rationalization so precious to them, unable to understand the deepest realities of their social order and the actual state of minds and hearts of "their" people. All these failings are intensified where racism enters, as it does in the "Yankee" approach to "colonials," to "underdeveloped" peoples—like Cubans.

In South Carolina, in 1822, several thousand slaves plotted to fight for freedom, and their meetings and discussions lasted months. The plot failed; scores of leaders were arrested; dozens were hanged. Among the leaders were three personal servants of the Governor of South Carolina. When told these slaves were impli-

cated, the Governor refused to believe; only when the evidence was incontrovertible, including defiant statements from the slaves themselves who said they went gladly to the gallows knowing that they were dying as enemies of slavery—only then would Governor Bennett admit that “his” servants were indeed implicated. They had bowed and scraped and served and fawned for him—in the required way—for months, and all the time they were recruiting and planning, and checking on the armory and dreaming of an end to bondage and never once did the great and mighty and brilliant Governor suspect it. And when he could no longer deny it, he ascribed it to the “damn Northerners” and their “intermeddling” and seditious talking about freedom; he could never bring himself to the truth—that the seeds of rebellion lay in slavery and that the slaves—“his” Negro slaves—might be treated like cattle or dogs but they were neither cattle nor dogs. You might brand a cow and that was the end of it; but brand a human and the fire may enter his soul and be transmuted into a burning passion for liberty. That’s the truth taught by all human history; but the exploiters will never learn the lesson and never believe that patent truth because they dare not and can not.

How many “shocking surprises” the deluded ones have had in the past; and how many yet await them!

American Traditions and Morality

The failures besetting United States foreign policy—with the most recent, the Cuban fiasco—are being explained increasingly on the grounds that the realities of the modern world and especially the perfidy of international Communism require a course of conduct and a code of behavior that are quite immoral. Such conduct and such a code, it is being insisted more and more often, come with extreme difficulty to the U.S. government whose traditions and behavior, it is affirmed, have been notable for decency, honesty and benevolence. This kind of reasoning is clearly implicit in the President’s insistence that Project-X training be intensified; others less burdened with official responsibility have made this point more explicitly.

Murray Kempton, for example, the acid-penned columnist for the *New York Post*, in assessing hostilely the CIA-planned and financed attack upon Cuba, says (April 21) that “for a nation with

our tradition, a crime is worse than a blunder." He thinks the "staggering incompetence" of the CIA may be due to the fact that "it is an immoral organization and that immorality in international affairs is not a skill to which this country brings much experience."

Persons having less worthy aims than Mr. Kempton have argued similarly; they have drawn the conclusion not that the filthy purposes should be changed but that more expertise and ruthlessness should be developed in applying the necessary means for their accomplishment.

The CIA failures lately, however, are not due to fastidious restraints resulting from noble traditions; they occur, rather, because the relationship of forces in the world today has shifted decisively away from the classes seeking to achieve CIA purposes; "pleasant little wars" such as those against Mexico where one-third its territory became "ours," or against Spain where Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam, and the Philippines became "ours," are no longer so "pleasant" and no longer have such delightful results; "lovely little excursions" such as those indulged in during the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, or in Vera Cruz in 1914, seem altogether out of the question in this New Era. So swift are the changes now, that even the overthrow of democratic-oriented governments in Iran and in Guatemala—which occurred only yesterday by the calendar—seem part of a lost epoch, like the bicycle-built-for-two.

It is important, however, that Americans get over their nationalistic vanity which leads them to believe that their government somehow—unlike all others—has recorded a past redolent of virtue. This will help Americans, who want virtuous policies, to fight for them with clearer vision; it will also help Americans understand why it is that the peoples of the rest of the world do not so evaluate our past.

For a nation whose past is steeped in the African slave-trade and is indelibly stained with two hundred years of chattel slavery, whose land was usurped from its original possessors through campaigns of systematic extermination, conducted for over three hundred years, whose order has been characterized by fanatic racism—to cut the catalog short—for such a nation to conceive of itself as the embodiment of nobility is another tribute to the distorting powers of nationalism.

That a virtuous past is being lamented as inhibiting the "realistic" requirements of a difficult present is all the more ironic in that

this lamentation is offered in connection with Latin America. Here the record of the United States government rivals for its innocence and purity the record of Belgium in the Congo and France in Algeria and Great Britain in India. As an introduction to the blessings of United States activities in Latin America one might read, for example, Gaston Nerval's *Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine* (Macmillan, N. Y., 1934).

Further, an important new book, just published by Doubleday—*Little Brown Brothers: How the U.S. Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn*, by Leon Wolff (N. Y., 1961)—should be required reading for those who, like Mr. Kempton, think that “immorality in international affairs” is alien to our government. Here is a documented story of greed, sadism, betrayal, torture, concentration camps, hypocrisy; a story of a “war of pacification” carried on by the United States government for three and a half years against a nation seeking independence, which resulted in the deaths of 220,000 men, women and children, of 6,000 American soldiers, the expenditure of \$600 millions, and the deliberate destruction of the homes and cattle of millions of people.

It is immorality, not morality, that characterizes the traditions of the United States Government especially since the days of slavocratic domination and the new control by monopoly capitalism. But traditions, too, are class things; and while there is the tradition of perfidy and oppression forged by ruling classes, there is the tradition of integrity and love of freedom forged by their opponents. These are the traditions of Thoreau and Garrison, Douglass and Debs, Du Bois and Foster—every one of them slandered and vilified and arrested. Traditions forged by the struggles of such as these have given what glory there is to the name “American”; those who seek that righteousness which really exalts a nation need but continue in the path they have made.

May, 1961

VIII. SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S VISION

Mr. J. W. Fulbright's opinions—at least when he does not discuss his native Arkansas—have been marked, on the whole, by a higher level of intelligence and a more informed grasp of the world's realities than are shown by most of his Senatorial colleagues. This, plus the fact that Mr. Fulbright is Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, make his opinions a matter of particular importance.

These views may be found expounded in an essay of some 9,000 words making up the lead article in the October 1961 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. This is the quarterly publication of the Council on Foreign Relations, whose editorial board includes such distinguished figures as Allen W. Dulles, John J. McCloy, Alfred M. Gruenther and George F. Kennan. Senator Fulbright's article is entitled, "For a Concert of Free Nations"; by this title the Senator conveys his main thesis: he wishes to see established in the present period an up-to-date version of the Concert of Europe which existed from the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the outbreak of World War I (1914). That which makes the Concert of Europe so attractive to Mr. Fulbright, is the fact—according to him—that it had to its credit "a splendid achievement," namely, "it kept the peace for a hundred years."

Apart from the historic truth as to the sources and functions of this Concert of Europe—which the Senator, I think, altogether misunderstands—this idea that the century from the final defeat of Napoleon to the onset of the First World War was one of peace, which is by no means confined to Senator Fulbright, is quite erroneous. It was, rather, an especially bloody century, even when compared with those that preceded it, in the fearfully bloody recorded history of man, coterminous as that history has been with the existence of exploitative social systems.

Let us begin our chronicle of the war-making of this Century of Peace by mentioning some of the better-known conflicts that ravaged Europe in that period: *The Crimean War* (1853-56) involving Britain, France and Turkey against Russia; the *War of Prussia and Austria against Denmark* (1864); the *War of Prussia and Italy against Austria* (1866); the *Franco-Prussian War* (1870-71); the *Russo-Turkish War* (1877-78); the *Balkan Wars* (1912-1913), involving Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Turkey. Then there were wars involving certain European and non-European powers and not having Europe as their main fulcrum, for example: the *Spanish-American War* (1898); the *Boer War* (1899-1902) involving the Dutch and British in South Africa, and the *Russo-Japanese War* (1904-1905). Then, still focussing on Europe, there were the bourgeois-democratic and national-liberation wars that inflamed the Continent in 1830 and in 1848, and that kept the Italian peninsula one continual battlefield for most of the 19th century.

One may add that Senator Fulbright is offering his vision under the title of *A Concert of Free Nations* to convey the idea of an alliance that is not only to keep the peace, but is to cherish freedom. Just as his model of the Concert of Europe was faulty insofar as it did not maintain peace (even in Europe), it is glaringly faulty insofar as its essential purpose was to maintain an oppressive and exploitative status quo. Its whole system was one vast exercise in violence, directed unrelentingly upon the disinherited of Europe—which is to say some 85 per cent of its population. It is at least ironic to see an American Democrat of the 20th century—a leading New Frontiersman, and spokesman for the intellectualized Liberal set—holding up as a “model” and an “example”—his words—the Europe of Metternich and of Bismarck, to cite the two leading figures respectively of the first and second halves of Fulbright’s Century of Peace. Of the first model, *The Columbia Encyclopedia* writes:

The Metternich system depended upon political and religious censorship, espionage, and the suppression of revolutionary and nationalist movements. His name became anathema to liberals everywhere. . . .

The second, epitomizing Prussian militarism and expansionism, would seem to be as incongruous a model.

I should think that from the viewpoint of liberalism, the contradictory character of citing the Concert of Europe as a model admittedly would be so glaring that no reply could be forthcoming. But in terms of the Concert as a model for maintaining peace, the reply might come from the Fulbright side that the list of wars offered in the preceding pages proves rather than disproves the point—that the 19th century was one of peace—for all the wars were limited both in areas involved and in time spanned. There is something to this, though the wars were fairly full-scale efforts, when the technique of that century is borne in mind. The main point, however, is not so much Fulbright's "carelessness" in ignoring the European wars that did occur in his "Century of Peace"; the main point is that Senator Fulbright equated Europe with the world. The main point is not that his rendering of European history was sloppy to the point of serious error, but that his ignoring of the rest of the world during the Century of Peace shows him to be so unable to see that one is appalled on realizing that he is a statesman with great responsibility. When one recalls that among many other American "statesmen," Fulbright is a giant, one can only shudder.

The fact is that while in the 19th century, Europe was sporadically devastated by wars and shaken by continual popular upheavals, the Great Powers there (plus the United States and Japan) were in the process of developing monopoly capitalism. Thus the 19th century—Fulbright's Century of Peace—is *the* century of imperialism's most methodical and brutal ravishment of most of mankind in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America. The preoccupation with this ravishment is one of the reasons for the merely sporadic wars fought on the European continent itself, as it is one of the reasons for the severely repressive measures taken against the home population.

Besides certain particular outbreaks of warfare, such as the American Civil War and the national wars of liberation waged throughout Central and South America, which also mark Fulbright's peaceful century, that period is filled with criminal wars of aggrandizement and repression, such as the U.S. war upon Mexico, the U.S. war for the suppression of the Filipinos, and the U.S. Army's campaign of extermination against the American Indians. Above all, Fulbright's century is exactly the period of imperialism's rape of Asia and Africa; just to list the wars carried on by Great Britain

in the Indian subcontinent would take a full page of this book. Sometimes the conflicts there were of sufficient scope so that they earned a precise name in Western texts—the First and Second Burmese Wars, the Kabul War, the First and Second Sikh Wars, the Sepoy Rebellion, the Afghan War, the Bhutan War—but generally speaking the British subjected that sub-continent to continual war. The same civilized behavior was bestowed by all the “advanced” countries upon China—the Opium War, the Chinese-Japanese War (1894-95), the Boxer Rebellion, etc.—not to speak of Africa with the French in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, the Belgians in the Congo, the British in Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya and Tanganyika, the Germans in the Cameroons, the Italians in Tripoli and Ethiopia, etc.

It is illuminating that Senator Fulbright is able to write of the Century of Metternich and Bismarck, of the Century of imperialism’s most horrendous assault upon the vast majority of humankind (colored, as that majority is) as being the Century which serves as the model for the kind of Century he would like our next hundred years to be. To be kind, let us ascribe this to inadvertence and ignorance; to whatever one ascribes it, Fulbright’s vision illuminates the fearful limitations of even the best among capitalism’s statesmen. It helps make clear why it is that the leaders of what Fulbright hilariously calls the “Free World” are less and less able even to converse with the majority of mankind, let alone to persuade them. These Western statesmen are living in a dream world (a dream world that was a nightmare for most people); they have no grasp of reality and this is why they are incapable of “taking the initiative” in the world as it really is today.

Basic to that world are the social systems of capitalism and socialism, but neither is so much as mentioned among Senator Fulbright’s nine thousand words. Fascism, too, is not in his vocabulary—it is no longer a “polite” word in respectable circles; it is replaced by a circumlocution that refers to the unfortunate results of “the excesses of nationalism”! Of the League of Nations, Fulbright finds that the British viewed it “as an enlarged and improved Concert of Europe” and that Wilson saw it “as a universalized application of the Monroe Doctrine;” then he berates the USSR for rejecting “the values which underlay both the Concert and the League”!

Of course, with all this, Senator Fulbright is able to write of the

Second World War that "the grand strategy of the war" was planned by the United States and Great Britain; surely this will surprise Heusinger, Speidel and Foertsch—to name only three military leaders of the "Free World"—who must vaguely remember being somewhat preoccupied with the Soviet Union, while in Hitler's service back in the remote years 1941-45.

We have not yet gotten to the main point in Fulbright's essay: it is that A Concert of Free Nations is needed because the United Nations will not do. He finds it ridiculous that nations like "Bulgaria or Guatemala" should be able to cast a vote—equally with a Great Power—in the General Assembly. At about the same time that Senator Fulbright's essay was making its appearance, the *Wall Street Journal* (Sept. 19) was editorializing in exactly the same terms and urging that the United States take a very long and very critical second look at the UN. Further, the National Association of Manufacturers at the same moment announced its withdrawal from an arm of the UN, the International Labor Organization, affirming that the ILO was made up of "pinkos and reds" and that "nothing could be accomplished there." What seems to be developing—just as the United Nations, now with its 100th member, approaches the state of really becoming a United Nations—is a concerted propaganda campaign in the United States against it. No doubt all this is of a preliminary nature awaiting the moment, which comes ever nearer, when the 700,000,000 Chinese people can no longer be kept out.

Also of outstanding importance in Fulbright's essay is the fact that in its thousands of words, ostensibly devoted to how best can be developed a concerted force for peace—having announced the UN to be worthless—there is not one word devoted to the question of disarmament! On the contrary, the assumption throughout this essay—by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, remember—is that a strongly-armed NATO would form the core of the "concert of free nations" that Fulbright proposes should, in effect, replace the United Nations. All this stands in the most complete contradiction with the public statements of the President of the United States—especially his statement before the United Nations. Yet this is the most recent and fullest expression of views coming from a very influential figure in the President's own party, and a potent force—so it has been repeatedly affirmed—in the shaping and implementing of foreign policy.

What Fulbright proposes, in his *Foreign Affairs* essay, is a *Pax Americana* to take the place of the *Pax Britannica* of the 19th century. But the *Pax Britannica* brought no peace a century ago; and a *Pax Americana* not only will bring no peace in this century, it is something that cannot be brought about at all in our era. Fulbright's *Pax Americana* does not differ in essentials from Henry Luce's American Century, projected just as the Cold War began. Both, postulating a world ruled by United States capital, project the impossible, lie at the root of the Cold War and, if persisted in, will continue to produce setback after setback for the U.S. government.

It is not *Pax Americana* that the world needs, but *Pax*. The road there is not through emulating Metternich and Bismarck; emulating them produced in our century Mussolini and Hitler. The road to peace is through negotiation, through strengthening a really representative United Nations, through terminating colonialism, through general and complete disarmament. On that road, mankind must go. There is no viable alternative to peaceful coexistence.

October, 1961

PART TWO

The Realities Tested: Areas of Crisis

IX. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE KOREAN WAR

"Today when the call for independence is given in the street, voices without number answer in response. In ten days and less the whole nation vibrates with its echo, and even the women and children vie with each other with no fear of death in their hearts. . . . Though you cut down and kill those who rise up everywhere, you may change the face of things, but the heart of it, never. Every man has written in his soul the word *Independence*, and those who in the quiet of their rooms shout for it are beyond the possibility of numbering. Will you arrest and kill them all?"

Such were the words of two aged Korean patriots, Kim Yun-sik and Yi Yong-chik. They were written March 27, 1919, in the midst of a great people's uprising and were addressed to His Excellency, General Hasegawa, Japanese Governor-General of Korea.

How did His Excellency reply to the question "Will you arrest and kill them all?" The answer is available: In 1919, says the precise record of the Imperial Police, 36,026 Korean men and women were killed and arrested, including the "bandits" who had presumed to ask the question.

And what had provoked this banditry? General Hasegawa listed the causes: 1) "German influence"; 2) "Bolshevik influence"; 3) "President Wilson's doctrine of self-determination for small nations, the full meaning of which the Koreans were apparently unable to grasp."

How trying "backward peoples" are! As the Washington correspondent of the *New Republic* (July 10, 1950) put it: "It is hard for us to face up to the difficulty a capitalistic democracy faces in trying to proselytize a primitive people." Yes, especially a people barred, on chauvinist grounds, from American citizenship, and

authoritatively defined in Webster's *New International Dictionary* in this manner: "Korean: A member of the native race of Korea . . . of an adeptly imitative rather than profound intelligence."

A people with a recorded history for four thousand years, a united nation for twelve centuries, astronomical observatories built thirteen hundred years ago, moving metal type for printing used fifty years before Gutenberg, iron-clad ships three hundred years before the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac*, their soil nourished by the blood of millions of martyrs to liberty—and arrogant rabbits mock them as "primitive."

Korea Under Occupation

When American occupation troops, under Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge, landed in southern Korea, September 7-8, 1945, the nation was already in the hands of People's Committees. In fact, a national convention with 600 elected delegates meeting in Seoul under the chairmanship of the liberal resistance leader Lyuh Woon-heung had proclaimed on September 6 a People's Republic and adopted a seven-point program. That program called for land to those who till it, the confiscation of the property of the Japanese and their collaborators, civil liberties, the equality of women, progressive labor legislation, an end to child labor and the wiping out of illiteracy.

General Hodge immediately announced that in the American zone (set by military agreement south of the thirty-eighth parallel) the People's Committees had no power, the national convention no authority and its proposals no force. He found, within forty-eight hours, that "the Koreans were the same sort of cats as the Japanese," restored Japanese officials, including the police, to their positions—"to prevent chaos," he said—and announced that "the Japanese are my most reliable source of information."*

For forty years the Japanese militarists had held Korea in bondage. The Korean language could not be studied in school, Korean history was not taught, all names were Japanized, Koreans were forced to worship at Shinto shrines, they were the last hired and the first fired, the last waited on and the most overcharged. Police

* A good account of these events is given by Richard E. Lauterbach in *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Summer, 1947.

arrested without warrants, there was no writ of habeas corpus, thought-control was universal, tens of thousands of patriots were tortured and killed, opium smoking was legalized, prostitution was institutionalized, girl children brought sixty yen on the open market. Illiteracy was rampant, the twelve-hour day was universal, three per cent of the families owned sixty-five per cent of the land, the Mitsubishis "earned" thirteen per cent net profits in Japan and thirty-three per cent in Korea.* After forty years of this unutterable torment—with the Japanese forbidding the word "devil" to appear in religious books, for as the censor said, "devil means Japan"—the American liberator returns the Japanese to office "to prevent chaos" and approves when Japanese police fire on Korean delegations!

For over two months this condition was maintained and then, after deafening protests, the Japanese were removed from civil posts and replaced by wealthy Korean collaborators and American personnel. One obtains an insight into conditions under this regime when he reads that Colonel William Maglin, American chief of the Police Division, remarked to an American reporter, in 1946: "Many people question the wisdom of keeping men trained by the Japanese. But many men are born policemen. We felt that if they did a good job for the Japanese, they would do a good job for us. It would be unfair to drive men trained by the Japanese out of the force." The same writer (Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary*) tells of being met in Seoul, in 1946, by an American officer: "The lieutenant spoke of the Koreans with contempt. He said they were dirty and treacherous. We were watching a flight of fighter planes cavorting over villages to the west. The planes dived in a mock attack, re-formed in the sky, and then dived on a new target. 'Psychological warfare,' the lieutenant said. 'That's the only way to show these gooks,** we won't stand for any monkey business.'"

In 1946 the cost of living index in the American zone stood at 1,400 times higher than in 1937, reported Professor George M. McCune in *Pacific Affairs* (March, 1947), and Dixie Tighe, of the *New York Post*, found Seoul jails jammed. And, she wrote on November 20, 1946: "The sorriest sight was children cooped up in one cell sitting on the floor shoulder to shoulder." No wonder that when

* The best single book, in English, on this subject is Andrew J. Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944).

** This chauvinist epithet seems to be an American invention.

in 1946 the American Military Government itself polled the residents of Seoul, forty-nine per cent stated they preferred the Japanese to the Americans!

In North Korea the Red Army did not find the People's Committees to be producers of "chaos." True, American correspondents earnestly viewing the scene from Tokyo and Seoul bars reported for months chaotic conditions, atrocities and merciless dismantling of Korean factories. It is certain that very few of the millions fed this poison ever saw the line appearing in the *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Summer, 1947): "Most of the wildest stories about the Russian zone atrocities have, when checked, proven untrue." And the two sentences that the American official Edwin M. Pauley uttered after visiting the area in 1946 were similarly well hidden: "There was little evidence of factory stripping. In fact, there was considerable evidence of efforts by the Russians to revive industry."

In North Korea the state apparatus was cleansed immediately of the Imperial Japanese and collaborationist parasites, and the People's Committees assumed power. In February, 1946, an Interim People's Government was formed, with the renowned Communist resistance leader Kim Il-sung as President. Three of the other leading government figures represented the New People's Party and the Democratic Party while of the ten members in the cabinet, three were Communists.

This government then proceeded to enact the "chaotic" seven-point program formulated by the Korean People's National Convention in September, 1945. In March, 1946, the basic land law was passed declaring*: "The mission of land reform lies in the abolition of Japanese land ownership, land ownership by Korean landlords (in excess of twelve and a half acres), and of land tenancy and of bestowing the right to exploit land to those who cultivate." Cattle and farm implements were also distributed to the peasants, and all debts due landlords were cancelled. As the result of this law almost two and a half million acres of land were distributed to over 680,000 peasant households.

Next, all banks, industries and means of communication owned by Japanese or traitors (in 1942, seventy-four per cent of all capital in Korea came from Japan) were confiscated by the People's government. In June, 1946, child labor was abolished; the eight-hour

* The full text of this law is in *Amerasia*, February, 1947.

day was decreed (seven hours for miners), two weeks paid vacation was ordered, pay for women was equalized and paid maternity leave (totaling sixty-seven days) provided. At the same time, the power of unions was enhanced and a broad, compulsory social insurance act passed.*

Finally, in July, 1946, women were granted full and equal rights in every respect so that in the universal, secret voting held in November, 1946, for members of the People's Committees, 453 women were elected. Culturally, the result was what may be expected when the energies of the masses are emancipated. Wrote John N. Washburn, interpreter of Russian with the U.S. Army in Korea, in *Pacific Affairs*, June, 1947: "During the Soviet occupation a cultural renaissance has been taking place in Northern Korea. A program of universal, free primary education was prepared in the fall of 1946. Many schools, both for children and for adults, have been opened. Theatres were built and several theatrical troupes were organized."

No wonder the late Professor George M. McCune of the University of California reported (*N. Y. Times*, October 27, 1947) that "Koreans in the Northern half were participating actively in their own government," and that Roger Baldwin, certainly no pro-Soviet witness, declared (*The Nation*, August 2, 1947) that "the Soviet occupation seems to have won considerable popular support."

The Rhee Regime

It is upon these newly-built schools and theatres, upon these newly-emancipated men, women and children that Truman's bombs are falling while MacArthur and Dulles desecrate the word freedom. The rule they seek to bolster befits them.

The Syngman Rhee regime has devoted itself, since 1946, to bolstering, for its American masters, the feudal-colonial social order of the Japanese epoch. The clique is made up of sadistic thieves who retained office for four years only because of the armed support of the United States government. The evidence for these assertions is irrefutable. Judge for yourself.

First, a glance at some of the personalities holding, as John

* The text of this enactment is in *Amerasia*, May, 1947.

Foster Dulles glowingly puts it, "the front-lines of freedom's forces."

There is Syngman Rhee himself—the "President." Of this gentleman, Dr. Bertsog, political adviser to General Hodge, remarked: "He is two centuries before fascism—a pure Bourbon," while James O'Connor Sargent, staff historical officer for the same General, found that "politically he stands somewhere between Chiang Kai-shek and the late Benito Mussolini." Rhee's top financial backer is Pak Heung-sik, described by *The Nation*, August 13, 1949, as having been, under the Japanese, "the leading economic collaborator." His Minister for Education is German-trained Dr. Ahn Ho-sang, "generally regarded by Americans here," reported the *New York Times*, January 25, 1950, from Seoul, "as using techniques modeled after those of Nazi Germany." In elaborating on these techniques, *The Nation*, August 13, 1949, reported that the distinguished educator "purged the school system of more than 2,000 teachers who were either inclined to the left or 'who did not make their political beliefs clear.'"

Rhee's Minister of Foreign Affairs is Chang Taik-sang. Chang had been chief of the Metropolitan Police of Seoul. What brought his promotion into the Cabinet?

Chang is one of those men Colonel Maglin had in mind when he referred to "born policemen." He, and his most trusted officers, "were trained in many Japanese torture devices and secretive 'thought-control' procedures," wrote James O'Connor Sargent in an *Overseas News Agency Release* on November 3, 1947. He used this training to "wantonly persecute Communists and their fellow-travelers, Socialists, Laborites, teachers, students and refugees." As a result when, in February, 1947, General Hodge called a Korean-American conference on the country's problems, continued Mr. Sargent, "American army officials and conservative and radical Korean politicians agreed that the police system maintained by the American command was responsible for many Korean grievances, and was the root of the anti-American feeling being generated among Koreans of the political Right and Left. The conferees, by unanimous vote, found Chang guilty of brutality, graft and political corruption, and recommended his immediate removal."

Not yet, however, had Chang earned his promotion, and therefore he was not removed.

For the rest of the story we turn to the American Military Gov-

ernment. The National Economic Board of the A.M.G. prepared, from time to time, lengthy studies under the general title, *South Korean Interim Government Activities*. Turning to issue No. 34, July-August, 1948, one reads, on page 213:

"Torture by members of the Metropolitan Police Force in January [1948] resulted in the death of the suspect. The National Police Detective Bureau began an investigation of the case, partly because of the constant feud between that Bureau and the Metropolitan Police. . . . This is not the first time that policemen in South Korea have tortured a man to death in an attempt to gain a confession. Such strong-arm methods, partly a hold-over from police methods during the Japanese occupation, are unfortunately all too frequent. . . . The man had been beaten in an attempt to gain a confession from him. When this failed, he was given the water treatment—water was poured continuously down the victim's throat. After three hours of this, the man died."

News of this event appeared in the press in July, 1948. An "investigation" ensued; no one was arrested. In August, Chang was made Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the head of the National Police Detective Bureau, Chough Pyung-ok, became Rhee's Ambassador-at-Large!

Rhee's Minister of Home Affairs is a man whose sensitivity seems to exceed that of Mr. Chang. We say this because the *New York Times* reported on February 1, 1950, that he had told the South Korean free press that: "The torturing of Communists by police is not to be criticized." This Peglerian statesman issued these instructions because, said the same issue of the *Times*: "Many Americans are horrified by the deaths by torture and wholesale executions of Communists. . . . A few weeks earlier the National Assembly had raised a hue and cry [in March, 1950, thirteen members of the Assembly were jailed!] over the number of prominent people who were dying under police and army torture. . . . Torture seems to be an accepted practice. . . . Escaped and recaptured prisoners allegedly were shot on the doorsteps of various citizens and left there apparently as an object lesson."

The leaders typify the entire regime. Annoying personalities,

like the liberal leader Lyuh Woon-hyeung (president of the 1945 National Convention) and the conservative Kim Koo (who favored national unity), are assassinated. A memorial service held for Lyuh in Seoul is dealt with according to the A.M.G. itself as follows: "Police broke up the meeting, arresting seventy-two [Laboring People's] party members and confiscating a number of documents." The jails are overflowing, with the Home Ministry reporting 36,000 political prisoners—"16,000 more than the capacity of the jails" (*New York Times*, September 6, 1949). And among them are men like Moon Eun-chong (the *Times*, October 21, 1946, in reporting the arrest of this nationally-known democrat said he had been one of the very few remaining leftist leaders "not either in jail or in hiding"), and Lee Seoung Back, secretary of the Railway Workers Union sentenced in the midst of a strike to eight and a half years in prison because he had delivered an "unauthorized speech."

Lee Seoung Back is but one of scores of imprisoned trade-union leaders, and the bona-fide labor organization, Chun Pyung, was driven underground late in 1946. Once again we may quote the official A.M.G. account issued in the summer of 1948:

"In April, 1946, the Tai Han No Chung was formed under the sponsorship of the extreme rightist group as a political counter-measure to the Chun Pyung. It remained generally unimportant until the general strike in September, 1946, when its activities in the back-to-work movement which ended the strike gave it favorable public support. . . . Police still assume the power of decision over whether or not union meetings can be held, their conduct and duration. Essentially rightist in political complexion, the police are reported in many instances to be favorable to Tai Han, favoring them to the exclusion of other groups and looking the other way, if not actually aiding them to gain their ends through strong-arm methods."

This is something of the background behind the remark of Allen Raymond in the *New York Herald Tribune*, May 5, 1948: "South Korea is obviously in the hands of Rightist groups bent on rule as arbitrary as that of Generalissimo Francisco Franco of Spain," and of Walter Sullivan in the *New York Times*, March 6, 1950: "Large sections of South Korea are darkened today by a cloud of terror that is probably unparalleled in the world."

Let there be no mistake about this: the Rhee regime is an American creation. South Korea, says Marguerite Higgins, in the *New York Herald Tribune*, June 26, 1950, "was in effect created by the United States . . . the governmental machinery was set in motion during the United States Army's postwar occupation, which ended last summer. The South Korean Army was trained by a 500-man American military mission . . . [her] economy has been under close American supervision. . . ."

Yes, for every tortured Korean patriot, for every violated Korean woman, for every famished Korean child the American ruling class, the American government is guilty.

In 1905 the United States, Great Britain and Japan secretly agreed to recognize specific areas of Asia as exclusive zones for respective exploitation. The Koreans were turned over to Japan and when their government appealed to President Theodore Roosevelt to come to its aid, as provided for in a treaty signed in 1883, the President dismissed the plea with the remark that "Koreans could not strike one blow in their own defense."

In revolt after revolt and in continual guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, the Koreans were to prove President Roosevelt wrong. It is clear now that he was not the last American President to be mistaken about the capabilities and the militancy of the Korean people.

As soon as the reactionary and imperialist nature of the American occupation in South Korea and of its creature, the Rhee clique, became clear, demonstrations, strikes, uprisings and guerrilla warfare appeared once again. These appeared, be it observed, in South Korea only—not in North Korea. Uprisings come from oppression. In North Korea the people ruled—therefore no revolts; in South Korea a new foreign master and new Korean traitors held power—therefore constant rebellion.

All Asia, all the colonial world, is in revolt. "No longer," says Mao Tse-tung, "shall China be an insulted nation," and every "insulted nation" from Korea to Nigeria vigorously assents. And for a generation the very fact of the existence of the liberated Eurasian land mass, the U.S.S.R., has sent its freedom-inspiring red beams into the hearts and hovels of the world's submerged masses.

All this, and the releasing of the Japanese yoke plus the fact that in North Korea freedom had come—the farmer possessed the

land, the woman possessed herself—made the life of the Rhee regime one continual war against its people. *The central aim in the people's struggle, the thread binding all together—except the treasonous Rhee clique—was the burning desire for national unity.*

In the fall of 1946, the spring of 1947 and early in the winter of 1948 gigantic strikes of scores of thousands of workers rocked South Korea and only mass murder and imprisonment terminated them. In April, 1948, after extraordinary police terror, the whole population on the island of Chyei-ju, off the south coast, rose in rebellion. Reported the U.N. Commission in Korea to the fourth session of the U.N. General Assembly: "With the aim of suppression, the Government sent large forces of troops to this island, but the disorders did not die down until the beginning of 1949. Military operations had not ended even on May 19 [1949]. Villages were reduced to ashes. . . ."

One of the regiments ordered to assist in this slaughter mutinied, in October, 1948, and rebellion immediately flared up. After days of fighting, the uprising was crushed, though many of the rebels joined guerrillas in the mountains.

An American photographer witnessed the government's "mopping-up" operation, and described the "questioning" of prisoners. Here is what he saw, as reported in *Life*, November 15, 1948:

"We watched from the sidelines of a huge playground with the women and children of Suchon while all of their men and boys were screened for loyalty. Four young men stripped to their shorts were on their knees begging. One had his hand up in a symbol of prayer. Suddenly these suppliant hands were crushed into his mouth and nose as a rifle butt smashed out his teeth.

"Behind them stood two men with clubs. They beat the kneeling group over heads and backs until the beaters, grinning, had to pause for breath. A policeman wearing black glasses and a Japanese helmet danced madly before the victims. Uttering staccato barks, he alternately spun his carbine butt forward and smashed a kneeling man in the face, then twirled the gun muzzle downward and feigned shooting. Finally, without missing a stroke, he charged like a goat, helmet lowered, and smashed the steel hat into the begging victim's head."

All the while, in the playground, women and children watched. "Wholesome" was the way John Foster Dulles described this "government" at the last July Fourth celebration in Washington.

The existence of the Rhee clique depended upon the suppression of the South Korean people, the pursuance of a policy of aggression against the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the prevention of Korean unity. Only this would merit support from American imperialism and without the master's support the creature would vanish.

None of this was hidden. The evidence of the suppressive nature of the regime has been presented. Its aggressive policy was also asserted with naked brutality. When and by whom?

The Seoul correspondent, Allen Raymond, of the New York *Herald Tribune* (August 5, 1949) declared: *"The one outstanding thing about the South Korean army, now it has been purged several times of Communist infiltrations, is its outspoken desire to take the offensive against North Korea. It wants to cross the border."* The United Press reported from Tokyo, October 31, 1949: *"Sihn Sung Mo, South Korean defense minister, said today that his army is ready and waiting to invade Communist North Korea but has been restrained by American officials. . . . 'If we had our own way we would, I'm sure, have started up already,' he told a press conference. 'But we had to wait until they (American government leaders) are ready. They keep telling us, No, no, wait. You are not ready.'"*

Finally, from Seoul on March 1, 1950, came this item (New York *Times*, March 2, 1950): *"President Syngman Rhee today told the Korean people that despite advice given by 'friends from across the seas' not to attack the 'foreign puppets' in North Korea the cries of 'our brothers in distress' in the north could not be ignored. 'To this call we shall respond,' he said."*

On the other hand, as Walter Sullivan reports from Hong Kong on June 26, 1950, *"The theme song of the official North Korean radio during the past year has been the quest for 'peaceful unification of the Fatherland,' that 'the warlike talk' has come from the Rhee group and that 'on a number of occasions Dr. Rhee has indicated that his army would have taken the offensive if Washington had given its consent."*

A necessary precondition for the achievement of a free Korea is the forging of a united Korea. Therefore the Rhee group as the

enemies of freedom have been the enemies of unity and thus, in fact, traitors. Here are the facts on the quest for Korean unification.

At Cairo in 1943, the United States, Great Britain and China, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea" declared themselves "determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." In the summer of 1945 the Soviet Union joined in this Cairo Declaration.

In September, 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union occupied their respective zones of liberated Korea. In Moscow, December, 1945, at the Soviet Union's suggestion, Great Britain, China, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the following arrangement: A Joint Commission of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was to assist, in consultation "with Korean democratic parties and social organizations," in the formation of a provisional Korean government. The Joint Commission and this provisional government were then to work out the details of a trusteeship for Korea which was to terminate, in not over five years, in the creation of a free, united and sovereign nation.

All organizations and parties in Korea hailed this arrangement with the exception of the extreme right, headed by Rhee. By February, 1946, Rhee was bold enough to assert publicly that "no one in General Hodge's office or in the Military Government is in favor of an Allied trusteeship" (*New York Times*, February 15, 1946). Official American denials could not hide the truth: American-Rhee determination to prevent the implementing of the Moscow Agreement. By December, 1946, as Professor McCune wrote in *Pacific Affairs*, March, 1947:

"Rhee arrived in the United States . . . to propose that South Korea be given independent governmental status and be admitted into the United Nations. His mission," McCune continued, "was opposed by moderate Koreans, and was violently denounced by the leftist groups." The professor remarked naively that the Rhee mission was "contrary to American expressed aims" and he therefore found it "surprising" that Rhee "was given air priority for his trip, was granted a long conference with General MacArthur and in other ways favorably treated."

Denials on the one hand and priorities on the other! The fact is that Rhee was American-picked and American-backed and the further fact is that the United States scuttled the Moscow Agreement and did within two years exactly what Rhee had sought.

In 1947 when it was clear the Rhee clique would never implement the Moscow Agreement, the Soviet Union recommended that all occupation troops be withdrawn from Korea and that its people freely choose their own government. Again all Koreans, except the Rhee traitors, hailed the proposal, but the United States turned it down and instead proposed the establishment of a United Nations Investigating Commission in Korea, to be followed by an election held with foreign troops present. This proposal the U.S.S.R. rejected.

Nevertheless, at American initiative the U.N. Investigating Commission was appointed and went to South Korea. This Commission itself *unanimously opposed the establishment of a national government in South Korea because, it said, that would "harden and perpetuate the existing division of Korea."* A bare majority did recommend an election for "consultative purposes," but said that before even such an election was held reforms were needed. "The police," said the Commission, "may arrest or detain a person three or five months, and it may be not only one person but a thousand people. They may even arrest ten thousand to fifty thousand people. . . . Any individual Korean is at the mercy of the police."

This report was made to the U.N. Interim Committee (the so-called "Little Assembly"—not even provided for in the U.N. charter). At American insistence this committee voted not only to hold elections in May, 1948, despite the conditions complained of, but to hold elections not for consultative purposes, as recommended, but for the purposes of erecting a Korean "government" as unanimously opposed by the Investigating Committee itself!

The Korean people were outraged. Even leading conservatives like Kim Koo and Kimm Kin-sic denounced the move, with the latter resigning as chairman of the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, half of whose members were designated by General Hodgel!

Meanwhile the provisional assembly in North Korea had called for the holding of a National Unity Conference at Pyongyang beginning April 22, 1948. This conference was attended not only by Northern representatives but also present, despite terror, were 240 delegates (including Kim Koo and Kimm Kin-sic) from fifty-seven South Korean organizations.

On May 1, 1948, this Unity Conference issued its proposals for a united, progressive Korea, general elections to be held in August,

1948, the adoption of a national constitution and the withdrawal of all occupation troops. This, reported Maxwell S. Stewart in *The Nation*, May 22, 1948, "not only won general approval in North Korea but substantial support from right, moderate, and left groups in the South."

On May 8, 1948, the U.N. election was held in South Korea. The presence of a terrorist governing body had been pointed out by the U.N.'s own committee and the additional conclusive evidence of this has been presented in earlier pages. The mass of South Koreans boycotted the elections and only thirty per cent of the electorate voted.

That summer, on the other hand, the elections called for by the National Unity Conference saw over ninety-five per cent of the electorate vote in the North and over seventy-five per cent vote in the South, despite, in the latter area, wholesale terror, arrests and murders. Thus was established the Korean People's Democratic Republic and its Assembly contained as many Southern representatives as Northern. Its President was Kim Il-sung; its Vice President, Heong Ki Doo, a Methodist minister; its Secretary, Kang Lang Ook, a Presbyterian minister. Included among its leading personalities were men like Oh Ki-sup, Minister of Labor, who had spent almost fourteen years in prison during the Japanese occupation and Kang Chin-kuan, president of the Farmers' Union, a veteran of nineteen years in continual confinement.

It was at the request of this Assembly that the Soviet Union began the removal of its troops from Korea in the fall of 1948, completing this action on Christmas Day. The United States occupation troops were not withdrawn until June, 1949, and even then 500 military advisers remained in direct supervision of Rhee's army.

During the ensuing year, as we have seen the New York *Times* admit, the Korean People's Democratic Government sought for peaceful unification. And despite the Rhee terror, pressure for this was persistently and openly applied in the South.

Thus, the Associated Press reported from Seoul on March 14, 1950, the arrest of thirteen members of the South Korean Assembly for supporting unity moves and demanding the withdrawal of all foreign military units. Despite this outrage, the majority of that Assembly favored, the same month, the curbing of Rhee's power through a constitutional amendment making the cabinet responsible

to it and not to him, but the necessary two-thirds vote (especially with thirteen members in prison) could not be obtained.

That the Rhee traitors had lost all support appeared in May when belated elections to the Assembly were held. With most of the Left underground, bona-fide democratic labor and mass organizations outlawed and the brutal police and other armed mercenaries supervising the election, Rhee still was defeated! Out of 210 seats, Rhee's clique captured forty-eight, the voters, reported the *New York Times*, June 1, 1950, supporting "those whom the police had persecuted, regardless of their political principles." Rhee nevertheless remained "President."

The Pyongyang government now pressed forward again with unity proposals. On June 9 it offered, as reported in the *New York Herald Tribune*, July 9, 1950, a five-point program for unity including direct negotiations between the Assemblies at Pyongyang and Seoul to begin June 15, national elections and the convocation of a united national assembly not later than August, 1950. The Rhee clique rejected this proposal and issued "a warning that any South Korean who responded to the invitation would be considered a traitor!" (Robert S. Allen, in *New York Post*, July 3, 1950.)

Nevertheless delegates from Pyongyang appeared with the proposals in writing, on June 11, at the designated rendezvous. They were met by a representative of the U.N. Commission to whom they gave the document. Upon parting, "suddenly, without warning, the South Koreans opened heavy fire" (*New York Post*, July 3, 1950) and arrested the Pyongyang delegation. This was reported by the U.N. representative to Lake Success, *but it was not made public in the United States until June 30, when American intervention in Korea was in full swing.*

What did the Pyongyang government do? On June 19 President Kim Il-sung announced that North Korea had "*made a proposal for attaining peaceful unification for the Fatherland through the uniting of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the South Korean National Assembly into a single all-Korean legislative body.*"

Remember Rhee's clique was not in a majority even in its "own" Assembly. It was desperate. What did it do? In the *New York Herald Tribune* of June 26, 1950, Homer Bigart wrote: "It may now be revealed that two weeks ago Korean Ambassador John

Myun Chang warned high officials of the State Department that his country was on the verge of collapse. . . . He pleaded for some guaranty of armed intervention by the United States in the event of war. . . . As a result of this plea, John Foster Dulles . . . visited South Korea a week ago."

At the same moment General Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Defense Secretary Johnson were in Tokyo conferring with General MacArthur. Then "a detail of American bombers, including the newest and largest types, was ordered to the Far East immediately. . . . Bradley and Johnson returned [to Washington on June 24] convinced that a new activist policy was essential. . . . Such a decision had been taken by a unanimous vote of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as long ago as last January" (Marquis Childs, *New York Post*, June 28, 1950).

On June 25, 1950, general fighting commenced in Korea.

On the Aggression

Who committed the aggression? "The evidence of aggression," says *The Nation* of July 8, 1950, is "unanswerable." And it finds the Pyongyang government "unanswerably" guilty. From the *New York Compass* through the Hearst press, from *The Nation* through *The Saturday Evening Post* this is the verdict.

What is the "evidence"? The Rhee clique and the Pyongyang government accuse each other. However, the U.N. Commission on Korea has rendered its decision and that supports Rhee.

But what did the U.N. Commission on Korea say? That Commission, with headquarters in South Korea, wired: "*Government of Republic of Korea states that about 04:00 hrs, 25 June attacks were launched in strength by northern Korean forces. . . . Pyongyang radio allegation at 13:35 hours of south Korean invasion across Parallel during night declared entirely false by President and Foreign Minister.*"

We find then that the U.N. Commission simply repeats and relays the assertions of the fascist Rhee and his erstwhile police butcher, turned Foreign Minister, and this is what *The Nation* finds "unanswerable"! Moreover, bear in mind that the U.N. Commission itself is pro-Rhee, and Pro-Truman, with its personnel comprising representatives from France, Turkey, Salvador, India,

the Philippines, Australia—and Chiang Kai-shek, including such savory characters as Yu-Wan Lin, formerly Chiang Kai-shek's consul general in Seoul!

The *New Republic* of July 3 has two more "arguments." It is absurd to believe that Rhee would attack a power "whose solid ranks extend all the way to Finland and West Germany." Why then should Pyongyang attack a power whose solid ranks extend all the way to Japan and East Germany? But the *New Republic's* clincher comes in its discovery that "the early fighting was almost all on South Korean soil." Correct. And *all* the early fighting in the American Civil War occurred on Confederate soil—but still it was not Lincoln who attacked Fort Sumter!

The fact is that the Rhee clique was a conglomeration of traitors in the pay of the American bourgeoisie. The further fact is that that clique, despite terror and torture, had lost all semblance of real power by June, 1950, and that it, with the promise and reality of American support and having nothing to lose, launched an armed counter-revolutionary and pro-imperialist assault upon *all* the Korean people on June 25, 1950. The entire people rose up and destroyed the power of that clique and its 100,000 Japanese and American trained mercenaries within five days. That is why "with great disappointment the Americans watched the virtual rout of this army, an army they thought one of the best in Asia" (United Press, July 7, 1950)—a "Korean" army whose officer corps, including its Commander-in-Chief, fought for the Japanese occupiers but five years ago! (Imagine a Nigerian army of liberation commanded by Churchill!)

And that is why Truman first sent planes and ships and then asked the U.N. if that was all right; that is why Truman drafted a note on Sunday, June 25, to the Soviet Union ostensibly seeking its help to end the fighting, but delayed sending it until Tuesday, June 27; that is why Truman first ordered full military sanctions against Korea and then got the U.N. Security Council—minus the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Republic!—to approve such action.

Yes, the evidence of an American frame-up in Korea is clear. Actually from the Foley Square frame-up to the Korean frame-up is a straight line. There is no reason why an administration which employs stool-pigeons to undermine civil liberties should hesitate to use Rhees to undermine peace.

The Stakes Involved

What does the United States hope to gain by this venture? First of all—Korea, and no nonsense about a Thirty-Eighth Parallel, either. As Rhee put it “The people of both North and South Korea are looking forward to an early liberation from Communist slavery,” and the *New Republic* chimes in: “It will not be enough merely to push the North Koreans back to the 38th Parallel.” In 1940 Korea mined more iron ore than Manchuria and she’s rich in gold, aluminum, chemicals, graphite, lead, zinc, nickel and tungsten. In the good old days investments yielded thirty-three per cent annually and 83,000 landlords owned two-thirds of the rich earth. Moreover, Korea was used eight times, in the past, as the base for major assaults upon China and Russia. Such a base would be handy again.

Secondly, Korea has served as Truman’s pretext for direct American armed intervention in Formosa (*i.e.*, in China), the Philippines and Indo-China.

In accomplishing this bare-faced assault upon the integrity and sovereignty of peoples Truman did not even attempt to obtain the approval of the decimated and terrified Security Council.

Thirdly, Korea has served as the pretext for further repression of all progressive movements in Japan, for increasing its armed force (“police”) to 200,000 men, for speeding the move to accomplish the open and full-scale rearming of the revived Japanese cartelists and for the demand by the United States, reports the *New York Times*, July 10, 1950, “not only to maintain military bases in Japan, but to move troops freely around the Japanese islands.”

Fourthly, Korea has served as the pretext for naked American intervention against the liberation efforts of all Asian peoples. Why block those efforts? The London *Economist* of June 19, 1948, tells us:

“Southeast Asia is today a region of primary importance in world economy as a supplier of foodstuffs and raw materials. . . . Above all, it is in part, and potentially to a much greater extent than now, a dollar earning area. . . . The conditions of developing still further this capacity to earn dollars and meet the world demand for food and raw materials is that stability

and order should be maintained in the face of nationalist demands."

The stakes at home are also of great consequence to the American ruling class. First—easy, quick and fabulous profits. Says *Newsweek* on July 10, 1950: "A localized war, possibly followed by other 'incidents,' would ensure heavy defense spending for a long time. That in turn would put a more or less permanent prop under the present high level of industrial activity. . . . Depression jitters should virtually disappear." Says the financial editor of the *New York Post* on June 27-28, 1950, as a selling wave hits Wall Street: "This was the selling of frightened people—not professionals, not big financiers. . . . The big boys weren't dumping on the plunge. . . . As I checked with top-notch financiers during the peak of the selling, I found them taking almost rueful pleasure in the debacle." And even this editor's stomach is turned by the response in the commodity market: ". . . there is something revolting about this week's commodity boom—so plainly keyed to disaster . . . speculators are having a field day. . . . There is something ghoulish about the handclapping . . . as the price advances pour fortunes in dollars and gold into the treasuries of the producing nations . . . there it is, a boom impelled by headlines of war. . . ."

Second—increased repression at home. Fifteen years ago when Pegler rejoiced at a California lynching, everywhere voices of protest arose. Now he demands we "shoot or otherwise put to death" all Communists. Whom he has in mind is clear when he expresses regret that C.I.O. organizers were not shot and when he declares on June 29, 1950, that the late "Governor Frank Murphy, the coward who later went to the Supreme Court, should have been tried and put to death." There is no cry of protest; on the contrary others join the lynchers. This is but symptomatic of increased attacks all along the line, as indicated by Truman's breaking of the railroad switchmen's strike on the avowed pretext of the "Korean war," and the indecent scuttling of F.E.P.C., basic to the Negro people's liberation movement. Above all—attack the crusade for peace by tremendous propaganda and by the physical intimidation and arrest of many collecting signatures for the outlawing of atomic weapons.

The program cannot succeed. The Seventh Fleet may patrol the seas around Formosa but what ships will patrol the veins of

the people of Formosa? MacArthur will search in vain for Russians in Korea, but the thirty million Koreans have made and will continue to make their presence felt.

"Even with the prospect of American aid," reports the Associated Press on June 22, 1950, "there is no end in sight to the costly war in French Indo-China." And the French have had an army of 120,000 (30,000 of them Nazi "volunteers") fighting the twenty-five million Indo-Chinese for almost five years. How many years and how many American lives does Truman intend to dedicate to the subjugation of 30,000,000 Koreans?

The Koreans and Indo-Chinese and people of Formosa together number "only" some 60,000,000. What of the remaining 600,000,000 now in various stages of their national liberation movements? "Before coming to the Orient," wrote Stewart Alsop in the New York *Herald Tribune* on June 22, 1949, "this reporter suspected that the new postwar Asiatic nationalism was largely a surface phenomenon. . . . It is nothing of the sort. It is a deep and universal force." Somewhat later Christopher Rand reported in the same paper (January 26, 1950): "Communism has rarely spread into Asiatic countries through outside force—a point diligently obscured by interested propagandists, but one that must be grasped. . . ."

That is why, as Walter Lippmann laments (July 4, 1950), the only great power which does not have troops fighting in Asia is the Soviet Union, but Communism advances, while the British, French, Dutch and Americans have hundreds of thousands of troops there and yet "have all but been ousted from eastern Asia." This is why, as Harold R. Isaacs states in the New York *Post*, July 5, 1950, the United States can win in Korea only if it engages in an all-out war "*that will inflict such damage on the country and its people as to efface, perhaps, the political fruits of any military victory.*" The true vista of fascism!

For this Truman calls upon American working people, American parents, American youth to die. Is this what the American Negro people will support? The *Herald Tribune* of June 28, 1950, finds a spirit in the United States "verging on enthusiasm," for the Truman-MacArthur frame-up. "Verging," indeed!

There is doubt, confusion, cynicism, fear; there is no enthusiasm. And as the casualties mount, as the truth presses home, fear will

turn to hate, and confusion to conviction and the American people will repudiate the ruling class' war.

An American's Duty

What is the duty of a patriotic American today? A person who loves this land and its people, a person who seeks dignity and equality and justice must join the ranks of Thoreau and Emerson, Lowell and Whittier, Lincoln and Douglass, Twain and Howells, Randolph Bourne and Eugene Debs. Each denounced robber wars in his day and each is honored for it today.

Over a hundred years ago four state legislatures—Rhode Island, Vermont, Massachusetts and Maryland—officially condemned the Mexican War, and Massachusetts called upon its citizens to arrest it “in every just way.” In fact, rising popular wrath induced the House of Representatives of the United States, after eighteen months of war but prior to the signing of a peace treaty, to formally resolve, in January, 1848, that the war had been “unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States.” This was carried by four votes and voting with the majority was Abraham Lincoln.

We cannot wait eighteen months. Already hints are put out that the atom bomb is to be used in Korea.

The Korean people—the Chinese people—all people have the right to choose their own form of government.

Stop the bloodletting in Korea! Withdraw all foreign military forces from Asia!

August, 1950

X. KOREA AND LIBERALISM

As part of the current reassessment of America's anti-Communist friend, Franco, Mr. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* reports: "In analyzing the political justice of Spain there are certain things that must be remembered on the 'good side.' Although the system as a whole is rotten and the people are frequently condemned to prison for no good reason, the prisons themselves are relatively good."

Sulzberger is expressing the classic role of American liberalism—the counterpart of European Social-Democracy—namely, to tidy up the ruling-class prisons. In a somewhat similar manner, Chiang Kai-shek, when declaring the Communists in open rebellion, remarked: "We have never attempted to castigate Communism as a theory or idea." He would not touch the brain—he would cut off the head!

The propaganda task of the American ruling class is to make a policy of enslavement appear to be one of liberation; it is to transform devastation into salvation, death into life. The problem is posed with varying degrees of frankness and clarity. Professor Howard S. Ellis of Stanford University, for example, puts it somewhat cryptically:* "We need a policy that is more sophisticated in its aims, more flexible in finding means and more convincing in its public justification." Clearer are the words of Dr. Charles Malik, Minister to the United States from that bastion of freedom—Lebanon. He finds the crucial need is a movement which is "revolutionary without being subversive." "If the Western world," he continues,** "can show a way to eradicate the shame and

* Howard S. Ellis, *The Economics of Freedom*, introduction by Gen. Eisenhower, published for the quasi-official Council on Foreign Relations by Harpers (1950).

** Charles Malik, *War and Peace*, published by the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. (1950).

scandal of poverty, of exploitation, of oppression, of greed, without resort to social revolution and class-struggle . . . then the necessity for communism would vanish."

The American ruling class would find it less difficult to discover water without wetness, fire without heat, humanity without struggle than the means—assuming the will—of ending exploitation without social revolution.

Clearer is Hanson Baldwin, military editor of the *New York Times*. Recalling Napoleon's dictum that a military outcome is decided by the sword and the spirit, Mr. Baldwin finds, in his column of August 21, 1950, that the American government has not emphasized sufficiently the spiritual aspects of its Korean crusade. "Bombs," he charmingly remarks, "are a bad way to win friends and influence people." Should we, then, stop hurling them? Perish the thought! Mr. Baldwin writes:

"In their extensive war against Russian partisans, the Germans found that the only answer to guerrillas, saboteurs and spies in the combat zone of a foreign country, was 'to win friends and influence people' among the civilian population. . . . But no such happy result can be achieved unless the population of Korea is convinced that we do not come merely [merely!] to bring devastation, unless these simple, primitive and sometimes barbaric peoples are convinced that we—not the Communists—are their friends."

Is it quite certain that, having invoked the Nazi as an exemplar, Mr. Baldwin will succeed in convincing simple, primitive barbarians of his friendship?

The Chief of Police himself swears to the Korean people that his sole aim is to see to it that they become "free, independent and united." He implores God to purge himself and all the other policemen of any possibly remaining bit of "selfishness and meanness." Just in case, however, that neither Mr. Baldwin's history nor Mr. Truman's prayers are efficacious, the House of Representatives adds sixty-two million dollars to the seventy-nine millions already appropriated for the Voice of America. Alas—the same week that the House votes sixty-two millions to strengthen the spirit, the Senate votes sixty-two millions to strengthen the Caudillo!

It is perhaps worth noting in passing—though one hesitates to insert so sordid a note—that there is one area of American life singularly devoid of a spiritual vocabulary. I refer, of course, to the market place, to that great arena of practical men and practical language, to that epitome of the American way, where men of business—"that all-consuming word"—carry on the activities that really matter. Here one learns—and the source, picked at random, is the August 4 issue of *U.S. News and World Report*—that with Korea, "Businessmen see . . . fatter profits . . . a chance to clean up . . . more money, fast," with only one fly in the pie—"if a real 'peace scare' should now develop, watch out." Did Mr. Truman mention meanness?

But returning from the mundane to the metaphysical—from the masters to the mannequins—how fares the spiritual crusade? Alack—ill is the report!

The Taiwan correspondent of the *New Leader*, Mr. Edward Hunter, relays, from "the reassuring upholstery of the sofa in a hotel bar," his conversation with "a man from Korea." The man has told Mr. Hunter of the ever-present guerrillas haunting the freedom-fighters. What follows is verbatim from the *New Leader* of August 19, 1950:

"How could they do so?" he was asked.

"Because the great rice bowl of Korea is full of pro-Communists," he said.

"Why can't the South Koreans infiltrate the same way behind the Communist lines?"

"Because they'd be betrayed and killed."

"And the same doesn't happen to the Northern troops in the south?"

"No."

"Why?"

"That's what's so hard to understand."

Mr. Hunter's prodigious intellectual capacities are equalled by those of Mr. Robert Trumbull, a *New York Times* correspondent in India. Asked to comment on the war of ideas in that strategic land, Mr. Trumbull reported on August 20, 1950:

"U.S. Information Service libraries in the major cities are popular, but American literature is scarce on the bookstalls, while Soviet books and pamphlets are plentiful everywhere. The Communists charge for all their reading matter, although only a few cents. This seems to make it more valuable than the free American material. . . . We suffer another disability in this propaganda war that the Russians do not. Indians do not like to feel that they are being propagandized. Therefore, American operations in this field are suspect and sometimes have an effect opposite to the one intended. But somehow the Russians get away with it. Probably that is due partly to the innate leftist tendencies in the Asians."

A war's character is revealed by the way in which it is conducted. The abracadabra of U.N. sponsorship does not and cannot hide the nature of the Korean war as being in origin a counter-revolutionary *coup d'état* engineered by a desperate and completely unpopular Rhee clique of traitors at the behest of its creators and maintainers—the American ruling class. And this—the way in which the war is being conducted—is the irrefutable reply to the verbal facade erected by the "liberal" pallbearers gathered prematurely for democracy's burial.

The *New Republic* (August 21) may lament MacArthur's "area bombings" as "a weapon of indiscriminate destruction," but the heavy-hearted mass murderer remains a mass murderer. Lewis Mumford may plead in the New York *Herald Tribune* for the greater efficiency, in a political and military sense, of old-fashioned artillery and infantry rather than B-29's and gasoline-filled half-ton bombs and atomic weapons and bacteriological warfare; but the techniques of an army reflect its politics, and the overwhelming inhumanity of modern imperialism's weapons mirrors the inhumanity of modern imperialism's nature.

In this "police action," American soldiers, says the New York *Herald Tribune* on July 13, "are understandably inclined to fire first and ask questions later when meeting any distinguished-looking Korean." In this "police action," writes Pvt. Glen Dupey of Tucson, Arizona, to his mother from Pusan on August 5, "We are instructed to shoot all Koreans we see . . . men, women and children." In this "police action," John Osborne reports in *Life*, we are "forcing upon our men in the fields acts and attitudes of the utmost

savagery" and information is extracted "by means so brutal that they cannot be described." This "police action" makes even the flesh of a Hearst correspondent creep. He himself feels "like a Nazi" in Korea and he describes the mental torment of an American "liberator" who finds that he is required to "kill the kids or get killed" (*New York Journal-American*, August 20).

From across the Atlantic, the *New Statesman and Nation* says on August 5: "The Americans . . . would have to destroy the country they are liberating, finding themselves in the end in the absurd position of having permanently to occupy it as a conquering army."

And why occupy it "permanently"? Because, writes Thomas J. Hamilton in the *New York Times* of August 24, after Korea is conquered—excuse me, liberated—"there is a strong probability of an over-all Communist majority if elections were held before the communization of North Korea had been undone, and before a United Nations reconstruction program had assuaged the bitterness of North and South Korea against the destruction of their homes during their liberation"!

In a word—to undo the land and labor and social reforms instituted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the imperialists of the world—led by the American government—must devastate the land, annihilate the masses of the population and permanently occupy the graveyard while transforming it into a base for more grandiose liberation efforts elsewhere!

Meanwhile, from the liberal camp followers—We will do it better! Please, more moderation! It is "not too late to save Asia!" Take from the Communists their slogans—let *us* give the land to the peasants, for land to the landless actually increases the number of property-owners.

Fifty-six times in one *Nation* article Vera Micheles Dean uses that indispensable, classless pronoun, "we." Miss Dean and MacArthur, Miss Dean and DuPont. "We" indeed!

During the American Revolution certain British generals suggested that were England to announce the liberation of the 650,000 Negro slaves the revolting colonies would be crushed. Why not? Because British industry and commerce was waxing fat on the enslavement of Africa, the slave trade and its million slaves in the West Indies. Because many of the wealthiest planters in the rebellious colonies were Tories; because the class interests

of the British government were reactionary and oppressing.

During the American Civil War certain Confederate officers urged the liberation of the slaves and their enlistment in the armed forces as a sure means of defeating Lincoln. Physically, Jefferson Davis *could* have written an Emancipation Proclamation, but ideologically, in class terms, he could not and he did not. The effective rulers of the Confederacy said that liberating the slaves might win the war, but it would not win *our* war. Programs are not haphazard; they are reflective of social reality, of class divisions. Slaveholders will lose *their* wars rather than liberate their slaves, because their wars are fought in order to enhance or ensure the possession of that property.

MacArthur and Rhee and Bao Dai and Chiang *are* the landlords, are the bankers. They and their class are and have been responsible for Charles Malik's "scandal of poverty, of exploitation, of oppression, of greed." This scandal is not extraneous to imperialism; it is not baggage to be taken or discarded by a traveler. The poverty and the greed are to imperialism what the fingers are to the hand. Landlords will fight for peasants, and bankers will fight for workers when Herbert Hoover fights for the release of Eugene Dennis.

The increasing brutality of American imperialism in deeds is reflected in a growing brutality in words. Joseph Barnes is correct when he reports in the *New Statesman and Nation* that "American liberals who back President Truman's action but want to strengthen it with a consistent political program with some promise of liberation and economic opportunity for Asiatics are now more lonely than ever if they dare to speak out." This is not because of deficient verbal skill; the increasing isolation is due to the more and more nakedly reactionary character of that program which therefore becomes increasingly intolerant of the slightest deviation from the desires of the ruling class. Thus, the more hideous the foreign policy the more repressive the home policy.

If the President declares himself ready to drop atomic bombs, why should not his Naval Secretary demand for the United States "a proud and popular title . . . the first aggressors for peace"? If the President violates the sovereignty of China, unilaterally places sea and air forces at Taiwan, invades Korea, sends men and arms to prop up decayed governments in the Philippines and Indo-China, why should not his Supreme Commander in Asia announce the

Pacific to be an American lake and demand "aggressive leadership" in order to impress "Oriental" minds?

MacArthur's "timing" may be off, as David Lawrence remarks in the New York *Herald Tribune*, August 29, but otherwise, he correctly points out, what MacArthur said "does not conflict with State Department policy." As for Secretary Matthews—a man, writes Hanson Baldwin in the *Times* on September 1, "noted more for his political loyalty than for his breadth of vision"—he is "always open to suggestion from his superiors" and his speech "was clearly a trial balloon."

The transparent demagoguery of Truman in these incidents in foreign affairs is paralleled by the Administration's policy in connection with domestic witch-hunting legislation. While ostensibly opposing McCarran's omnibus alien and sedition bill, Truman's whip in the Senate, Mr. Maybank of South Carolina, makes clear that the differences are purely tactical. Indeed, in the act of opposing McCarran's maneuvers he joins Republican Governor Duff of Pennsylvania in calling not for the registration of "Communists" but for their execution! Communists, said Maybank in the Senate on August 17, "ought not to be put under control, they should either be put in jail, or under the jail." And on September 2 we find the Trumanite Senator Kilgore of West Virginia proposing to "put all Communists in concentration camps," thus outgastapoing a fuming McCarran.

What has turned the American rich into frothing Cains who keep whipping their obsequious liberal lap-dogs?

Its impending doom accounts for this. Indian peasants prefer paying for its opponent's literature rather than accepting its own as a gift. Its selected "labor leaders" report that American policy in Western Europe "had damaged the morale of the workers and opened the way for effective Communist propaganda" (*Nation*, September 2, 1950). While Chiang Kai-shek "staged a mass execution of a thousand men" in Taiwan in the spring, still it is clear that in an emergency the people there would take "great pleasure in blowing up bridges and roads at the back of Kuomintang forces" (*New Statesman and Nation*, August 5, 1950). And over a hundred thousand ground troops, the entire American Pacific Air Force and naval power, plus important increments of power from Australia and Great Britain, have been unable to intimidate, let alone conquer, the people of Korea—of tiny Korea!

Meanwhile, according to front-line correspondents in the capitalist press, American troops persist in asking, "Why are we in Korea?" From twenty-five to thirty percent of drafted men still fail to appear. Arthur Krock reports that Congress' mail shows "the war is unpopular" (*New York Times*, August 27, 1950). Two million Americans sign the Stockholm Peace Pledge despite unprecedented intimidation. David Lawrence finds "the big problem now for President Truman and his advisers is home-front morale" (*New York Herald Tribune*, August 8, 1950).

Communist leaders have repeatedly pointed out that a bourgeoisie which moves towards fascism confesses its *weakness*. And where fascism comes, it comes not because of the strength of the rich but because of the division of the exploited. It is just here that the bourgeois-begotten liberal word-weavers play their key role of instilling doubt, nursing timidity and thwarting unity.

Marx noted that the will of the capitalists is unlimited but their power is limited. This was true when it appeared in *Value, Price and Profit*, but how much more profound and more significant is its truth in our day! The will of the rich, their greed, is indeed insatiable and faced by an ever-shrinking area to exploit, the lust drives them berserk. But the shrinkage lessens their power and enhances that of their enemies.

What a strength lies latent in the mighty American people and how the day of their awakening is feared by their deceivers!

October, 1950

XI. THE NAZIS COME BACK

"In a very short time conservative elements . . . will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe. . . . Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be welcoming Germany as our friend."

Lloyd George said that in the House of Commons on November 28, 1934, some eighteen months after the establishment of the Nazi dictatorship. His words reflect the policy of world imperialism without which there would have been no such dictatorship, no Munich, no Dachau, no World War II. And his words contain the continuing core of imperialism's policy.

This policy, with the breath-taking speed of desperation, has transformed the pledged program for the denazification of Germany into a calculated effort at the renazification of Western Germany. More and more this fact, this "fiasco of denazification," as Professor John H. Herz of Howard University put it,* is openly admitted—if not trumpeted—by the American ruling class. Thus, a dispatch from Munich, in the *New York Times* of November 30, 1949, begins: "It is very important to recognize that renazification [observe—"renazification"!] has left Bavaria largely in the 'hands of those who controlled it under Hitler.'" And further along one finds: "Bavaria is not alone. Investigation in the other states of the United States zone reveals a resurgence of nazism." Or, again, a dispatch from Stuttgart, in the *New York Herald Tribune* of January 13, 1950, refers to "the cynicism and contempt in which the denazification process has foundered," while Telford Taylor, formerly a Brigadier-General, and successor to Justice Jackson as Chief of Counsel for War Crimes at Nuremberg, categorically notes

* See his illuminating article in *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1948.

"the failure of the denazification program" which "started out a 'noble experiment,' but ended up a sour joke" (*New Republic*, January 30, 1950).

Indeed, the failure of the denazification program in Western Germany is so frequently acknowledged that its original contents are in danger of being forgotten. It would be well, therefore, to review briefly what that program was. The program for the denazification of Germany is a legal obligation undertaken by the United States government (together with the governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union) in two treaties signed by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and ratified by the Senate. The treaties were signed at Yalta in February, and at Potsdam in August, 1945.

At Yalta the signatories unequivocally asserted

Our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazism . . . to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people . . . enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice.

At Potsdam all this was reiterated and even more explicitly it was agreed

permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism . . . to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda . . . German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines . . . the judicial system shall be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy . . . all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part [in political life]. . . .

Between the signing of these two treaties, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to General Eisenhower in April, 1945 a

directive on the military occupation of the American zone of Germany. This document is crystal-clear in defining the denazification program. Here the aim of wiping out the Nazi party is not only repeated but the General is told to prevent "the reconstitution of any such organization in underground, disguised or secret form." And the defining and implementing sections of this directive merit lengthy quotation:

"All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities, all active supporters of Nazism or militarism and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes will be removed and excluded from public office and from positions of importance in quasi-public or private enterprises such as (1) civic, economic and labor organizations, (2) corporations and other organizations in which the German government or subdivision have a major financial interest, (3) industry, commerce, agriculture, and finance, (4) education, and (5) the press, publishing houses and other agencies disseminating news and propaganda.

"Persons are to be treated as more than nominal participants in Party activities and as active supporters of Nazism or militarism when they have (1) held office or otherwise been active at any level from local to national in the Party and its subordinate organizations, or in organizations which further militaristic doctrines, (2) authorized or participated affirmatively in any Nazi crimes, racial persecution or discriminations, (3) been avowed believers in Nazism or racial and militaristic creeds, or (4) voluntarily given substantial moral or material support or political assistance of any kind to the Nazi Party or Nazi officials and leaders. No such persons shall be retained in any of the categories of employment listed above because of administrative necessity, convenience or expediency."

With these three documents in mind one who examines what has actually been done, in the ensuing five years, in Western Germany will realize the extent to which avowed aims have been betrayed and legal obligations flouted.

The building of the Nazi monster by international finance capital had as its declared, basic aims the crushing of Marxism in Germany and its neighbors and the forging of an anti-Soviet

spearhead. "The whole of American policy during the liquidation of the Armistice," wrote Herbert Hoover in 1921, "was to contribute everything it could to prevent Europe from going Bolshevik." Two years later General Hoffmann, the "hero" of Brest-Litovsk, remarked to the British Ambassador in Berlin: "Nothing can go right in the world until the civilized Powers of the West come together and hang the Soviet government." The London *Daily Mail* editorialized (November 28, 1933): "The diversion of Germany's reserves of energies and organizing ability into Bolshevik Russia would help to restore the Russian to a civilized existence."

During World War II clear evidences began to appear of the intent of the rich to revive Nazism as part of their strategic determination to destroy the Soviet Union and to bury socialism. If, in doing this, one could also gain financial advantages over competing imperialism, so much the better. When to all this is added the compulsion to preserve and extend the one and a half billion dollars invested by American corporations in Germany in 1939 (the Treasury Department reported in 1943 that 171 United States corporations had *controlling* interests in German industry amounting to nearly half a billion dollars) then this ultimate betrayal of humanity becomes comprehensible.

Thus it is that the well-known super-sensitive heart of Herbert Hoover moved him to declare back in 1942 that "there can be no real reparations," to decry "this endless treadmill of punishment," and to warn against "victory with vengeance."*

Meanwhile the principals in the strange drama were acting out their parts unbeknown to the audience. During the war the Nazi official who was Alien Property Custodian of the Reich was a Dr. Caesar. His correspondence, subsequently captured by American troops, contains touchingly friendly letters from numerous French, British and American financiers. One is dated January 15, 1943, and came from a Mr. Lecestre of the House of Morgan. Among other things Mr. Lecestre asked for kindly attention since "Mr. Morgan never admitted Jews as associates or fellow-workers." Moreover, "The Morgan House has been frequently found in its business in opposition to the great Jewish banking houses in the

* Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson, *The Problems of Lasting Peace* (N. Y., 1942), p. 247.

United States such as Kuhn, Loeb & Co. As to *Morgan et Cie.*, Paris, the personnel, since the foundation of the bank in 1868, has never included a Jew.”*

By the summer of 1943 another carefully manicured beast—the Nazi Ambassador to Turkey, Von Papen—was urging “that every possible move should be made to save German industry and military power for the future,” while in April, 1945, the U. S. Department of State announced that:

“Nazi Party members, German industrialists, and the German military, realizing that victory can no longer be attained, are now developing postwar commercial projects, are endeavoring to renew and cement friendships in foreign commercial circles and are planning for renewals of pre-war cartel agreements.”

How potent these “friendships” were became apparent very soon. The American chief counsel for the prosecution at the Nuremberg trials, General Telford Taylor, was told as early as July, 1946, by *Secretary of State Byrnes*, that the United States did not favor the trial of leading Nazi businessmen. Yet the distinguished freedom-fighter from South Carolina remarked that, “The United States cannot afford to appear to be in the position of obstructing another trial.” Still, he added—so subtly!—that should “the plans for a second trial break down” that would be “well and good.” At the same time, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, chief American prosecutor at the first Nuremberg trial, favored President Truman with a secret memo: “I also have some misgivings as to whether a long public attack concentrated on private industry would not tend to discourage industrial cooperation with our government in maintaining its defenses in the future while not at all weakening the Soviet position, since they do not rely upon private enterprise.”

Dr. Schacht, Hitler’s chief financial adviser, knew of what he was speaking when he gloatingly declared, in October, 1946, upon his release by the International Military Tribunal, over Soviet protests:

* Drew Pearson attempted to print this and related material in his column but pressure from Morgan and Chase National Bank prevented that. Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas published it in the *Congressional Record*, May 5, 1945 and excerpts appeared in *Jewish Life*, March, 1950.

"If you want to indict industrialists who helped Germany rearm, you will have to indict your own, too."

We are prepared now to examine concretely how the United States has carried out the obligations of Yalta and Potsdam in Western Germany. The basic betrayal was expressed with great frankness by the London *Times* on October 21, 1947:

"Most of the confusion [!] of the last two years derives from the abandonment of the policies of reform. . . . Little or none of the promised land reform has been carried out. The transfer of heavy industry to public ownership is still a matter of words. Nothing decisive has been done to destroy great concentrations of industrial power like the Steel Union. . . ."

That's the crux of the matter. In the Western zones, where some fifty million Germans live and where seventy per cent of Germany's industrial capacity is located, nothing has been done to eliminate the generations-old domination of financiers, industrialists and landlords.

The personalities selected or approved by the United States to administer its zone demonstrate that the intent was betrayal. General Lucius D. Clay, the professional soldier from Georgia, has as much sympathy for the necessities of present-day democratic government as has that military Humphrey Bogart, General Frank Howley, who was his chief assistant in Germany. General Clay has belligerently remarked that his earliest recollections go back to the "horrors" of radical reconstruction in the post-Civil War South as perpetrated by "thievish carpetbaggers" and he was determined that "Americans were *not* to be carpetbaggers anywhere in Germany!" (New York *Herald Tribune*, Jan. 30, 1950.) No, he was going to "spare" Germany even aborted Reconstruction and institute a modern analogy of K.K.K. counter-revolutionary administration at once!

General Howley was the perfect overseer for this Bourbon plantation owner. Only the script of some Grade-C Hollywood tripe could equal the uncouth, chauvinistic, arrogant and gross language of his book, *Berlin Command*, which was singled out for recommendation by the President in his exclusive interview with Arthur Krock of the New York *Times* (Feb. 15, 1950).

And the civilians? High Commissioner John J. McCloy, for-

merly chief of the World Bank, was a member of two major Wall Street law firms—Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, and Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood—the latter having represented I. G. Farben and its affiliates in the United States. Mr. McCloy is also one of the largest shareholders in the Gillette Company, which in 1949 took over the Zollenwerke Corporation in Western Germany. McCloy's chief counsel has been Chester A. McClain, who is also a partner in the Cravath, etc., law firm, and was chief counsel for Bethlehem Steel. The E.C.A. (Marshall Plan) representative in Western Germany is Norman H. Collison, formerly attorney for United States Steel.

During the two crucial years of 1945-1946, there were five American members of the Economics Directorate of the Allied Control Council. Who were they? Brigadier-General William F. Draper of Dillon, Read; R. J. Wysor, former president of Republic Steel, was supervisor of the steel industry in the U.S. zone; E. S. Zdunek, head of Antwerp division of General Motors, was supervisor of the engineering industry; Philip Gaethke, prewar manager of Anaconda interests in Upper Silesia, was supervisor of the mining industry; and P. P. Clover, an executive of Socony-Vacuum Oil, was supervisor of the oil industry.

Typical, too, were the five American members, in 1949, of the Steel Commission of the Bizonal Economic Administration: Four—W. J. Brinkerhoff, W. P. Naumann, Ronald Clark and I. F. Elliott—were from United States Steel; the fifth, F. M. Dillies, was from Inland Steel Corporation.

The German administrators and officials serving with these Americans are of a fitting character. Thus, associated with the last-named five American steel tycoons in running the great Ruhr steel concentration are twelve Germans, typical of whom are Herman J. Abs, director under Hitler of the Deutsche Bank; Guenther Sohl, director under Hitler of Krupp and United Steel Works (Vereinigte Stahlwerke); and Heinrich Dinkelbach, another director of United Steel Works, described by the *New York Times* (Feb. 25, 1949) as "sponsor and financial contributor to the Nazi S.S."

Dr. Theodor Heuss, President of the German Federal Republic, was a prominent office-holder of the Right before Hitler, and as a Reichstag deputy voted in 1933 for the enabling act that gave Hitler his dictatorial powers. The Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, a leading post-World War I nationalist, was a director of

the Deutsche Bank between wars. His Minister of Finance is Fritz Schaeffer, described by the *New York Times* (September 21, 1949) as "former Minister President of Bavaria who was dismissed by the United States Military Government for obstructing denazification."

Occasionally there appears an interesting and delightfully cozy family relationship between these American and "denazified" German office-holders. Notable is the fact, for example, that Chancellor Adenauer's wife was born Gussie Zinsser, who is a first cousin to High Commissioner McCloy's wife (born Ellen Zinsser), who in turn is the sister of the wife (born Peggy Zinsser) of the American Ambassador to England, Lewis W. Douglas. Mr. Douglas is a director of the House of Morgan, while Peggy and Ellen are sisters of the American tycoon, John Sharman Zinsser, another Morgan director and president of the pharmaceutical trust, Sharp & Dohme. Friendly, isn't it?

It should surprise no one, then, to see how solicitous the Truman administration has been of the great industries—especially the steel industry—of Germany, notwithstanding the explicit commitments of Yalta and Potsdam. Shortly after hostilities ceased, the United States Military Government appointed a mission, directed by Professor Calvin B. Hoover, to investigate the German economy. This mission asserted in September, 1945, that the Potsdam agreement on reparation and disarmament was unrealistic, recommended the restoration of German exports to the pre-war level (by implication calling for the rebuilding of industry), and specifically proposed that German steel production be set at ten million tons a year, not at three million (used by Germany in 1932 for domestic consumption) as proposed by the Soviet Union.

This proposal was excessive for the moment and a total of just under six million tons was set. In 1947, the Marshall Plan was unveiled and, as the *New York Times* (July 14, 1947) put it, "the Ruhr is the central feature of American economic planning." By November, 1947, the figure for the West German steel industry was put at over eleven million tons, while in April, 1948, the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid was urging that:

"The utmost effort should be made to maximize the western German steel industry's contribution to relief of Western Europe steel shortages. This will involve (a) reducing planned

German exports to non-participating areas, especially the Soviet zone, to the extent feasible; (b) raising German steel output at the most rapid possible rate."

In March, 1949, another American mission recommended German steel production be lifted to fourteen million tons at once with the longer-range goal set at seventeen millions. In November of that year the Western Powers informed the Bonn government it need not dismantle the Thyssen works or key synthetic rubber and oil plants and could begin establishing shipbuilding yards.

Accompanying this has gone the campaign looking toward remilitarization. Pioneering in this regard was the pseudo-official spokesman for the Department of Defense, Mr. Hanson Baldwin. In the *New York Times* of September 29, 1948, in a sentence reeking with authoritativeness, he wrote: "Sooner or later we must come to grips—whether we like it or not—with the utilization of German manpower for defense of the West and to help to restore the balance of power in Europe." A year later Senator Elmer Thomas of the Appropriations Committee announced himself as ready to consider the organization of "a certain number of German divisions" and *Newsweek* found Germany to be "the main source of continental manpower."

By December, 1949, Field Marshal Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, comes to West Point to announce, "If you tell me to rearm Germany, I will do it in a way that is safe." The way? "Western Germany must be rearmed for defensive warfare under Allied command." The next day (December 4, 1949) Dr. Adenauer mimics, at Bonn: "If the Allies demanded that we should take part in the defense of Western Europe, I should be in favor, not of an independent Wehrmacht, but a German contingent in a European force."

The year 1950 begins with a dispatch from Frankfurt in the *New York Times* (January 14) which blandly announces: "A group of German generals and staff officers has informed Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal republic, that Germany's minimum requirements in the event of rearmament are one infantry division by June of this year and the addition of an armored corps by 1951, it was learned today from an unimpeachable source." And not only is the German General Staff back at work for Germany but Nazi General Guderian prepares a "blueprint for a United States General

Staff at the request of the United States Army" which is blithely printed in *U.S. News and World Report* (February 10, 1950)! And General Clay, when asked by *Life* (February 20, 1950): "Do you think Germany should again have a standing army?", coyly replies: "Two facts seem plain enough. One: the West German people are entitled to some security against aggression. Two: the military occupation that now provides that security cannot be expected to endure for all time."

What of the actual process of denazification as applied to individuals? In March, 1946, the task was turned over to German authorities and thereafter greater and greater loopholes, amnesties and exceptions appeared. Early in 1948 General Clay urged that the job be concluded by the summer of that year.

The overall figures to June, 1948, show that in Western Germany nearly thirteen million persons were registered for investigation, of whom over nine millions were immediately dismissed. Of the remainder, almost two and a half million were given amnesty without trial and about 800,000 were tried. Nearly forty per cent were exonerated, fifty per cent were classified as "followers," and one-tenth of one per cent were classified as "major offenders." These are the figures for the lower courts; on appeal less than thirty per cent of the classifications and punishments were confirmed. Of those convicted, the vast majority (eighty per cent) were *finéd less than a thousand marks* and as of December, 1949, there were throughout Western Germany, 250 people in jail for Nazi activities and atrocities!

Who are the people exonerated, lightly fined or jailed for a few months? In addition to such relatively well-publicized figures as Dr. Schacht and Ilse Koch, the names include: Simpfendorffer, a Nazi Minister of Education—freed; Hildebrandt, head of the foreign-labor branch of the Nazi Labor Ministry—fined 250 marks; S.S. Major-General Klepfer—classified a "minor offender"; S.S. Lieutenant-General Wolff, chief of all Gestapo activities in Italy—given a four years' sentence and released four days later because of his prior internment. People like Ernst Bohle, head of the Nazi Party's Foreign Office, and Josef Altstoetter, S.S. representative in Hitler's Ministry of Justice, have been freed after serving about two years. Here are other choice tidbits, selected more or less at random: *Exonerated were*: the former Dean at Bonn University, a member of the S.S. and S.D. and an informer for Himmler; a Director in

the Reich Interior Ministry, 1933-1943. *Fined less than a thousand marks were:* the former deputy police president at Nuremberg who organized the 1938 pogrom there; the Mayor of Augsburg, 1935-1945; Saar District President and subsequent Mayor of Vienna; the Nazi physician responsible for execution of the sterilization law.

Perhaps the most fitting epitaph on this almost incredibly sordid tale is the one-inch story sent by United Press from Munich, February 23, 1950, which said: "The Bavarian Denazification Ministry was ordered closed. . . . Ministry officials said the closing was necessary because no funds for denazification had been included in the 1950-51 budget."

No wonder the Bavarian Minister of Economics, Dr. Rudolf Zorn, found the courage to declare in June, 1947, in the presence of United States Military authorities, that the Jews in D.P. camps "can be compared to the most vicious of the insects that infest the German body." No wonder Wolfgang Hedler, a deputy of the Bonn parliament, becomes a hero when a court acquits him though he remarked "that the sending of Jews to the gas chamber may have been the right course," and that the Deutsche Recht Party wires him: "Congratulations on your acquittal under which the Right holds its own against the pressure of the street" (New York *Herald Tribune*, February 16, 1950).

The American press reports "a total of about eight million voters, one-third of the electorate, ready to support many of the same things Hitler stood for" (*U.S. News and World Report*, March 3, 1950); while the A.M.G. itself notes that its opinion survey shows some fifty-six per cent of the population in its zone felt, as of 1949, that Nazism was "a good idea, only badly carried out."

This mental reflection of the material counter-revolution engineered by American imperialism is stimulated deliberately. It is the American overlords who have seen to it that sixty per cent of the judges and seventy-six per cent of the public prosecutors of Bavaria are former Nazis, so that, as Telford Taylor reports, it is considered "unpatriotic" now to have been anti-Hitler! It is the American overlords who placed the Nazi author of *Race Hygiene*, Dr. Karl H. Bauer, over Heidelberg University as its rector, and put the former director of Hitler's Berlin Propaganda and Information Service in charge of the University of Mainz. Those overlords have seen to it that the West German school texts contain nothing on

German or European history since the First World War (*New Republic*, January 30, 1950); they are responsible for the fact that there are "more Nazis in German schools today than in 1945" (*New York Times*, April 27, 1949); upon them is the guilt for the fact that only six per cent of the West German children "are permitted to enroll in special, privileged schools" and that the remainder do not go beyond the fourth year in the public school system (*New York Times*, January 27, 1950).

Today, reports Drew Middleton from Munich, many of the Bavarian newspapers are "owned and edited by the same men who owned and edited them under Hitler" (*New York Times*, December 1, 1949), and the best-sellers, the "big-name" writers are Hans Jost, former S.S. officer, president of the Hitler Academy of Poetry and creator of the noble line: "Whenever I hear the word 'culture' I take the safety-catch off my revolver," and Frederick Blunck, former President of Hitler's Literary Chamber of the Reich, and Pauli Hitler who states in her book, *Mein Bruder Adolf*, that her late brother "was the friend of little children"!

The line now is, as expressed by High Commissioner McCloy, to promise to deal "with any *serious* resurgence of German Fascism" (*New York Herald Tribune*, January 26, 1950—my italics). Now men like General Clay and Henry Byroade, Director of the Bureau of German Affairs of the Department of State, like to stress the need for a *gradual* elimination of Nazism, and to insist that this process cannot be legislated, cannot be "forced," and that it is "undemocratic" to *repress* fascism—i.e., to do what was pledged at Yalta and Potsdam.

This re-writing of the explicit provisions of Yalta and Potsdam, this "gradualism," this waiting for "serious" evidences of Nazism, represents in this instance—as the policy of gradualism always does—a policy of the active fostering of reaction.

Its policy is a sign of weakness and of desperation. It faces throughout the world the rising forces of peace, democracy and socialism.

And in the eastern sector, in the German Democratic Republic, it faces the fact that the Junkers and financiers are crushed and the former top Nazis dead or jailed. Thus, Professor Herz states that "as to the Soviet zone . . . denazification . . . was used to eliminate social groups like big land owners and industrialists, i.e., groups which to a large extent had been responsible for the access

of Nazism to power," though he feels the "political use" to which the policy was put "precludes it from being called genuine denazification." Denazification is "political," and if "genuine denazification" does not mean the elimination from power of those classes and forces "responsible for the access of Nazism to power," it does not mean anything.

The facts about the deliberate rebuilding of Nazism in Western Germany by the Truman Administration must be brought to the American people. The evidence of the betrayal of Yalta and Potsdam would help greatly in driving that Administration from public life. It would help, too, in convincing the American people that it was high time they took their destiny out of the hands of the McCloyes and the Achesons.

April, 1950

XII. THE GERMAN QUESTION

"How does it become a man to behave toward this American government today? I answer that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it."—Henry David Thoreau, 1849.

U.S. Policy: Then and Now

On January 7, 1959, the Department of State issued a Memorandum entitled: "The Soviet Note on Berlin—An Analysis." There the Department summarizes what it alleges to be the purposes and commitments entered into by the United States *vis-à-vis* Germany during World War II, in these words:

In wartime agreements the Allied nations stated two fundamental policies: they pledged to defeat the enemy, and they declared they would strive for recovery from the war, continuing wartime cooperation.

This presentation of alleged wartime commitments was made by the State Department in reply to Soviet insistence that they required an anti-fascist and anti-militarist policy, that this had not been pursued by the United States and that, therefore, arrangements entered into on the basis of those commitments needed thorough re-examination.

These versions contradict each other; while neither need be true, it is certain that both cannot be true. What are the facts concerning World War II agreements relative to Germany and the purposes for which the war was being fought in Europe?

In August, 1947, the State Department issued an official Memorandum entitled: "Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress." That Memorandum, then, began with this sentence:

The guiding objectives of the Government with respect to Germany were: 1) the total destruction of the Nazi regime; and 2) insurance against the reappearance in the future of a regime or ideology calculated to disturb the general peace and security.

The reader is invited to compare this 1947 summary with the 1959 summary quoted earlier. On what is the 1947 summary based? The Memorandum itself tells us by quoting from the major policy statement made by the President of the United States, in his Message to Congress, dated September 17, 1943. On that occasion, President Roosevelt stated:

There is one thing I want to make perfectly clear: When Hitler and the Nazis go out, the Prussian military clique must go with them. The war-breeding gangs of militarists must be rooted out of Germany—and out of Japan—if we are to have any real assurance of future peace. . . . We shall not be able to claim that we have gained total victory in this war if any vestige of Fascism in any of its malignant forms is permitted to survive anywhere in the world.

These words anticipate not only in substance but in detail the solemn wartime agreements entered into by the Allied Coalition; the agreements that gave meaning to the indescribable suffering brought on by that war and that lifted the hearts and steeled the arms of millions and millions of men and women who fought on through everything for years with the single-minded purpose of making those agreements come into being. If the Eisenhower Administration believes that it can get away with an effort to wipe out the memory of those agreements and the reality of those commitments by a couple of lines concocted by their Madison Avenue boys about “defeating the enemy” and “recovering from the war,” then it is clear that the ailments of this Administration, while indubitably severe in the physical sphere, are even more critical in the mental.

The agreements entered into by the Three Great Powers at Yalta in February, 1945 and at Potsdam in August, 1945—quoted in the previous chapter—formed the basis for the State Department Memorandum of 1947; they contradict the Department’s Memorandum of 1959.

The facts concerning the agreements of World War II refute, then, the State Department assertion of January, 1959 that the USSR is in error when it insists that those agreements had at their heart an anti-Nazi and anti-militarist commitment, and that those agreements called for nothing more than the enemy's defeat and recovery from the damages of the war through united effort. On this matter of historical fact, the government of the Soviet Union is right, and the government of the United States is wrong.

Why Is the Record Falsified?

The U.S. government falsifies the nature of the World War Two agreements because she has failed to abide by them. Its policy has been to renazify, not denazify; to cartelize, not to decartelize; to remilitarize, not to demilitarize. Let the record speak:

On denazification: James Stewart Martin, for a year and a half immediately after the war chief of the Decartelization Branch of the American Military Government in Germany, wrote that, beginning in 1946: "Top Nazis and Nazi supporters who think democracy ridiculous moved into key positions in the economic and administrative life of Germany, or were never thrown out" (*All Honorable Men*, Boston, 1950, p. 168).

Earlier pages have demonstrated the undoing of the denazification process during the first years after the war ended. During the next seven or eight years, renazification replaced a defunct denazification. The evidence is overwhelming:

Koppel S. Pinson, a professor at Queens College in New York City, is the author of an eminently conservative and heatedly anti-Communist study of *Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization* (N. Y., 1954, Macmillan). This respectable gentleman writes on American occupation policy in Germany immediately after the war:

Few as the anti-Nazis were, they should have been given enthusiastic support by military government. This was usually not the case. While it was not always apparent whether Nazism paid or not, it became all too evident from the start that anti-Nazism did not pay.

As the months passed, matters deteriorated. Thus, continues Professor Pinson, "the years after 1947 saw the huge rehiring of

former Nazis for important places in the administrative machinery of the new German states." In fact, he states that matters reached the point where those Germans who had been anti-Nazis or had participated in the denazification effort, "began to find it increasingly difficult to find employment, and have come to form a new class of political and economic outcasts."

Presently, this is a "cause for serious alarm." No wonder, since four members of Adenauer's own cabinet had been important members of the Nazi party, and two of them had been Gestapo members! And the Chancellor was forced to admit in 1951 that of the 383 senior officials in his Foreign Office, 134 had been Nazi party members. Of these, Professor Pinson writes:

They are not only nominal party members. They include among others the author of the official legal commentary to the [racist] Nuremberg laws, the organizer of the activities of the Grand Mufti in the Near East, the director of the East European Division of the Nazi Foreign Office, the active leader in the deportation of the Jews of Amsterdam, and the man who ordered the extermination of Jews deported from Rumania.

And, "the police force is staffed with numerous SS [Gestapo] officers." Generally, "open admiration for the top Nazi leaders has also begun to reappear. . . . Revived Nazi sentiment has been utilized to form various political groups, political parties, and veterans' organizations." Anti-Semitism again is rampant, writes this professor in 1954, but, "Much more serious than the open and crude manifestations of Nazism are the more subtle and deeper aspects of authoritarian nationalist sentiment." All this—plus the adoption by the West German government for its official anthem of—once more—the anthem of Bismarck's Germany—*Deutschland über Alles!* And 600 judges who administered the law under Hitler now sit under Adenauer.

The institutionalizing and legalizing of renazification occurred with the passage in 1951 by the West German government of a law which gave all ousted civil service employees a vested right to their former positions, regardless of their relationship with the Nazi Party. The only exception then made—since repealed—was to bar former Gestapo members from civil service reinstatement as a matter of right. In a quite recent critical study of *Democracy in Western Germany* (Oxford University Press, N. Y., 1958), Richard Hiscocks

refers to the "enormity" of this 1951 law which actually favored collaborator and Nazi civil servants at the expense of the heroic minority opposed to Hitlerism.

Lately, Professor John H. Herz, whose earlier writing on the subject we have already cited, prepared a study of "Political Views of the West German Civil Service" for the RAND corporation.* The West German bureaucracy, as one might expect, bows to none in terms of numbers; Professor Herz estimates that in it are about one and a half million employees. He concludes that the great majority prefer to forget the "trouble" before 1945, or to blame "others" for its occurrence. A considerable minority are outright Nazis, he states, but most adopt an attitude of utter cynicism and eschew all systems and all values. He finds that "today's service is made up largely of the service that existed under the Nazis. . . ."

The politically reactionary majority in Adenauer's civil service, writes Herz, "object to almost everything in earlier American policies: democratization, denazification, demilitarization, and so forth. By the same token, they express great satisfaction with the more recent change in American policy in all these fields." The small minority, however, which has some pro-democratic feelings, "are profoundly apprehensive." This minority of pro-democrats in West Germany, "are disturbed not only about the international implications but above all about the internal impact of a policy which, so they say, tends to encourage the militarist, ultra-nationalist, anti-democratic forces in Germany." As a result, "German democrats, so these officials complain, have thus been discredited."

On Democratization

Of course, renazification means a repudiation of democratization—one of the undertakings explicitly pledged at both Yalta and Potsdam. In addition to the material presented above, however, there is much evidence confirming a U.S. governmental policy of hindering rather than assisting the development of democratic organization, action, and thought in Germany.

Thus, clearly, any serious effort to undo Hitlerite reaction would have to undertake a remodeling of the educational system, both in

* This forms a chapter in Hans Speier and W. P. Davison, eds., *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Row, Peterson & Co., White Plains, N. Y., 1957).

terms of undoing its caste nature and its elitist, racist, militarist, and jingoist content. In fact, however, nothing like this was done, and higher education remains the privilege of the offspring of the rich in West Germany, while the autocratic and aristocratic nature of the universities, notorious since Bismarck, characterizes them under Adenauer.

By 1947, Saul K. Padover, the well-known historian—during the war a Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army's Psychological Warfare section, assigned to educational work in the American Zone—was already reporting "The Failure of Re-education of Germany."^{*} He explained that while the straight-out Nazi textbooks were removed, "it was not easy to cleanse those that contained subtle militaristic propaganda or an indirect nationalist slant glorifying German heroes." Dr. Padover then gave two actual examples of what he thought were "subtle" and "indirect" militaristic and nationalistic inculcation:

Take, for example, this sentence from the grammar school textbook, *Deutsches Lesebuch*, IV, which ends the story of Alfred Krupp—"His work remains as a blessing for hundreds of thousands of diligent hands, an enlightening example of national labor and a proud glory of our German fatherland." This seems innocent enough, except for the fact that Alfred Krupp built Germany's largest armament works. The question is, should such sentences be left in or cut out? This has been left in. Or take this sample from the history textbook, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte*, III, which, speaking of the Prussian defeat of 1807, says: "The successors of Frederick the Great were weak sovereigns and they missed the right moment for the inevitable war." Is this legitimate history or propaganda designed to keep alive the militaristic spirit? The answer is obviously not easy.

What is not easy, is to understand Padover's naiveté. And these were the standards back in 1946, when the ink on the Potsdam Treaty was hardly dry! No wonder Padover concluded: "Unfortunately the superintendence of education, like that of political affairs in general, is not infrequently in the hands of ultra-nationalist

^{*} Published in: *Education in Transition*, 34th Annual Schoolmen's Proceedings, 1947, University of Pennsylvania.

Germans whose aim is to revive the nationalist spirit and keep fresh the military tradition." And he offered two instances of such superintendence of which he had personal knowledge: the person in charge of education in the Aachen area "was an old militarist clerical," who despised the French and loathed the British, and "naturally defended Hitler's war"; the Minister of Culture in Bavaria was "a violent reactionary and fanatical militarist . . . who personally supervises the revision of textbooks, one of which contains a notorious glorification of war."

These, we repeat, were the personnel selected by the American Military Government, back in 1946, to implement the re-education of the German people so that the last vestiges of Nazism might be extirpated and militarism might never rise again.

Bernard Taper, the A.M.G. official whose article in *Harper's* (Feb. 1949) has already been cited, was charged specifically with supervising elections in West Germany. His conclusions are indicated in the article's title: "Heil Free Elections!"; they are spelled out more fully in this sentence: "It cannot be seriously contended that the Germans have developed any feeling for democracy or have made any basic changes in a way of life whose social and cultural institutions remain thoroughly anti-democratic."

By 1950, the propaganda line of the U.S. government, as we have noted, was to stress the need for the *gradual* elimination of Nazism.

Now there are two main elements to government propaganda on this matter, depending on the level of the media being used. One, employed especially in the mass media, presents, as we have seen, a complete falsification of the actual nature of the wartime obligations and agreements; the other, more commonly used for academic and sophisticated audiences, insists that those obligations and agreements are so "vague" as to be in fact meaningless, that they were agreed to as matters of wartime propaganda and that, therefore, they carry no real weight.

The latter argument, for example, is developed at length in Harold Zink's *The United States in Germany: 1944-1955* (Van Nostrand, N. Y., 1957). This is of particular interest, for the author, now a professor at Ohio State University, was Chief Historian for several years in the office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. Professor Zink begins his argument by remarking that

"there is little convincing evidence that democracy can be imposed by one country or a group of countries on another." He thinks that the fact that the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain all jointly agreed on the Potsdam commitment itself tends to demonstrate "the vague or perhaps meaningless character of this objective." The experience of fighting World War One in order to "make the world safe for democracy" should have shown all concerned, writes Professor Zink, that the undertakings at Potsdam represented "a futile proposition." In any case, this author wonders how it was possible for anyone to think that the "generally negative provisions" of the Potsdam agreement and of the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its implementation "could be regarded as any real 'preparation' for such democratic reconstruction." Considering the question a rhetorical one, he concludes that, at any rate, "the tendency [of Military Government] was to leave the problem of democratic reconstruction in abeyance."

The question is not rhetorical at all, and it poses the fundamental problem relative to Germany. The "negative provisions" of the Potsdam Treaty required the elimination of all vestiges of Nazism from German politics, culture and society; there is nothing vague about this, though the method of its implementation and the degree to which it is done or need be done might be subjects for debate. But surely such provisions were not enforced by a policy of *renazification*! And, the "problem of democratic reconstruction" was not left "in abeyance"; for social development does not wait on any particular person, whether he is High Commissioner or Chief Historian. Post-war Germany was a living, albeit devastated, organism; therefore, it was in process of change, and this change could be either progressive or retrogressive.

One thing would not happen; things would not be left in abeyance. And as we have seen, they were not; rather a policy was instituted by the U.S. government of renegeing on its anti-fascist commitments and this carried with it a policy of restoring to authority nazi, militarist, reactionary figures. The "problem of democratic reconstruction" was answered by the U.S. government by the adoption of a policy of anti-democratic reconstruction.

Before concluding this discussion of democratization, a brief note should be added concerning Chancellor Adenauer himself. This extremely conservative and very old man is a typical product of European Catholic hierarchical political training, educated in

the law and holding political office ever since the days of World War I. His personal arrogance and fierce bureaucratism have in them the qualities and traditions of the Germany of the Kaiser. Richard Hiscocks, in the book previously cited, has this in mind when he refers to West Germany as having a "Chancellor-Democracy." Professor Gordon A. Craig, of Princeton, in a not unfriendly study,* nevertheless refers to Adenauer's "peremptory manner," his tendency to offer "gratuitous affronts," his extreme rigidity, and his habit of secrecy, so that, for example, while he offered to supply several German divisions to the Allied High Commission in a memorandum of August, 1950, he did not feel it necessary to inform the Bundestag of this offer until February, 1952, and then did so "almost by chance."

On Anti-Semitism

Renazification and anti-democracy mean, in Germany, revived anti-Semitism. The latter ornament most certainly adorns the Dulles-Adenauer version of a free Germany. The matter is tricky for them, somewhat in the way that the Jim-Crow system in the United States annoys the Eisenhower-Dulles team. Of course, both men are staunch Anglo-Saxon supremacists and have conducted their lives in full accordance with the "restricted" and "exclusive" nature of such supremacists, but both men, operating in a world most of whose people are colored and are on the march, and both posing as champions of freedom, find this question of Jim Crow most distressing—in the words of C. L. Sulzberger, "the dreary, tormented racial problem most acutely embarrasses our policy makers" (*What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy*, Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1959, p. 20).

Flagrant anti-Semitism, especially since the horror of Hitlerism and the fact that half the remaining Jews in the world live in the United States, and in view of Wall Street's Mid-East policy and its line in connection with the Ben-Gurion administration in Israel, does not sit well with the State Department's demagoguery relative to present-day West Germany. On the other hand, the Adenauer government, being a renazified one, is naturally permeated with

* G. A. Craig, *From Bismarck to Adenauer* (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1959).

anti-Semitism; furthermore, being what it is, it nurtures anti-Semitic ideas and provocations. The "solution" in the face of these contradictory conditions has been a "free" press that tends to play down the realities of anti-Semitism in West Germany; with this has gone an effort at reparations to the Ben-Gurion government that it is hoped may gloss over that angle and possibly neutralize if not win over certain of the upper-class components of American-Jewish leadership.

Yet, the anti-Semitism in Adenauer's land is so gross and persistent, the memory of Hitlerism is so keen and widespread, and portions of the Jewish population and press do stand on guard; therefore something of the mounting pressures upon the 25,000 to 30,000 Jews still living in West Germany has reached public notice.

Drew Middleton reported in the *New York Times* (Oct. 15, 1951):

Six years after the end of the war, most Allied observers agree that anti-Semitism continues to exist in Germany. It often reveals itself in crude vandalism against Jewish cemeteries or brutal attacks in speech and in print by extremists.

The persistence of anti-Semitic feelings in Germany is not to be wondered at, especially in view of its history, and the intensity with which backward ideas tend to endure. But here the point is that the policy of renazification and anti-democracy encouraged this persistence and its display, and assumed a position of helplessness if not quite benevolence in the face of such persistence and such display.

A typical and very recent example is the Nieland case which broke late in 1958. This involves a lumber merchant of Hamburg, one Friedrich Nieland, and a printer named Adolf Heimberg. These men produced and distributed a pamphlet entitled "How Many World Wars Do Nations Have to Lose?" The pamphlet holds that the murder of 6,000,000 Jews during Nazism was the work of "secret representatives of international Jewry"; its main point is that Germany was deceived and betrayed by this international Jewry into losing the Second World War. It demands a reaffirmation, officially, of a policy of anti-Semitism and specifically that Jews be barred by law from any position of consequence in government, political parties, banking "or elsewhere."

The author and publisher were arrested and charged with acting to the detriment of the State and libeling a whole people. The case was dismissed by a lower Hamburg court in November, 1958. When the public prosecutor filed a request for a re-hearing, the Hamburg State Supreme Court, on January 6, 1959, rejected it. This Supreme Court, in rejecting it, said it did so because the pamphlet did not call for a fight against Jews as such, but rather "only" against "international Jewry" and, "The pamphlet showed clearly that the author had separated the Jewish people from 'international Jewry' and any measures suggested in the pamphlet were directed against the latter." The pamphlet, with this official blessing, is now circulating in West Germany, in defense of whose freedom free men everywhere are supposed to mobilize. Characteristically, the New York *Times* story giving these details was headlined: "Adenauer Piqued by Anti-Semitism" (Jan. 10, 1959)!

A one-inch item in the New York *Times* from Bonn (Jan. 30, 1959) told of the arrest of twelve people who had damaged a coffee shop, owned by a Jew; the owner was called a "Jewish pig" that the Nazis somehow had "forgotten to gas." The same day's paper, in a half-inch item from Freiburg, said that the town had offered a reward of a thousand marks (about \$230) for the apprehension of those responsible for the painting of red swastikas over tombstones in a nearby Jewish cemetery.

The same paper, on February 26, 1959, gave two inches to another story from Bonn involving a woman named Jeannette Wolf, who had been an inmate of a concentration camp, had lost two daughters there and whose husband had been murdered by the Gestapo. The woman had brought charges against a tax collector and another man identified simply as "a former Gestapo leader." Mrs. Wolf said:

that the tax official had said concentration camps were desirable and too few Jews had been killed in them. She said also that the former SS leader had publicly threatened to use a riding whip in the same way as he said he had done before on naked Jewish women.

The New York *Times* (March 16, 1959) notes that "Bias Issue Stirs Germany's Jews," that "perplexity and terror" were expressed by many; nevertheless, keeping to the pattern of restraint, the

correspondent comments: "the acts of anti-Semitism here seem no more numerous than those in other democratic countries"!^{*}

On Remilitarization

The repudiation of Potsdam carried with it the rearming of Western Germany. The movement towards this end has been guarded, for the results of German militarism stretched stark and terrible in a thousand devastated cities and millions upon millions of graves. Nevertheless, the aim has been pursued with great persistence and has achieved notable success: today West Germany is a major military force.

Some of the evidence showing the Western turn in favor of German remilitarization, as this manifested itself through 1950, was presented in earlier pages. It is noteworthy that during 1948, 1949 and 1950 there was no mention of remilitarization as being necessary in Western Germany in reply to such moves in the Eastern zone; this was because there were no such moves in that zone, and the United States and Adenauer did not even try to justify their policy of rearming West Germany on any such specious grounds at that time.

In August, 1950, as we have shown above, Adenauer secretly offered the Western powers several divisions of German troops. This places in its proper context a dispatch from London, dated October 20, 1950, in the *New York Times*: "The Soviet Government today accused the Big Three Western Powers of contemplating the revival of the regular German Army and warned that Russia 'will not tolerate such measures.'"

The first open and official pronouncement looking towards the remilitarization of West Germany—still camouflaged in terms of subordination to an Allied Command—came in an AP release from Bonn, September 24, 1951: "The Allied High Commissioners formally invited Western Germany to raise an army for the West." From then on it has been a matter of steadily increasing the number of men, ships, and planes, of shifting their control to West German authority, of fully integrating them—as equals—within the

^{*} As West German capitalists undertake once again the "penetration" of Africa they adopt the white supremacy conventional in "democratic countries." Bonn's Food Minister, Heinrich Luebke, on an official visit to the Union of South Africa, complimented that country on its strict segregation and urged the system be applied throughout Africa—*Frankfurter Rundschau*, March 18, 1959.

whole military apparatus of NATO, of placing German officers in leading positions within NATO and of providing for the arming of the West German forces themselves with nuclear weapons.

This policy of the rearming of West Germany—highlighted by the Brussels Pact of 1953 bringing her into NATO formally, and the Paris Treaty of 1954 granting the West German government almost absolute and full sovereignty—reached a climax in November, 1958. But before we turn to the 1958 climax, we must pause briefly to look into the London and Paris agreements of October, 1954. These agreements were forced by a furious U.S. government after the French Assembly, in August, 1954, had voted down the proposal of making West Germany a full member of the European Defense Community. They represented a method of achieving the same end through diplomacy rather than the less reliable parliamentary method.

In these agreements, the sovereignty of West Germany was formally recognized, and it was allowed its own army—to be integrated within the Western military system—to begin with of twelve fully mechanized divisions, plus an air force and a navy—a total of about 500,000 men in the armed forces. On this event, the *Times* correspondent, M. S. Handler, wrote (October 24, 1954):

The sense of the Paris agreements was to create a sovereign West German state based on a national army integrated with other European forces at such a high level as to leave no doubt as to which military establishment would ultimately become the most important in the Western alliance. The basic twelve divisions, mechanized and motorized, would have a fire power and mobility far greater than anything known in the last war.

One last point on this 1954 agreement. In it West Germany agreed not to arm itself with atomic, bacteriological or chemical weapons, but absolutely no system of inspection, no method of guaranteeing the enforcement of this commitment was undertaken. Adenauer's word was given; that is all.

Del Vayo, the former Foreign Minister of the late Spanish Republic, wrote of his astonishment at the "optimism" displayed by the Allied statesmen in their asking for no guarantees. And he commented:

The story of Germany's rearmament in violation of the Ver-

sailles Treaty, of the complete collapse of the Allied effort to halt the rebirth of German militarism, is a story not from history books, but of our own generation. The very statesmen who today speak so glibly and confidently of "guarantees" and "controls" were only yesterday fulminating against the inadequacy of either to halt the growing German military menace. It is as if the whole period between the two world wars has been expunged from time. There can be only one explanation for this astounding amnesia: the current anti-Communist obsession, the hatred of Russia and the fear of Communist China, has proved stronger than memory or reason. (*The Nation*, October 23, 1954.)

And now for the November, 1958 climax. On November 24, Jack Raymond reported from Washington in the *New York Times* that the United States had decided to press for the elimination of the last remaining curbs on the sovereignty of West Germany, especially so far as her right to militarize was concerned. This dispatch went on to say that the main purpose behind the United States decision to lift the last limitations included a desire "to reinforce West German forces in the Baltic with anti-submarine vessels," to provide Adenauer's government with a greater role in the Atlantic Ocean, and to see that it had significant reinforcements for its ground forces "with tanks and other weapons."

The "other weapons" involved are spelled out in this paragraph:

The United States has also scheduled for delivery to West Germany next month several missiles that can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads. The West Germans will get only the conventional type of missiles, but the United States will hold in reserve the nuclear warheads, as in arrangements with other members of the North Atlantic alliance.

The reader is to observe that this has reference only to arms to be supplied to West German forces; of course, U.S. forces in West Germany are supplied with all the latest nuclear weapons and weapon-launching devices. Included in the weapons to be turned over to the West German government and army, said the Raymond dispatch, were not only the 15-mile-range artillery rocket, but also the 600-mile-range jet-driven winged missile, the so-called Matador.

Bonn, said this dispatch, had ordered about 300 of these Matadors; moreover, West German troops have been training in the servicing of missiles, here in the United States, "for several months" and specifically they have been training in the use of the Matador, in West Germany "for many months."

The reader is to bear in mind that the distance from Hamburg to Prague is about 350 miles; from Hamburg to Warsaw, less than 500 miles; from Munich to Budapest about 350 miles; to Prague about 220 miles; and to the borders of the Soviet Union about 500 miles.

We repeat that the point had been reached in November, 1958, where the *New York Times* was printing the fact that the West German government had ordered about 300 Matadors—with a range of 600 miles—for delivery to their own armed forces; that the delivery was being made, and that West German troops had been training for many months on how to fire this weapon, which may be armed with thermonuclear weapons having enormous, devastating force. And all this ensconced in a story about how the United States was going to insist on the removal of the last of the limitations on remilitarizing West Germany.

A few days after all this became a matter of public record—though surely weeks, if not months, after these arrangements and plans must have been known in all the capital offices of the world—the Soviet Union presented, November 27, 1958, its note relative to the Berlin situation and made its proposals for the resolution of the altogether unnatural condition existing in that city and in the German nation. Yet repeatedly, these proposals are dealt with as though they were sheer bolts out of the blue, the result of the capricious whim of the unaccountable Mr. Khrushchev.

Further announcements relative to the intensified drive to make of West Germany an area teeming with military potential followed, all of them clearly the result of many weeks of earlier preparation. On December 4, 1958, the Defense Ministry of the West German government announced that its Army was to be equipped at once with three battalions (144 launching pads) of rockets, one of which will have the potential of firing atomic weapons. These, however, remain under the control of the Supreme Commander of NATO, the U.S. General Norstad.

In connection with the latter fact it is at least sobering to notice that Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary-General of NATO, has raised

the point that he thinks the responsibility for the use of atomic weapons must not be confined to the United States. He writes:

Of late, however, the situation has been changing as European armies, or at least some of them, have been receiving tactical and, more recently, strategic nuclear weapons. Continental Europe's ability to play an effective part in atomic retaliation is now a fact. Would it not be legitimate, then, to give Europe some share of the responsibility for the conduct of this kind of warfare? Common sense [!] dictates an affirmative reply. (*Foreign Affairs*, April, 1959.)

At the same time, and in the same publication, Franz-Joseph Strauss, Adenauer's Minister of Defense, makes a point that, coming from him at this time, is more than sobering; it is a real cause for alarm. Strauss urges that the West remember that the strategy of deterrence requires three things: (1) the necessary weapons; (2) the determination to use them; (3) a cause strong enough to justify their use in the eyes of world public opinion. Of the three, only the third worries the West German Defense Minister, especially since as he writes: "... we can expect that the justification for our employing thermonuclear weapons will be made as obscure as possible by a Communist aggressor."

We feel impelled to remind the reader that Hitler also faced this problem; and when, soon after his attack upon the USSR he felt it necessary that a southern front be opened up through Hungary, he arranged, with Horthy, as the latter tells in his *Memoirs*, for the Luftwaffe to bomb some Hungarian villages, and to have the Hungarian government announce proof of a Red Air Force attack, and then to declare war.

Two "little" items tucked away in recent dispatches add some color to the story of remilitarization. An AP dispatch from Bonn, January 28, 1959, announced that the West German government has indicted Pastor Martin Niemoeller—the renowned anti-Nazi—on a charge of "criminally slandering its army." Conviction could mean a two-year prison sentence for the minister who had dared to suggest that the purposes of remilitarization of West Germany were not necessarily of the purest or calculated to promote the welfare of mankind. The other item was reported by Waverly Root in a story on SHAPE, the military headquarters of NATO;

it seems that only recently German officers attached to this headquarters have taken to wearing their battle ribbons, but out of deference for their allies, they wear only "those won on the Eastern front" (*The Reporter*, March 19, 1959). The armies they led, however, did march West, too; in fact, they did somewhat better in the West than they did in the East, and it is not likely that the present-day wearers of highly-selective decorations have forgotten that fact.

Defense Minister Strauss continues busy—at least as busy as he was when serving as a political education officer in Hitler's Wehrmacht—for his office announced from Bonn on March 18 the signing of a contract with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the General Electric Company for the purchase, at a cost of \$357 millions, of 300 F-104 jet fighters, capable of supersonic speeds, very fast takeoffs, and use in all weather.

All this preparation is, of course, quite apart from what the American, British and French forces situated in West Germany are doing, and the Americans adding rocket launchers and missiles like mad are restrained by no one and nothing from arming them right now with nuclear weapons.

Hans Speier, founder of the social science division of RAND, and a consultant for the State Department and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, in a recent study of *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (Row, Peterson, White Plains, N. Y., 1958), accepts as an established fact the complete remilitarization of West Germany. He notes that most of the Army and Navy officers there are strongly anti-democratic, and are convinced that it was Hitler's amateurishness that lost Germany the last war. He adds that many German officers now are serving in the Bundestag, and that a great many of the former officers in Hitler's Army today hold leading positions in West German industry. He also observes a bitter resentment against U.S. domination, and particularly U.S. control over atomic weapons; most of the officers, also, feel that such weapons have not replaced the need for conventional arms and so propagandize actively for larger and larger ground forces.

Finally, all the newly-constituted West German divisions are commanded by officers who held analogous positions under Hitler and who fought on the Eastern front. The General Staff is reconstituted and is actively participating in the plans of the Adenauer government and of NATO.

On Decartelization

While Potsdam called for the breaking up of the intense monopolistic structure of the German economy and the limitation of its industrial capacity so that it could never again support a major aggressive undertaking, developments in West Germany under Allied and especially U.S. control have gone in exactly the opposite direction. Instead of decartelization, there has been recartelization until today West German industry is more highly monopolistic than it was under Hitler; instead of a reduction in the capacity of German industry to wage war, that capacity, particularly in the Ruhr, has been enhanced.

On July 3, 1942, Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold warned:

The secret influence of the international cartel is going to be thrown in favor of peace without victory when the first opportunity arises—just as it was thrown in that direction at Munich. . . . The small group of American businessmen who are parties to these international rings still think of the war as a temporary recess from business-as-usual with a strong Germany. They expect to begin the game all over again after the war.

In previous pages we have shown how, immediately after the War, "the game began all over again."

By 1947, James S. Martin, already noted as originally the Chief of the Decartelization Branch of Military Government, was writing:

What has happened is that within a period of two years U.S. policies for the treatment of Germany have changed their course by 180 degrees. Now in all important respects they coincide with what the German financiers, industrialists and politico-militarists have wanted us to do ever since they surrendered (*New Republic*, October 6, 1947).

Naturally, today, as even the *New York Times* (January 7, 1959) admits, "The tendency throughout West German industry is toward reconcentration rather than deconcentration." In steel, coal and auto, an interconnected Big Eight dominate production—and these include all the old Kaiser and Hitler names—Krupp, Thyssen, Mannesmann, Flick, in all cases with significant U.S. interpenetration;

Marquis Childs recently noted (New York Post, February 5, 1959) that just from 1946 to 1951 four billion American dollars were invested in West Germany.* And once again German finance is controlled, as during Hitler, by three great banking concentrations—the same three: Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank. The point has been reached where Chancellor Adenauer himself—between World Wars a director of the Deutsche Bank—and sounding for all the world like Theodore Roosevelt, permitted himself to say:

There is great future danger that a handful of economic structures will control the German economy to such a degree that government will be forced to take drastic steps against them (*Time Magazine*, March 5, 1959).

For present purposes these data will be considered sufficient to establish the main point: while Potsdam required the breaking up of the monopolistic structure of the German economy—which had been of basic consequence in the creation and the sustaining of Nazism—the policy of the United States government from the very beginning, and with increased boldness as the years passed, was to undermine such a program and, on the contrary, to assure the recartelization of the economy of West Germany. That economy today is more concentrated than it was when Hitler lived.

There is one additional piece of history in connection with this movement that is not nearly as well known as it should be. It is told by Kenneth Ingram in his *History of the Cold War*.

A Labor government ruled England right after the war. That government officially announced, late in 1945, that the coal mines, chemical and engineering industries in the British Zone would be socialized. For a year, however, nothing was done. At the Cologne Convention of the German Social Democrats of the three Western Zones, held in 1946, it was unanimously voted that the British be urged to fulfill their promise of socialization. And later the Ruhr German government passed a Resolution towards the same end, but Great Britain rejected both demands. The

* Outright merger of U.S. and German corporations has begun. The Armco Steel Corporation formed a partnership with Thyssen-Huette in 1955, and a new plant in Dinslaken, West Germany, jointly-owned, was opened in November, 1958 (*N. Y. Times*, Dec. 1, 1958). In November an international finance corporation, called Intercontinental, was formed; in it are Krupp, and Siemens, Charles Allen, chairman of Colorado Fuel & Iron, and Bruno Pagliai, a Mexican millionaire. The headquarters of this firm are in Mexico City and the intention is to concentrate on Latin-America.—*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 29, 1958.

final crusher on the Labor Government's promises came when in December, 1946, Great Britain agreed to U.S. proposals for the merging of their two zones—the beginning of the U.S.-dominated drive towards the creation of the German Federal Republic.

This may be chalked up as another service by the leadership of international Social-Democracy on behalf of monopoly capitalism.

* * *

Such is the record of performance by the Government of the United States in implementing the obligations undertaken with the signing of the Potsdam Treaty. That Treaty crystallized the purposes for which—in terms of public affirmation by all the Allies—World War II had been fought in Europe; these purposes and the sacrifices that went into their execution have been repudiated by the actions of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.

Why Was Potsdam Repudiated?

This explains why the record concerning publicly avowed war aims was falsified. But why is it that these aims were betrayed; why has the U.S. Government followed practices the opposite of those required if the aims were to be fulfilled? It is because those aims were avowed when the kind of war which the dominant elements in the U.S. ruling class wanted had not materialized. Those dominant elements—in Great Britain and France, as well as here—wanted a war between the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome Axis and the Soviet Union, in which the contestants would inflict fearful damages upon each other, and as a result of which the movements for Socialism and national liberation, as symbolized by the USSR, would be dealt shattering blows, and the hegemony of the world would fall to Anglo-American imperialism, with the English suffered to be junior partners in The American Century, as Henry Luce put it.

This was the point of the Munich policy, but that policy was shattered by the Axis' hesitancy and then final refusal to serve as "fall guy"; by the strength of the Left throughout the world, which exposed the nature of the policy and organized millions in opposition to it; by the divisions among the rulers of Western capitalism; and by the strength of the Soviet Union which, in both diplomacy and war, emerged triumphant from the ultimate ordeal.

The reality about that Munich policy cannot be reiterated too often, especially in view of the fact that President Eisenhower has taken it upon himself to remind the Premier of the Soviet Union of its alleged "lessons." And Adlai Stevenson, in a speech delivered March 5, 1959, also invoked Munich and "pleaded with the Russian leaders to remember their own terrible experience with appeasement of Hitler"; and the New York *Herald Tribune* (April 5, 1959) editorializing on "The Lesson of Munich" held that:

What Munich taught was that to surrender a key point under threat of war, in the hope that thereby the foe will be "appeased," is dangerous folly.

This bipartisan interpretation of Munich is false. At Munich the Prime Ministers of England and France were not yielding to a foe; they were rewarding a friend. Chamberlain and Daladier were not grudgingly giving up the living body of Czechoslovakia in the hope that the beast would thus be satiated; they gladly gave him Czechoslovakia with its magnificent fortifications and its enormous armaments-producing capacity and its strategic geographical location in order further to beguile him into attacking the Soviet Union, and to assure him that now—with Czechoslovakia—he had the means for doing this successfully and he had the assurance of no Second Front, if he stuck to the bargain.

The Czechs, as a contemporaneous observer noted,* "were not only deserted [by England and France] but ordered to conform to the German wishes by their former friends." The Czechs were told not only that if they failed to yield they would find themselves in "complete international isolation," but that "they would alone be responsible for the outbreak of war"; i.e., the Czechs would be considered enemies of England and France, if she "forced" Germany to wage war upon her! And the fact that, in the face of this, the Soviet Union repeatedly assured Czechoslovakia—privately and publicly—that she would stand by her commitments and defend Czechoslovakia if she were attacked (even if France did not do so, as required by treaty), made even more urgent the betrayal of Czechoslovakia so far as the dominant bourgeoisie of France and England (and Poland and Czechoslovakia, too) were concerned.

* Hubert Ripka, *Munich: Before and After* (London, 1939), pp. 14-15.

G. E. R. Gedy, in his *Betrayal in Central Europe*, published in 1939 (New York, Harper), summarized the views of those responsible for Munich, using the device of quoting an unnamed English official, in this way:

"Probably Chamberlain and his friends hope that if Germany destroys Czechoslovakia, she will go on down through the Balkans and extend eastwards in preparation for an attack on Russia. But by the time she is ready for this, they trust, we and France will be so strong that we shall be able to say to her: 'If you attack us, you will attack a strong opponent, and you know that Russia will attack you from the rear, whereas if you attack Russia, we can promise not to attack you, and to wish you luck'" (p. 356).

The Communist Parties of the world correctly analyzed the Munich developments while they were proceeding, and warned that they presaged world war. For example, the Communist Party of France, several months before Munich—commenting on a Foreign Ministers' meeting involving France and Great Britain and held in London wherein the line of Munich was announced—warned:

Obedying the injunctions of Hitler, Mr. Chamberlain has got the British and French Ministers to agree to a dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the integrity of which is inseparable from France's security and the peace of Europe. Repudiating the treaties bearing the signature of France and the undertaking they solemnly renewed only a few days ago, the Daladier Government have agreed to this new capitulation to international fascism.

Compare this with the comment made at the same time, and concerning the same event, by Leon Blum, leader of the French Socialist Party:

Whatever happens, the consequences of the London plan will be far-reaching both for Europe and France. War has probably been averted. But it has been averted in such conditions that I cannot feel any joy, and am merely filled with mixed feelings of cowardly relief and shame.*

* Quoted in, Alexander Werth, *France and Munich* (N. Y., 1939, Harper), p. 264.

Well, if war was to be averted, one could bear up under Blum's feeling of cowardice and shame! But, if France's security and the peace of Europe were at stake, were "mixed feelings" appropriate? With hindsight, vouchsafed by history, all may see who was right and who was wrong. But shall not this lesson sharpen our vision for the present and for the future? Shall not the truth about Munich lead us to beware of the falsifiers of history seeking to peddle a new Munich twenty years after the original one ended in catastrophe?

All right, then, the war went wrong. But perhaps not all was lost? The Soviet Union was set back a decade; the threat of hegemony reverting to Berlin-Rome-Tokyo was undone; the domination of the U.S. ruling class in what remains of world imperialism is clear. Now, on that basis, perhaps we can start all over again? And there remains as constant as the North Star, ever since that fearful 1917 Winter, the two fundamental and interlocking aims: (1) destroy Socialism, particularly as this draws essential strength from the existence of the USSR; (2) re-establish imperialist domination of the world, with the United States ruling class as the king-pin of that kind of a world.

Potsdam symbolizes the "war that went wrong"; Munich heralds the "war that might have been." Therefore, Potsdam is repudiated, as we have seen, in spirit and in letter; and the policy of Munich, in the name of anti-Munich, is refurbished. However, *if twenty years ago the strength of anti-imperialism was great enough to force upon monopoly capitalism the "wrong war," today the strength of anti-imperialism is great enough to force upon monopoly capitalism competitive and peaceful co-existence.*

The Two-Bloc Concept

But perhaps there is no "lesson of Munich" at all? Perhaps, it is sometimes argued—as by C. Wright Mills in his *The Causes of World War Three* (Simon & Schuster, 1958)—scientific and technological changes have been so vast and thorough-going in the past two decades that our era is characterized by complete discontinuity of history, rather than a continuity of history? And perhaps, no matter what may have been true of the diplomacy and foreign policies of the past era, in our own day, given the qualitative changes that allegedly have occurred, what we are actually faced

with are two behemoths, two vast concentrations of strength, really more alike than different? Therefore, perhaps, the danger of war in the present-day world arises out of the existence of the Two Blocs; out of the enormous concentration of power thus polarized? This is, essentially, the position of the present leadership of Yugoslavia; it is the position of Professor Mills; it is conveyed in the image offered by Professor J. Robert Oppenheimer, of two scorpions in a bottle, with each able to kill the other, and, therefore, the danger of the mortal conflict coming equally from both creatures.

But this view is not valid. There are leaps in history, but continuity, not discontinuity, characterizes history. Imperialism produced World War I and World War II and it is imperialism which threatens World War III. Today there are two major constellations of power grouped around the United States and the Soviet Union respectively and there are other areas of more or less uncommitted strength—greater than is generally conceded by the “two-power” school. But the policies of these two constellations are not to be compared to two scorpions, for the policies of the two are contradictory; that is why one and only one finds its allies in figures like Franco, Salazar, Rhee, Chiang, Hussein, Trujillo and depends for support upon multi-millionaires, feudal landlords, compradores, and slaveowners. These two constellations are two because the social systems basic to them are decisively different; therefore, one stands for imperialism and colonialism, for racism and war-making; the other stands for socialism and national liberation, and for equality and peace.

These truths are decisive for a comprehension of the world today. They apply to the whole area of foreign policy and to any specific zone for the implementation of foreign policy. They apply specifically to the German question; indeed, an examination of that question illustrates their validity.

Chronology and History

We have seen that the betrayal of the denazification, demilitarization and decartelization requirements of the Potsdam Agreement began, on the part of the Western Powers, within a matter of months after the last shot was fired in Europe. Simultaneous with that, there began to develop a move, led by the United States,

for the separation of the Western part of Germany from the Eastern; this was necessary because in the East denazification, demilitarization and decartelization were pressed forward vigorously. This transformation had to be stopped in the Western zone, not only because it heralded the end of capitalism in the heart of Europe, but also because it heralded the end of the possibility of effectively waging war upon the Lands of Socialism (plural, now) at least from the European side. This is true because if Germany were to become an anti-fascist, anti-militarist state, with its location, its productive potential, and its 75 million people, it would be impossible, physically, to mount a war upon the USSR. When, after World War II, it appeared likely that the Soviet Union's Asia neighbor would rid itself of reaction and imperialism, and when this happened with finality in 1949, then keeping capitalism, reaction, and militarism alive in as much of Germany as was possible became a matter of top priority for U.S. imperialism.

Let us trace something of the chronology and history of this process of dismembering Germany and setting up a separate Western entity. Of the four zones into which Germany was divided after the fighting, it was the U.S. zone which made the first separate administrative move. This occurred in May, 1946 when the United States announced that reparations to the Soviet Union would no longer be paid out of the German zone under its control. Soon thereafter, prodded—as we saw in earlier pages—by English promises to socialize basic industry in its zone—the United States urged the merging of ALLIED zones of control. The Soviet Union denounced the move at the time, and France announced itself as opposed; but Great Britain—its Labor Government anxious to renege on its promise—agreed. The result was the Washington Agreement of December 2, 1946, under which a Bizone was established; thus was consummated, as early as 1946, the first organizational crack in the Four-Power unity for the administration of defeated Germany, and thus was begun the process which was to culminate in less than three years in the formal setting up of West Germany.

The United States then concentrated on overcoming French resistance to the policy of separatism. This was accomplished in the early part of 1948 by the use of economic and political pressure and by detaching the Saar, economically, from Germany and attaching it to France. In March, 1948, the Three Powers an-

nounced the London Recommendations, which, among other things, proposed a separate currency for the area under Anglo-French-U.S. control, and suggested the possibility of the creation of a separate West German State.

This move aroused protests again from the Soviet Union, and from many Germans, especially within the Social-Democratic Party and the Communist Party. In fact, the Ministers-President of the *Länder* in the Western Zones addressed a letter to the Western Powers, in July, 1948, pleading that "everything should be avoided that would give the character of a state to the organization that is established."^{*}

But that which the authors of this letter feared was exactly that which was intended. The new currency was introduced—unilaterally, without the approval of the USSR—and was even introduced into the Western-administered part of Berlin, creating financial chaos there and precipitating the so-called Berlin Blockade.

At the same time, under the lead of the United States, the three Western powers were preparing the launching of a Western Union alliance, the predecessor of NATO, and were contemplating the incorporation of a separate West German state within the military potential of such an alliance. The Soviet Union, in a Note sent to the Three Powers, January 29, 1949, warned that it could not look with equanimity upon the creation of the Western Union, especially since the Three Powers were:

striving to enlist and utilize for the furtherance of their plans, Western Germany where, chiefly with the help of the British and American authorities, the old pro-Hitler and militaristic elements of Germany are entrenching themselves more and more securely in all departments of administration.

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formally launched; on April 8, the Three Powers announced the merger of their Zones and the establishment of the German Federal Republic, whose Constitution was approved in May, 1949. And by the close of 1949, Chancellor Adenauer was announcing, publicly, that he would insist upon the building of a West German Army as a part of the European force projected in NATO.

With the actual creation of the German Federal Republic, the

^{*} K. P. Pinson, *Modern Germany* (N. Y., 1957, Macmillan), p. 545.

destruction of a single overall Germany subject to the cooperative administration of Four Allies was accomplished. As a result, and several months *after* that deed—in October, 1949—there was announced, with Soviet approval, the creation of the German Democratic Republic. Similarly, several months *after* the creation of NATO, and the moves to incorporate therein a renazified West Germany, the Socialist countries formed, in the Warsaw Pact, a defensive military alliance.

Efforts on the part of the Socialist countries to halt the developing remilitarization of West Germany and to make possible the creation of a united, anti-militarist Germany continued. In 1950 there was held in Prague a Foreign Ministers' Meeting of all the European People's Democracies (including East Germany) and of the Soviet Union. Here was proposed, reported the Associated Press on October 22: "the undelayed conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, creation of a unified German state and withdrawal of all occupation forces a year after signature of the treaty." The next day from Frankfurt, William H. Stoneham, correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*, reported that Western officials received news of this proposal with "something approaching consternation" because:

A unified Germany hasn't been figuring in the plans of Western nations for a long time and would present the West with a multitude of problems. It would end suggestions for German participation in a Western European defense force.

This, of course, was what the proposal was meant to do; for once a separate German entity had been created and rearmed and integrated within a military alliance avowedly aimed against the USSR, then—unless this were undone—the unification of Germany and the termination of the Cold War became impossible. Though, in the same period, Premier Grotewohl of the German Democratic Republic made a personal appeal to Chancellor Adenauer for all-German talks looking towards unification, and though the *New York Times* reported (October 10, 1951) that the six-million-member Federation of West German Trade Unions favored such talks, and, a little later (November 5, 1951) that "a large number of politicians outside Dr. Adenauer's immediate circle and the lay and clerical leaders of the Protestant Church advocate discussions on unity," Adenauer rejected all appeals for such dis-

cussions. (Of course, throughout this period even the Bundestag, let alone the general public, did not know that Chancellor Adenauer secretly had offered the Western Powers several German divisions in August, 1950—something he did not tell his own legislature until February, 1952!)

On March 10, 1952, the Soviet Union tried again. This time it sent an identical Note to the United States, Great Britain and France. In this Note the USSR proposed an all-German government to be chosen in elections supervised by the Four Powers. The resulting Government was to be independent, but it was not to join any military alliance; it was to have severely limited defensive forces for purposes of internal police only; it was to ban all nazi or quasi-nazi organizations; it was to guarantee full civil liberties for all individuals and organizations that were not fascist or militarist.

This Note was not made public in the United States for ten days; its first publication, in English, appeared in the London press. When it was made public, it was summarily rejected by the U.S. Government, the State Department affirming it "contained nothing new." Dorothy Thompson, incensed, wrote in her column dated March 21, 1952:

Our Administration misrepresented the contents of the note, saying it contained nothing new. That is not a fact. The fact is that in thirty years of journalism I have never known such pressure for conformity, such withholding of basic historical knowledge, such ready-made interpretations and apologies for policies and so much official propaganda as exists today.

Russell Hill, New York *Times* correspondent, wrote from Berlin (March 23, 1952) that "the United States does not want free elections in Germany now because they would upset the apple cart. The apples are the Schuman Plan and the European army, including twelve German divisions. . . ." The State Department sought, at all costs, agreed Walter Lippmann (in his column of March 27, 1952), "to avert an all-German election during the next sixteen months—that is to say before the Adenauer government has signed up with the West." Lippmann got his figure of sixteen months because the next general election in West Germany was scheduled for August, 1953, and:

The foreign policy of the Adenauer government . . . is to consummate the legal integration of Western Germany [into NATO] before the 1953 elections. . . . The theory of the policy is that while there is not now a popular majority in Western Germany for rearmament with the Atlantic Alliance, the West Germans can be persuaded to acquiesce on that if it is an accomplished fact before they have a chance to vote.*

The Washington correspondent of the *Wall Street Journal* wrote in that newspaper (March 26, 1952) that the Soviet Union's

move to offer Germany a peace treaty has President Truman's defense and diplomatic advisers really scared. . . . The U.S. worry is based on Germany's deep and earnest hope for being a united country. That hope spreads politically from the Left to the Right, and from the young to the old. . . . There's also a split between the American, the British and the French on this Russian move. The British and the French are inclined to take it as a chance of a deal with the Russians that could lead away from war.

The summary rejection of this Soviet move in 1952 was too much for two former Ministers in Adenauer's Cabinet; both publicly accused the Chancellor of deliberately sabotaging the possibility of German unification on the altar of rearmament and adherence to NATO. In May, 1952 a contractual agreement was signed between the United States, France, Great Britain and West Germany, integrating the latter within the framework of the European Defense Community. But efforts to get this Agreement ratified by the Parliaments concerned were fruitless, though they extended over a two-year period. As we noted, parliamentary failure led to diplomatic effort, and the result was the London and Paris Pacts of October, 1954, recognizing the sovereignty of the

* This rejection of free elections by the U.S. seven years ago, when real issues were still unresolved—especially the full remilitarization of West Germany and its integration within NATO—is significant in view of this Government's insistence very recently that all it really wants is "free elections"! This reminds one of U.S. refusal to permit elections in Viet-Nam last year, as required by international agreement. The U.S. government apparently wants in West Germany the kind of "free elections" that it used to run and supervise in Latin America some thirty and forty years ago. John Foster Dulles, himself, was the U.S. "supervisor" of one such "free election," in Costa Rica in 1917. On this, see the valuable article by T. P. Wright, Jr., "Free Elections in the Latin-American Policy of the U.S.," in *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1959.

German Federal Republic, integrating it within the Western military system, and allotting to it an ultimate total of 500,000 men under arms, including, to begin with, twelve fully mechanized divisions.

On October 23, 1954, the Soviet Union sent another Note to the Three Western Allies, urging the holding of a Four-Power Foreign Ministers' Conference which would consider: (1) the unifying of a peaceful and democratic Germany; (2) the withdrawal of all foreign troops from all of Germany; (3) the convening of an All-European Conference for the purpose of creating a system of collective security in Europe. This Note was ignored. On November 13, 1954, the USSR sent another Note to the major Powers, again urging the holding of an All-European Conference, plus the United States, to meet, if convenient, in Moscow, and as early as possible, with November 29 suggested as a target date. This time a reply came: the date set was too early. The USSR replied: set your own date. The reply came: rejection. On November 29, 1954, there convened in Moscow representatives from the Socialist countries of Europe; now the agenda of this conference was how best to secure their own mutual defense.

The Paris and London Agreements went into force in May, 1955 and West Germany became officially and fully a part of NATO; shortly thereafter, the Bonn Government placed orders in the United States for \$700,000,000 worth of armaments; in 1956 the Bonn government introduced military conscription; in 1957 General Hans Speidel—Hitler's General in command of occupied Paris—became the commander of NATO ground forces in Europe; in March, 1958, the Bonn legislature agreed to nuclear armament, and in the ensuing months hundreds of German specialists and millions upon millions of dollars were being devoted to implementing that agreement.

Jakob Altmeier, a member of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic, writing in *The Nation*, January 24, 1959, states that many people in West Germany are convinced that "the authoritarian-minded Rhenish Catholic, Dr. Adenauer," in his insistence upon remilitarization and integration within the Western military system, has demonstrated that for him "Germany's reunification is no more than lip service, that his heart has never been in it." Then follow two exceedingly important paragraphs from the pen of a West German legislator:

It is now a year ago—January 23, 1958, to be exact—that this complaint was turned into an open and direct accusation. Dr. Dehler and Dr. Heinemann, two of his former Cabinet Ministers . . . told him to his face that they were resigning from their posts because they had come to the conclusion that his policy had prevented Germany's reunification. Twice, in 1952 and 1954, Soviet Russia offered reunification. Bonn had disregarded these offers and influenced the Western powers to do likewise. Adenauer had chosen the "policy of strength" to bring Russia to its knees.

Silent and pale, the Chancellor sat facing his accusers. Neither he nor any of his supporters dared to voice a denial. If anything is at all certain, it is that the "policy of strength" has ended in fiasco. Russia has not been weakened throughout the cold war; on the contrary.

The fact is that West Germany constitutes a key instrument in the double-pronged nature of the U.S.-dominated anti-Soviet policy; she is, first of all, the main component of NATO, itself the fundamental power for the frankly military assault upon the Soviet Union; she is, secondly—and here West Berlin in particular is decisive—the symbol of the whole policy of "liberation," as this policy expresses itself in attempts at counter-revolution.

It is on these bases that the present leadership of West Germany has flung itself into the State Department-Pentagon plans. Walter Lippmann correctly pointed out, back on December 6, 1950, that the West German military contribution had to be based "only on an all-out American strategic commitment not only to defend Western Europe but to liberate Eastern Europe"; two days earlier, even more sharply, pointing to French fears anent the rearming of West Germany, he noted that these sprang from the "realization that a German army would wish to march, and to drag along with it all the rest of us, against Koenigsberg and Warsaw. . . . The idea that the Germans could or would dedicate themselves to the defense of the West is an illusion that is entertained only in Washington, and perhaps in London."

Richard Lowenthal, a leading adviser of the State Department on its anti-Soviet crusade, writing from Berlin in *The New Leader* (March 16, 1959), emphasized that the presence of Allied troops in West Berlin "only makes sense as part of a continuing concern

for the freedom of East Germans and Poles, Hungarians and Czechs." And, he concluded, "*in West Berlin the circumstances of the postwar military arrangements have left us an obvious way to discharge these obligations.*" (Italics added.)

Once again, however, it is necessary to repeat that no army yet has been created that could march only east, and could not march west; or in the language of General Telford Taylor, chief U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg, "an army, mighty when marching east but feeble when marching west, does not and never will exist" (*Harper's Magazine*, March, 1950).

The Nature of the Two Germanys

The U.S. press has presented the nature of the Two Germanys in this way: in West Germany is a magnificent democratic society, where tremendous economic advances have been made because of the superior quality of "free enterprise"; in East Germany is a sombre, impoverished, tyrannical land where economic stagnation is characteristic because of the stultifying effects of "totalitarianism." This presentation is as distorted as is everything else touching on significant social problems in the monopoly press of the United States.

In West Germany, there has been a resurgence of nazism, anti-Semitism, contempt for democracy, militarism, and an intensification of the domination of the economy by cartels, with a generous dose of U.S. capital involvement. Recovery of productive capacity has occurred, to a large degree on the basis of the pumping into West Germany of billions of dollars by American sources, in return for a considerable share in the ownership of the economy by those sources; at the same time, the recovery and expansion have been spotty—the first three months of 1959, for example, showed a decline in pig iron and steel production—and all the "normal" accoutrements of capitalism have been present, including chronic and considerable unemployment ranging from 5 to 9 per cent of the total labor force.

In East Germany, on the other hand, nazism has been extirpated and anti-Semitism decisively and consistently combatted; the junkers and capitalists have been eliminated; the economy has been fundamentally socialized; the society has been transformed in favor of the workers and the peasants; Prussian militarism has been

uprooted; and the productive capacity and the standard of living have been enormously enhanced. This latter accomplishment is the more remarkable since East Germany is much the poorer from the viewpoint of natural resources and original industrial capacity, and since she could not depend upon billions being pumped into her by a country enriched and not devastated by World War II, but rather faced, in common with the whole socialist sector, the brutal policy of blockade instituted by the United States from 1947 on.

From the United Nations studies, *World Economic Survey*, 1956 and *Economic Survey of Europe* in 1957, and in 1958, one learns that real wages in East Germany rose 115 percent from 1950 through 1955, so that while real wages were in 1950 about 42 percent *below* the pre-war level, they were, by 1955, 24 percent *above* pre-war level; savings deposits that totalled 3.7 billion marks in 1954 stood at 9.0 billions in 1957—with no inflation. Retail trade turnover in 1957 was 17 percent above 1954; production of electric power in 1957 was 68 percent higher than 1950; the production of meat, milk, eggs was considerably higher in 1957 than in 1955; industrial production in 1957 was 33 percent higher than it had been in 1953; and in 1958 it was another 11 percent higher than it had been in 1957. Overall, while the index of industrial production in West Germany grew from 100 in 1950 to 204 in 1957—certainly a rapid growth, the comparable figures in East Germany were even higher—from 100 in 1950 to 217 in 1957.

Indeed, recently the more sober among Western correspondents have begun to admit very notable advances in standards of living in East Germany, with those for working class elements more than equal to West Germany. This has been true in the writings of Denis Healey, a British M.P., and in the most recent columns of Walter Lippmann.

Meanwhile, in West Germany, while neo-nazi parties and organizations flourish, the Communist Party is outlawed, various peace organizations have been banned, and harassment of trade-union organizations has increased. Perhaps the most dramatic exemplification of the basic differences between the two States will appear in a brief contrasting of the cabinet-level personnel of both:

(East) German Democratic Republic:

Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl: Printer, former Social-

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Democratic Member of Reichstag, anti-nazi underground, twice arrested.

First Deputy Prime Minister: Walter Ulbricht, carpenter, anti-nazi underground, forced exile in Soviet Union.

Foreign Minister: Lothar Bolz, lawyer, stricken from rolls by nazis in 1933; forced exile in Poland and Soviet Union.

Chairman of Planning Commission: Bruno Leuschner, office-worker, anti-nazi underground, nine years in nazi jails and concentration camps.

Defense Minister: Willi Stoph, bricklayer, anti-nazi underground throughout Hitler era.

External Trade Minister: Heinrich Rau, metal worker, member, International Brigade, Spain, in nazi concentration camps.

Finance Minister: Willy Rumpf, office worker, anti-nazi underground, 5 years in concentration camps.

Justice Minister: Hilde Benjamin, lawyer, anti-nazi underground, husband killed in concentration camp.

Housing Minister: Ernest Scholz, painter, International Brigade, Spain, with French Maquis during World War II.

(West) German Federal Republic:

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer: Lawyer, Director, Deutsche Bank, briefly interned, but received full pension throughout Hitler era.

Foreign Minister: Heinrich von Brentano, lawyer, practiced law throughout Hitler era.

State Secretary, and Adenauer's personal assistant: Hans Globke, chief, "racial questions department," Nazi Interior Ministry.

Minister of Interior: Gerhard Schroeder, lawyer, SA member during Hitler era.

Defense Minister: Franz-Joseph Strauss, teacher; political indoctrination officer, nazi Wehrmacht.

Economics Minister: Ludwig Erhard, professor of economics during Hitler era.

Finance Minister: Franz Etzel, lawyer, officer in nazi Wehrmacht.

Justice Minister: Fritz Schaeffer, lawyer, Nazi Party leader, fired by U.S. in 1945 as "notorious nazi."

Housing Minister: Paul Luecke, industrialist, officer in nazi Wehrmacht.

The City of Berlin

Berlin is the capital of the German Democratic Republic. It is located 110 miles east of the border of the German Federal Republic. It is split into two halves, with the western half the seat of the tripartite administrative and military machinery of France, England and the United States. This itself is the rump left from the original Four-Power administrative center established for the purpose of governing all of occupied Germany. This was in accordance with the original intent—stated in the Potsdam Treaty—of keeping Germany together as a single unit, and finally making a peace treaty with all of Germany, once that country was demilitarized and denazified. It is because of this origin that no provisions were made in the original agreement for the securing of transportation and communication from Berlin, or any sector thereof and any other part of Germany. This is not an "oversight" as it has been called in the U.S. press; this is indicative of the original conception of the Berlin occupation.

This arrangement was made increasingly anachronistic as the Western Powers, led by the United States, as we have seen, moved toward the separation of the Western parts of Germany from the Eastern, and finally toward the establishment of a sovereign West Germany. These moves, months later and after repeated protests, were followed by analogous moves by the East Germans and the Soviet Union. Finally, the present situation was reached of two German States, each with a full apparatus for government, each with diplomatic missions in many parts of the world, and both recognized as such by the USSR and both receiving and sending Ministers to the Soviet Union.

West Berlin itself exists as a disembodied *Stadt*; it is not actually part of the German Federal Republic, so that, for example, it prints its own postage stamps, and while it sends a delegate to the Federal Bundesrat, that delegate may not vote.

All civilian transportation and communication from the rest of the world into the western sector of Berlin is now handled and

has been handled for some time by the authorities of the German Democratic Republic. The only portion of this traffic which is not so handled, constituting less than 5 percent of the total, is that required to service the military installations of the Western Powers; and it was the announcement of the Soviet Union that it desired to withdraw its personnel from East Berlin and turn over to the German Democratic Republic the handling of traffic for the Western military personnel that started the recent furore. Its concocted nature is perfectly manifest, for even Adenauer's government has reconciled itself to the fact that 95 percent of all traffic into and out of West Berlin is handled and approved by the authorities of the German Democratic Republic.

There are in fact today three political entities in Germany—the two Republics and the West Berlin concoction. Any objection to legalizing the recognition, internationally, of that which is a fact, and any objection to placing such legalization under the aegis of the United Nations, with exit and entrance guaranteed, can only be an objection by those who desire to keep West Berlin as a stimulant of the Cold War and as a center for espionage and counter-revolutionary propaganda. Its use for the latter purpose is notorious; one needs but mention the Gehlen organization and the Crusade for Freedom and its Radio Free Europe.* Recently, fairly full documentation has been offered of the frankly terroristic and reactionary work of the so-called National Alliance of Russian Solidarists, whose members fought with the Nazis during World War II and whose Director of Foreign Affairs is the son of the Czarist Minister, Stolypin, notorious, even in Czarist history, for his pogromist, Russifying, and ultra-reactionary policies. This organization, with plenty of money—most of it from American sources—operates with Adenauer's permission in West Germany, with headquarters in Frankfurt and branches elsewhere, including West Berlin. It conducts radio stations, prints newspapers and magazines and sends agents into the USSR, all for the avowed purpose of forcibly overthrowing it.**

* For these, see the present writer's *The Truth About Hungary* (N. Y., 1957), pp. 69-110; and R. T. Holt, *Radio Free Europe* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1958).

** A glowing account of this fascist-like movement, called *The House of Secrets*, by Gordon Young, has just been published by Duell, Sloan, Pearce, N. Y., with an admiring foreword by C. W. Mendell, Dean Emeritus of Yale. Charles Poore in the *N. Y. Times* (April 4, 1959) commended the work but "forgot" to mention the Nazi alliance and the Stolypin brand.

The Problem Today

The present problem is to force a liquidation of the Cold War. It is to reverse the U.S. policy, of "liberation" and massive coercion, whose bankruptcy is convulsing the "Free World." That U.S. policy, upon which Adenauer has staked his political life, cannot work, for its implementation has resulted not in the relative weakening of the USSR, but its strengthening; not in the unifying of the Western Alliance, but in its near shattering.

For the immediate future, a detente is needed in Central Europe, and this still can be achieved without the United States Government appearing to suffer a shattering blow to its prestige. The longer that Government resists, the more devastating to itself will be the accommodation that must in any case come. The accommodation must come because of the growing splits among the Allies: France insists that West Germany be content with the present borders of Germany, but Adenauer refuses; West Germany and France unite economically to oust Great Britain from important European markets and to compete more effectively in Africa, and Great Britain seeks means of effective retaliation, especially together with the Scandinavian countries. West German coal barons cut off imports of U.S. coal, and U.S. coal-mining and railroad corporations howl in rage; U.S. investors buy out whole English industries—as aluminium and others—and the British bourgeoisie seek to retaliate with Commonwealth restrictions.

And within each of the major "Free World" powers, dissension grows. Here space remains but to indicate some of the recent highlights of this development. First, the Left, led by the Communist Parties, continues to represent the largest single segment of public opinion—and to absolutely predominate among the working classes—in Italy and France.

In Great Britain, opposition to the Washington-Bonn policy is sweeping the country; it is shaking the Conservative Party, pushing the Labor Party into more and more critical statements, and invigorating the growing Communist Party. The Aldermaston March in England, in 1959, in protest against nuclear weapons, was several times the size of the previous year and this time the British press had to feature news of it. The *London Observer*, for example, reported: "The line of marchers was so long . . . that, unlike last year, few marchers could feel that they were part of a

small and illicit band of near-martyrs. *Those not marching seemed the outsiders.*" (italics added.)

Opposition in West Germany

In West Germany itself there is tremendous mass sentiment against the Adenauer line, which increasingly is viewed as one which not only poses the threat of war, but also makes impossible the unification of an independent and peaceful Germany. This manifests itself, for example, in the decisions of the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party to confer with Premier Khrushchev, and in the proposal from that leadership for a settlement of the German question which, in any case, recognizes the real existence of the German Democratic Republic, accepts the sincerity of the Soviet Union's expressed desire for a settlement, and urges serious negotiation. Even Willy Brandt, Right-win Social-Democratic Mayor of West Berlin—according to an AP dispatch dated April 21—said: "I would have liked that the West would have paid more attention to the Rapacki Plan [put forward by Poland's Foreign Minister for a demilitarized zone in Central Europe] as a basis of discussion."

To indicate something of what is seething among tens of thousands in West Germany, note is to be taken of the demonstration in January involving 500,000 residents of the Ruhr in opposition to the stationing of atomic missile bases in Dortmund; in March, in the same city, there assembled 700 delegates from West Germany representing the Congress of Opponents of Atomic Armament. Rector Mochalski, of Hamburg University, struck the keynote of this Congress: "Atomic rearmament, anti-Semitism, and anti-Communism belong together. They must all be eliminated at once, so as to prevent a catastrophe."

Of even greater consequence than the splits among the Allies and the mounting political dissension within West Europe—and related to both—is the magnificent recovery of the USSR from the devastation of World War II, the success of the Socialist Revolution in China and in several Central and East European countries since that war, and, particularly since 1956, the enormous leap forward taken by the Socialist sector in productivity and standards of living. This has tipped the scales, weighing the relative strength of the Socialist and capitalist sectors, in favor of the former. And now with the Seven-Year Plan of the USSR, the tipping of the scales

will proceed at a constantly accelerating rate. This will, in turn, help to diminish further the already shrinking colonial world of imperialism, and further discredit capitalism in its main centers.

This development is of fundamental consequence in exposing the idiocy of the Washington-Bonn line of "liberation" and "massive strength." It does lead to the intensification of plans and desires for "preventive" war among the most fanatical of the Cold War criminals. This is dangerous to the highest degree; it is, however, a response of desperation born of accumulating weakness. With vigilance, organization and struggle, especially on specific questions as they arise, this danger also can be overcome.

A Suggested Program

The Cold War, founded as it is upon basic divergences of interest and ideology, will take much time to really thaw out. That time must be spent in cracking the ice field at specific points where the biggest blocks can be chipped away. Right now it is Germany, and that is the biggest block of all. How much of it can be chipped away in the immediate future, cannot be said with any assurance. I would suggest, however, the following as having nothing but (salutory possibilities and as being realizable—given sufficient demand—through negotiation:

1. There must be mutual recognition of the existence today of two German States, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic.

2. The atomic and nuclear arming of West Germany must cease at once.

3. The German Democratic Republic should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact; at the same time, the German Federal Republic should withdraw from NATO.

4. The Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO should sign a mutual security agreement, pledging that neither would war upon the other.

5. All foreign troops should be withdrawn, within a specified, brief period, from all parts of both German States.

6. The German Federal Republic must formally agree to the present boundaries of both German States, and forswear a policy of territorial aggrandizement by any means.

7. An "atom-free zone" of as wide an extent as possible should be established, with proper guarantees, in Central Europe, comprising at least both German States, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

8. The unification of Germany—with full acceptance of the substantive Potsdam agreements—is to proceed, and is to be in the hands of the German people themselves.

9. Pending such settlement, West Berlin—with no interference from outside with its social system, and with guarantees for its supply requirements—should be declared a neutral zone, preferably under United Nations protection. Espionage and counter-revolutionary centers must be liquidated.

10. A final peace treaty with Germany should be negotiated by all the Powers participating in the late war against her.

This program-for-coexistence, focussed upon the problem of Germany, will go far, if achieved, to end the Cold War. It is realizable and it is necessary.

A neutral, demilitarized Germany makes war in Europe impossible. Surely that is a goal requiring and meriting the whole-hearted devotion of all friends of humanity, and lovers of our country.

April-May, 1959

XIII. WHAT HAPPENED IN HUNGARY

Though the President urges patience in the face of violent defiance of law and decency within the United States where Jim Crow is concerned, his Administration manifests remarkable impatience when it comes to Hungary. The United States Government insisted in the winter of 1956 upon the creation at once of a United Nations Committee to investigate the Hungarian uprising; it was most prompt, not to say precipitate, in endorsing that Committee's Report issued in June, 1957. It could not wait for the reassembling of the normal session of the UN General Assembly but pressed for a special session whose sole business was to be this Report. At that session, concluded in September [1957], the United States was foremost in demanding acceptance of the Report, and showed no concern over moderation in the language with which its own delegation discussed the Hungarian events.

Let us recapitulate a bit and see what it is that has just been endorsed by such freedom fighters as the rulers of Guatemala, Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, Taiwan—not to speak of Henry Cabot Lodge and the Dulles Brothers.

The "Free World" bloc in the United Nations, in January, 1957, appointed a Committee from five nations, chaired by an Australian diplomat, to make "a full and objective investigation" of the Hungarian events and "to base its investigation on direct observation in Hungary." The manifestly hostile nature of the proceeding precluded the Hungarian Government from giving this Committee permission to enter its territory. Nevertheless, despite the requirement of the General Assembly resolution, the Committee went forward with its inquiry.

The Committee did this by spending five months interviewing one hundred and eleven individuals who had fled Hungary after

the armed uprising had failed; these individuals were questioned in New York, London, Geneva, Vienna and Rome.

The New York *Times*, June 21, 1957, reported an interview with the Australian chairman of this Committee of Inquiry, explaining how the story was put together:

Sometimes the missing bit was given in testimony by a chauffeur who had just happened to drive a Hungarian dignitary to a certain spot. Sometimes it was a valet who remembered the timing of an historic event simply because he was in the room serving tea.

This may be called the "chauffeur-valet" theory of historical methodology. It is beneath contempt from the viewpoint of scientific investigation; it is peculiarly appropriate for the whole conception and purpose of this Committee of Infamy.

The Report contains 150,000 words. The New York *Times*, of cited date, said that the Chairman of the Committee "drew three broad conclusions from its exhaustive inquiry." In the words of that newspaper, these conclusions were:

1. The Soviet Union intervened by force in Hungary to crush a popular uprising and, in the second instance, to overthrow a legal and popularly supported government.
2. The uprising of the Hungarians was a spontaneous demonstration and not assisted from the outside. It was not an attempt to restore the old pre-war form of government, an allusion to the Soviet contention that the uprising was a counter-revolution aimed at restoring to power capitalists and landlords.
3. The Kadar Government did not at the time of its installation and does not now have popular support and the Soviet military command in fact administered the country for some time after the Kadar Government was formed November 4.

In every instance the truth is more or less exactly the opposite of the assertions of this Committee. The resort to violence on October 23, 1956 was the work of a minute minority from among the 150,000 Hungarians peacefully demonstrating in Budapest in recognition of and in furtherance of a process of the purification of the socialist system of their country. At no time were more

than a few thousand Hungarians actually participating in armed rebellion; in terms of the nine millions in the country, an infinitesimal fraction of the nation resorted to violence.

The first Soviet intervention—very partial, lasting three days, and confined to Budapest—came as a direct result of the request of the legally-constituted authorities of Hungary, and was offered in full accordance with the requirements of the treaty ending Soviet-Hungarian hostilities after World War II, and of the Warsaw Pact.

The second Soviet intervention, starting November 4, did not come in order to overthrow a legal and popularly-supported government. The fact is that by November 1, increasing anarchy prevailed in Hungary, widespread White Terror was appearing, dozens of villages were besmirched by pogroms, and effective central authority in Budapest was disintegrating. This second intervention made possible the termination of anarchy and mass lynchings, prevented a full-scale repetition of the kind of general White Terror that took tens of thousands of lives under Horthy and the Allies from 1919 to 1921 and was followed by 24 years of fascism, and may very well have staved off the outbreak of general war in Europe.

The resort to arms beginning October 23 most certainly was not a "spontaneous demonstration" and as certainly was "assisted from the outside." The most careful distinction must be made between the really popular and mass character of the demonstration on that day, and the resort to arms by a small segment of the demonstrators.

Those who first resorted to arms had been prepared for their role long beforehand. They wore similar identification bands, they carried small arms and were trained in their use, they had carefully selected objectives (a motor park, a radio station, a newspaper office, the Party headquarters, etc.) and carried out their missions with military precision explicable only on the basis of trained veterans carrying out clearly conceived plans. This resort to arms was supported with money and guidance from the outside—especially by the United States Government and its Intelligence Services, in active cooperation with similar services of other Western countries, particularly the notorious Gehlen organization of West Germany. Hungarian fascist veterans, of the Arrow Cross Party and the Szalasi Army, poured into Hungary from all of Western Europe, and some even came, as they have boasted in print,

from the United States. This does not mean that all who at any time took up arms during the Hungarian uprising were of this calibre or political orientation; many were not, and were moved by genuine grievances and by sincere devotion to the needs of Socialism as they understood them. But the organizers and the precipitators and the main leaders and bulwark of the *armed* attacks were counter-revolutionary, and many were directly working for the agencies named above.

The effective leadership of the armed uprising did aim at the restoration of capitalism and landlordism, and many of its outstanding participants were actually figures who had played important roles in fascist Hungary. Among these, for example, were the man in charge of propaganda for the ultra-reactionary and anti-Semitic Szalasi regime in Hungary, Odon Malnasi, and the man in charge of Szalasi's Department for the Extermination of Jews, Moklos Serenyi—which Department, by the way, did exterminate several hundred thousand Jews in the weeks before the Red Army freed Budapest in 1945.

The armed uprising actually moved "too far to the Right too fast" even for some officials of the American Embassy in Budapest, certain of whom tried to prevail on the Hungarian leaders after October 31 to moderate the public pronouncements of their anti-Socialist, anti-Soviet and pro-reactionary aims. Ultra-reactionary parties, which had ruled in fascist Hungary, reappeared and demanded the restoration of the landed estates, the reinstitution of Church-State unity, the elimination of the secularization of the schools, etc. The leading figure groomed to take over actual control was Cardinal Mindszenty—a medievalist in outlook, who, in 1948, told the *New Statesman and Nation* correspondent that "Charles Darwin was a dangerous heretic who should have been burned at the stake." By November 3, the Cardinal was publicly calling for the return of the lands to the Church, the return of education into the Church's hands, the destruction of Socialism, and in fact, a return to all the splendid "freedoms" identified with the name of Admiral Horthy.

The "assistance" from the outside did not end with millions of dollars nor with continual calls for violence from the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, nor with actual military-tactical instructions coming from other radios outside Hungary. It did not end with the distribution of thousands of leaflets in the Russian

language in Hungary calling upon the Soviet troops to mutiny, which leaflets had been printed earlier in Italy. This "assistance," this intervention, was a clearly formulated policy of Anglo-American imperialism, which pursued it actively ever since 1944. It was, indeed, a policy institutionalized in legislation still in effect in the United States as the Lodge Act for the recruiting of a fascist-minded Foreign Legion, the Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act appropriating millions every year for the declared purpose of subversion in the lands of Socialism, and the Central Intelligence Agency with its billions of dollars, scores of thousands of employees, and its aim of destroying Socialism.

The Kadar Government came into being in the course of struggle against Rakosite repression, aberration and illegality, on the one side, and against fascist, war-inciting restorationism on the other. It was the only force within Hungary having sufficient coherence, will and organization—and a program—to terminate the anarchy, eliminate the danger of successful counter-revolution from within, repair the damage to the nation, preserve Socialism, and press forward the process of purifying Socialism that had been going on in Hungary ever since 1953, and had made notable, though still quite insufficient, progress by October, 1956.

The vast majority of Hungarians do not want the factories returned to the bosses (most of whom had not been Hungarians, by the way); they do not want the land returned to the magnates and bishops; they do not want the educational system to return to the backwardness of the Church hierarchy; they do not want Hungary as the outpost of the "Free World" pointing like a dagger into the USSR and the East European socialist countries, in a world refrozen into a Cold War. The Kadar Government is pledged to prevent all this, and whatever may be the hostility and suspicion that remain, and the changes and renovations that still need completion, that Government is certainly closer to the desires of the Hungarian people than are the purposes and aims of Messrs. Dulles and Lodge.

The UN Committee Chairman in summarizing the findings refers to "the Soviet contention that the uprising was a counter-revolution aimed at restoring to power capitalists and landowners." This contention is by no means confined to the Soviet Union. It is also the contention of a number of Socialist and Social-Democratic leaders and organs throughout the world, including England, West

Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Chile, Indonesia, and elsewhere. These, in the main, stressed the danger of a fascist revival in Hungary and the threat there to Socialism and, above all, to world peace.

In rejecting the falsehoods contained in the Report of the UN Committee of Inquiry, now just again "reconfirmed" by the General Assembly's condemnatory action of September, 1957, there is no intent on my part to minimize, let alone deny, the grave mistakes and grievous malpractices of the Communist Parties in both Hungary and in the USSR, which led to serious errors of judgment and practice, gross violations of legality, insensitivity to national sentiment, and inequality in international relations among socialist powers. These were of decisive consequence in explaining the large degree of mass discontent that existed in the New Hungary, without which the basic drive of imperialism to induce counter-revolution would have fallen short altogether. In rejecting these falsehoods, also, there is no intent to minimize or ignore the very knotty questions of theory and practice—involving Party organization, bureaucracy, attitude toward religion, functions of the State, and other problems which require the most thorough study and which challenge adherents of Socialism.

In 1918 the U.S. State Department was responsible for fabricating the notorious Sisson documents and attempting to foist these upon the world as authentic. The documents purported to prove that the Bolsheviks in Russia were really agents of the Kaiser, and that the whole Russian Socialist Revolution was thus an alien imposition. These documents were vouched for repeatedly by the Government and certified as true by distinguished professors of history; they have never been repudiated by the U.S. Government, but the entire world of scholarship knows today that they are as crude forgeries as the Protocols of Zion.

In 1919 the Allied Supreme Council charged the Horthy regime with securing to all Hungarians full freedom in all respects. When reports persisted that the Horthy government was remiss in carrying out this charge, inquiry was made of the Inter-Allied Military Mission in Budapest, and it reported in March, 1920: "There is nothing in the nature of a terror in Hungary"; the British member of that Mission went out of his way to add personally that Admiral Horthy was "a strong character, a man of liberal tendencies, whose government was a Christian one in a Christian country." The Mission

in general and its British member in particular were falsifiers and while they falsified, thousands of Communists, Socialists, democrats, Jews—men, women, and children—were being slaughtered.

The imperialist powers foisted these forgeries upon the world because they hate and fear Socialism and because they want human exploitation and colonialism to endure forever, for they fatten on it and secure power from it. The UN Committee of Inquiry Report on Hungary is a forgery of a piece with these predecessors. Its aims are basically the same as these earlier efforts; but specifically in our time, the concoctors of this mockery of truth seek to intensify international tensions, confuse world opinion (especially American opinion), obscure their own bestialities in Mississippi and Cuba and Guatemala and Colombia and Taiwan and Kenya and Algeria, and thwart promising efforts for disarmament. They want to undercut the mounting popular demand for peaceful coexistence.

October, 1957

XIV. FRANCE AND ALGERIA

Do you remember Gulliver's description of the beginnings of European colonialism? "A crew of pirates" find themselves approaching a likely-looking new land, and "go on shore to rob and plunder."

They see a harmless people, are entertained with kindness; they give the country a new name; they take formal possession of it for their king; they set up a rotten plank or a stone for a memorial; they murder two or three dozen of the natives; bring away a couple more by force for a sample; return home and get their pardon. Ships are sent with the first opportunity; the natives driven out or destroyed; their princes tortured to discover their gold; a free license given to all acts of inhumanity and lust, the earth reeking with the blood of its inhabitants; and this execrable crew of butchers, employed in so pious an expedition, is a modern colony, sent to convert and civilize an idolatrous and barbarous people.

The nearest and earliest of the areas ravished in the manner indicated by Swift was Africa; it was the first assaulted, and will be the last to secure its release. "Africa," wrote Du Bois, "has been literally bathed in blood at the behest of Europe." This is true of every inch of the tortured continent, not least the northern quarter where, thirteen decades ago, France began carving out for herself a vast empire. She touched first, in the form of 30,000 troops, on Algiers, and then moved south and east and west; in eighty years of bloodletting and rapine France annexed Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

To conquer the coastal plain of Algeria took France seventeen

years; to reach the first range of mountains guarding the interior took her another decade. When, by 1869, France had reached the northern end of the Sahara, and so occupied a tenth part of Algeria, she had lost 300,000 soldiers and colonizers—the losses among those resisting the Christians have never been even estimated.

With conquest came subjugation, exploitation and unspeakable indignities—and continual rebellion. In this seething torrent of unrest, moments of wholesale eruption stand out—the great uprisings of 1864, 1871, 1876, 1879, 1881, 1884, 1901. . . . Stephen H. Roberts, author of a standard *History of French Colonial Policy* (London, 1929), speaks of Algeria as “a charnel-house of massacred natives” and describes the typical imperialist policy of slaughter, expropriation and impoverishment. He added this resulted in the inhabitants “hating France with the accumulated hatred of four [five, now] generations.”

In our own day the awful slaughters have continued and intensified—intensified as capitalism’s technical prowess has grown almost as quickly as its callousness. While casualties reaching the tens of thousands took imperialism some months or years a few generations ago, similar and even more grandiose “accomplishments” occur today in a matter of days, or even hours. Thus, confining ourselves only to the French in Africa, and then to but a few examples: in Constantine, Algeria, something like 25,000 Arabs killed in a matter of days in 1945; in Madagascar, about 85,000 killed in a few weeks in 1947; in Casablanca, Morocco, some 800 murdered in a single day in 1952; and about 600 more in the same city in one day in 1955; and 5,000 killed in two days in Algeria in 1955. . . .

And what of those who remain alive, with that fantastic persistence which is the miracle and the glory of human history; what of those the French imperial administrators refer to as “the original vice” of their colonies—*i.e.*, the indigenous population? Let us consider Algeria today and suggest an answer to this question.

In Algeria, a country four times the size of France, live about ten million human beings. Nine million are a mixed Arab-Berber people, Islamic in religion, Arabic in language; one million are European, the majority *not* of French extraction. Despite pretenses toward the political enfranchisement of the Arabic men—gestures extracted through mass pressure—the reality of French

rule ever since 1830 has been that of imperial overlordship, with the original inhabitants stripped of all real political power.

The country remains basically agricultural; its main products are wine (which the masses are forbidden by their religion to consume!), wheat, and esparto grass (alfa). What industry exists is of an extractive and processing nature; but the country's natural resources are rich, and considerable mining of coal and iron occurs. Oil, too, has been discovered—of which more later. In the cities, hugging the coast, the skilled workers are European; the unskilled, paid a pittance, are Arabic. The Arabs are forbidden to form their own trade unions; they are banned, in actuality, from other trade unions, though some token membership is permitted. The greatest mass of the Arabs are farm workers, with sharecropping—for all the world, like Mississippi—the predominant form of labor relationship.

Although the French government insists that Algeria, which happens to be in North Africa, is an integral part of France, the social-security legislation of France does not apply to this southernmost “department.” And, out of a total of nine million men, women and children, there is, declares Alexander Werth, a permanent army of wholly or partially unemployed amounting to one million adult men (*Lost Statesman: The Strange Story of Mendes-France*, Abelard-Schuman, N. Y.). The average annual income of the Moslem farmer in Algeria comes to \$70; five-sixths of the Arabic children attend no school; in the entire country, only 6,000 Arabs are studying above the elementary level. According to John Gunther, 98 per cent of the Arabic population in the cities are unable to read or write; 99 per cent are in this condition in the rural areas (*Inside Africa*, Harper, N. Y.). Two-thirds of the country's arable land is owned by the *colons*; seventy of the largest landowners possess 500,000 acres.

The results are what one would expect from these figures; they are the universal results of imperialism. Summarily put by Werth: “Many parts of Algeria are fairly near the starvation level”; Gunther: “Sixty per cent of the indigenous rural population is officially classed as ‘destitute.’” Destitution and starvation are spelled out somewhat more graphically by a French officer participating in a “pacification” campaign. Looking about him, he observes the “enemy”:

The wretchedness of the people in this area is almost

unbelievable. Some of the *mechtas* [hovels of molded earth in which the "natives" live] are sickening to see. Most of the adults have lost the sight of at least one eye because of a kind of ophthalmia which turns the eyeball into a whitish protruding globe, while many of the children have lost all their hair and their heads are covered with green moss, dotted with scabs, which is eating into the scalp (*Lieutenant in Algeria*, by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Knopf, N. Y., 1958).

Imperialism does not mean only victimization; as we have remarked, it means, also, resistance. No people have forged a more glorious record of heroic resistance than the Algerians—it is, indeed, in the forging of this resistance that they have forged their nation, the existence of which is denied by apologists for imperialism, but whose reality is being written in blood every day. A French chronicler, Vignon, wrote in 1888, of "how numerous are their revolts"; he added that "the repression of one was the germ of another."

Now, with capitalism in general crisis, the system crumbles within and disintegrates without, each blow reinforcing and stimulating the other. Now chronic discontent produces not only sporadic uprising but also full-scale revolutionary struggles and wars for national liberation. The greatest of these proceeding at this time is that of the people of Algeria—part of the breakup of the French North African empire, of the general rising of all Africa, of the renaissance of the colored peoples of the world, of the shattering of imperialism.

Of course, the official French explanation for Algeria is as idiotic as Dulles' explanation for the "loss" of China; *i.e.*, the Algerian war is the product of the activity of local bandits stimulated and armed by Cairo or the Kremlin. This explanation, devoid of reason, does possess for the ruling class the compelling virtue of relieving their own system from the condemnation which the rebellions epitomize. This explanation stems, too, from the basically anti-democratic outlook organic to imperialism. As a sympathetic observer summarizes "the argument of the responsible French authorities":

The Algerian people are ignorant and immature, and there is no limit to their capacity to be led astray. Leaving the fate of Algeria to their moods and impulses would mean handing

it over to the most uninhibited demagogues and dervishes. The people do not know what is good for them; they must be led by the hand, like children. (Herbert Leuthy, *France Against Herself*, N. Y., Praeger.)

Well, of course, they are not exactly children; and their overseers are not exactly "leading them by the hand." They are using other methods of correction, more in keeping with the real nature of the malady. That is to say, France wages war upon the people of Algeria. For forty-six months the might of France, reinforced by a good share of the wealth of the United States, has been hurled against these children, but their unruliness persists.

For two years France used 200,000 troops in this war; during the past two years, under the aegis of the Socialist Mollet, she doubled her commitment—indeed, for several months now fully 500,000 French troops have been engaged in the war upon Algeria. This, by the way, is the most numerous and the mightiest array of force that France has sent beyond her borders in all her history.

Five hundred thousand soldiers—with planes and tanks, with flame-throwers and cannon—are hurled for months and years not against "bandits," but against a people aroused and inspired. The logic of this is historically confirmed and irrefutable, yet it may not be out of place to cite briefly some explicit documentation. There is, for example, the work of Servan-Schreiber, already cited. This liberal French newspaperman, who fought for six months in Algeria, wrote in 1957, "the entire Arab population is joining the resistance against us." And: "It is estimated that the rebels have got from the French army about three times as many arms as they have received from the outside. They are living off us." Alexander Werth, in Algeria during the summer of 1956, reported the French army "up against something new—a kind of national unanimity among the Algerian masses they had not known before."

Under these circumstances, and fighting in the service of imperialism, the French soldiers do in Algeria what the Germans did in France, or, better, in Poland and the Soviet Union, though, it must be stated, the wholesale, organized, genocidal extermination of hundreds of thousands via gas chambers and crematoria has not been resorted to—at least, not yet. We add the saving phrase, because Thomas Brady reported in the *New York Times* (April 17, 1958):

There is a good deal of loose and unthinking talk in Algeria about how the best way to settle the problem is "to kill three million" Moslems with mass weapons. Why the figure three million is chosen nobody seems to know but it is a standard conversation piece.

Additional pause is justified over this "conversation piece" now that France has moved officially into the orbit of nations to be armed with nuclear weapons. Surely, with these in the hands of a completely reactionary French government, faced with continuing resistance in Algeria, the possible slaughter of three million Algerians with five or six bombs takes on the dimensions of more than loose talk. Meanwhile, with old-fashioned methods, the troops of imperialist France have chalked up a thoroughly respectable total of maimed and slain men, women and children in Algeria.

Paul Johnson, assistant editor of *The New Statesman* (London), offers a good summary statement of the facts in this regard:

Villages known, or suspected, to be supplying the rebels with food were obliterated by jet fighter-bombers (supplied, incidentally, by American offshore funds for NATO defense against Russia); flame-throwers and gas bombs were used against mountain hide-outs. Torture was employed against prisoners; both *gonflage à l'eau*, the forcible injection of water by a reverse stomach-pump, and the notorious *ceinture électrique*, an electrical-shock device perfected by the Gestapo . . . some 40,000 Arabs were interned in vast, filthy concentration camps outside Algiers. Liberal Frenchmen were expelled or arrested. Arab lawyers, doctors, teachers, who had played no part in the rebellion were given long terms of imprisonment, schools were shut down, newspapers suppressed, hospitals were handed over to the military. With each excess, each act of violence, more Arabs drifted into the hills. . . . (Paul Johnson, *The Suez War*, Greenberg Publishers, N. Y., 1958.)

Servan-Schreiber offers his eyewitness accounts. Thus: "Not a single house is standing in those groups of *mechtas* along the roadside"; "they open up with artillery against women and children because the whole tribe has gone over to the guerrillas." A lookout is caught by a patrol—he turns out to be a boy of perhaps 12 years; but he has information, or it is thought he has information,

and the child is "persuaded" to talk. He is obstinate, but he is persuaded, though when the persuasion is done and he is seen asleep, exhausted in a ditch by the side of the road, his face is swollen beyond recognition.

Alphaeus Hunton, in his impeccably documented study, *Decision in Africa* (International Publishers, N. Y., 1958), tells of the torture of children as now common throughout the rebellious continent. He quotes Mendes-France, when Premier of France, admitting in the Chamber (February 4, 1955) that he himself had seen in Algiers an 8-year-old victim of the civilizers—who had been in jail a full year! The Premier continued: "I am not telling you the worst, for there are some things that one does not dare say from a public platform"—let alone print in the *New York Times*!

A Moslem deputy from Algiers, the Socialist Benhamed—obviously one of the "moderates"—found it possible to be more outspoken at the rostrum of the French Chamber. Speaking there, also in 1955, he said, as quoted by Werth:

My fellow-Moslems know what is meant by "the bath-tub torture." They also know what is meant by the "water-pipe" trick. It is a way of pumping water into the stomach of people who are not even guilty but who have often simply been denounced anonymously by somebody. . . . Moslems living in the *bled* know at last what electricity means—they know not from electric bulbs, but from the electric gadgets that are inserted into various parts of their body. I might also mention the "bottle-torture"; it consists in forcing quarter-bottles of Perrier you know where. I maintain that all these tortures are regularly practiced in Algeria today.

With the Premier himself having acknowledged the reality of this nightmare, it was hardly necessary for the Minister of the Interior (responsible, with fine irony, for Algerian affairs) to acknowledge the truth of the Moslem deputy's charges. He could only say: "Unfortunately this sort of thing continues to happen in Algeria despite an attempt to discipline the police." Werth himself added: "At present, the Minister of the Interior is unable to carry out an enquiry into torture and other police methods employed in Algeria—if only because certain police officials are in the service of the feudal lords of the North Africa lobby, much more than in the service of the French Government."

* * *

In the midst of the Algerian struggle for freedom—as has been true in every battle for freedom everywhere in the world for the past eleven decades—stand the Communists. One of the paradoxical benefits deriving from the imperialist fiction that Algeria was an integral part of France was the fact that here (unlike Morocco and Tunisia, when still held by France), the Communist Party was not illegalized. And the Party of Algeria has been strong, solidly based and finely tempered; it is an important constituent of the revolutionary coalition, the *Fédération Libre Nord-Africaine*—the F.L.N. And, of course, in closest solidarity with the Algerian Communist Party and the entire F.L.N. stands the Communist Party of France, which alone of French parties favors the independence of Algeria.

In the past three or four years the Party's influence, among Arabs and the Algerian-European workers, has been growing; the Mayor of Sid bel Abbes—fabled as the main garrison city of the French Legion—was a Communist, and in other elections in the coastal cities the Party's candidates polled as many as 100,000 votes. One source of its influence was its newspaper, *Alger Republicaine*, described in this way by John Gunther: "It is the only newspaper in Algeria that encourages Arabs to join its staff . . . it is probably read more by non-Communists than any Communist newspaper in the world, because the other Algerian newspapers, owned by *colons*, are so imperviously reactionary."

Most recently, as the terror campaign of the French masters intensified, Communists have in fact been outlawed, under the sweeping charge: "endangering the safety of the State." In the past year General Massu, of the paratroops, has been specifically charged with the task of smashing, at all costs and no matter what the methods, the liberation forces within the city of Algiers itself. He has worked hard and thousands have been arrested, with hundreds upon hundreds having been executed—lately (May 26, 1958) the *New Republic* reported those slaughtered in the immediate past in this one city to number three thousand. In the course of this Free World operation, the *Alger Republicaine* was closed, and its young editor, Henri Alleg, pursued and finally caught.

From the pen of this French-born leader of the Communist Party of Algeria has come a work to rank with Gabriel Peri's *Toward Singing Tomorrows* and Julius Fuchik's *Notes from the*

Gallows. Alleg's contribution to the immortal literature of human selflessness, sublime courage and Communist clear-sightedness and steadfastness is entitled *The Question*; together with a long introduction by Sartre, it has just been published here (George Braziller, 1958). *The Question* is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the world in which he lives.

Alleg was held one month, by the paratroopers, in their torture chambers in El-Biar, a suburb of Algiers. After the thirty days, having told the sadists nothing, he was transferred to one of the concentration camps dotting Algeria—this one at Lodi, where he wrote the present little volume. Some weeks later, he was brought for the first time before a magistrate, charged with "endangering the State" and is now confined in a civil jail in Algiers.*

Alleg tells of the "enormous overcrowded prison" where hundreds were systematically tortured. In one sense that it was overcrowded was a "blessing"; the torturers had so many victims that they hurried their work. One whole wing of this splendid NATO edifice was devoted to ministering to women: "There," writes Alleg, "are young girls, not one of whom has given way: Djilma Bouhired, Elyette Loup, Nassima Hablal, Melika Ghene, Lucie Coscas, Colette Gregoire, and many others. Undressed, beaten, insulted by sadistic tortures, they too have been submitted to the water and the electricity."

The details of the torture are overwhelming. After one especially excruciating ordeal, it is suggested to Alleg that he may wish to kill himself, but: "I suddenly felt proud and happy not to have given way. I was convinced that I could still hold out if they started again, that I would fight them to the end, that I would not help them in their job of killing me." He does hold out, and he never answers their "questions."

Of course, most of the prisoners are Arabs—learning civilized behavior; and when they see Alleg's festering naked body: "They understood that, like themselves, I had been tortured, and they greeted me in passing: 'Have courage, brother!' In their eyes I read a solidarity, a friendship, and such complete trust that I felt proud, particularly as a European, to be among them."

The editors of *The Saturday Review* managed to find a reviewer who would handle this book with the least embarrassment for the

* Still later, Alleg was transferred to prison in France. He escaped in 1961, and today is a political refugee in Czechoslovakia.

Dulles brothers. He is Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, recently Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the British Foreign Office. Sir Ivone accomplished this fabulous feat by giving Alleg's narrative exactly one paragraph (filled with errors, by the way), and devoting the rest of his "review" to criticisms of Sartre's introduction. What troubles the nobleman is Sartre's suggestion: "Disavowed—sometimes very quietly—but systematically practiced behind a facade of democratic legality, torture has now acquired the status of a semi-clandestine institution." What really bothers mylord—so that he actually raises his voice—is Sartre's suggestion that this even applies to Great Britain.

Mylord is shocked. He has forgotten the British War Office's practice of selling blankets infested with smallpox germs to American Indians; the "Communist-hunts" in Malaya; the mobile gallows adorning Kenya. . . .

And an American, such as this writer, must not forget that the "watercure" described by Alleg was used upon thousands in the Philippines by American troops; he must never forget the genocide against the Indians; the sadism of slavery and peonage and Jim Crow; the delights brought by Marines to Haiti and Nicaragua; the torture of imprisoned foes of World War I. He must not forget that police brutality is notorious, and that the third-degree is an American expression.

And a Communist, such as this writer, must not neglect the phrase in Sartre's introduction that "there are brutes East as well as West." This is true; it is awful but it is true. Yet, Sartre misses much when he tends to equate, and he is altogether wrong when he sees nothing but "opportunity and occasion" preventing the tortured from becoming the torturer. The equation is wrong, because it is only systems of exploitation that have institutionalized mass torture, and it is only the elimination of such systems which can eliminate such institutions. Such institutions and the creation of humans so brutalized as to keep them functioning are the hallmark of exploitation with its dependence upon violence and fraud, its contempt for human life, its elitism and its racism.

That any remnants and any aspects of such behavior persist after the elimination of capitalism, after the victory of working-class movements building socialism, reflects how tenacious is the filth of the centuries of class domination. Of course, nothing whatsoever—no danger, no provocation—nothing whatsoever, can

justify anything approximating the torture of one human being by another. This is for capitalism and imperialism and fascism; they inflict poverty; they foster racism; they cultivate anti-Semitism; they breed wars—institutionalizing torture befits them.

This has nothing to do with being “soft.” One is not to be soft with a Franco and a Hitler; with a Mussolini and a Laval; with a Horthy and a Chiang; with a General Massu or such “socialists” as Mollet and Lacoste. One who really knows what these leaders and misleaders bring, and what more terrible horrors they portend, understands that to defeat them takes strength, persistence and even, at times, ruthlessness. But to move even the least bit in the direction of their methods dignifies them, and weakens the struggle against them.

* * *

Alleg quotes one of the officers in charge of his torment:

What we are doing here, we will do in France. We will do it to your Duclos and your Mitterand, we will do to them what we are doing to you. And your whore of a Republic, we will blow it up into the air, too! You're going to talk, I tell you.

This officer failed in his last threat. But he drew much blood from Alleg before he confessed defeat. He will fail, I think, in his other threats, too; but how much blood, how much damage will he and those he serves be able to inflict before they are defeated? Sartre in his introduction makes the point that the fascist-like behavior of the authorities in Algeria clearly was infecting the behavior of their fellows within France itself. “The gangrene is spreading,” writes Sartre, “it has crossed the sea. It has even got about that the ‘Question’ is applied in certain civil prisons in the Metropolis.”

Servan-Schreiber, in his already-cited volume, adds to this that with 500,000 Frenchmen serving in Algeria—“what with the reservists, the draftees and regular army men”—it is really “an entire generation” that is being conditioned by the abominations they are ordered to perpetrate. Hence, says one of the French officers: “We're turning them into moral failures, sometimes into monsters.” This same author tells of the blackmail, beatings, torture and assassinations practiced within Algeria with the connivance of the highest officials *upon French Army personnel* who

express opposition to the aims and methods of the murder-bund now running things. He writes of this as already "the routine"—namely, "the intimidation, threats, kidnappings, and quiet little executions that have become part of everyday life"; the efforts to "liquidate the men in politics, in the press, or in the Army" who stand in their way. The victims here are Frenchmen; the victimization is organized and politically-motivated. Servan-Schreiber warned a year ago:

The swirling tide of corruption and hate which has already stripped so many of these young Frenchmen of their dignity, threatens now to engulf the army in Africa, and may one day, in the violence and blindness of this war, and amid a general indifference, sweep all France after it.

Yet the Algerian monstrosity is more a symptom of decay than a cause, though, of course, there is a dialectical interplay here. But what I have in mind is the experience of Vichy, and even more, the proneness of capitalist society to welcome Hitler and to adjust itself, in a suitable national form, to fascism. Here the adjustment was made even though the immediate impulse towards this came from the traditional national enemy.

Alexander Werth, in his *France, 1940-1955* (Holt, N. Y.), wrote of the general cooperation offered the Gestapo by the French police. "The net result," he said, "of the French police's activity during the Occupation and the Vichy regime has still been to make the *policier*, never greatly loved in France, a particularly distasteful character."

Not only that [Werth continued]; but since the war, third-degree methods learned from the Gestapo during the years of the "co-operation" have tended to ingrain themselves into the daily routine of the French police, not in North Africa only, but even in France itself. A leading jurist like Maitre Maurice Garcon has denounced in no uncertain terms, notably in several articles in the *Monde*, the virtual legalization of torture since the war.

It is vital to bear in mind, also, that except for the working class and the Communist Party, most components of French life either warmly embraced or, at least, generally acquiesced in the fascism of Vichy. Werth makes the point that this was true of the

intellectual elite as a whole; "the great majority" embraced fascism. Gide, Bertrand de Jouvenal, Andre Maurois, the poets Claudel and Valery, Sacha Guitry, "almost all painters and musicians" fell into line. Of course, the Church hierarchy enthusiastically supported Petain; so did practically the entire civil service. It is important to remember that the law of July 10, 1940, destroying the Third Republic and setting up the Petain-fascist state was approved by a vote of 569 to 80 (with 17 abstentions). By then the Communist Party was outlawed, though its position was made clear that same day in a manifesto signed by Thorez and Duclos denouncing this act; of the 175 Socialists in the Chamber, all but 36 voted "Yes," and a Socialist, Rene Belin, was Petain's Minister of Labor!

Werth, in discussing the groups backing Vichy, neglects the most significant of all—namely, the businessmen. Possibly he assumed awareness of this; but any reader who would like to refresh himself on the French bourgeoisie and their delight in fascism will find important material in the just-published *Organized Business in France*, by Henry W. Ehrmann (Princeton University Press, 1958).

In the struggle against fascism, "the Communists," wrote Werth, "were in the front rank of the Resistance, and received no reward for it"—30,000 of the most conscious anti-fascists were murdered by the Nazis and the Vichyites; of the 112,000 French women and men deported to Germany, only 35,000 returned alive, and many of them were physical and mental wrecks. Beginning in the summer of 1944, as the second front took shape, the struggle against the counter-revolution took on more organized and effective form. The French liberation forces, through emergency courts-martial, and summary executions, eliminated about 4,000 collaborators and Gestapo aids. Later the *Comite d'Action de la Resistance* sentenced several thousand more to die. In France, in addition there were 39,000 imprisonments for fascist collaboration (this was quite low, relatively—in Belgium, Norway and Holland, there was a total of 150,000 imprisonments).

Yet the fact is that most of the leaders of Petainism went unpunished; by January 4, 1945, *Combat* was already warning: "A country that has failed in its clean-up is also liable to fail in its renovation." Meanwhile, safe with his family in England lived de Gaulle, being groomed in the first place by Churchill and

somewhat grudgingly by Roosevelt, as the "safe and sane" savior of France. Certainly, much of the purest patriotism motivated the largest numbers of those who rallied to the Resistance under the legal, if absent, leadership of De Gaulle, but the presence around De Gaulle from the beginning of elements of the extreme Right, including Cagoulards, is just as certain.*

The ecstatic praise of De Gaulle that has marked almost the entire American press—notably the *New York Times* and the *Herald Tribune*—reflects that press' commitment to imperialism and its deep contempt of and fear for democracy. But it verges on the shocking to see Max Ascoli, the editor of *The Reporter*, declare (June 26, 1958): "De Gaulle remade France, literally as he said, starting from nothing." And "After the defeat, what was left of France if not a motley collection of real estate?" What was left of France were forty million men and women living not in England, but on that "real estate." They did not wait for De Gaulle to fight the Nazis; and it was they, plus the Red Army and the soldiers of the Allies, who made it possible for De Gaulle to set foot again on some of that "real estate."

De Gaulle's Ideas

It is relevant to touch, if only briefly, on what evidence exists concerning the ideology of De Gaulle. Despite the protestations of such sterling friends of freedom as Max Lerner and Seymour Freidin, the evidence all points to that ideology as being extremely reactionary, with clear fascist-like tendencies. We have in De Gaulle a megalomaniacal professional Army officer, steeped in the tradition of caste, elitism and anti-rationalism, and filled with the hatred of the French Revolution that characterizes so many upper-class and devout partisans of the Catholic hierarchy.

When in the early '30's, rationalizations for fascism appeared throughout the capitalist world, De Gaulle produced one in France—*Le Fil De l'Epee—The Edge of the Sword*, published in 1932. De Gaulle's theme was that the edge has become blunted, but that it needed resharpener, for without the Sword—without Authority—chaos would descend. "Great men" were the makers

* Readers will find detailed evidence concerning this in the very interesting book by the French Right-wing nationalist, Henri de Kerillis, *L'Accuse De Gaulle* (Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1946).

of history, wrote De Gaulle, men who "could not be conceived, except as possessing generous doses of egotism, pride, harshness and deceit." The masses of people were "political animals" whose greatest need was for "organization" and for "discipline" under the direction of these "chiefs."

"Our times" above all, wrote De Gaulle, "are hard for Authority." In home and in factory, "in the State as in the street" Authority "excites impatience and criticism rather than confidence or subordination." It doubts itself, and it is this doubt which must be overcome, by discipline, by order, and by the reassertion of itself—of Authority.

Even De Gaulle's military theories—which later won praise as showing accurate prevision—were largely the theories worked out by those reflecting reaction's fear of mass soldiery and concentration upon an elite force. This, theoretically, is one of the cores of the Panzer-Luftwaffe complex of the New Germany—swift, highly-trained, manned by a select corps, and aimed at the civilian population, with frightfulness and terror the heart of technique.

The first effort by De Gaulle to suggest a specific employment of this technique for French forces came in his 1939 memorandum that France send a motorized expeditionary force through Norway into Finland, so that together with Mannerheim, they might "quickly put to rout the disorganized Russian hordes and march on Leningrad"—as De Kerillis writes. This was to be coordinated, by the way, with an attack from Syria upon the Caucasus under Weygand, spearheaded also by tanks and by 200 bombers. In this way, France, then in a "phoney war" with Germany, might yet achieve military glory!

Not a little of the distrust felt for De Gaulle by Roosevelt stemmed from the latter's fears, as the *New York Times* reported from Washington (July 7, 1943) that "the General is regarded by some who have known him as animated by dictatorial tendencies." That same month, Ernest Lindley published in the *Washington Post* (July 12, 1943) a summary of a recent British official inquiry, where it was held that De Gaulle "clearly has fascist and dictatorial tendencies."

But with the growing evidence of the triumph of the Red Army, and with the fact that leadership of the partisan armies throughout Europe was held by Communists, these tendencies

became looked upon, more and more, by the Western Allies as virtues rather than liabilities. De Kerillis, whose sources of information were on top levels, flatly declares that, "After Teheran, the British government moved energetically in favor of De Gaulle as insurance against communism."

In the First Imperial Conference of Free France, held in Brazzaville, January, 1944, presided over by De Gaulle, the colonial outlook of the man and the movement he headed was affirmed. Herbert Leuthy sums it up this way:

The final resolution of the Brazzaville conference . . . announced imperatively "that the aims of the work of colonization which France is pursuing in her colonies exclude any idea of autonomy and any possibility of development outside the French empire *bloc*; the attainment of self-government in the colonies even in the most distant future must be excluded."

This in no way was contrary to the law of June, 1946, passed by France, that "all subjects of overseas territories, including Algeria, possess the quality of citizens with the same rights as French citizens in the home country and in the overseas territories."

The rights of these overseas "citizens" we have already discussed; the law is and has been a farce, a demagogic facade. This throws light upon the meaning of De Gaulle's promises of full equality and citizenship rights to "all ten million Frenchmen in Algeria," which he has just made this past June. What he is saying to people who for four years have been waging a struggle for national liberation is that he assures all Algerians of the "right" of—remaining French! What De Gaulle said in June, 1958 was what he said in Brazzaville in 1944, and what the law of 1946 said in life—that is, continued colonial subjugation forever.

A fascinating exposure of the ideology of De Gaullism appears in a little book entitled *The Case for De Gaulle: A Dialogue Between Andre Malraux and James Burnham* (Random House, N. Y., 1948). Burnham and Malraux agreed on almost everything. And what was it they said? The enemy at home is Communism; the enemy abroad is the Soviet Union. For "democracy" to survive, Communism must be extirpated; how numerous are Communists and how significant a force in the national life remain irrelevant to this necessity. In fact the more numerous and the more deeply entwined within the life of the nation the more

necessary its extirpation. As for the U.S.S.R., Malraux says: "You know as well as I that there can be neither political nor national defense by a country whose government is incapable of choosing its enemy." The enemy is the Soviet Union—that is the basic program. The United States must interfere and is expected to interfere in the domestic concerns of France and all other countries, so long as the problem of Communism exists—"from this necessity there follows a limitation on sovereignty," but that cannot be helped.

"What Gaullism stands for, first of all," says Malraux—now France's Goebbels—"is the restoration of a structure and vigor to France." He speaks with derision of "the ghost of Karl Marx"—having once gotten near Marxism, to denounce it becomes an obsession with Malraux, as with so many others. He has a substitute for the ghost, in addition to Authority and Vigor and Structure: "We said that we would unite the country around the idea of public welfare"; and the point here is that Malraux sees this "welfare" as offering a "choice between the idea of class and the idea of public welfare."

Naturally, Burnham concludes:

You describe a reality in terms of which many of the present institutional forms of French society are not so much inadequate as irrelevant. It does not seem likely that a solution can be found by the methods of the present government or any similar government.

Prophetic advice, is it not, from the American expert?

Additionally, Burnham suggests that if this Gaullism works in France, it will spread—"it cannot be confined within French borders." Burnham is really thrilled with Gaullism—"it is the first genuinely *new* political reality since Hitler." Yes, agrees Malraux:

In every country resistance to Communism takes on the color given it by the particular spirit of that country. In Germany, it was Nazism; and with us it is something which looks like the First Republic.

I had mentioned one point of disagreement between Malraux and Burnham. This was over Germany. Burnham was all for a powerful Germany fully integrated within the power complex of a "new" Europe; Malraux, being French, after all, was not so sure and could not help mentioning what German armies twice

in the 20th century had done in France. Undoubtedly, this remains a point of difference today with De Gaulle and his NATO cohorts. It is important, especially in view of the sense of damaged national pride (the "loss" of Indo-China, Tunisia, Morocco; the presence of American troops) that forms an ingredient of De Gaulle's return to power. Yet, it is not to be overestimated: the French elite more than acquiesced in fascism even under the Germans. Moreover, several months ago steps were taken to integrate the military machinery of France and Germany (and Italy); some of this has been made public. Thus, the former Premier, Felix Gaillard, when asked by the editors of *U.S. News and World Report* (January 3, 1958): "Is it true that France, Germany and Italy have reached an agreement to undertake joint production of weapons?" replied: "Yes."

De Gaulle's Practice

Of course, the basic test of De Gaulle's ideas is his practice. De Gaulle's resignation in January, 1946 came about, as Werth has written, "because he realized that the Left continued to hold the initiative." With De Gaulle then a failure, he was replaced with the Marshall Plan, which as part of the whole Cold War pattern moved the center of gravity of French politics toward the Right. This American interposition was, again citing Werth, "not a French solution of France's post-war problems; whereas the fundamental Socialism of the Resistance would have been." In the course of the ensuing years, De Gaulle's Party stood consistently with the Right in both domestic and foreign policies. Meanwhile a deliberate effort was made to destroy the viability of the parliamentary system of the Fourth Republic by barring from participation therein the Communist Party, which consistently has been the largest single French party and has gained the vote of one-quarter of the entire electorate.

With the largest Parliamentary bloc barred from participation and with five and a half million French voters read out of the bourgeois-democratic system; with the colonial wars eating up billions upon billions of francs and utterly distorting the economy into one devoted to war; with these wars bringing nothing but inflation, defeat and shame; with the Algerian War taking on major proportions, devouring scores of thousands in casualties and

tying up 500,000 troops, and obviously going against France in any case; with the poison of the German occupation and Vichy never really eradicated; with the racist horror of Algeria intensifying that poison; with Big Business and the Church hierarchy actively seeking the end of bourgeois democracy; with the Army elite anxious for Authority—the way was prepared for the effort to destroy that democracy and to begin the establishment of a French fascism.

Documentation of the conspiratorial and long-time nature of this counter-revolutionary stroke that brought in De Gaulle has been considerable; at this point it may be referred to very briefly. The conspirators range from multi-millionaire manufacturers in France to fabulously rich colonial overlords to dozens of colonels and some generals of the Army to intelligentsia—like Soustelle and Malraux—and to top levels of several bourgeois parties, particularly that of De Gaulle and to Mollet, general secretary of the Socialist Party and certain of his key aids, like Lacoste, supreme civil officer in Algeria.*

That this conspiracy involved the active participation of De Gaulle at all decisive policy levels is perfectly clear. While it is true that there proceeds an "Operation Seduction" along with the "Operation Sedition"—as Duclos said in the Chamber—it should fool only the very naive.

The French Right and the U.S.

Alexander Werth wrote of war-time France:

That America was on the side of counter-revolution, the Resistance knew only too well. Thus, in June 1944, the clandestine Radical-Socialist *Aurore* wrote, under the title, "The American Card":

"These Vichy gentlemen have now found the Road to Damascus. They are playing the American card. It is their supreme hope. At Vichy they go on whispering all over the

* Details so far available to the public may be found in the *N. Y. Times*, June 4, 1958; *The New Republic*, June 2, 1958, pp. 5-6; the column by George Herald in the *N. Y. Post*, June 9, 1958; the story on Delbecq in the *N. Y. Times*, June 14, 1958; the summary by Anne Bauer from Paris in the *National Guardian*, June 23, 1958. Important additional material will be found in the latest Werth volume, already cited and in that by Servan-Schreiber. Very significant for the long-range Army plots is "Armée et Nation" by Alfred Malleret-Joinville, in *Democratie Nouvelle*, April, 1958.

place that, being afraid of the USSR, America will facilitate the creation, in the West, of an anti-Bolshevik barrier composed of France and of a Germany camouflaged to look like a democracy. . . . These gentlemen imagine, above all, that if this marvelous stunt were to come off, they would have nothing to fear from the courtmartial of a Free France, and might even take their seats in the Government!"

In France, as throughout the world, it is American monopoly capitalism which is the basic supporter and promoter of reaction. To the French government, the United States government has given and loaned since World War II a total of over eleven billion dollars. Furthermore: inside France right now are 55,000 American military personnel, six wings of bombers and troop-carrier planes, and a billion dollars' worth of American military installations. Through the heart of France runs the main American military convoy feeding the 250,000 American troops in West Germany; to the north of this, from St. Nazaire in the west to Metz in the east, runs a 12-inch military oil pipeline.

Within France itself, and to a greater degree, within the former French empire in Asia and in the Middle East (especially in South Vietnam and Lebanon) American finance capital has gained a significant foothold, and in some cases domination. In Africa, American (and West German) capital has made enormous strides in penetration during the past decade; this is notably true so far as Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria are concerned. Let us indicate something of the details so far as Algeria is concerned.

In Algeria, French and French-Algerian dominated companies and banks have made fabulous profits for generations not only from farm, public utility and communication enterprises, but also from the mining of iron, phosphates, coal, lead and zinc. In the Sahara sands (located in the Southern Territory of Algeria, legally a colony of Algeria, not of France) have been discovered recently oil reserves estimated to total at least one hundred million tons; very lately, a little further north (near Touggourt) a substantial oilfield has been tapped and pipe lines moving north have been laid. Enormous deposits of natural gas have also been found lately, and one of the world's largest deposits of iron ore, as well as manganese, tin and copper have been uncovered. Intensive exploratory work is now proceeding for uranium; it has also been

established that beneath the northern Sahara there lies a huge fresh water "sea," and the tapping of this marvel has started.

John Gunther, writing four years ago, reported that \$150,000,000 had been spent by then looking for oil in Algeria. He mentioned large-scale activity by Shell Oil (British) and the American Caltex Corporation. He wrote: "All over the northern Sahara we saw teams of geologists and geophysicists, prodding into the desert sand, building camps, and waiting for the oil to flow." Alphaeus Hunton states that the *Societe Nord Africaine des Petroles* is 65 per cent controlled by the Gulf Oil Company; the *Compagnie Algerienne des Petroles Standard* is dominated by Standard Oil of New Jersey. Of decisive importance is the fact that in November, 1949, according to the *New York Journal of Commerce* (November 30, 1949) a committee of leading American and French bankers was established "to stimulate and facilitate development of overseas territories of the French Union." On this committee were top officials of Chase National, Guaranty Trust, National City, Morgan Stanley, Kuhn Loeb, Dillon Read; on the French side, the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, Banque de Paris, Banque de l'Union Parisienne, Union Europeenne Industrielle, Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale, Banque Lazard Freres, and Banque Worms (see Victor Perlo, *American Imperialism*, International Publishers, N. Y., 1951, pp. 183f.).

When to all that has preceded one adds that the Sahara has been selected by NATO as the locale for the establishment of long-range missile bases, and for the development of atomic weapons by both France and West Germany, one gets to the heart of the forces waging the Algerian holocaust, seeking the destruction of France and the re-establishment of fascism in the heart of Europe.

Alternatives to De Gaulle

It was widely insisted by the American press that there was no alternative to De Gaulle. This is false. One of the notable facts about this coup was the persistent resistance to its accomplishment *within the Chamber of Deputies*. There is no doubt that much of the resistance was faked, to placate public opinion, but there is also no doubt that the Chamber's persistence in voting

overwhelmingly for Pflimlin until the last moment of betrayal and usurpation reflected deep splits among the French bourgeoisie as well as the overwhelmingly pro-Republican and anti-fascist sentiment of the French masses.

The fullest and most responsible non-Communist consideration of this matter came from K. S. Karol, the Paris correspondent of the London *New Statesman*. His dispatches (May 24, May 31, and June 7, 1958) leave no doubts on this question. Had Pflimlin "decided to take draconian measures against the insurgents, he would have had all France behind him." But Pflimlin and Mollet "are more afraid of a Popular Front in France than of the generals in Algiers." Later, Karol reported that had there been a "recall to the colours and the draft into the police force of the former resistance officers who were dismissed after the war as too Left-wing" and who were begging to be allowed to save the Republic, it would have been saved; and had this been backed up by arming the factory and dock workers, there could have been not a moment's doubt as to the outcome. And, reports Karol, the majority of the Socialist deputies throughout May "went so far as to express openly their willingness to make common cause with the Communists." But, "this is the simple truth: the French Republic is collapsing because of the treason of its leaders." Finally, there is the picture of the Socialist leader, Mollet, repeatedly going to De Gaulle, "in an almost hysterical condition, begging him after all to go before Parliament. He explained that he had done everything in his power to switch the Socialist vote and that he had only partially succeeded."

While the votes for Munich and for Vichy were overwhelmingly favorable, with only the Communist Party standing firmly opposed to both betrayals, this was not true of the De Gaulle *putsch*. Here, of course, the Communists voted solidly in the negative, but so did the *majority* of the Socialist and a considerable minority also of the Radical Party, including the former Premier Mendes-France. Indispensable, then, to the triumph of reaction, once again as so often in the past, was the betrayal by the Social-Democrats. But this time, the betrayal nauseated not only the rank and file, but also a very large segment of the leadership. As a result, in the opinion of K. S. Karol:

Whatever the next few months may hold, the old Socialist

Party, the Party of Mollet and Lacoste, of the Suez War and the tortures in Algeria, the party which mistrusts the workers more than it does the extreme right, is dead.

The Communist Party throughout the crisis upheld the highest traditions of its honorable history. It struggled to arouse the masses and to lead them to display their feelings and their power. It sought the widest possible allies; it welcomed all who desired the Republic. And it maintained its principled position in opposition to the Algerian War as catastrophic as well as unjust, and in favor of the ending of that war by recognizing the independence of Algeria.

Meanwhile, the war continues and intensifies in Algeria, and the France of De Gaulle will no more be able to crush it than were his predecessors. And the solidarity of the colonial peoples and their strength accumulate. This is true of Asia and Latin America and is the meaning of Bandung. It is true of Africa and is the meaning of the recent (April 15-22) Conference of Independent African States held at Accra, the capital of Ghana, a conference singularly neglected by the American press.

But that neglect only underlines the importance of this unique and historic conference. Represented at it, for the first time, were official delegations from all the independent African peoples: Ghana, Liberia, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic, the Republic of Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. None of these countries is socialist; most of them have been identified in the past much more closely with the "West" than with the "East." Yet, these delegates unanimously adopted resolutions in favor of disarmament and peace, world-wide economic and cultural cooperation, and in utter condemnation of racism which cut at the political and ideological foundations of imperialism. And specifically on Algeria, the independent African governments unqualifiedly condemned France for its continuance of the war and its refusal to grant independence to Algeria, and they affirmed their "determination to make every possible effort with a view to helping the Algerian people towards the attainment of independence."

Meanwhile, the billion peoples of the Socialist sector and their governments will exert their will and their might in opposition to the imposition of fascism upon France. Whatever may be the particular diplomatic and political developments, that truth re-

mains; it is today a truth of such dimensions that it must give pause not only to De Gaulle but to those dominating him, including the whole NATO apparatus.

Conclusion

The crisis in France brings home the reality of the danger of fascism, and of war; it emphasizes again the truth that monopoly capitalism drives towards these expedients, and that only organized, conscious resistance will guarantee their defeat.

The French events emphasize the corrosive power of racism; the fact that enslaving one people vitiates the freedom of the slaveowners. They illuminate, too, the real nature of the bourgeois state, with its bureaucracy and its administrative machinery dedicated to the services of the monopolists and contemptuous of democracy or even legality. They show once again that it is reaction which is the source of violence in the modern world, violence both domestic and international.

The French events demonstrate that in the modern era it is the working class which bears the destinies of the nation upon its shoulders; that the interests of this class and of the people as a whole fundamentally are one. It shows again that the staunchest defenders of liberty—those in the forefront, those first arrested and tortured by reaction—are the Communists. In France only the Community Party as a party has emerged from the trials of May and June, 1958 with honor untarnished and with popular prestige enhanced. This great Party of the Martyrs, of the Resistance, of the Nation, once again carries forward the best traditions of France.

July, 1958

XV. THE MID-EAST: PEACE OR WAR?

The recently founded National Church of Nigeria and the Cameroons has its own book of prayers and hymns. Here is a stanza from that book:

*From foreign rule and domination,
God of freedom deliver us
From oppression, suppressions and exploitations,
God of Freedom deliver us.*

This is the Battle Hymn of a Republic-in-Birth; and of a colonial world in new birth. The tempo of the struggle varies from one portion to another; at the moment the Arab peoples are in the headlines. "What's the name of this place?" a marine wants to know, as he digs into the hard sand on a strange beach very far from home. "Is this what they call Beirut?"

The Middle East or the Near East—as Europeans have named the area with their characteristic self-centeredness—is made up of that part of the globe on which are concentrated the great and ancient Arabic peoples. It consists of West Asia and North Africa; of some four million square miles reaching from the Persian Gulf in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, and from the Sudan in the south to Syria in the north. In this enormous bowl, astride the junction of three continents, live about eighty million people.

Impoverishment

The vast majority of these eighty millions do not live well; indeed, nowhere in the world is there a more profound poverty and deeper human suffering than in this area where once bloomed

the Garden of Eden. Emil Lengyel, in his *World Without End: The Middle East* (John Day, N. Y.), calls it "the poorhouse of the world." Generally speaking, its death rate and illiteracy rate are the highest in the world. Most of the population is ridden with disease—pellagra, tuberculosis, dysentery, typhoid, trachoma, malaria. Some of the data are very nearly unbelievable in conveying such stark and mass impoverishment: Iraq has one doctor for each 7,000 inhabitants; in that land of six million people, 50,000 die every year from malaria; in Iran out of every 1,000 live births, 500 die in infancy; of 16 millions, one-fourth suffer from malaria.

The evidence points to a worsening of conditions in the Middle East (with some exceptions) especially since World War II, when the most rapid and intensive exploitation of the area's resources by Western capital has occurred. When one has conditions approximating starvation to begin with, intensified impoverishment is really something to conjure with: yet such appears to be the fact. Thus, in Iran, the daily calorie content of food supply available for the population for the period 1934-1938 was 2,010; for the period 1946-1949 it was 1,811;* the latest UN report (*Economic Developments in the Middle East*, 1956-57, Columbia University Press) notes a steady rise in the cost of living since 1950, which in Iran amounts to 54 per cent and in Turkey to 55 per cent; the deficit in the trade balance for the whole area is mounting steadily; and in some places there has been a sharp fall in agricultural production—cereals and fruits in Jordan, for instance. Professor J. C. Hurewitz, of Columbia University, declares in a volume published in 1958, that in much of the Middle East, since 1945, "there has, if anything, been a relative decline in living standards" (P. W. Thayer, ed., *Tensions in the Middle East*, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 28). This, too—the fact of intensified impoverishment of colonial peoples during the past generation—is a central theme in Germaine Tillion's *Algeria: The Realities* (Knopf, N. Y., 1958).

These are the material blessings brought the Arab masses by Western civilization; they are the facts after one disengages himself from the flood of propaganda as to the "benefits" coming from Big Business' investments of hundreds of millions of dollars. J. H.

* Benjamin Shwadran, *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers* (N. Y., 1955, Praeger), p. 174.

Huizinga, writing in 1956 of Iraq—supposedly one of the show-places of Western philanthropy—declared “these vast expenditures are benefiting the contractors and entrepreneurs far more than the great sharecropping mass of the populace” (*The Reporter*, May 17, 1956). And Joe Alex Morris, Jr., Mid-East correspondent for the New York *Herald Tribune*, also referring to Iraq, said (July 15, 1958) the expenditures had “not yet paid off in concrete terms for the man in the street”; for him it meant rather inflation and additional suffering. Mr. Morris added that “one sheik from the rural south of Iraq” had told him “that the country’s feudal land-tenure system, plus the government’s manipulations of crop prices, was ruining the villagers.”

Imperialism, then, has been exploitative and parasitic; this has meant maintaining and worsening the minimal standards already endured by a people functioning under a semi-feudal system, with most of the land in the possession of a very few, and the vast majority, though dependent upon the land for their living, being totally landless.

Oil Imperialism: Some Realities

The practice in dominant American circles, assisted by the revolutionary and anti-colonial traditions of our country, has been to deny the existence of an American imperialism. In the past, it was acknowledged (sometimes insisted, depending upon circumstances) that there was a British or French or German or Italian or Dutch or Portuguese or Spanish or Belgian or Russian imperialism, but never, never, an American imperialism. Lately, the apologists for monopoly capitalism—with a noteworthy assist from revisionists of or defectors from Marxism—have been tending to declare that imperialism is old-hat, and doesn’t “really” exist any more except in the embalmed writings of Marx and Lenin and the even more embalmed brains of their bemused present-day partisans. Oh, yes—there was one other exception—imperialism, that is, real imperialism did exist, but that was only in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics!

Imperialism—and in the forefront American imperialism—has not yet been embalmed. It exists and has existed for over fifty years. It is today more virulent and active than ever before; an especially potent ingredient in it is petroleum. The imperialism

of oil giants—their aggressive searching for resources, their efforts to dominate transportation, refining and marketing, their inter-connections with government, and their insistence that government actively support and further their own private interests—has been a fact, especially in connection with Great Britain, France and the United States, since some years prior to World War I.

This fact and its relationship to the origins, course, and results of the First World War are as firmly established by historical research as anything can be.*

With the end of World War I, the significance of oil and of the great oil corporations to the economies and governmental structures of the capitalist powers was enhanced; at the same time, the conflict among the powers — and especially between Great Britain and the United States—over oil, and over which government could most effectively further the interests of their “own” oil barons, became a central feature of diplomacy. It still is — only more so because the specific gravity of the oil industry in terms of the whole picture of industry and finance has very much increased, particularly since the end of World War II.

The inter-relation of government and the oil companies reached and today reaches the highest levels. Presidents Wilson, Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, Commerce Secretary Hoover, Secretary of State Hughes, time after time were in the closest personal contact with oil barons—giving and taking advice in drafting treaties, and in threatening (and using) violence.

Many present-day readers may have forgotten, or never learned, that three members of Harding’s Cabinet were on the payroll of oil companies, and bartered away invaluable national resources to the private possession of those companies; that Wilson’s son-in-law and Secretary of the Treasury (later a U.S. Senator, and very nearly Democratic Presidential candidate), William Gibbs McAdoo, received a million-dollar retainer from oil interests combating nationalizing efforts by the Mexican government.

Today, as Victor Perlo, in particular, has made clear, we have witnessed a significant shift in the economy of our country; oil, not steel, is now king. From 1901 to 1953 steel production increased $7\frac{1}{2}$ times, oil 34 times. Today the oil companies have greater assets

* The interested reader is referred to the following works, and the sources cited therein: Louis Fischer, *Oil Imperialism* (International, N. Y., 1926); Parker T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (Macmillan, N. Y., 1926); Ludwell Denny, *We Fight for Oil* (Knopf, N. Y., 1928).

than those of all companies in the next three largest industries, and their distribution of profits is relatively greater, too; hence, oil tycoons control investment funds very nearly the equal controlled today by the Morgan group.

Today, oil leads in U.S. foreign investments; while it represented 19 percent of all such investments in 1943, it held 30 per cent twelve years later. So great are these investments and so lucrative that more than half (in the case of Standard Oil of New Jersey, three-fourths) of the industry's profits came from foreign investments; the rate of return from foreign investments was six times greater than from domestic!

Reflecting this decisive position of the oil companies in the economy of our country is their decisive position politically. This may be summarized by quoting a paragraph from the pen of Karl E. Meyer, of the staff of the *Washington Post & Times Herald*, who has made a close study of the matter. He wrote in *The Progressive*, May, 1957:

The American oil industry is one of the towering giants of the national economy. Its resources and profits are prodigious; its special tax privileges have no parallel in the business community; its impact on domestic political life is felt on every level of government; its influence in the field of foreign policy is often decisive. And yet this all-pervading industry enjoys an unusual freedom from government regulation and a remarkable immunity in the hands of the nation's press.

To give but two specific examples from the recent past: It is well-known and has been openly admitted that the CIA had a major hand in overthrowing the government of Mossadegh in Iran in 1954; this government was destroyed because it had dared undertake the nationalization of its oil resources. But when the Mossadegh government was replaced by one headed by the leading Iranian collaborator with Nazis, General Zahedi, it not only had to arrest 600 protesting citizens and immediately execute twelve "Communists"; it had also to undo the nationalization. This was done with the major participation of an under-Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., and when it was accomplished the stock of the interested oil corporation advanced in value 350 per cent. At the same time, what had hitherto been entirely a British monopoly

The Mid-East: Peace or War?

was now one in which the British shared their hold with five American corporations who together held a 40 per cent interest in Iran's oil!

Henry Byroade, U.S. assistant secretary of state in charge of Near Eastern Affairs, became absolutely lyrical in commenting upon this Iranian achievement: "Out of the black cloud, white rain has descended. His majesty the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi are producing sweet remedies. Zahedi's advent to power is a repudiation of the sterile negative policies of the past."

Somewhat less well-known, because less spectacularly accomplished, were the State Department-oil companies' achievements about the same time in Turkey. That government, by a law passed in 1933—reflecting the continuing impact of the post-World War I national revolution—had forbidden the exploitation of its oil resources by foreign companies. This was long a target for diplomatic sniping. Beginning in 1942, U.S. Ambassador McGhee—formerly a geologist for several major oil corporations—concentrated all his efforts on undoing it. In November, 1952, the Turkish Cabinet announced its desire to abolish the aforementioned law, and invited a Mr. Max Ball—formerly of Shell Oil and then a prominent Washington "petroleum consultant"—to come to Ankara and draft a new law. He did so, and in March, 1954 the Turkish Assembly passed Ball's law, permitting the exploitation of Turkey's oil resources by foreign companies.*

And at about the same time Secretary of State Dulles was working out the plans for his Baghdad Pact, charter members of which would be the now thoroughly modernized governments of Iran and Turkey!

In connection with the intimate relationship between the present United States government and the oil monopolies, one further example may be offered. This has to do with the principle of the right of a sovereign country to nationalize any of its resources. The legality of such act, especially where compensation is offered, is universally recognized; yet there has been a continuing, though little publicized, campaign by the Eisenhower Administration to undo this. In December, 1952, the economic and financial com-

* For the Iranian affair, see the work by Shwadran, previously cited; additional material on this, and information on the Turkish episode are in L. P. Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil* (London, 1955). By the way, Attorney General Brownell, in 1954, at the urging of the National Security Council, granted the five companies in the Iranian consortium, exemption from the anti-trust laws!

mittee of the UN approved a proposal made by Iran and Bolivia upholding the right of nationalization. This was aimed at the United States, which alone voted in opposition. Thereupon, the United States submitted an amendment asserting the right of foreign nationals to their investments; this was voted down 27 to 15; the entire Latin-American, Asian and Arabic bloc voted in opposition.

Dulles, however, has not altered his position. On the contrary, in a confidential meeting he held with leading oil producers in August, 1956—where he briefed the barons on the line he, the Secretary of State, would take in the forthcoming London Conference—Mr. Dulles insisted that it was legitimate to nationalize assets only if they “were not impressed with international interest.” It is this which is basic to the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine; it is against this, in particular, that that Doctrine is aimed when it speaks of “subversion”;^{*} it is a fundamental motivation in the current Anglo-American invasions of Lebanon and Jordan.

Facts of this kind are to be borne in mind when one reads the pious protestations of Dulles, or the sentimental claptrap written for the President. They are to be remembered when one reads: “A number of nations of the West, including the United States are parties to the oil agreements made with the several sovereign nations of the Middle East.” (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, July 28, 1958). Such falsehoods are intended to lead the unwary reader to think in terms purely of a mythical “national interest” since oil monopolies are discreetly unmentioned. The deception is made explicit by the *N. Y. Times* in an editorial of July 19: “The United States did not go into Lebanon to ‘protect the oil interests.’” The internal quotation marks take the place of evidence, of course; and one is asked to make a distinction between the private oil interests which just happen to own and exploit the oil of the Mid-East and some intangible, not to say invisible interest “of that larger stability which is vital to the whole world.” But one cannot separate the oil of the Mid-East from the companies that own it, because that is the actual, real and living interest which exists right now. And the presence of instability in the world today, and in the Mid-East in the first place, is a characteristic of the situation as it now is, i.e., with

^{*} For the UN action of 1952, see Harvey O'Connor, *The Empire of Oil* (Monthly Review Press, N. Y., 1955), p. 338; for the secret Dulles meeting, exposed by a Senate investigation of monopoly in 1957, see the *N. Y. Post*, May 8, 1957.

the private profit-making ownership of the oil. There is instability in the Mid-East and there is private, exploitative ownership of the basic resource of the Mid-East; these two facts are causally connected. To remove the instability now afflicting the area it is necessary, to begin with, to remove the private possession by alien, profit-making corporations of the basic wealth of the area.

The Dollars—and Sense—of the Question

American oil companies have about three billion dollars invested in the Middle East. Profits are fabulous, for the wells are very productive, the laborers put in a 12-hour day, and are paid one-eighth what American workers are paid. Moreover, while a barrel of oil costs about 30c to produce in the Middle East, and four times more in the United States, the basic price, set and controlled by the international oil cartel, is determined by cost in the United States. We will offer just two examples of the fantastic profits realized in Middle East oil operations: the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco), which has a 100% monopoly in Saudi Arabia and splits its take fifty-fifty with the ruler of that country, paid him from 1950-1952 the sum of \$437,000,000; the Standard Oil Company of California profited from its Middle East holdings, from 1948 through 1954, to the tune of \$645,000,000.

Concessions involve major portions of and sometimes entire countries. The Iraq Petroleum Corporation (in which American firms now have a large interest) has a concession covering over 79% of Iraq, which expires in the year 2013; the same corporation has a concession of 100% of Jordan, to expire in 2022.

To give some idea of the reach of the giants concentrated in the Middle East, let us offer one example: the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in its report of December, 1951, listed its associated companies. These companies, in all sorts of enterprises related to the mining, refining, transporting, and marketing of petroleum and petroleum products, were located in sixty-five different countries throughout the world—veritably the entire Free World. An indication of the specific interest of American capital in the Middle East is in the fact that although major concentration there, so far as oil is concerned, really began only in 1947, by 1953 U.S. interests controlled 70% of its oil production—a central feature, of course, in the

mounting conflict between Great Britain and the United States. A study by the Middle East Institute, in Washington—F. C. Mattison, *A Survey of American Interests in the Middle East* (1953)—showed 512 corporations actively investing in the area, with the most significant field being oil. But in addition, such major firms as Chrysler, Firestone, International Harvester, Du Pont, and all the major banks—Chase National, Guaranty Trust, Irving Trust, etc.—are represented. In fact, down the main street of Beirut right now, American marines will find these and a dozen other names reminding them of home. It may even suggest to them why they are in Beirut.

We have mentioned the international oil cartel; let us offer a few additional words about this. It is the greatest cartel in the world. In it are five American and two foreign oil companies: Standard of New Jersey, Standard of California, Socony-Vacuum, Gulf, Texas, Anglo-Iranian, Royal Dutch-Shell. A Federal Trade Commission Report issued in 1952, entitled *International Petroleum Cartel*, declared that as of that date the cartel controlled 55% of oil production, 65% of oil reserves, 57% of refining capacity, and 66% of private tankers, outside of the Socialist world. This cartel controls Free World prices, production and distribution of petroleum and petroleum products.

In 1955, the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe, of the UN, exposed certain features of the cartel's operation. This study was never published, but word of it leaked out, and a summary was issued. This summary condemned the cartel because it was responsible for "the wide divorce which persists between prices and production costs in the Middle East"; it held that its practices amounted to usury, citing the fact that in 1952 over 82% of the sale price of Aramco's oil represented profit!

Since men, once again, are being asked to die for oil, in the name of patriotism and other sacred causes, one might expect the companies who profit so heavily from the attention of the government to display something approximating patriotism themselves. But sentiment and business mix no better than oil and water. After lengthy hearings, a Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program published its report, in April, 1948, on Navy purchase, during the War, of Middle East oil. The *Report* concluded that the oil companies grossly overcharged the government, in time of war, and this despite the fact that the Govern-

ment was subsidizing the Saudi Arabian government, and therefore the oil companies, to the tune of \$99 millions. "The government clearly was defrauded," said the *Report*. And specifically: "The U.S. Government was overcharged between 30 and 38 million dollars on sales made to the Navy by Aramco and its affiliates, between January 1, 1942 and June 30, 1947, by payment of prices higher than those the oil companies had a right to insist on. . . ." No prosecutions ensued.

In August, 1952, a Congressional sub-committee formally charged the International Petroleum Cartel with gross violation of the anti-trust laws of the United States. In August, 1952, the United States, with obvious reluctance, began a suit against the five American companies in the cartel. In December, 1952, the case was postponed until March, 1953. Then, with the Eisenhower Administration in office—and its ties to the oil monopolists being closer than that of the Truman Administration—there followed not delay, but the tacit dropping of the case altogether. From that day to this, not a further word has been heard about this "prosecution."

No wonder that, in the debate on the Eisenhower Doctrine, Senator Kefauver—who played a leading role in investigating growing monopoly—said in February, 1957: "I don't think the American people want a foreign policy based on the judgment of the international oil interests." He said more, and in the light of recent developments these remarks of a United States Senator made in 1957 merit quotation:

If, for whatever reason, any one of the oil producing countries in the Middle East were to nationalize its oil industry, it would follow as night follows day that the oil company involved would immediately call upon our government to protect its interests by intervention.

If we may reason from the past record of the Administration—from its record on the synthetic plants, on the consortium, on the recent price increases, on tidelands, on the natural gas bill—we can only conclude that such a demand for action would immediately be followed by actual intervention. As in the past, what the oil companies want, the oil companies get.

To complete the record of the oil companies' patriotism, mention should be made of their income-tax practices. With their fab-

ulous profits, and with the enormous assistance rendered them in their business activities by the Government, one might expect a certain generosity in letting the Government have its share. But, once again, sentimentality is irrelevant to business. The fact is that the 27½ percent tax exemption which oil companies get, theoretically because of the rapid depletion of their resources *in this country*, is carried over to foreign enterprise, and profits made abroad also gain this same tax exemption. But that is not all; in 1918 a tax law was passed permitting an oil company to get an offset credit on all foreign taxes, so that all royalties paid foreign governments actually appear as offsets in profit statements by oil corporations! That is why, for example, in 1956, Aramco made a profit for itself of \$280 millions, and paid the United States the total sum of \$282,370 in income taxes!

Arab Nationalism

Edward Crankshaw, writing in the *London Observer*, July 15, 1958, makes the point, really known by the entire world, that Eisenhower's insistence that he is invoking his Doctrine, providing for protection against "internal aggression from without," due to Communism, in intervening in Lebanon, was fraudulent. The danger, writes Crankshaw, is "Arab nationalism"; he then goes on to comment that this is really made up of "misty and often half-baked aspirations," but that it is, nevertheless, a powerful force.

This dismissal of a phrase in this form is quite common; it is generally presented to the American people, when mentioned, as something altogether nebulous, rather "primitive," and nigh ridiculous were it not also, somehow, dangerous. Actually, the concept of Arab nationalism is neither misty nor half-baked, and it is far from ridiculous. It has its roots in thousands of years of history; it has its first modern, fully organized expression in the meeting of the original Pan-Arab Congress in Paris in 1913. (Six years later, in the same city, with similar inspiration and intent, met the first Pan-African Congress, led by Dr. Du Bois.)

Nationalisms differ—that of France associated with a great bourgeois-democratic revolution and invoking the concepts "liberty, fraternity, equality"; that of Germany (or Hungary) dominated by ideas of monarchy, authority, racism, and war. Arab nationalism, born out of common language, culture and tradition, and out

of alien domination and terrible oppression and deprivation, has four distinct components: (1) a passion for independence; (2) a strong urge for unity, to eliminate that disunity so useful to the alien oppressor; (3) a craving for social justice—that phrase (in Arabic, *Al-adalah al-ijtimaiyah*) forms the dominant theme in Arab nationalism; (4) the desire for a neutralist foreign policy.

In a way, the content of Arab nationalism may be summed up in phrases that should be familiar to every American: "All men are created equal"; "towards a more perfect union"; "avoid foreign entanglements."*

Since industry is hardly developed in the Arabic countries (with the partial exception of Egypt) there is a rudimentary working class; hence, in class terms, the bourgeoisie tends to dominate the content of this nationalism and to offer the leadership of the Arab Revolution. On the other hand, this bourgeoisie finds itself so shackled by the alien dominator and the feudal landlord, that it tends to be very advanced in its revolutionary passion and its demand for reform. Still, it remains bourgeois, and fears the development of the Revolution at the same time that it leads it.

The feudal landlords and ancient controllers are losing prestige and power quickly as capitalism develops, as their resistance to any kind of amelioration of insufferable social conditions hardens and, particularly, as their dependence upon the power of the despised alien overlord becomes more and more clear.

Confirmation of all this came from a rather unusual source in the remarkable editorial that appeared in the *New York Times* on July 15, 1958, immediately after word of the revolution in Iraq had gotten out. Given conditions in the Middle East, said the *Times*, on this occasion

a revolution would have two prime targets—feudalism, which is an internal conflict, and imperialism, which takes the form of a supposedly (!) predatory West, with Great Britain as the chief villain. From the Western point of view, therefore, the status quo was the best possible arrangement.

For the *Times*, amazingly accurate; and it is the American gov-

* The fullest account of this matter, in English, is *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*, by Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh (Cornell University Press, 1956); also useful is the article by R. H. Nolte and W. R. Polk in *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1958.

ernment's attempt to maintain an altogether rotting status quo, in a world quite different from that of the good old gunboat diplomacy days, that makes its foreign policy so manifestly bankrupt—"insane," Mr. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* permitted himself to say (June 28, 1958).

Secretary of States Dulles, speaking at the recent London meeting of the Baghdad-Pact powers, said that President Nasser of the United Arab Republic did not represent "true Arab nationalism." Apparently, Mr. Dulles, who behaves as though he thinks he is God's Regent on earth, was offering himself as the bonafide representative of Arab nationalism, or, at least, as its most authoritative judge. Since he was speaking to the Baghdad Powers, minus Baghdad, and since none of the others is an Arab state, and since all of them are his junior partners or office boys, it is not surprising that no one in London contradicted him.

The War Upon Egypt

Foreign intervention was used in an effort to destroy the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution—and the Egyptian Revolution. The attack upon Egypt, participated in by Israel, France and England, after months of secret planning, cannot be understood unless it be seen in terms of the meaning of the Egyptian Revolution for the Arab world from North Africa to Syria.

Today we are assured that this combined assault "had Nasser whipped in days" (*U.S. News and World Report*, July 25, 1958); that "two more days of fighting would have brought down Nasser's regime" (*New York Herald Tribune*, July 17, 1958). And Max Lerner, with the special venom that drips from his pen when he writes of the Arabic world, tells his readers that "President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles picked Nasser up out of the mud of the Nile, and brushed him off and gave him back his power and prestige" (*New York Post*, June 25, 1958).

Related is the report by the syndicated Washington columnist, Robert S. Allen, that at the emergency meeting between the President and leaders of Congress held July 14, 1958, "a House leader" asked the President: "Don't you think it would have been infinitely better to have allowed Britain, France and Israel to have finished off Nasser a couple of years ago? Wouldn't that have

saved a lot of trouble and expense?" To which, writes Mr. Allen, the President replied: "On second guess, yes."

To such widespread opinions, certain facts must be juxtaposed, vital to an understanding of the present Mid-East crisis.

First, the Egyptian crisis, so far as this was reflected in the nationalizing of the Suez Canal, was caused, as Michael Adams states, by "the precipitate action" taken by the U.S. government in July, 1956, in reversing its promises on the Aswan Dam project, and doing so in a blatantly arbitrary manner spiced with gratuitous insults to the government of Egypt. Second, the Egyptian action was entirely legal, and her Government's attitude so embarrassingly reasonable and accommodating that the British and French governments found themselves repeatedly in the position of one who advances demands with an intention to fight and then, finding the demands met, has to concoct new and more severe demands. Indian proposals, accepted by Egypt, were rejected by England and France. United Nations proposals, accepted by Egypt, were rejected by England and France. Throughout this Anglo-French capriciousness, Dulles offered firm support.

By July, 1956 there was firm—though then secret—agreement between France and England to seek the destruction of the Nasser government by arms; and both governments were led to believe that this would not meet United States objection. The Israeli attack was sponsored (and partially provisioned) by France, and its timing and scope were pushed ahead at French insistence. Immediately after the Israeli assault, France and Britain announced ultimatums to *both* combatant powers; both, attacked and attackers, were warned to cease firing within twelve hours, and the attacked power was required to withdraw its own troops, at once, from its own territory, in and around the Canal! "It was," said an unnamed western diplomat—quoted by Paul Johnson,* of the *New Statesman*—"the most brutal ultimatum in modern history."

Of course, the ultimatum was rejected, as it was meant to be. At once, on October 31, British and French planes bombed the cities of Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Ismailia, bringing wholesale death and destruction. These bombings continued day and night for five full days; on November 4 several thousand French and British paratroops landed at Port Said and Port Fuad, to be

* In his valuable book, *The Suez War* (Greenberg Publishers, N. Y., 1957), p. 94.

followed the next day by 30,000 British and French commandos, with scores of tanks.

Far from the war being nearly over, or Nasser being in the mud of the Nile, effective Egyptian resistance was just beginning, especially with the wholesale arming of the civilian population, starting on November 4. Indeed, the Western announcement of the surrender of Port Said was a fraud; for though it appears that the officer in command there did desire to surrender, the men refused and the city had to be taken by storm, the Egyptian troops not moving out until they had lost one thousand dead and fifty-five hundred wounded*—and then they retired in good order.

The evidence is plain that the penetration of the main populated regions of Egypt had barely begun when the UN cease-fire was acceded to. When one remembers that the ten million people of Algeria have held their own against several hundred thousand French troops for several years, it is absurd to believe that the forces of England and France could have destroyed the Egyptian Revolution—which was their purpose—in days or weeks or ever.

The thwarting of the imperialist plans in Egypt and the stopping of the attack were due to Egyptian resistance, to an outraged and articulate world opinion, to the might of the Soviet Union and the Socialist world which plainly expressed its determination to stop the attack. It was by no means United States action—as Max Lerner and Mr. Dulles like to pretend—which was decisive. This action played a part, and was itself the result of the forces already mentioned. It appears, too, that the sanctimonious Secretary of State double-crossed Eden, but as Paul Johnson writes: "Surely Eden knew Dulles well enough to realize that nothing he said could be relied on—even if it were down in writing." And the double-cross sought to accomplish one of the central purposes of American diplomacy for the past dozen years—namely, to displace Britain as the dominant power in the Mid-East. This failed because the Egyptian government did not buckle or yield, and because its Revolution was strengthened, not weakened by the attack.

This explains why the noble Eisenhower government froze forty million dollars in Egyptian assets in the United States, during the Suez crisis; why it rejected an Egyptian request that it release

* In addition to the Johnson book, see on this point, Guy Wint and P. Calvocoressi, *Middle East Crisis* (Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1957).

\$14,000 (fourteen *thousand* dollars) of the millions frozen so that medicines could be shipped at once for the wounded of Cairo and Port Said; this is why it refused to sell any surplus wheat to the Egyptian government desperately striving to halt starvation in the wake of the bombings and the invasion.* (Incidentally, both medicines and wheat came from the "barbarians" of the USSR.)

A prime lesson, then, from the Suez War is not that extracted by President Eisenhower—i.e., it is too bad the War was not continued until Egypt lay prostrate. The lesson rather is that the days of 1830 when battleships could easily take over Algiers and 1882 when battleships could easily take over Alexandria are gone and done with.

The People Are in Motion

Immediately upon the news of the revolution in Iraq, when the extent of American military involvement in the Middle East was unclear and the possibility of U.S.-backed war there was great, the *New York Times* was careful to explain to its readers that in that part of the world there "cannot be a real, popular, mass uprising." This was because, the editorial (July 15) went on to explain, "the majority of the country . . . is politically apathetic."

The great fact is quite the opposite of the *Times'* assertion. On this, experts agree. Thus, George Hakim, writing in 1952:

The poverty-stricken, disease-ridden masses of the Near and Middle East are slowly awakening to the misery of their condition and gradually are realizing that it is not unalterable. . . . They are coming to realize that they can be rid of diseases and epidemics and that their work need not be painful and strenuous. Their right of education is being affirmed, and they have come to believe that they need not remain illiterate and ignorant (Ernest Jackh, ed., *Background of the Middle East*, Cornell Univ. Press, 1952, pp. 163-64).

Elizabeth Monroe, writing in the *New York Times Magazine* (August 30, 1953), said of the Arab:

Today he is as unlettered as he always was but he knows

* On this, see the article by R. E. Nolte and W. R. Polk, in *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1958.

what he does *not want*. He does not want the life he has been used to leading in squalor and disease without hope of a living wage and he does not want rulers who promise him better standards and then fail to alter his lot. The key to his change of outlook is his sudden grasp of the fact that misery is not inevitable.

Emil Lengyel, returning from the Mid-East in 1953, reported the same observation:

What did the people want? They wanted to live, of course, and not merely to vegetate, worse than animals. Bread, that's what they wanted, and occasionally a little meat. They wanted to have a piece of land, and some work paying wages on which they could live.

Business men, writing for and to each other in their organ, *Business Week*, sometimes inadvertently let out truths. Thus, in that magazine for April 2, 1955 there is a run-of-the-mill article on "Keeping Reds Out of the Mid-East," and here one finds the ordinary muck about positions of strength, and Dulles' wishes and the need for powerful pacts, etc. But right in the middle of the conventional twaddle appears a little time-bomb—the really dangerous thing in the Mid-East, one learns, is that the masses there "for the first time in their history, believe that their life of misery and poverty isn't inevitable."

T. Cuyler Young, chairman of the Department of Oriental Languages at Princeton, puts the point more centrally in discussing "The Crisis in the Near East":

One of the paramount changes in the area is the conviction of the masses that an economy of scarcity and their own poverty are no longer necessary nor inevitable, but rather it is possible—and their right—to share in the world's plenty. (S. N. Fisher, ed., *Social Forces in the Middle East*, Cornell Univ. Press, 1955, p. 253.)

Greater than any energy yet released in our atomic age is the energy contained in the mass apprehension of the new fact in the world: Poverty, though afflicting some six out of every ten human beings, is no longer necessary; now technological and industrial and scientific advances have reached the point where everyone may have a rich, full, healthful, and cultured life. This new capability

and, above all, the fact that its essential import has been grasped by the overwhelming majority of mankind make inevitable the elimination of all exploitative-based obstacles to its realization.

In light of the geographic and climatic problems of the Mid-East the reader may wonder whether in that region, too, the real possibility of eliminating poverty exists. The answer is yes, it does.

This is the answer made by the *Final Report of the United Nations Survey Mission for the Middle East* (1949). There it was demonstrated that, for example, while there were ten million acres of cultivable land in northern Iraq, only 15 percent of that actually was cultivated; in southern Iraq it was held that the present acreage of 3,200,000 could be doubled. In Syria, out of the total available cultivable land, only 12 percent was then being used; Lebanon could double its present 110,000 acres of irrigated land; Jordan was using but 6 percent of its cultivable land, and enormous possibilities existed there with modern usage of its two rivers, the Jordan and the Yarmuk.

An Arab scholar, writing in 1956, stated*:

There is little doubt that the potentialities for development are tremendous. Agriculture can be expanded many times in every Arab country, thereby providing a stable groundwork for greater industrial expansion, higher living standards, and improved social conditions.

Of course, this will take careful, overall planning, Arab unity, the extirpation of feudalism, and the elimination of imperialism—and peace. Hence one finds in the requirements for the elimination of impoverishment exactly the program of the Arab revolution now shaking the world. Old Canute Dulles may rant and rave, tie himself to sheiks, landlords and kings, and throw together ten thousand military pacts, but in trying to sustain a status quo that has run out its time and evoked the universal hatred of the masses enduring it, he has undertaken a hopeless as well as amoral task.

Lebanon, Jordan and Hungary

One finds it commonly argued in much of the American (and some of the European) press that the American and British inter-

* Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism* (Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 197.

ventions in Lebanon and Jordan were like the Soviet intervention in Hungary—only very much “better.” The nature of this argument is summed up in a letter from Ferenc A. Vali, identified as a one-time Professor of International Law at the University of Budapest, published in the *New York Times*, August 6, 1958. Professor Vali finds the American and British military actions better from a legal, social, moral and political standpoint, for in the Anglo-American case the interventions came as the result of the proper requests of legal governments; in the other, it did not. Further, in the Anglo-American case the interventions were meant to serve peace and freedom; in the Soviet case the intent was to crush freedom and so threaten peace.

Professor Vali is wrong on every ground. The Soviet Army in 1956 prevented the destruction of socialism in Hungary; its action nipped in the bud an effort to establish an extremely reactionary regime in Hungary, which, if successful, would have threatened the existence of Socialism throughout eastern Europe and would have most seriously enhanced the danger of world war. The Anglo-American armies are in the Mid-East in order to curb the development of a democratic, national-liberation movement; their presence there affronts freedom and endangers world peace.

But what I wish particularly to point out is that which is missing from Professor Vali's analysis, and goes unmentioned in all the equations I have seen between Lebanon-Jordan and Hungary. This is the fact that the Soviet Army did not enter Hungary in October, 1956; the Soviet Army was stationed in Hungary at that time. It was stationed there in accordance with the provisions of international treaty approved by all the Allies who together had defeated the fascist forces in World War II. The Red Army was in Hungary under identical provisions and (ostensibly) for the same purpose that explained the presence of American and French and British (and Russian) troops in Germany. These were occupation troops, present in enemy territory, as a result of victory in war. And the essential function of those troops, according to the solemn treaties closing the Second World War, was to see to it that the defeated powers never again threatened the peace; above all, to see to the accomplishment of that basic task by extirpating the last vestige of fascism and by guaranteeing that fascism never reappeared in any shape or form.

Of course, the Western Allies have taken this solemn obliga-

tion so lightly that the Supreme Commander of the Ground Forces of NATO is now General Speidel, the Nazi butcher in charge of Hitler's occupation of Paris! But surely this is not a good demonstration of what Professor Vali calls the superior moral right of the Anglo-American forces! But the main point is that the Soviet Army in seeing to it that fascism did not have a chance to reappear again in Hungary was performing exactly its legal (as well as social and moral) duty, as prescribed by international treaty, a treaty won after oceans of blood had been expended.

Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq

It is now generally admitted, even by the American press, that the main purpose of the Anglo-American military interventions in Lebanon and Jordan was to crush the Iraqi revolution of July 14. The purposes of maintaining the wobbly regimes of Hussein and Chamoun were of course offered as the official explanations, and they were not without consequence; but the main intent at the time was to launch an armed attack upon the new Iraqi government, with the assistance of troops from Iran and Turkey. Since this is so generally admitted now, perhaps only one quotation—from dozens available—may be offered to substantiate it. This comes from C. L. Sulzberger's column, in the *New York Times* (August 6, 1958):

When we dispatched troops to Lebanon it was apparent this was more in order to be in place to move against a new Iraqi regime than to protect President Chamoun, who had requested such a force for weeks.

I would like, however, to offer some information on the nature of the Lebanese and Jordanian governments which American and British soldiers are guarding—in the name of freedom!—and on the nature of the former Iraqi government, to restore which Mr. Dulles very nearly plunged the world into the ultimate catastrophe of general war.

The two which still exist, and the one eliminated by revolution, are (was) as corrupt, tyrannical, backward, brutal, and popularly despised as any governments in human history.

Under Chamoun, Lebanon alone of all Arab states did not break

off relations with France and England after their attack in 1956 upon Egypt. Lebanon ratified the Eisenhower Doctrine, and it did this, in March, 1957, actually before it had been approved by the U.S. Senate! On April 5, 1957, Chamoun asked Parliament to approve his policy. By pure coincidence, on April 4, Washington announced the allocation of ten million dollars to aid Lebanon; and to add to strange coincidences, on that very April 5, the U.S.S. *Forrestal*, all 60,000 tons of that largest aircraft carrier in the world, together with its full complement of scores of planes and 3,500 crew members, was steaming outside the harbor of Beirut, while an attendant American helicopter buzzed fishing vessels in the same port. Chamoun's Parliament approved.

During the month of June, 1957, Parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon, and Chamoun's pro-Dulles stand was the central issue. It was despised by the population, but the vote returned 46 out of the 66 deputies for Chamoun. How? First, 45 percent of the population did not vote, according to the government. Second, fifty opposition leaders were killed during the elections, twenty-three of them at one time. Third, the Government was openly buying votes, and, as the correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* reported at the time: "The prices of votes were being freely quoted." Added to this, according to the same on-the-spot reporter, were intimidation of officials and the falsification of returns. In addition to the \$10 million officially allocated by Washington in April, as already mentioned, Bushrod Howard, writing in the *New Republic* (June 30, 1958), reports very large expenditure of money during the elections in Lebanon by "an unnamed United States agency."

Thus, Chamoun won a decisive victory. Having the two-thirds majority in Parliament needed to amend the Constitution, Chamoun let it be known that he desired an amendment to make possible a second term for himself, for another six years, after his term was to end in 1958. However, this was too much—rigged elections, and fifty corpses and the *Forrestal* notwithstanding. For as Bushrod Howard notes, in the cited source: "When this plan became known, not only the vast majority of the Moslems but the majority of the Christians announced their opposition." From then on, Chamoun's government descended ever more rapidly into a quasi-fascist form, and all pretense of seeking popular or even Parliamentary approval was dropped. Cabinet Ministers, starting with

the Attorney General in April, 1957, began to resign at a furious rate and to be replaced with acquiescent lackeys. Organized opposition among the intelligentsia, merchants, students, urban workers and farmers took on more and more of a revolutionary flavor. A climax came when, in April, 1958, eighty of the most distinguished citizens of Lebanon—Moslem and Christian—signed a manifesto warning the country against an impending attempt by the President to foist himself for a second term upon the country.

Among the signers of this truly national manifesto was Nasib el Mitni, owner-editor of the *Télégraphe*, the most respected of Lebanese newspapers. On May 8, 1958 this beloved figure was assassinated, and the crime was universally ascribed to government-hired thugs. Demonstrations protesting the outrage swept the country, and on May 9, in Tripoli, troops fired upon one such mass outpouring, killing fifteen people and wounding one hundred and twenty-eight men, women and children.

The next day, Chamoun clamped martial law on the country, sent regular army units to all main squares; within another two days nationwide insurrection gripped the country, and has continued, somewhat sporadically, ever since. And ever since, the Lebanese army has become more and more unreliable, until by June, 1958, as was notorious throughout the world, it in fact refused to prosecute any serious hostilities upon the numerous and varied rebel forces.

Chamoun himself became a more and more isolated figure, so that by June his only friend, quite literally, seemed to be Mr. Dulles. This is why, as the *New Statesman* reported (July 5, 1958), the President of the country was forced to an "increasing reliance on armed Fascist irregulars." At the same time—June 14—Chamoun announced, quite illegally and arbitrarily, the outlawry of the three leading opposition political parties.

That was the government and this the "freedom" that U.S. troops intervened to secure—after the Iraqi revolution.

The Jordanian government of King Hussein is, if possible, more rotten than that of Chamoun. Created by Britain, it is a prime example of the so-called "client states." For a dozen years its treasury depended upon British subsidy; for a short time it was paid off by Saudi Arabia; today it is kept in business by U.S. grants, most recently in July when \$25 millions were given the King. Its Army was British-trained, armed and officered; today

3,000 British troops occupy the country and maintain Hussein on his throne. In addition, the United States supplies tanks, machine-guns, ammunition and fuel.

When Hussein moved, early in the spring of 1957, to ratify the Eisenhower Doctrine, a general strike swept Jordan. The King turned loose his British-trained Royal Guard and slaughtered scores, while hundreds were arrested. The Government itself was dismissed by the King, as being insufficiently energetic. The *Manchester Guardian* correspondent reported the installation of an "ultraconservative Cabinet" on April 23; two days later martial law was declared throughout Jordan. Meanwhile, units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet paid its respects to Jordan, and the Eisenhower Doctrine was approved. The U.S. had "won," through, quoting the same reporter: "the suppression of political parties, the banning of public meetings, the suspension of Parliament, the arrest of potentially 'subversive' individuals."

Nevertheless, as the *Wall Street Journal* (July 22, 1958) confessed, though "an armed camp atmosphere" prevailed, the "fortress Jordan still is shaky." Partially to bolster further this murder and plunder racket, troops were sent from the confederated Iraq in the spring of 1958. Later, as the insurrection in Lebanon gathered power, reinforcements were ordered into Jordan from Iraq, with the clear intent to suppress the popular movements in Lebanon with a Jordan-Iraqi army. But this move boomeranged, because the troops and their officers refused to obey the order to leave Iraq, and rather used the opportunity given by appearing to fulfill the order to overthrow the Iraqi Kingdom itself. Having done this, in a matter of hours, the new revolutionary government of Iraq then ordered its troops home from Jordan, and they returned, every last man and officer among them, without a moment's hesitation.

The Iraq monarchy was overthrown and crumbled without a friend inside the country to say nay, because its anti-popular, pro-imperialist, corrupt, and brutal conduct had lost it all semblance of support.

The *U. S. News and World Report* (July 25, 1958) told its readers that Iraq was a model of enlightened government and that, "All Iraq needed to continue its progress was peace and stability." The New York *Herald Tribune* (July 15, 1958) editorialized in the same vein, asserting that King Faisal and Premier

Nuri es-Said were men "who did more than any other in the Middle East to help their people."

But on the same day, that same paper published a report from Beirut written by its Mid-East correspondent, Joe Alex Morris, Jr., declaring that the elections held in Iraq in May, 1958 "were a farce." And, continued Mr. Morris:

The discontent [in Iraq] ran deeper than political considerations, however. The poverty-stricken and landless farmers, particularly in the south, have benefited little if at all from a land reform program that has gotten virtually nowhere in the last five years.

As for Premier and General and Pasha Nuri es-Said, he "put his country's democracy in cold-storage," wrote J. H. Huizinga some time ago in *The Reporter* (May 17, 1956). In 1954, "he dissolved all political parties and muzzled the press" and his government exercised the right to disband any party or association, "such as a trade union" that, citing his decree, "sows discord and dissension among the public." This Premier and General and Pasha, this model statesman of the *Herald Tribune* and *U.S. News*, "ruled," said the *New Statesman* of London (July 19, 1958) "through an alliance of top Army commanders (placated by large-scale donations of British tanks, artillery and jets) and the feudal landowners . . . there were 10,000 political prisoners, torture was regularly employed and Nuri spent three times as much on the police as on public education."

Yes, indeed, there is the model ruler for American Big Business!

But, the *London Times* (February 23, 1955) reported worry lest Nuri "may have been too thorough"—for the man dissolved his own Party, and reduced the number of licensed newspapers from sixty to seven, and dismissed thousands of students and teachers and civil servants. All this was in honor of the signing of the Baghdad Pact in February, 1955.

Demonstrations and rebellions occurred regularly. These demonstrations were the result of organizational work by the National Unity Front, formed early in 1957 and consisting of the National Congress Party, the Baath Socialist Party, and the Communist Party. That Unity Front was Iraq; and when the Army turned against Faisal and Nuri, they were finished and the revolution

succeeded. The Republic of Iraq stands now for a foreign policy based on Bandung. Its revolution was intensely popular; its source lay in the intolerable tyranny of Nuri and in the courage and strength of the Iraqi people, not in the Dulles-concocted myth of "indirect aggression."

It is very important to note, as was admitted by the entire commercial press here and in England, that the United States and Great Britain were seriously planning armed intervention to put down this new Iraqi Republic, and that this was to be undertaken jointly with Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iran. *The greatest danger persists that some such intervention will yet take place.* Surely Admiral Hollowell is absurdly wrong when he says that the continued build-up of American forces in Lebanon has "neither military nor political significance."

Meanwhile, the British reinforce their troops in Jordan, in Aden, in Libya and in Cyprus. Armed intervention in Iraq did not occur in mid-July because of world public opinion, the stern warnings of the Soviet Union, and the absence of any force or body whatsoever in Iraq with which such intervention forces might work.

The Future of Israel

The further to the Right one moves in Israeli political life, the more fanatical does one find devotion to an aggressive foreign policy, based upon contempt for the rights and the lives of Arabs. The further to the Right one moves in Arabic political life the more intense does one find anti-Israeli feeling; the more fully does this move in the direction of being anti-Jewish; and the more intently is it desired to war upon Israel in order to put off the accomplishment of necessary social renovation.

On the latter point, it will be well to read the last testament of Nuri es-Said as published, posthumously, in *Life Magazine*, July 28, 1958. Here this staunch Western friend, bulwark of the Eisenhower Doctrine and of the Baghdad Pact, makes clear his intense hatred for Israel and his belief that its extermination is necessary. Similarly, Dr. Fadhil Jamali—for whom John Cabot Lodge delivered so moving, and premature, an obituary in the United Nations—former Foreign Minister of the Iraqi monarchy, "was fanatically

anti-Israel." We are quoting John Cogley of the editorial board of the liberal Catholic weekly, *Commonweal* (August 1, 1958). Mr. Cogley reports on his own conversations with Jamali, who explained that he "thought the Jewish State should be utterly destroyed and said baldly there would be no peace in the Middle East until it was only a memory."

From the Israel Right comes the view that the Arab national revolution must be thwarted, else Israel will die. G. F. Hudson, writing in *Commentary* (August 1958), the organ of the American Jewish Committee, says flatly that "Arab unity is the condition for crushing Israel."

But to thwart the national revolution of the Arab peoples is not possible, let alone moral. Mr. Hudson himself admits this, wherefore he urges that Western (and Israeli) foreign policy gear itself to the "loss" of most of the Middle East, forge a firm unity with Turkey, and continue to exist as an armed camp, bristling with enmity in the center of nearly one hundred million united and liberated Arabs.

For Israel to depend for its continued existence upon an alliance with the Right in Arabic life, tied to Dulles and Macmillan, is doomed to failure for the same reason that the Arabic Right is doomed to defeat, as are the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. For Israel to depend for existence, after the demise of the Arabic Right, upon friendship with a reactionary Turkey (and how permanent is that?), and the goodwill of Dulles and Macmillan, is for Israel to certify its destruction. If Israel is to march into the future under the banner of the Baghdad Pact, with Dulles in the front and Macmillan in the rear, it will march to certain and to bloody destruction.

Israel as an entity in the Middle East will live and can live in accordance with Bandung. It can and will live by action which rectifies the unforgettable atrocity of tearing one million innocent Arabic men and women from their homes and hurling them into fearful suffering, and by action which bases itself upon Arab-Jewish friendship and equality at home and outside its own limits. Should Israel continue to pursue the policy of being a tail to the kite of France or England or Dulles, nothing will save it from the disaster that is manifestly imminent for the Dulles-Macmillan line.

The line of reaction is the line of national catastrophe for Israel as for every other state in the world.

Conclusion

Anglo-American imperialism has evolved a foreign policy which, in the modern world, represents moral and political bankruptcy. The pursuit of that policy threatens mankind's annihilation.

It is a policy that seeks to end recession through war scares; that thinks in 19th century military terms and sees the Mid-East as a great strategic center for war-making; that fears and hates all progressive social change and bulwarks feudal and quasi-fascist regimes, whose time has run out; that aims at the destruction of Socialism and the curbing of national liberation movements, neither of which is possible; that aims at securing fantastic rates of profit made by giant monopolies (especially in oil), but the days of such exploitation are clearly drawing to a close.

For all of these reasons, despite the enormous power of the Anglo-American combine, the Dulles policy meets one disaster and one great setback after another. Its bankruptcy is so glaring that it is seen and shouted by the entire world, including the majority of the American people.

The opposition to this policy at home is gathering momentum. Publication after publication—from the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the *Christian Century*, the *Reporter*, the *Progressive*, the *Commonweal*, the *Chicago Daily News*, the *New York Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Lorain (Ohio) Journal*, the *Denver Post*, the *Phoenix (Arizona) Republic*, the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, the *Nashville Tennessean*, the entire Negro press—have taken strong stands against Dulles' policies, and particularly against the intervention in the Middle East. Individual after individual have so expressed themselves; readers by the hundreds and thousands in the publications named; people like the Republican diplomat, Nicholas Roosevelt; columnists like Walter Lippmann; labor leaders like Walter Reuther and Harry Bridges; Democratic Party leaders like Senators Fulbright, Morse, Neuberger, Humphrey, etc.

Even the Gallup Poll of "Free World" public opinion reported (July 23) that only 42 percent of those polled said they approved U.S. intervention in Lebanon. When the *New York Herald Tribune* said, editorially (July 16) that, "The whole country closed ranks behind the President," it is hard to believe it did not know it was

lying; but whether it knew it or not, it certainly was misreading public opinion.

There also was a deluge of world opinion against the interventions. This was true, not only, of course, in the Socialist and colonial areas—where live about two-thirds of humanity—but it was also true of Canada, Great Britain, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Japan, and all Latin America.

It was, indeed, this storm of world opinion that stopped the interventions short of wholesale shooting and further advances (especially into Iraq); that resulted in the recognition finally by Great Britain and the United States of the Iraqi Republic; that led to trial balloons about emphasizing “indirect aggression”; and that, now, have resulted in the bursting of even those balloons.

Humanity outside the United States is disgusted with Dulles’ foreign policy; and, increasingly, the American public is penetrating the dense fog of Big Business propaganda, appreciating the existence of this world-wide hostility, and beginning to move in the direction of demanding an end to brinkmanship, an end to besmirching the American flag by wrapping it around tyrannical and sadistic political gangsters like Hussein and Batista, Rhee and Chiang, Trujillo and Chamoun.

August-September, 1958

XVI. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

Never before in the history of the United States has its foreign policy provoked such widespread and intense opposition as at the present moment, and particularly as it relates to China. We shall have occasion, further on, to summarize some of the expressions of this world-wide response; at the moment consider the severity of the language occurring in American publications:

The Christian Century, a Protestant publication, "abysmal quality of our diplomacy" (September 24, 1958); *The Commonweal*, a Catholic publication, "confusion, misrepresentation and irresponsibility" (September 19); Roscoe Drummond, a leading Republican columnist, sees the United States placed in "intolerably disadvantageous circumstances," and therefore, the "lonely defender of a very unpopular cause . . . [with] the hostility of the whole uncommitted world" (New York *Herald Tribune*, September 15); Max Lerner, a leading Democratic-Liberal columnist, who apologized for the rape of Guatemala and gloried in the military intervention in Lebanon, gags at this latest exploit in Asia: "the worst place, for the worst cause, with the worst ally . . . forlorn of promise, of hope, of meaning" (New York *Post*, September 5); *The New Republic*: "Disastrous diplomacy . . . impossible situation . . . appalling chasm" (September 22); *The Nation* entitles an editorial on this question: "Deaf, Dumb, Blind" (September 13).

A policy which evokes this kind of language from such varied observers naturally moves them and others to attempt an explanation for its existence. But while the characterizations are apt, the explications fail to satisfy; and without accurate diagnosis, we may be left only with the capacity to label symptoms rather than to effect a cure.

What explanations are being offered? One is to ascribe insanity

to the policy's authors. This is done not in the largely figurative sense conveyed in: "Those whom the gods would destroy . . ." etc., but in a more literal sense, reflective of the malady and fate that overtook the first U.S. Secretary of Defense. Max Lerner, for example, in the aforementioned column, felt able to ascribe the source of the unholy mess only to "insanity"; similarly *The Nation*, in its cited editorial, concludes that "one searches in vain for some rationale"; it can do no better than ascribe "the utter folly of our China policy" to an "obsession" suffered by Mr. Dulles.

Mental illness may indeed often afflict those responsible for pursuing a disaster-ridden policy; but the illnesses of individuals do not create the foreign policies of nations. Here, too, there is interrelation, and in these days of the possibility of the accidental launching of catastrophic war this is no insignificant point. Yet the fact remains that explaining the sources of United States foreign policy on the basis of the "obsessions" or "compulsions" of individuals is altogether inadequate and misleading.

Vera Micheles Dean, in advocating some time ago a relatively salutary *Foreign Policy Without Fear* (McGraw-Hill, N. Y., 1953), found the operative foreign policy of the United States to be some kind of inexplicable paradox, also stemming from strange, if not psychopathic, obsessions. At one point (pp. 84-85) she commented:

The paradoxical result is that the United States, while leading a crusade for democracy against dictatorship, has come to the conclusion that the maintenance in power of General Franco in Spain or Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa, of Emperor Bao Dai in Indo-China or Dr. Syngman Rhee in South Korea, is essential to the security of the United States.

Of course, the tenure of these "necessary" props to U.S. security is somewhat precarious and since Miss Dean wrote the above words, Emperor Bao Dai has faded away; but then one can easily substitute others (in power as these words are written) allegedly essential to American security—like Batista of Cuba and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic—and retain the "paradox." If, however, one rejects the premise that the United States is leading a democratic crusade, then he has eliminated the apparent paradox; and if one replaces Miss Dean's premise with another—that the United States is the leading imperialist power seeking therefore to restrain social progress and curb national liberation—then what

appears paradoxical in the admitted facts becomes logical. Is not a purpose of science to place all the observable facts within the framework of causative explanation, rather than inexplicable paradox?

Louis J. Halle, formerly a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and now a professor at the University of Virginia, in declaring faulty "Our China Policy" (*New Republic*, September 15) finds "the mood of the country" to be responsible for it; the country was in "one of those periods of psychological disturbance." The bad policy, having sprung from this somewhat ill-defined source, was then persisted in "simply by force of inertia." Apparently one must wait for a change in mood that presumably must come about as unaccountably as did the original condition, which would then, I suppose, produce a period without psychological disturbance. Then one might hope that the inertia would be overcome—and a wise foreign policy would appear!

Behind Professor Halle's numerous verbal entrenchments, the only really operative cause explaining the admittedly disastrous foreign policy appears to be "public opinion." This comes close to the idea that the trouble with American foreign policy is that it is too democratic, too dependent upon "the man in the street." Others have not left this to be inferred from their writings. Marguerite Higgins, for instance, who has managed to stick with Dulles from brink to brink and still holds on to his coat-tails, is incensed at the widespread popular opposition to the Quemoy-Matsu junket, and wants to know "just when the canonization of the 'man in the street' in the Western democracies occurred"; she thinks, too, that he "was wrong about nearly all the milestones that led to both World War I and World War II" (*New York Herald Tribune*, September 15). It is Miss Higgins who is wrong; the milestones that led to both World Wars, while marched over through blood by the "man in the street," were laid out for him by responsible statesmen, by the elite, for imperial and exploitative considerations. And, of course, any consideration of "public opinion" which ignores the class ownership of the means of communication is superficial and demagogic.

We have spent some time on this idea because it forms an important feature of developing reactionary ideology. Faulty public opinion is blamed for political failures in many recent works—as Raymond Aron's *The Century of Total War*, Henry Kissinger's

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Walter Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy*, Will Herberg's *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, and Herbert Butterfield's *Christianity and History*. It forms a rationalization for the increasingly arbitrary and secretive manner in which public affairs in general are being administered in our own country; and for the outrageously bureaucratic and altogether unconstitutional manner in which Mr. Dulles has seen fit to conduct the foreign policy of the United States. An element helping to explain the abysmal failure of Dulles diplomacy is, in fact, its complete separation from any kind of democratic control, even the notoriously inadequate provisions for such control provided by our Constitution.

The most extensive attack upon current U.S. foreign policy to come from a significant national political leader was that offered by the second ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas. It is reproduced, with some revisions, in *The Progressive*, for September, 1958. Senator Fulbright expresses complete disapproval of that policy; hence he calls for a thorough "reconsideration and reorientation." This is all to the good and is an important example of the growing popular revulsion against the Dulles line.

Yet, again, it is necessary to suggest—if we are to achieve that thorough reconsideration and reorientation that Senator Fulbright demands—that the Senator offers no explanation for what he himself calls an "incomprehensible" policy. He says we are too often aligned with reactionary governments abroad, but he does not even ask why; he says the United States spends too lavishly abroad for military purposes and too little for creative purposes, but again he does not ask why. He finds the government of the United States suspected or disliked in Latin America, Asia and Europe (the Senator forgets Africa, not to speak of Arkansas) because it is the defender of a despised status quo, but why it is, he does not inquire.

The nearest the Senator comes to an explanation is to blame a poorly informed public opinion (again) for failing to exercise sufficient supervision over Congress! And he has one other suggestion as to cause:

If there is a single factor which more than any other explains the predicament in which we now find ourselves, it is

our readiness to use the spectre of Soviet communism as a cloak for the failure of our own leadership.

And, he adds: "In the fear of the devilry of communism, we have cast ourselves indiscriminately in the role of the defender of the status quo throughout the world." Extremely important is the Senator's hint (it is no more than that, of course), that the whole anti-Communist ballyhoo has been a racket and a fraud. But again, the failure to ask why makes exceedingly limited the illuminating quality of the remarks. Actually, it is not because of the fear of Communism that "we" have cast "ourselves" in the role of twentieth-century Metternichs; it is rather because of the Administration's devotion to reaction that its foreign policy has gone from one catastrophe to another. And it is because a reactionary line is catastrophic for our national interests that the Administration, and the whole ruling-class apparatus, has made anti-Communism its trump card. Standing Senator Fulbright's analysis on its head improves it and brings it very near the real operating cause of why, as he says: "Our foreign policy is inadequate, outmoded, and misdirected."

An attempt at explanation having racist and Malthusian overtones is becoming more and more common, again as a component of developing reactionary ideology. A very recent example was the comment by Philip Wylie in *The Saturday Review* (June 6) that American and European setbacks in Asia and Africa reflected the "Decline of the West," and the impending conquest of the world by its colored inhabitants—forming as they do a majority of the human race. Mr. Wylie's remarks not only reverted to Spengler but to the "rising tide of color" of Lothrop Stoddard and the "Yellow Peril" of William Randolph Hearst.

We are witness in this age to the decline of capitalism, not of the West. It is true that this decline brings with it degenerative phenomena, but just as the decline applies basically to a ruling class, so the degenerative aspects mark in particular that class's ethics, reasoning, and leadership. And we see in our time not the rising tide of color, but the rising dawn of socialism and national liberation. It is true that this dawn carries with it the elimination of the special oppression of people of color; but this means the achievement of human brotherhood.

Such worldwide equality may offend those who have assumed

that Washington and London would be the centers of "civilization" and the arbiters of mankind's fate forever; that era is already over as everyone, except the Eisenhower Administration, understands. Its termination will mark the enhancement of the well-being of all mankind, including those who are white.

Ralph Matthews, the militant Negro journalist, falls into an opposite, though related, kind of error in a column in the *Afro-American* (September 20). Denouncing the course of the State Department in its current China provocations, Mr. Matthews ascribes it entirely to the existence of white chauvinism in that Department, and makes the conflict one of white versus colored. It is certainly true that a large ingredient in the arrogance and blindness displayed by the State Department toward China stems from racism; but the arrogance and blindness are forms within which the policy is conducted; they are not the policy itself. Similarly, racism is a result of the system producing that policy; it is not the system itself. Capitalism breeds racism and imperialism intensifies it, and racism displays itself in an arrogance towards the "inferiors"; all these are inter-related. But the root is imperialism, and the stake is continued exploitation and oppression and power.

The distinction is vital, not academic, and it explains facts which the hypothesis of Mr. Matthews will not explain. It explains Dulles' colored "allies" (to the extent that he has any); above all, it explains why a predominantly non-colored state like the Soviet Union stands four-square as the immovable and mighty bulwark of the colonial and national liberation movements, why the white socialist states of central and eastern Europe similarly align themselves; and why radical and progressive whites elsewhere in the world, including in the United States, oppose American imperialism. It is on the basis of this unity that the national liberation movements have achieved the successes they have; the continuance and strengthening of that unity are a pre-requisite for the great achievements that the future certainly holds.

The Eisenhower-Dulles Line

Let us now turn to aspects of the argumentation and justification put forth by the Eisenhower Administration for its Chinese policy.

First of all, the Eisenhower Administration seeks to forget the Chinese civil war; it seeks to transform that civil war into some kind of an international conflict, either by constructing the myth of "Two Chinas," or by the myth of a Formosan nation.* At the moment it concentrates on the "Two Chinas" idea because this is the commitment of Chiang, because it fosters the "legality" of Chiang's usurping China's seat in the United Nations (and in the Security Council), and of Dulles' refusal to recognize China, and it tends to "justify" Chiang's (read: Dulles') refusal to relinquish the coastal islands. It sticks to this position very stubbornly, too, in the hope that if and when it is forced to move to the other position (as appears increasingly likely) it can pose as having yielded a great point quite sacrificially, and can the better insist upon the permanent severance of Taiwan from the Chinese People's Republic in return for its "sacrifice."

The fact is that Taiwan is as much a part of China as the Balearic Islands are of Spain, or Sicily is of Italy, or Gotland is of Sweden, or the Isle of Wight is of England, or Staten Island is of the United States. Says the *Columbia Encyclopedia* (2nd edition, 1950): "Formosa, Chinese *Taiwan*, province of China."

The island's settlement by the Chinese goes back to antiquity; its universal acknowledgment as a part of the Chinese nation goes back to the 17th century. Certainly it was seized through war by a rising Japanese imperialism in 1895. But it is relevant to know that the Chinese on Taiwan bitterly and seriously resisted, with arms in hand, the actual taking over of the island, and that from 1895 until the end of World War II, there was never a moment when the Chinese on Taiwan left the Japanese occupiers in doubt as to their desires and their nationality.

Of course the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Potsdam Treaty (1945) found the Allies pledging the return of Taiwan to China with the defeat of Japan; this pledge was made good, and the return to *China* was acknowledged by Japan in its peace treaty. And the people who now live in Taiwan are in their overwhelming majority Chinese; descendants of the original inhabitants of the island going back to the middle ages constitute a very small

* It was interesting to see, in connection with this American propaganda effort, that a severe critic of the Administration line, Walter Lippmann, writes of the "Formosa people": "The American national interest in Formosa is not that it should masquerade as China, but that the Formosa people should have autonomy and that in a military sense the island should be strategically neutralized"—*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Sept. 11, 1958.

fraction of the population, and Japanese, left over from the occupation, also constitute an insignificant fraction. Going back to 1924, the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (14th edition, 1930) reports that of four millions then on Taiwan, the Chinese were "much the most predominant element," with two groups of aborigines totaling 140,000 people and with the Japanese totaling 180,000.

Taiwan is Chinese; it is Chinese legally, historically, ethnically. It belongs to China and until it is in fact returned to the effective and actual Chinese government, that government will not rest, the people on Taiwan will not be satisfied, justice will not have been done, and tranquillity cannot return to Asia.

The point is made that Taiwan in the hands of the actual Chinese government would threaten world peace, for it would serve as a base for "further" advances, just as in the hands of the Japanese it served that function. But, Taiwan was stolen from China as the first step in the expansion of Japanese imperialism; it was used by Japan to expedite the seizure of Korea, which in turn served as the base for the rape of Manchuria, and this served as the base from which to launch full-scale war upon China, and limited war (in the 1930's) against the Soviet Union. And today, the fact is that Taiwan is a major air and naval base for the United States, which simultaneously holds the Ryukyu islands as spoils of war, has bases throughout Japan and dominates half of Korea. This is the physical fact, and this is true of the United States which is five thousand miles away from China. For the United States in this condition to charge China with aggression in seeking to regain possession of its own province Taiwan, ninety miles from its coast—remembering the past history of Taiwan—is manifestly absurd. Its very absurdity and the persistence in that absurdity make more suspect a policy dependent upon it.

The islands of Quemoy and Matsu are within the territorial waters of China; they have been in the possession of the Chinese mainland government throughout the thousands of years of recorded Chinese history. They are held today by the United States Navy and Air Force, in conjunction with troops of the Chiang regime—a regime whose finances, foreign policy, armaments, and physical existence are absolutely and wholly dependent upon the support of the United States government. Those islands are held not because they are vital to the defense of Taiwan—Eisenhower, Chiang and Secretary of Defense Wilson have all testified to the

contrary—but because they have made possible the blockading of Amoy and Foochow, the launching of harassing and spying expeditions onto the mainland, and because their possession symbolizes Chiang's announced intention to forcibly return to the Chinese mainland.

For China to remain indifferent to this would be as though the United States paid no attention to the blockading of its Atlantic coast from Norfolk to Philadelphia. For China to remain indifferent to this would be for it to permit the remnants of a reactionary civil war foe to continue physical attacks and avowed preparations for the renewal of full-scale warfare, with no counteraction on its part. Again the absurdity of the U.S. position which denounces the Chinese People's Republic as "aggressors" because it seeks to terminate this impermissible situation is clear to the entire world. It is clear, too, that the Eisenhower-Dulles persistence in this absurd posture in which the partners pretend to abjure violence while pursuing a policy of naked force, hides their own sinister aims, which at its present maximum seeks the destruction of the Chinese People's Republic and the return of China to the plundering, corrupt, sadistic, and utterly reactionary mercies of the Kuomintang, leashed (to use the significantly canine-like language commonly employed in this connection) to the Pentagon, or, as its apparent minimum, the achievement of some kind of Two-China deal.

Tibet and Korea

We wish to deal very briefly with two other components of the Dulles charge of "aggression" against the Chinese People's Republic. These are grouped around the names of Tibet and Korea. Dulles persists in repeating the lie that China forcibly swallowed up an independent country on its western borders named Tibet.

Tibet is and has been for centuries part of the sovereign nation of China. As for the recent period, one need do no more than examine the map of China appearing in the book published by the U.S. State Department itself, in 1949, entitled *United States Relations With China*. There, following page 409, one will clearly see Tibet designated as a constituent part of China. The nation, other than China, having naturally the greatest interest in Tibet is India, for Tibet borders it. India, in recognizing the Chinese

People's Republic, has acknowledged its sovereignty over Tibet. The Indian Ambassador to China who negotiated the recognition of the New China writes, in his recently published memoirs:

The only area where our interests overlapped was in Tibet, and knowing the importance that every Chinese Government, including the Kuomintang, had attached to exclusive Chinese authority over that area I had, even before I started for Peking, come to the conclusion that the British policy (which we were supposed to have inherited) of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special political interests could not be maintained. (K. M. Pannikar, *In Two Chinas*, London, 1955, p. 103.)

Mr. Pannikar, one of India's leading historians as well as a distinguished public figure, also refers (p. 113) to the "blood-curdling stories issued from Hong Kong by Taipeh agents" about the alleged Chinese military conquest of "poor little Tibet." It is impossible that Mr. Dulles does not know these facts; his persistence in charging the Chinese People's Republic with "aggression" on the basis of Tibet reflects his notorious disdain for the truth* while furthering aggressive aims of his own.

Another instance of alleged Chinese aggressiveness often cited by the Eisenhower-Dulles duo is Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The facts here again actually prove the opposite of Dulles' conclusions. Quite regardless of one's views on the origins of the fighting in the Korean civil war, the fact is that China did not intervene until the UN (*i.e.*, the U.S.) forces, commanded by General MacArthur, crossed the 38th parallel and drove well up towards the Chinese border. This was done despite President Truman's earlier pledge that it would not be done; it was done despite advice against it by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; it was done despite, as Walter Lippmann noted at the time, "the critical importance of Korea in the foreign policy of any Chinese government, no matter what its ideology"; he had added that "in its geography Korea is to China what Florida is to the United States."

The attack north of the 38th parallel was undertaken although the Chinese Premier had told the Indian Ambassador that China would not tolerate having American troops in force so near its

* For other examples of his "laxity with the truth" see "The Lord and John Foster Dulles," by Charles F. Edmundson, in *The Nation*, Sept. 13, 1958.

own border. He had added that this warning did not apply to South Korean troops since China acknowledged the existence of civil war in Korea, but it did apply to American troops. This was conveyed through diplomatic channels to all the parties involved. Nevertheless MacArthur crossed the parallel; *afterwards*, under U.S. pressure, on October 8, 1950, the UN authorized such crossing. The Indian Ambassador in China wrote that day in his diary:

So, America has knowingly elected for war, with Britain following. It is indeed a tragic decision, for the Americans and the British are well aware that a military settlement of the Korean issue will be resisted by the Chinese and that the armies now concentrated on the Yalu border will intervene decisively in the fight. (K. M. Pannikar, cited work, p. 110.)*

"Appeasement" and "Munich" Again

The Administration and its supporters insist that to yield on the question of Quemoy and Matsu—not to speak of Taiwan—would repeat the tragic policy of appeasement and would represent the Munich of our time.

It may appear remarkable to find the most conservative quarters, as personified by the U.S. Secretary of State, so vehemently opposed to a policy of appeasement and to another Munich, for both were associated originally with arch-reaction. The matter is not remarkable, however; it is altogether logical and proper. For today reactionary elements are raising demagogically the hated symbol of Munich in order, under present conditions, to accomplish what Munich accomplished for them twenty years ago.

Those pursuing an anti-Soviet and anti-progressive line; those fearful of colonial liberation movements; those sympathetic to ultra-reaction and fascism; those who despised socialism and desired the destruction of Communism—they were the appeasers and the Munichers. And they are today the same class (often

* Additional evidence of the provocative nature of the crossing of the 38th parallel and refuting the charge of "aggression" against the Chinese in the Korean case will be found in Kenneth Ingram, *History of the Cold War* (N. Y. Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 224; and in *U. S. Foreign Policy, 1945-55*, by W. Reitzel, M. Kaplan, C. Coblentz (Brookings Institution, Washington, 1956), pp. 272-73.

the same people, notably Mr. Dulles himself) who, in the name of resisting appeasement, seek the same ends.

Moreover, the essence of Munich was not yielding to the threats of fascist aggressors; the essence of Munich was the policy of *building up and encouraging* the fascist aggressors. The essence of Munich was the effort to use fascism to break the backs of labor and radical movements at home, and as a spearhead for what was hoped would eventually be a worldwide and irresistible military onslaught upon the Soviet Union.

Thus, specifically in terms of the Asian area, consider the fact that while Japan conquered Manchuria and Jehol and moved further into China in the 1930's, the United States was Japan's main foreign source of arms, supplies, and money. Thus, for example, the United States bought 85 per cent of the raw silk exported by Japan in 1935; she bought one-fourth of all Japan's exports in 1936 and sold her one-third of all imports. From 1937 to 1938 the United States sold Japan over \$325,000,000 worth of war materials, including 75 per cent of Japan's gasoline and over 30 per cent of her steel.

Comparable activities were conducted by the United States and France and Great Britain in connection with Italy's rape of Ethiopia, with fascism's invasion of Spain, with Hitler's advances into Austria and Czechoslovakia. *Munich was the climax of a whole program of encouraging reaction and fascism, not of grudgingly yielding to it.* And it was a climax which had the inevitable conclusion of world war—as the Soviet Union and the forces of the Left throughout the world had warned without letup for a decade.

John Foster Dulles, as attorney for the international cartels responsible for this policy, was then a leading apologist for it, just as today, holding the same class position, he functions as the leading executor of an analogous policy. No book is more relevant to a comprehension of the present and especially the Dulles foreign policy than his own work, *War, Peace and Change*, published by Harpers in 1939. Its whole argument is an apologia for the expansionism of Japan, Italy and Germany. Indeed, this was so marked, that Dulles himself wrote in the foreword: "The reasoning of this study may be repellent to some, as suggesting a defense of those powers which are in rebellion against the present scheme of things."

In this work, the words fascism, imperialism, nazism, socialism,

the Soviet Union are not present; but it is an elaborate defense of the policy of appeasement and of Munich itself (indeed, the preface is dated November, 1938, *i.e.*, two months after Munich).

John Foster Dulles was personally a major architect of the Munich policy; his current cries of alarm lest we repeat the tragedy of Munich are acts of demagoguery and deceitfulness in pursuit now, as then, of a policy dedicated to the destruction of the Soviet Union and of socialism, the thwarting of all national liberation efforts and the imposition on mankind of a fascistic inferno.

The Threat of Atomic War

The seriousness of the danger of war between the United States and China with all the implications that holds for further expansion of the conflict is admitted by everyone. None denies that this is the closest we have yet come to going over one of Mr. Dulles' brinks.

In this mid-twentieth century, with what full-scale war means to all humanity, such dangers are simply impermissible. It is imperative to understand that the United States Government moves more and more certainly not only in the direction of war-making, but also in the direction of committing itself to the employment of atomic weapons in war.

Since 1954, the United States has adopted the position of considering so-called tactical atomic weapons as being in the "conventional" arms category. In the past several years it has moved—together with Great Britain—in the direction of revamping its military tactics and strategy, and therefore its tables of equipment and organization, in the direction of atomic warfare. Once the huge military machine is committed, it develops a power and an inertia to change that are vast. The fact is that the reorganization of the American armed forces from the high-explosive base of World War II to the atomic and nuclear energy base for its projected World War III is so well advanced that it now plays a significant part in predisposing the Government towards atomic warfare and opposing a ban on atomic-weapon development, let alone atomic-weapon disarmament.

On March 27, 1955, James Reston wrote from Washington, in the *N. Y. Times* (remember, this is 1955):

The situation is disturbing in the extreme. The U.S. is isolated from its Western Allies over Quemoy and Matsu. It is risking war for islands that are not vital to its own security or even—if we are to take the word of Secretary of Defense Wilson—to the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Moreover, officials in Washington are now talking about tactical weapons as if they were instruments of mercy that could knock out military targets more neatly and quickly than "conventional" weapons.

Ever since then a campaign has been conducted to accustom the American public to expect the use of atomic weapons by its forces in any serious fighting. That is why one now finds the military expert for the *New York Times*, Hanson Baldwin, writing (Sept. 7): "Attacks against Chinese mainland airfields—if made—might well have to be made with nuclear weapons." Mr. Baldwin explains that this "necessity" follows from the fact that such weapons would require only seven flights, rather than the seven thousand needed if old-fashioned high-explosive bombs are used. And Joseph Alsop, writing from Washington (*New York Herald Tribune*, Sept. 10), reports: "The highest Pentagon authorities in fact maintain that the U.S. armed services will be almost compelled to use tactical nuclear weapons." Two days later, the same person, writing from Taiwan, declared:

No one should forget for an instant that the American armed services intended to use nuclear weapons to defend Quemoy and Matsu. That is the present intention . . . certain key figures in the armed services . . . are not averse to having a nuclear showdown now.

A correspondent for the *U.S. News and World Report* (Sept. 26) writes from Taiwan that in various places on the island, "spotted at strategically located sites" are guided missiles, "their noses aimed at predetermined targets on the mainland." He adds: "Atomic warheads probably are here." The Seventh Fleet, patrolling the waters of Taiwan, and moving to within five or six miles of the Chinese mainland, has six aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, thirty-six destroyers, twenty service ships and four submarines—several of these vessels are equipped for nuclear warfare.

This fleet is manned by 60,000 men and carries 500 planes. All this is in addition to the enormous buildup of airpower in the Pacific (especially South Korea and the Philippines) and about 2,000 U.S. troops now on Taiwan as instructors of the 500,000 combat-ready men under Chiang.

Most recently: "U.S. Air Secretary James H. Douglas said at Dallas the U.S. forces were in a state of readiness to use nuclear weapons in the China crisis" (*New York Times*, Sept. 28). And Madame Chiang, visiting our country, openly advocated, via radio and television, the use of nuclear weapons upon China, "to get the war over with quicker."

The American public has been reassured many times that the decision to use atomic weapons could come only from the President. While this assurance is far from satisfactory, it has indicated some sense of responsibility about this most grave question. Lately, however, there has been a tendency to remain silent on this matter, and the only recent reference to it that I have seen tends to throw serious doubt as to the validity of the assurance any longer. Thus, in the President's news conference of August 27, 1958, the President was again asked: "If the U.S. does get involved in war, will military commanders at the front make the decision whether or not to use tactical atomic weapons?"

First, the President replied: "I think not." He then amended that to indicate that there was no doubt and that the use of such weapons did require "the specific authority of the President." When, however, he was pressed further, as to whether "in the case of an immediate threat to American troops," such weapons could not be employed "at the discretion of the local commander," the President then replied:

It has been a long time that I have gone through these, all these directives, and many of them go into tremendous detail.

I am not going any further than that, and, if it is possible, I will take a look again, because there is one exception, but I don't believe it mentions atomic weapons: that, if the United States itself or any of its armed forces are under attack, that they can use any measures necessary for their defense, but I would have to make certain. My memory is not quite that good this morning.

If the President did refresh his memory on this "detail," and if so, what he found has not been announced, so far as I know. But from what the President did say, there appears now to be the gravest doubt as to whether or not atomic weapons may be used at the discretion of local commanders, or—as the American people had been repeatedly assured—only at the discretion of and with the authority of the President.

There was another significant statement made by the President at this press conference. The President was asked if it was expected or if it was policy for the United States not to open attack, not to deliver the first blow, and specifically the first nuclear blow. The President replied: "Now, *I don't see any reason, therefore, for saying we necessarily have to take the first blow. . . .*"

Given the catastrophic quality of nuclear weapons, and the fact that only the United States has used atomic weapons in warfare, thus slaughtering scores of thousands of civilians, it is likely that neither of these statements by the President won us many friends abroad.

Dulles' Treaty With Chiang

The Secretary of State, in his best church-going manner, cites the "solemn obligation" imposed upon the "honor" of the United States to support Chiang Kai-shek because of treaty commitments, notably the alliance of 1955, and the consequent Senate Resolution authorizing the President to use American military force to protect Chiang's hold on Taiwan and the Pescadores. He appears horrified if one suggests that the existence of the treaty and the Resolution do not put at rest all arguments opposed to his China policy.

We would first remind Mr. Dulles that in his 1939 book, already mentioned, he devoted several pages to explaining to his readers why treaties were not sacred, and were subject to change or even to repudiation. And he concluded his discussion, then, with these words:

There are doubtless many treaties which under any international system would be accorded the sanction of authority. There are others which would not. In the absence of any cen-

tral authority to pass judgment, one cannot consider treaties, as such, to be sacred, nor can we identify treaty observance, in the abstract, with "law and order." (p. 47).

Of course, here Mr. Dulles' purpose was to apologize for the violations and repudiations of treaties which regularly marked the conduct of the fascist powers; then, in those circumstances, he found treaties far from sacred. Now, having signed a treaty of mutual military assistance with a bankrupt and repudiated counter-revolutionary—whom he owns body and soul—whose whole purpose in life is to destroy the Chinese People's Republic and who knows he cannot even attempt that seriously without the large-scale involvement of the United States in an attack upon China—now, under these circumstances and with these commitments, Dulles assures the American people of the sacredness and inviolability of treaties, and that treaty in particular.

Dulles' treaty with Chiang has no more moral and legal force than did the treaties Hitler made with the "Protector" of Moravia and Bohemia. Moreover, concerning that treaty, and particularly its invocation to justify the Quemoy-Matsu line, there is more than the suspicion of fraud and deception. Senator Wayne Morse (D., Oregon), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, writing in *The Nation* (Sept. 20, 1958), in an article entitled, "How Dulles Tricked Congress," proves that the treaty ratification and the Senate Resolution of 1955 resulted in large part from "the deception and intellectual dishonesty of Dulles toward Congress and the American people." He proves that it was thoroughly understood at the time that the commitment specifically did not include the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and that any effort to include those islands would require a formal amendment of both the treaty and the Resolution. He proves, further, that it was understood, and stated in writing as part of the Resolution and treaty, that any major movement of troops by Chiang out of the immediate Taiwan vicinity would be undertaken only with the express knowledge and approval of the U.S. authorities. Yet, as Senator Morse writes, though one-third of Chiang's forces were moved almost ninety miles from Taiwan to Quemoy and Matsu, "neither the Senate Foreign Relations Committee nor the Senate Armed Services Committee has ever been officially apprised of the move, either before or afterward." These facts lead the Senator to

conclude, in measured words, which, from such a source, have very few precedents in American history:

As Dulles proudly treads the brink of war, he also treads the brink of unconstitutionality, for his commitment to Quemoy in the Far East, as in Lebanon, is his own and not that of Congress.

Nor is that all: When Dulles was questioned about the movement of 90,000 Chiang troops to Quemoy, he replied that it was done with neither the approval nor the disapproval of the United States, falling back upon his transparent myth of Chiang as an independent and fully sovereign "power." The first point to note is that the treaty with Chiang and the Senate Resolution specifically required prior approval for any such major military move of the "independent" ally; and the second point to note is that, in this instance specifically, once again, Dulles is not telling the truth. This follows from the fact that Chiang does not have the capacity to move 900 men, let alone 90,000, without the financial and logistical support of the U.S. Furthermore, Joseph Alsop, an ultra-reactionary columnist fittingly sympathetic with Dulles, wrote (*New York Herald Tribune*, Sept. 7):

Even after the famous "unleashing" [in 1953], Chiang himself saw that his regular troops and his political prestige ought not to be committed on the offshore islands, which he was then treating as entirely expendable. *He made the commitment on the islands under severe American pressure, which was applied to give substance to the unleashing.*

The Dulles-Chiang treaty is a moral monstrosity and a legal fraud and needs to be discarded together with its author; the Senate Resolution was obtained through deception and has been stretched to cover measures either never envisioned or specifically barred by that Resolution itself.

Dulles' Ally and the New China

To what has Dulles committed the United States, in the name of protecting freedom? And against what nation has Dulles joined in a war-making pact?

A decade ago, American Ambassador Stuart writing to President Truman characterized the Chiang government as "an unpopular regime which does not have the interests of the country at heart." This was the reason for revolution and this was the reason for the success of the Communists in China, despite the tremendous aid given to Chiang by the United States. The evidence documenting this is overwhelming; its truth is admitted today by everyone except Dulles and Chiang. We will offer one very recent reiteration of this truth. Our source is Y. Chu Wang, professor of Far Eastern History at Pennsylvania State Teachers College. Professor Wang wrote in *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1958):

When V-J Day came, all the evil symptoms [of the Chiang government] reappeared with double vigor. Corruption in the government reached an all-time high. . . . When the regime was faced by a large peasant army, led by the Communists, with nothing to lose but a world to gain, it crumbled like a house of cards.

And what are the facts in Taiwan itself? The censorship there is exceedingly tight and very little gets through. Yet some things are available. Thus, the State Department itself, in its previously cited volume, *United States Relations with China*, wrote as follows (p. 308):

During the Japanese occupation the principal hope of the people had been reunion with the mainland. Instead of utilizing this highly favorable situation to its own advantage the Nationalist Government appointed to the governorship General Chen Yi, a long-time associate of the Generalissimo. . . . The new Governor arrived with an imposing retinue who proceeded with great efficiency to exploit Formosa. In addition the local population was ruthlessly excluded from any important role in public life and was made to feel that it was again under the rule of a conqueror.

The economic deterioration of the island and the administration of the mainland officials became so bad that on February 28, 1947, popular resentment erupted into a major rebellion. In the ensuing days the Government put down the revolt in a series of military actions which cost thousands of

lives. Order was restored but the hatred of the mainland Chinese was increased.

Seven months after the repression of this uprising, General Wedemeyer, on an official mission to China, reported to the President, August 17, 1947, that in Taiwan the Nationalists were behaving "ruthlessly, corruptly and avariciously" and that its Army "conducted themselves as conquerors."

Somewhat later a civilian governor replaced the military, and for a year and a half, American officials reported some improvement in government, and stated: "Although it cannot be said that economic conditions improved, it can be said that the situation did *not* become measurably worse." But in January, 1949, the civilian governor was removed and replaced by General Chen Cheng, "who proceeded to restore military rule." Thereafter conditions deteriorated; "in summary," said the State Department late in 1949, "the island is badly and inefficiently run." This General Chen Cheng is today Prime Minister of Chiang's "government." Intermittent outbreaks have since occurred; Chiang's regime on Taiwan is comparable to Batista's in Cuba. Among the more delightful efforts of the free and democratic American press to demonstrate the amenities of life under Chiang, there was this paragraph in the *Saturday Evening Post*, September 6, 1958:

There is little sign of dry rot or deteriorating morale among the tough soldiers. . . . There is a permanent "Paradise House" run, curiously, by the Officers Moral Endeavor Assn., where officers and men alike find surcease from their loneliness. The establishment is supervised by a medical staff, the girls are under contract to the government at the equivalent of 50 American dollars a month, and an atmosphere of strict propriety prevails.

But the New China—the China that threatens "us," and against which "we" are ready to hurl nuclear weapons—has other kinds of moral endeavor, which trouble the pious Mr. Dulles. Its enormous achievements are astounding the world; they are a magnificent tribute to the creative capacities of the masses, and a thrilling confirmation of the liberating potential of Marxism-Leninism.

Professor L. C. Walmsley of Canada, for 27 years a missionary

in the old China, returned to the new China for several weeks late in 1957. Remembering the poverty, filth, oppression of the old, he found the New "amazing" and almost incredible. He found a new pride, a new dignity; he found the working man and—what is more—the working woman, emancipated and working enthusiastically for themselves, collectively. He concludes: "I can be glad for the measure of progress they have made, and I rejoice to see hope replacing despair, and pride in achievement replacing fatalistic apathy." (*The United Church Observer*, Toronto, March 15, 1958.) That is Dulles' enemy, whom he would treat to nuclear bombs.

The President of the Royal Bank of Canada, James Muir, visited the new China in the spring of 1958. He reports:

The growth in industry, the change in living standards, the modernization of everything and anything, the feats of human effort and the colossal impact of human labor are not within our power to describe and still give a worthwhile picture of the scene. All I can say is that it must be seen to be believed. It's truly stupendous. . . . We think the vast majority of the people of China have a government they want, a government which is improving their lot, a government in which they have confidence, a government which stands no chance whatever of being supplanted. (*National Guardian*, September 15, reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, July 15, 1958.)

A former official of the old Chinese government, who resigned after the Communist victory and now lives in San Francisco, Ping-Chia Kuo, in his book, *China: New Age and New Outlook* (Knopf, N. Y., 1956), commends the "remarkable progress" made by the New China. He says it is necessary "to recognize first of all that the new China led by the Communist government in Peking is here to stay"; that it has unified China as never before in her history; that "it has aroused new hope in the Chinese people"; and that it "*represents an irresistible force, which cannot be stopped or checked.*" Wherefore, says this non-Communist Chinese: "It is the responsibility of the statesmen of all nations to devise means within the given circumstances to find a way of living together, of minimizing the chances of war and strengthening the cause of peace."

The opposition abroad to the Asian policy of the United States as expressed in Dulles' antics is well-nigh unanimous. George Herald, surveying the European press "from Oslo to Rome and from London to Vienna" found "a rare unanimity" on several major points in direct conflict with the Dulles policy (*New York Post*, September 11). Drew Middleton, the *New York Times* correspondent in London, reported (September 14) the most widespread hostility to Dulles' policy throughout Great Britain, and stated that similar findings had been reported by the same paper's correspondents in Paris, Bonn and Rome.

Eisenhower and Dulles have made much of their so-called "dominoes" theory, in which they put forth the idea that "giving up" Quemoy and Matsu would lead to the collapse of all the "free" or non-committed nations in Asia—such as Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, etc. This concept—first put forward, by the way, to buttress support of France's "dirty war" in Vietnam—is faulty not only because it is applied to nations and peoples who are not quite the same as dominoes; it is also faulty on its face because public opinion within the very countries Dulles seeks to "protect" is opposed to his protection.

The Dulles line is rejected in Australia and New Zealand. It is anathema in Malaya—the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Malaya said that the "dominoes" concept "has been received here with a mixture of amazement, hilarity and anger" (September 15). The Prime Minister of Thailand has announced his country's "non-intervention" beforehand in any war Mr. Dulles may precipitate; Defense Minister Vargas of the Philippines also questioned Mr. Dulles' wisdom in connection with Quemoy and Matsu; and even the Deputy Secretary General, William Worth, of Dulles' own concoction, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), made a point of declaring that the commitment of that organization did not cover the Taiwan Strait nor the coast of China. In the UN itself the governments of Burma, Indonesia and Cambodia opposed Dulles, and a leading newspaper in Pakistan (a member of Dulles' Baghdad Pact), the *Karachi Times* (August 30, 1958), found Dulles' "maneuvers highly provocative" and said that "U.S. armed intervention in the area would constitute an act of aggressive war." So even among the "dominoes," it appears that Dulles has only two certain pieces—Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek.

As for the hostility of public opinion in Latin America on this matter, nothing need be said; the same holds for the people (and the independent governments) of Africa; it applies to the Mid-East; and it has been vigorously expressed by the Government and the peoples of India.

That the peoples of the socialist world, and in the first place of the Soviet Union, stand foursquare with the Chinese people and nation is crystal-clear. The partisanship of the USSR is unequivocal, and history shows that its commitments in such matters are not to be taken lightly. The Premier of the USSR wrote President Eisenhower:

I have already told you, and I believe it necessary to re-emphasize it, that an attack on the People's Republic of China is an attack on the Soviet Union. With People's China, our great friend, ally and neighbor, we have a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, meeting the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples and the interests of peace. Let no one have any doubts about it; we shall fully perform all the assumed obligations.

The evidence leads to this conclusion: if it is the duty of the Secretary of State to achieve the utter isolation of the United States, in the face of serious international difficulties, then John Foster Dulles has performed so admirably that he is, as President Eisenhower insists, the greatest Secretary of State in American history.

American Public Opinion

There is a rising uneasiness among the American people with the Dulles foreign policy. The myth of bipartisanship on foreign policy has been smashed (in part due to Dulles' terrible arrogance) and Senators Fulbright, Cooper, Green, Morse, Mansfield, Kennedy, Humphrey, and Kefauver have spoken out, with varied vigor, against the Dulles line. The denunciations of the policy coming from Mrs. Roosevelt, former Secretary of State Acheson and former Senator Lehman are well known. An increasing section of the press, including the Republican press, is casting critical glances at the current foreign policy. The public, in the form of letters

to the newspapers, to Congressmen and to the State Department, have been overwhelmingly—about 8 to 1—in opposition to the Asian adventures. Some old-line Republican figures, like Henry B. Cabot of Massachusetts and Hamilton Fish of New York, have spoken out in a similar sense.

Dana Adams Schmidt, writing from Washington in the *New York Times* (September 14), stated: "The only force likely to deflect the Administration from its course would be mushrooming domestic political opposition." I believe the other forces indicated above have also played a part in this deflection; but certainly a basic force is American public opinion and it has been speaking out in unprecedented numbers and vigor. No doubt it has helped to deflect the Administration from actually launching a full-scale "hot" war. Its continuance and acceleration will guarantee the permanent "deflection" of that Administration.

The Reality of the War Danger

Dulles has led the country to so many brinks that a mood is developing to the effect that it is all a game and that neither he nor anyone else really intends to produce war. People are becoming bored with the cries of "wolf"; but real wolves do exist. Added to this is the feeling that nuclear weapons have made war so catastrophic that it is inconceivable that any leaders would permit a major conflict in which such weapons probably would be used, to ever break out.

Such feelings and moods are not in accord with reality and are most dangerous. They can contribute to a lessening of vigilance in opposition to war, and by that to the unleashing of the dogs of war. The Chiang lobby is powerful, and there are extreme Right-wing elements here and elsewhere quite capable of launching nuclear war.

One has from Mr. Dulles himself a statement like this:

I think we would win a hot war, and I do not know if we will win this "cold war" or not. It depends on whether we have an adequate program. . . . But as far as the defense of the principles and ideals for which this country has stood from the beginning and to which it is dedicated, those are, I think, in

greater jeopardy from a cold war than from a hot war (New York Times, June 27, 1958).

No, peace will not come of itself and it will not come because of the horrors of implements of war; it will come in our time only because the will for peace among the masses of mankind is made sufficiently articulate and organized so that it can muzzle imperialism's organic war-making drive.

Conclusion

We began our commentary by pointing to inadequacies in analyses of causation among those critical of the Administration's brink-of-war policy. We wish to conclude by underlining another, and a related, failing among these critics. True, from all of them, Walter Lippmann, Dean Acheson, Herbert Lehman, *The Nation*, etc., has come the proposal that the off-shore islands be relinquished, and that China be recognized and seated in the United Nations. These proposals are necessary ones and that they are brought forward is as welcome as is the criticism of policy which accompanies them.

However, in every case, it is simultaneously advocated that Taiwan be torn from the Chinese People's Republic, and either be "neutralized" in some way, or else established as some sort of "independent" nation, under UN auspices. *The Nation*, for example, urges (September 20) that "The way out is to hark back to the declaration embodied in President Truman's executive order of June 27, 1950, when the 7th Fleet was 'interposed' between Formosa and the mainland." Or, Lewis Mumford wants "to establish Formosa as a self-governing nation" (New York Times, September 28, 1958).

But the fact is that the tearing of Taiwan from China and its so-called "neutralization" in an ocean dominated by the U.S. 7th Fleet are precisely the basic line of the United States Government, both under Truman (after June, 1950) and under Eisenhower.

One wonders why *The Nation* wants to go back only to June, 1950. Why not go back to January 5, 1950, when President Truman declared that the United States accepted the fact of Chinese

sovereignty over Taiwan, that the United States had no designs on that island, that it would not give military aid or advice to Chiang on the island, and that it would follow a policy of strict non-involvement in the Chinese civil war? Or why not go back to President Truman's statement of December 15, 1945:

The U.S. government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of sovereign nations. . . . U.S. support will not be extended to U.S. military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife. . . . The U.S. government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate.

Taiwan is Chinese. There would be more reason to neutralize and internationalize Hawaii than there is to so deal with Taiwan. At least Hawaii—not appropriated until 1898—is over 1,500 miles from California. Or perhaps, one should internationalize Newfoundland, only recently a province of Canada, and as far from the coast of Canada as Taiwan is from China.

Furthermore, the history of the imperialist rape of China has been a history of the carving up of that nation, with pieces taken by Japan and Czarist Russia and England and France, etc. The New China is the most stable and most firm central government in Chinese history; a fundamental drive of the Chinese Revolution has been a national one, one seeking the attainment of the full integrity and sovereignty of China over all China. Hence the Chinese People's Government could never agree to the permanent relinquishment of Taiwan, a province of China, with ten million people.

Therefore, any solution of the Asian crisis which consists of tearing away part of the flesh of China is no solution. It cannot last: it can only be a source of international friction and a potential war danger. The Chinese people must settle their own problems in their own way and they must conclude their civil war without any interference from any Power, let alone one that is five thousand miles away from its borders.

In the name of the real national interests of the United States,

in the name of its own good-fame, and in the name of the securing of peace in the world, it is necessary that:

*The United States recognize the Chinese People's Republic
The Chinese People's Republic be seated in the United Nations
and on the Security Council of that body*

*There be no outside interference in the internal affairs of the
Chinese nation, including its civil war*

*The United States withdraw its land, sea, and air forces
from the territory of China*

We need a policy of friendship with the 650,000,000 Chinese people, not one of hostility, which in turn isolates us from world public opinion. Such friendship would serve the best interests of our country and would enhance the welfare of the peoples of the world.

October, 1958

XVII. IMPERIALIST INTELLECTUALS ON AFRICA

Marx, toward the conclusion of the first volume of *Capital*, summarized the genesis of capitalism:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations with the globe for a theatre . . .

To justify a system whose birth was fertilized with human flesh watered with children's tears, and whose continued existence was dependent upon one awful atrocity after another, from the African slave-trade to Hitler's crematoria, has required special ingenuity. The exercise of such ingenuity developed a special breed of thinker, of scholar, of intellectual. A system of injustice required a camouflage of lies; one of the central injustices was the rape of the darker peoples, and to cover this was developed that whole massive structure of lies known as racism.

But there is an immutable justice in history, and the law of dialectical development works its inexorable way. Lying corrupts the liar and does not alter the truth. The truth has a way not only of enduring, but of growing; as its time for fulfillment nears it becomes more and more mighty, while the lies become more and more transparent, more and more outrageous, more and more ob-

scene. Finally, reality has departed so far from the assumptions of the liars that they themselves begin to sense the crumbling foundations and hysterically thrash about, absolutely lost to reason, lost to all decency, lost to humanity.

As Africa was the first of the victims of budding capitalism—the modern European slave trade in Africa begins in the 1450's—as it was the continent of the fiercest, most merciless and most prolonged oppression, so the Western respectable intelligentsia display the most fantastic ignorance concerning it,* the most colossal chauvinism towards its peoples, the most arrogant posturing about “what it needs,” and the most obscene demagoguery in connection with their own programs.

Few indeed of the white western intellectuals have escaped the plague; its victims range from the most respected all the way down to David Lawrence and George Sokolsky. Thus, Adlai Stevenson—surely among the most respected—speaking at a dinner of the American Bar Association on September 1, 1960, and having Africa particularly in mind, remarked: “Many sections of the globe are returning to the chaos from which Western rule briefly rescued them.” Here, in one sentence, is conjured up all the ignorance of the West—the picture of the savages of the steaming jungle—a la Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer—brought to order and the Mission and diligence by the West—in the person of a firm-jawed Gary Cooper or a gay-outside and rock-like-inside Clark Gable.

The descent from Stevenson is swift and deep, and many are the available rungs. One may stop at Stewart Cloete, something of a best-selling author on African themes, and the piece he did for the New Orleans *Times-Picayune*, syndicated by the Associated Press, and widely reprinted—as in *U. S. News & World Report* (August 1, 1960). Mr. Cloete announces that: “Such civilization and education as exist [in Africa] are products of colonialism.” Africa, says this obliging expert: “. . . is a black giant whose flesh is supported by white bones, nerves and sinews. When they are removed the flesh falls back, shapeless, into the forest.”

At about Cloete's level is Robert L. Buell, introduced by the editors of the *New York Times* (August 10, 1960) as one who

* The American pioneer in African historiography—as in so much else—is W. E. B. Du Bois; see especially his *The Negro* (N. Y., 1915), and *Black Folk: Then and Now* (N. Y., 1939). The Historians Group of the Communist Party of Great Britain has issued, in mimeographed form, a valuable study, *Africa in World History*, which includes an extensive bibliography.

"spent twenty-seven years in the U. S. Foreign Service, fourteen in dependent areas. . . . Consul General, in the Belgian Congo from 1945 to 1947." This gentleman is disgusted with "swivel-chair writers . . . do-gooders, emotionally disturbed and starry-eyed Christian leaders, vociferous groups, ill-informed people" who do not understand the "countless benefits" brought to "abysmally backward natives" by colonialism. With these kinds of insufferable ignoramuses staffing the U. S. Foreign Office—for twenty-seven years!—one begins to understand how it compiled its well-known brilliant record that is the envy of all the embassies of the world.

We move from the lackeys to the masters—from the Consul General to the *Wall Street Journal*. This *Journal* (July 27, 1960) greets the leaders of the new African republics—Nkrumah, Touré, Lumumba—as "these brilliant leaders who don't pause to consider the inordinate trouble, in time, money and effort, their own stupidity is causing the members of the U.N." The *Journal* writes of the U.N. as though it were the branch office of some promising new corporation; and displays its impatience that the office's routine should be disturbed by every "pipsqueak 'nation'" and its fantastic complaints.

Perhaps the clearest expression of the "civilized" white bourgeois western approach came in a CBS radio broadcast from Eric Sevareid—reprinted in *The Reporter* magazine (February 4, 1960). Mr. Sevareid began by noting that Prime Minister Macmillan was then visiting Africa, and he assumed that the distinguished man would be badgered by innumerable complaints concerning the behavior of dominant whites in that continent. Too bad, Sevareid continued, that a man in Macmillan's responsible position cannot really talk back to the Africans—he has delicate political problems to consider. But Mr. Sevareid, who entitled his piece "Talking Back to the Africans," was in no way inhibited from speaking the whole truth—in common with all CBS commentators. This he proceeded to do.

Mr. Sevareid spoke up for the necessarily close-mouthed Prime Minister and offered, as he said, "what we suspect Mr. Macmillan felt an urge to say." First, Sevareid-Macmillan wanted to note that "when the Lord shared our faults among mankind he did not exempt the Africans any more than the whites." Furthermore, that "Most of you Africans are getting your independence at the negotiating table; many western countries had to fight for it, in most

terrible wars. Self-pity is not among the noblest traits of man." And, that:

The good life for Americans or Britons was earned the hard way. They developed their countries by study, work, self-denial; but you Africans sound as if you want the fruits before the tree takes root. You want a social-welfare state, complete with minimum wages, medical insurance, pensions, before you have created the capital to pay for it.

Sevareid-Macmillan concluded his free advice with this admonition to what he called the "excited Africans": "I guess that one phrase would sum it all up: Begin at the beginning."

Mr. Sevareid speaks of the Africans being "given" their independence in the same way as white historians speak of the Negro people in the United States as having been given their emancipation from chattel slavery.* In both cases the ignorance is so dense as to be impermeable; meanwhile the ignorance is persisted in as an attribute of the arrogance that marks racism; at the same time, the ignorance permits the racism to continue undisturbed by fact.

Mr. Sevareid speaks of the Americans and the British fighting for the good life and developing their own countries through their own hard work and study—and this remark is made by a white American lecturing Africans! It is enough to force tears from a stone, or even from J. Edgar Hoover. No inkling of what the ravishment of the continent of Africa meant to the early accumulation of capital wherewith the economy of Great Britain was able to leap forward; no inkling of what the slave trade meant to the continued accumulation of such capital—a slave trade that cost the lives of scores of millions of Africans during four centuries of crucifixion; no inkling of what the enslavement of the Negro masses for over two hundred years meant to the establishment and growth of the free-enterprise economy in the United States; of what the enslavement in the West Indies and South America

* It is worth noting that Stanley Elkins in a recent book *Slavery*, published by the University of Chicago Press (1959), throws the treatment of Negro slavery back to the standards of U. B. Phillips. In fact his chapter, entitled "Slavery and Personality," probably antedates Phillips in the coarseness of its chauvinism. There are other indications that certain gains made in scholarship in the social sciences, in connection with racism and the Negro, are under mounting attack, and a vigorous counter-attack is needed.

meant to the economies of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal; no inkling of what the imperialism of the 19th and 20th centuries in Africa, with its hunger and its wars, has meant to the wealth and the political stability—and even the political freedom—of the western countries; no inkling of what the cocoa, rubber, diamonds, gold, copper, uranium, and the Africans' toil have meant for the enrichment of the capitalists of England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and the United States! No inkling that from this human suffering—indescribable in its intensity—to a large degree have come the wealth and the capital making possible the universities in the west to which favored and fortunate young men like Eric Sevareid might go and learn how smart they were, and study how to make speeches, and how to "Talk Back to Africans," while African men and women and children toiled within the bowels of the earth for a pittance, never learned to read or write, never voted—neither Democratic nor Republican—never saw a doctor or a dentist, never went to any school, and died, worn out and famished, at perhaps 30 years of age.

No wonder these smart and white and rich western ones, with their cars and microphones and splendid teeth and manicured nails, are unable to talk to African men and women, when now—after incredible suffering and legendary heroism—these men and women are speaking for themselves. No wonder—as our Christian Herter says—these "excited Africans" are acting as the "dupes" of Communist agents! Yes, when I see the given name of this Secretary of State, I bethink me of the name of the ship that served as Great Britain's first slave-trader—it was called "Jesus."

I repeat—it is a marvelous vindication of the universality of the law of dialectics that the expensively trained mouthpieces of the exploiters are unable to converse with the exploited; that they find themselves unable to help their employers, now when those employers need some magical word to restore the "natives" to their senses and get them to be patient and to start at the beginning and not to want so much so soon; and above all not to set out for themselves and make their own lives in the way they see fit on their own land and in their own sweet time.

Now we are told—the President himself tells us—that "trouble-makers" are appearing; people are urged not to make "trouble"—from the segregated schools of the South to the Apartheid con-

centration camps of South Africa—please don't make "trouble." There is no trouble when a Negro mother must explain to her thirsty child why he may not have a drink of water at that store's counter; there is no trouble when the South African is thrashed for failing to show his "pass." There is "trouble" only when the mother insists on the glass of water now and here; when the African burns the pass and demands the right to walk as a free man in his own land.

Above all, there must be no "violence"; there must be only our violence; our pass-laws; our jim-crow; our militia; our cops; our clubs; our machine-guns—this is not violence—it is law and order.

When Africans are the victims, gentlemen are just practicing—just exercising the prerogatives of gentlemen; but when the victim turns, when he stands and fights back, then, and only then, does one hear shocked cries about "violence." I've not seen a better commentary on this than that which came from the English radical, John Bright, and being an Englishman, perhaps Mr. Severeid-Macmillan will pay attention to what he said, in 1866:

I have never said a word in favor of violence. All I have said has been against it—but I am at liberty to warn those in authority that justice long delayed, or long continued injustice always provokes the employment of force to obtain redress. It is in the ordering of nature and therefore of the Supreme that this is so, and all preaching to the contrary is of no avail. If men build houses on the slope of Vesuvius, I may tell them of their folly and insecurity, but I am not in any way provoking, or responsible for, the eruption which sweeps them all away. *I may say that force, to prevent freedom and to deny rights, is not more moral than force to gain freedom and secure rights.*

Of course, the great Western tradition is that of Jefferson and Paine, of Martí and Castro, and the greatest of the writers of the West, reflecting and imbued by that tradition, took their stand on the side of the oppressed, including very often the African masses. Specifically, the horrors of imperialist exploitation in the Congo were exposed unforgettably in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*. Arthur Conan Doyle carefully investigated the horrors of the

Congo, and wrote of it in his *The Crime of the Congo*. Vachel Lindsay saw the King of the Belgians in Hell:

*Listen to the yell of Leopold's ghost
Burning in Hell for his hand-maimed host,
Hear how the demons chuckle and yell
Cutting his hands off, down in Hell.*

Mark Twain said, "The royal palace of Belgium is . . . the den of a wild beast" and he went on to describe the mutilation, starvation and murder of millions. Statesmen of the West, the patient ones, the Christian Herters, might ponder the meaning of a few population figures: in 1900 twenty million people inhabited the Belgian Congo; in 1950 the population there totaled twelve million.

"The Revolution in Expectations"

There is a phrase current in State Department publications and in some academic journals that is revealing; it is "the revolution in expectations." One writes of the revolution in politics, in industry, in science—and now there is talk of the revolution in expectations. What these phrasemakers have in mind is the growing insistence among more and more millions of "common" people for the full perquisites and all the good things of this earth. The rise of socialism, the appearance of technological advances offering illimitable energy resources and this "expectation revolution" are dialectically intertwined. Together this constitutes the basis for the New Era now maturing—an era of the realization, in all phases of life, of the sovereignty of the people.

Nothing more dramatically indicates this than, once again, Africa. It was only in 1885—within one lifetime—that all the major European powers, and the United States, participated in the Berlin Conference, at which Africa was divided up among the "civilized" ones—of course no African was present at this barbecue. The Act resulting from this Conference was signed "in the name of Almighty God" and while the Powers were frank enough to mention their interest in "the development of trade" and "the advantages of free navigation" their major stress was upon their determination to discover "the means of furthering the moral and

material well-being of the native populations," to "bring home to them the blessings of civilization."

Leonard Woolf, writing of these blessings forty years later, noted in his book, *Imperialism and Civilization* (N. Y., 1928): "It would be a waste of time to retell the story of atrocities, exploitations, and hypocrisy which forms so large a part of the record of African imperialism."

Even more recently, as late as 1944, in fact, in the midst of World War II, the leading French colonial officials—all non-Africans—gathered at the Brazzaville Conference to consider the future of colonialism. Here it was agreed:

The aims of the work of civilization accomplished by France in its colonies exclude all idea of autonomy, all possibility of evolution outside the French bloc of the Empire; the eventual establishment, even in the distant future, of self-governments is dismissed.

These were the sentiments, in 1944, of the colonial administrators of Free France, let it be understood—this is not the voice of Laval and of Vichy. Let this 1944 declaration be contrasted with the realities of today, and then one will have some idea of the magnitude of the changes involved in the concept of the New Era.

It was a happy historical circumstance—and not at all a coincidence—that found President Nkrumah of Ghana and Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet Union addressing a General Assembly of the United Nations on the same day. It was a profound augury of the new day, also, that both men, though approaching questions from differing points of view and though developing out of environments quite distinctive, found themselves in substantial accord on the most burning issues of our time—those of the liquidation of imperialism and colonialism, the cessation of the arms race, and the assurance of peaceful co-existence in the world. Said Nkrumah:

- Africa wants her freedom; Africa must be free. It is a simple call, but it is also a signal lighting a red warning to those who would tend to ignore it.

The thoughts are not new, but that an African President of an

African Republic says it—clothed in full sovereignty—before an assembly of world powers, including twenty-two other African sovereignties, is altogether new. Helping make possible the whole scene, and helping give weight to the heart's cry uttered by this African statesman, was the appearance at the same rostrum on that same day of the head of the first Socialist Government on earth, no longer an "experiment" but a throbbing reality representing a power without a superior and leading a constellation of socialist states encompassing one-third of all humanity. Here Premier Khrushchev, as the embodiment of today's world of Socialism, said:

The Soviet Union, faithful to the policy of peace and support to the struggle of oppressed peoples for their national independence which was proclaimed by V. I. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, is urging the United Nations to raise its voice in defense of the just cause of liberating the colonies, and to undertake prompt action towards the complete elimination of the colonial regime of administration.

One has here, in the actions and words of President Nkrumah and Premier Khrushchev, a fresh affirmation of the Marxist truth, as enunciated by Marx himself, that "Labor in a white skin cannot be free while labor in a black skin is branded." The indivisibility of the peoples' freedom thus is enunciated on a plane and at a level without precedent in human history. We indeed have the glorious privilege of living in a New Epoch, wherein all the dearest dreams of mankind may become realities. Let us Americans hasten to give our full measure of effort to the realization of these noble aims.

October, 1960

XVIII. THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

Rebellion against oppression is as old as oppression itself; and *that* is as old as recorded history. At the root of oppression has been the private possession of the means of production. Forms of such possession have been altered through the centuries and these alterations have been enormously consequential in the development of human capacity and freedom. But it was only in our century that it became possible to challenge seriously and realistically the private ownership of the means of production itself.

The decisive and unique feature of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia is that there for the first time such a challenge was offered and succeeded; despite everything, it was not undone. Socialism was built there, now exists there, and the matter of "experimentation" is at an end. Thus was ushered in the era of the Building of Socialism; it signalizes as it intensifies the era of the Decline of Imperialism.

In this new era, imperialism, reeling under the "catastrophe" of the appearance of a world system of Socialism now embracing one billion people, today finds its colonial reserves—hitherto fundamental sources of raw materials, fantastically lucrative markets, preferred areas for investments of accumulating capital and prime suppliers of cannon-fodder—breaking away from it. And the process of breaking away cannot really be halted any more because the power of imperialism is decisively reduced and because—given the existence of a Socialist world—the colonial peoples *can* now push their revolutionary efforts through to real success. No longer need these efforts be aborted into mere palace upheavals, for now there is a market for products, there is a source of credit, there is a pool of available technique, there is the wherewithal for industrialization and economic diversification, there is a power-

ful bloc of states sympathetic in principle and fundamental self-interest and carrying enormous diplomatic and military weight.

The time when the poor "shall inherit the earth" is now; they are inheriting it and that is what is shaking the ancient globe, and making it bountiful beyond genius' dreams "even for the least among you."

The term "underdeveloped countries" obscures more than it illuminates. It is of some usefulness as a descriptive term, for certainly the areas so designated *are* underdeveloped when it comes to the persistence of hunger, the prevalence of disease, the high level of illiteracy, the distorted economies; but analytically the term will not do. These countries are over-exploited and therefore are underdeveloped. When one sees they are over-exploited he understands the cause of the retarded development; he also understands why, to a large degree, the developed countries enjoy their status. It is the parasitic relationship between the capitalist metropolitan powers and the colonial peoples that helps explain the relative disparity in their respective standards and productive plants.

Since World War II, this parasitism has intensified to the point where, for example, less food was being produced per capita in Latin America in 1958 than had been produced in 1938; at the same time, not only was there an intensification of absolute impoverishment but the relative impoverishment of the colonial peoples very much increased. This, plus the basic shift in the balance of forces in the world, *vis-à-vis* capitalism and socialism, explains the leap forward, in quantity and quality, of the present national-liberation movements.

The most powerful of the imperialist powers is the United States; in its own bailiwick—the Western Hemisphere—the system of imperialism remained unbroken. This was no small part of its own strength, economically, militarily and diplomatically. The Cuban revolution is the first really profound and successful shattering of this homogeneity; it shatters not only concepts of "geographic fatalism," but also theories of American exceptionalism. Revolution is not only something for Asia or even maybe Europe—especially eastern Europe; no, here it is in America, and—ninety miles from the United States. Here it is in a little country, owned lock, stock and barrel by U.S. monopolies and having on its territory a huge naval base, with air and ground forces actually present.

The contagious quality of the Cuban upheaval is not the least of the worries it entails for the United States ruling class; hence to undo that upheaval represents a major interest and commitment of that ruling class. No one should be under any illusions as to the lengths it will be willing to go—if it feels it can get away with it—to destroy that revolution.

There have been two main techniques employed by the U.S. government to protect the huge investments and stakes in Latin America held by major American corporations. These have been the threat or use of naked military force and the reliance upon less direct political, diplomatic and economic pressures. Generally speaking, the Republican Party has been especially prone to the former and the Democratic Party has tended to prefer the latter, although major exceptions occur—as, for example, Wilson's frequent resort to direct force. Very recently, there has appeared a valuable examination of the history of both forms of interventionism, with special reference to Cuba, in Robert F. Smith's *The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917-1960* (Bookman Associates, N. Y.).

This book is especially strong for its treatment of the period from Wilson through Franklin Delano Roosevelt; here it is solidly based on first-hand research in the National Archives. Its material on the post-World War II era is skimpy and seems to have been appended in an effort to make the book up-to-date and so gain a wider readership. Professor Smith—of the Texas Lutheran College—demonstrates the gross and persistent interference in Cuban affairs by the U.S. Government for the past sixty years and he shows this to have been done on behalf of American monopolies. He proves, with the use of many hitherto unpublished documents, how the U.S. government employed troops in 1917 to suppress labor organizing activities and strikes in Cuba, while publicly affirming that the troops were there only for purposes of "training." While Hoover's use of food for political purposes is well-known in terms of central and eastern Europe just after World War I, Smith shows that the same official created a shortage of food in Cuba in 1918-19 in order to pressure its government into accepting a reduction in the price of sugar and that only when such reduction was agreed to was Cuba permitted to import food and to borrow money from American banks.

One of the most illuminating sections of Smith's book deals

with the New Deal period and FDR's policy towards Cuba. Smith notes that Batista's taking of power coincided with FDR's becoming President; he shows that Batista's ascendancy would not have occurred without the approval of the U.S. government. He demonstrates how that government—through the "good offices" of men like Welles, Caffery and A. A. Berle—pressured the Batista government ever further towards the Right—towards a "safe and sane" policy so far as U.S. investments were concerned. He notes that with U.S. assurance that the Batista regime was "safe" it was then kept in power for twenty-five years, while its plundering, murdering, and torturing activities were known to the responsible U.S. officials.

That Professor Smith himself is strongly anti-Communist and seeks to equate the blame between Castro's "excesses" and U.S. "intransigence" for the current severance of relations between the two governments may make all the more persuasive for many readers the well-documented first two-thirds of his volume whose main contents we have briefly summarized in the preceding paragraphs.

The weight of Smith's conclusions is in the direction of an appeal for a change in U.S. policy in Latin America away from opposition to all social advance and rigid support for an intolerable status quo to a more enlightened effort at alliance with the "middle groups" and support for ameliorative attempts.

This is the message that is appearing more and more often in most of the recent American scholarly works on Latin America. An example is Edwin Lieuwen's *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, N. Y.). "Unless," he writes, "some major changes of approach are made, our entire foreign policy in Latin America may be destined for frustration and failure." A social revolution is sweeping Latin America, Professor Lieuwen sees; he insists, therefore, that the U.S. government must show foresight and "must not be too closely identified with an outworn order." The U.S. government must "assist the Latin Americans through their difficult process of social revolution"; else their drift will be further and further to the Left, and, presumably, one will have then a real social revolution, in no way "identified with an outworn order."

Professor Lieuwen quotes with approval John M. Cabot: "We simply cannot afford to identify ourselves with the elements which

would tie down the social safety valve. That wouldn't protect our national interest; it won't even for long protect our investments."

Mr. Cabot's language gives away, perhaps unwittingly, his chief concern; rather clearly, it is not the welfare of the Latin-American masses. Moreover, Lieuwen's choice of Cabot as his spokesman is not a happy one, for Cabot was President Eisenhower's Assistant Secretary for Latin-American Affairs and subsequently his Ambassador to Brazil; surely, it is somewhat paradoxical for an author who states the urgent need "for major changes of approach" in U.S. policy toward Latin America to bring forward the policy statement of the man directly in charge of implementing that very policy.

I think it is the fundamental weakness of Lieuwen's case that helps explain the clumsiness of his argumentation. He knows that a social revolution is in process in Latin America; he knows that its economy is decisively shaped and dominated by U.S. corporate interests; he knows, therefore—without ever making it explicit—that basic to the advance of any significant social progress in Latin America (not to speak of social *revolution*) is the removal of this alien corporate stranglehold upon its economy and therefore its politics. Is the state, whose function it is to serve those corporate interests, going to assist, of its own will and its own choice, a social revolution whose primary object must be to release the control those corporate interests have on most of Latin America?

An approach similar to that taken by Smith and Lieuwen marks the collected essays appearing in the volume *Social Change in Latin America Today: Its Implications for U.S. Policy* (Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, N. Y.). In so far as the volume again documents decisive U.S. corporate influence in Latin America and the role this has played in bulwarking the Right in that area it is of importance. The scholars contributing to this volume also show that what "aid" has gone to Latin America has been predominantly of a military kind and often has served to suppress efforts at social advance; they demonstrate, too, that where such "aid" has been of a civilian nature it has largely "been channeled into the traditional social structure from the top" (p. 106) and again served to bulwark the status quo. The chapter on Guatemala is of particular interest; it shows that there—where, since 1954, the domination by the United States has been naked—U.S. policy has expressed itself in fear of and hostility towards any form of

social change and has exerted itself to undo what advances were gained in the half decade prior to the CIA-engineered counter-revolution.

The volume's central proposal again is that the United States ally itself with the "middle class" in Latin America; thus, it may emerge not as the basic support of reaction, but as the champion of moderate reform and gradual amelioration of the most glaring of the inequities. This, too, is the burden of the books and speeches coming from Chester Bowles, A. A. Berle, and A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., all now in the State Department; increasingly it is tending to dominate the public stance of the Kennedy administration.

Mr. Berle, personally, while making similarly high-sounding speeches twenty-five years ago, as a public official actually advanced a policy in Latin America that helped produce the kind of relationship in U.S.-Latin American affairs that he now, again, publicly laments. Professor Schlesinger is now touring Latin America as a representative of the President. He seeks, through an "enlightened" policy of moderation and restraint, to convince the professionals, intelligentsia and middle-class elements that by combining forces with the New Frontier it will be possible to prevent "revolution from below" and tyranny from above.

Since Professor Schlesinger was the author of a book published in 1949—*The Vital Center*—one of whose main themes was to insist upon the obsolescence of revolution in the present age of awesome military and psychological weapons for mass control, there is a certain historic justice in his present somewhat desperate anti-revolutionary mission.

There is further irony in the hope that it is the "middle classes" in Latin America that offer salvation, for it is exactly U.S. imperialism whose economic policies stunted the growth of such middle classes and thus turned many of their members into partisans of national-liberation movements whose main foe is American imperialism. Imperialism as it ages tends to fear elementary democratic rights in its home territory, let alone in its colonial preserves where such rights always were considered altogether seditious. It is more than a little late for American imperialism to try to fasten its hopes for survival in Latin America on the embryonic middle classes who have managed to survive the monopolistic practices of the Yankee corporations and its State

Department. The natural allies of monopoly capitalism, in its colonial areas, are feudal and comprador elements, not the genuine national bourgeoisie.

Splits in the bourgeoisie here may help bring salutary pressure upon the State Department; considerations of simple decency no doubt are not altogether unimportant in leading some—even among the bourgeoisie—to a genuine revulsion when the United States is the main support of monsters like Trujillo; difficulties of carrying on in the old way in the face of the rising militancy and strength in Latin America help promote reconsiderations of such old ways; recognition of the changed relationship in the world's forces, with the weight of the Socialist world decisive in that change, also requires a seeking of altered tactics—all these matters bear very heavily in the direction of impeding traditional U.S. policy towards Latin America and in particular towards its most critical point, the Cuban Revolutionary Government.

Not unimportant is nagging doubt in the minds of U.S. policy-makers as to the real state of American public opinion relative to Latin America and particularly Cuba. There is the gravest doubt as to the reliability of such opinion among the twenty-five million Negro, Puerto Rican, Mexican-American and Cuban-American masses in the United States. And there is uncertainty, at least, as to how reliable would be the great mass of plain American people—with no investments in United Fruit or Standard Oil—if some gross and "old-fashioned" form of reactionary or counter-revolutionary course were pursued towards the New Cuba. In this connection, the near-unanimity with which Castro is backed by, and the universal arming of, the Cuban population cannot be entirely unknown to U.S. Intelligence, no matter how blundering it may be.

The danger, too, that an invasion of Cuba—or U.S. "support" to a mass invasion by mercenary murderers of non-American nationality—would produce another Spain, with the United States playing the role of fascist Italy and nazi Germany and could have the same result as Spain—i.e., ignite a new world war—this must weigh very heavily with responsible American officials, no matter how impatient they may be to "deal with" Castro.

Nevertheless, evidence accumulates that while the dominant tendency in the Kennedy Administration towards Latin America seems to be a relatively "enlightened" concentration on economic

pressures and reformist tactics, there has been no abandoning of the more brutal approach of force, at least as a reserve policy. Thus, U.S. military vigilance now finds it "impossible" to prevent the flight of planes from American soil for bombing, strafing, and propaganda missions over Cuba, though such vigilance was notoriously effective in the past against democratic refugees from Batista's terror. Thus, the training and arming of counter-revolutionaries by the hundreds and perhaps thousands in Florida and in Guatemala are open and well-publicized "secrets." Thus, there continues the publishing of advertisements in such papers as the *New York Times* (January 5) and the *Herald Tribune* (February 21) from well-financed counter-revolutionary organizations openly announcing their purpose as the forcible overthrow of the Cuban government.

The confidential business news service operating out of Washington, known as the *Kiplinger Letter*, under date of February 18, 1961, flatly predicted that "Castro will be overthrown within months." It stated that this would be accomplished by an invasion of counter-revolutionaries now being trained in Guatemala; that the United States Navy "will not interfere" with this movement; that many landings would occur simultaneously; that desertions have already been "arranged" within Castro's army; that there would be "local uprisings"; that there "will be great slaughter"; and that Castro's successor will be "radical" but not anti-United States and not a Batista follower.

Six days later, Senator Keating (R., N. Y.) stated, in the United States Senate, his belief that "Castro will not last out this year"; he added, "my conviction that this is so is supported by substantial evidence."

What "substantial evidence"? Is the *Kiplinger Letter* simply to remain confidential? Shall the American people acquiesce in the admittedly counter-revolutionary activities of Mr. Dulles' Central Intelligence Agency, and permit reactionary fanatics to attempt "another Guatemala" which may well lead to another World War and certainly would lead, in any case, to fearful loss of life?

We have enumerated above some of the factors that tend to impede an openly counter-revolutionary course on the part of the Kennedy Administration. But the factor that can be decisive in this regard—as in all other aspects with that Administration—is the development of articulate and organized public opinion in our

own country, especially stemming from the working class and the Negro masses, unequivocally opposed to any form of U.S. meddling with the complete national independence and perfect sovereignty of the Cuban Revolutionary Government.

To achieve this, the truth concerning that Government must be brought home to the American people.

Towards Open Intervention

In an unprecedented display of contempt for world public opinion and for the legalities—not to speak of decencies—of international relations, the U.S. ruling class openly is pressing towards unleashing wholesale slaughter in Cuba. The New York *Herald Tribune*—now owned by John Hay Whitney, recently U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, and currently employed in diplomatic duties by the Kennedy Administration—serialized a five-part distortion concerning the New Cuba by Joseph Newman, having as its explicit aim the justification of such counter-revolution. The President himself announced his approval of this series; its republication in Spanish and Portuguese and distribution throughout Latin America is to be undertaken by the U.S. government, while the miscalled Voice of America is to broadcast it.

Every propaganda means available has been employed to evoke sympathy for the murderous counter-revolutionary junta established in New York City, and the State Department expresses pleasure that since these traitors call themselves a Council rather than a “provisional government” it has abided by the letter of the law; meanwhile, the members of this junta boast that they are responsible for the sabotage and the killings—including of women and children—recurring in Cuba. Of these assorted planters, bankers and one hundred percent Freedom Fighters, the New York *Times* editorializes (March 23): “Their problem, and it is clearly one with which the United States policy concurs, is to overthrow the Castro regime.”

Benediction is offered beforehand by Cardinal Spellman, who, in a rare display of humor, suggests that he would contribute to a fund to maintain Premier Castro in an insane asylum; hurling anathemas upon one like Fidel Castro should come easily for a hierarchy which blessed Batista for twenty-five years. Cardinal Spellman’s evaluations have been consistent at any rate: he now

finds Castro a fearful lunatic, and during World War II, having interviewed Francisco Franco, he reported in *Collier's* that the fascist was "a man loyal to his God, devoted to his country's welfare, and definitely willing to sacrifice himself in any capacity and to any extent for Spain" and that when the Generalissimo smiled "he is indeed very pleasant."

Some of the "liberals," smelling gunpowder from afar, are performing their tricks even before the master has called for his hounds. Max Lerner, who swallowed the CIA assassination of democracy in Guatemala, found no difficulty in consigning Castro to the darkness reserved for "Kremlin stooges"; Robert J. Alexander, in *The New Leader* (February 6), while noting unfortunate lapses in U.S. policy and suggesting Berle-like changes, nevertheless manages, with something approaching a heavy heart, to conclude: "Washington has little choice but to continue its present policy toward Cuba for a while."

But most of this is warmed-over and nearly worn-out stuff. Castro's Cuba is a new Cuba, really new, befitting our New Epoch. And there is a fresh and new wind blowing in our country. It started up, in these post-McCarthy years, with the tremendous revitalization of the Negro liberation movement—once again, as so often in the past, the Negro masses being pioneers in general democratic and progressive movements. It has reached broader areas in the anti-war and anti-armaments movement whose numbers and influence have grown considerably in the past few months; it has penetrated into the trade-union movement where a higher militancy and political maturity are appearing; it is very marked among the youth, especially those on campuses, where the shedding of apathy and cynicism is so clear it has even reached many among the faculties.

One of the catalysts in all this is the New Cuba. It has won the favor of the American Negro masses because it has mounted an all-out assault upon racism and discrimination and because it represents the interests and aspirations of the poor and the oppressed. It has captured the imagination of tens of thousands of our youth, because it is a movement of and by and for youth in the first place; because it is filled with idealism and self-sacrifice; with nobility and daring; with great accomplishment and greater promise and because the best of our youth always and naturally respond to such qualities. Its elan and vigor are stimulating many

people who had permitted themselves to become "tired." Its battle against unemployment; its cutting rents in half; its war on illiteracy; its campaign to bring the best of the arts to the masses; its attack on disease and slum; its efforts to bring a sense of dignity to the every-day person; its returning Cuba to the Cubans—not only the plush hotels and palaces, the "restricted" beaches and residential areas, but the whole country itself, so that the people en masse feel that now it is theirs, that they are masters, not tenants, in their own home, and that now they build for themselves and they reap for themselves and they work for themselves and not for the ermine-wrapped ones, the chauffeured ones, the loafers with their roulette wheels and torture chambers—all this etches the word "Cuba" into the heart of every democrat, every humanist, every informed man and woman of goodwill.

Manifesting this cleansing impact of the Cuban Revolution upon our own scene—and at the same time, part of the cleansing process—are the many writings that have appeared in the most varied publications reflecting in essence a positive evaluation of that Revolution and urging that hostility towards it by the U.S. government violates our own best national interests. These include the *Christian Century*, the *Catholic Worker*, the *National Guardian*, the *New Republic*, the *Monthly Review*, the *Nation*, student publications like *Studies on the Left* (Wisconsin), *New University Thought* (Chicago), and *Controversy* (Cornell). Included are the writings of Carleton Beals, Samuel Shapiro, Richard Taber, Sidney Lens and many others, with some of whom we shall deal in the following pages. There are, of course, many differences among these writers, and they differ in significant matters from the reports and analyses coming from Joseph North and James S. Allen, in *The Worker* and in *Political Affairs*.*

But their areas of agreement are more numerous and more vital for our time than are areas of difference. Sometimes the tendency—especially among friends and relatives!—is to take for granted the agreements and to concentrate on the differences. This is unfortunate as a rule; it is particularly unfortunate when those who do agree on highly significant questions, and on the most significant question—*i.e.*, the wonderfully positive character of the Cuban Revolution and the necessity to protect it against counter-

* The May 1961 issue of *Mainstream* is devoted entirely to the art and culture and thought of the New Cuba.

revolutionary attempts, especially as these have their fount in the U.S. ruling class—are surrounded by foes, who possess a basically contrary estimate of the Cuban events and seek to destroy the Revolution by every possible means, excluding none.

I do not mean that differences are to be covered up; they are not. They are to be exposed as clearly as may be and argued out persuasively. This is to be done in an effort all have in common—the advancement of human welfare. Here, too, of course, sharp differences will appear, not only as to how best to make advances, but even as to what such welfare is. Let everything be argued out, but in the context of friends of Cuban freedom, independence, and social progress. As opponents of imperialist intervention against the New Cuba we must treasure the staunchest unity. There is, I think, a certain complacency in progressive circles where the great reality of the New Epoch has struck home, and where it is felt that the “forces of history” moving against imperialism assure its defeat. The reality of the New Epoch must produce not complacency but confidence; and basic to the forces of history are the men and women whose actions make that history. Of course, history is not simply made by disembodied wills; but just as certainly history does not result from the mechanical working out of forces separated from the people upon whom and through whom those forces exert and demonstrate themselves.

Today, because of the new relationship of forces in the world—which constitutes the New Epoch—such a genuine national and social revolution as that characterizing the New Cuba *can* occur and *can* succeed; but this is true only on the basis of enormous struggle. It was such struggle which made possible the success of the Revolution; it will be such struggle that will preserve the Revolution and permit it to unfold further so that both its preservation and its extension may be secured. For us in the United States who oppose colonialism, and oppose any moves towards intervention against Cuba—and it is on that elementary basis that unity needs building—the urgent task now is emphasizing points of agreement and consolidating our forces in the supreme effort to prevent the still very powerful U.S. imperialism from undoing Cuba’s liberation.

This theme of unity runs through the Communist analysis of *The Cuban Revolution* (New Century Publishers, N. Y.), made by Blas Roca, General Secretary of the Popular Socialist Party of

Cuba, in his Report to that party's Eighth Congress held in August, 1960. Early in his Report, Blas Roca said:

The motto of the imperialists, of the sellout governing class, of the reactionaries and exploiters of every kind is: *Divide and Rule*. In logical contradiction, the maxim of the revolutionaries, of the representatives of the workers, peasants, and the people generally, the maxim of the Marxist-Leninist, is: *Unite to Triumph* over the enemies of the nation, the people and the toiling masses. This maxim guided all our activity against the tyranny, and has guided and guides today all our activity in the course of the revolution, its triumph and its development (p. 31).

Roca reverted to this unity theme in the closing section of his Report where he developed the particular duties of the party itself:

The line of the party is to establish and reinforce cooperation and collaboration with all revolutionary forces and elements. . . . Every Communist, in his post, has to be the most vigorous enemy of sectarianism, for sectarianism is a hopeless obstacle to cooperation and coordination, it is an obstacle to unity, it destroys unity. . . . Sectarianism is division! (p. 125).

Here in the United States all progressives must conduct themselves in the spirit of this injunction from Blas Roca, for if anything can destroy the New Cuba it is only the might and the malevolence of U.S. monopoly capital exerting itself through the instrumentality of the U.S. government. To a degree, what that government does depends upon American public opinion; what it is, how well it is organized, and how effectively it expresses its desires. Friends of the New Cuba who are citizens of the United States will demonstrate the quality of their friendship for this New Cuba and the depths of their own patriotism by the contribution they make to restraining intervention—in any and all guises. That is the test of tests.

Friends of the New Cuba

Let us examine some of the most recent writings coming from

friends of the New Cuba. Among those that stand out is the work of C. Wright Mills.* Mills, a professor at Columbia University, one of the best-known sociologists of the United States, and the author of several earlier volumes having wide circulation and great influence throughout the world, again in his book on Cuba has demonstrated his originality, sense of timing, attractive style, and courage. These qualities, combined with the author's standing, have made it possible for Mills to break through with a devastating critique of U.S. imperialism and a passionate defense of the Cuban Revolution among literally hundreds of thousands of Americans. A condensation of his book, appearing in *Harper's* (December, 1960) reached scores of thousands, and the book itself has been bought now by about 400,000 people.

The form of the book, while no doubt helping to account for its great popular appeal, makes careful analysis of its content quite difficult, for it consists in its greater part of letters from a Cuban revolutionist to a "Yankee"; these letters are preceded and followed by brief "Notes to the Reader" from Mills himself. There is no doubt, of course, that the letters are authentic, in the sense that, as Mills assures us, they are verbatim reproductions of interviews he conducted. They reflect, however, Mills' own selection, both as to whom he interviewed and what, from his various interviews, he chose to reproduce as most reflective of what he thought were the true feelings of Cuban revolutionists and the essence of their movement. In this sense, what one must deal with is the substance as conveyed through this peculiar form, remembering that Mills himself does not hold with the substance in every case. Unfortunate, because simply quite untrue, is the remark in one of the letters that the Communists in Cuba "did not play any part at all in the making of our revolution" and that, indeed, they were rivals of Fidel Castro, "for over five years before we won"; the seriousness of this error is compounded, for in Mills' final "Note to the Reader" he himself says the revolution was made entirely by non-Communists "against Communist Party opposition" and he cites the altogether tendentious and distorted writings of Theodore Draper—which slander the Castro movement as well as the Cuban Communists—to support his opinion. Since somewhat similar—although less extreme—views are expressed by

* *Listen, Yankee!* (Ballantine, paper; McGraw-Hill, cloth).

several other writers whose work we shall notice shortly, we choose to examine this idea at a later point.

Serious as this error is, and reflective of the anti-Communist view which mars all of Mills' work to date,* it nevertheless does not negate the main content of Mills' book—an excoriation of U.S. imperialism and a ringing defense of the New Cuba. It may be noted, by the way, that Mills' attention to and condemnation of the realities of American imperialism represent a new development for him; perhaps the essential failing of his other books is that while all of them are highly critical of the American status quo, none came to grips with the fact of imperialism as decisively characterizing that status quo. In *Listen, Yankee*, Mills leaves no one in any doubt that it is the exploitative practice of American monopoly capitalism—that it is U.S. imperialism—which has enslaved Cuba hitherto. Nor does he leave any one in any doubt as to his own view that Cuban freedom and sovereignty could not begin to be complete unless the grip of those monopolies upon the Cuban economy and politics were eliminated.

These are big strides forward for Mills, but there are additional advances in this work. He announces himself as for the Cuban Revolution, and as recognizing that anti-Communism is counter-revolution. He states that parliamentary forms *may* be veils behind which any real freedom is murdered, as happened in pre-Castro Cuba; he insists that in the present revolutionary situation an election would offer counter-revolution the opportunity to institutionalize itself and legalize itself.

Mills always has insisted on the relevance of Marxism to today's world, though himself rejecting it; he repeats his insistence on Marxism's relevance and emphasizes this point. He adds that it is the ideas which are officially acceptable and intellectually respectable in the United States today which are the really irrelevant ones, so far as grasping reality is concerned. His book is strong on the essential quality of the support given the Cuban Revolutionary government by the Socialist states; without this support, he affirms, the depth of the Revolution and its accomplishment would not be possible.

Mills advances a long way through his Cuban experience towards comprehending the terrible difficulties the Soviet Union

* The present writer examined this body of work in his *The World of C. Wright Mills* (N. Y., 1960, Marzani & Munsell).

faced in building socialism in a war-devastated country surrounded by a hostile world and subjected to intervention and boycott. He does this both explicitly and even more clearly in an implicit fashion, when he observes that the difficulties of social transformation in Cuba are infinitely less now that one-third the world is socialist and powerful and ready to assist the Cuban people.

While Castro's Cuba has helped Mills crack through several limitations of his genuine radicalism, it did not succeed—so far as this particular book shows, at any rate—in overcoming Mills' blindness where the Negro people are concerned. In his other critiques of the American social order, the central failing of that order—the jim-crow system—went unnoticed. Similarly, in his book on Cuba, though the question of building Negro-white unity has been basic to Cuban revolutionary efforts, though the Castro government is dedicated to and has accomplished much in wiping out all discrimination, and though this plays an outstanding part in the attitude of the U.S. ruling class towards the New Cuba, the whole matter is simply omitted. As might be expected, this question is dealt with carefully and rather fully in Joseph North's *Cuba: Hope of a Hemisphere* (International Publishers, N. Y.) in a chapter, "The Negro in Cuba." North found that "in the new Cuba, the head of the air-force was a Negro; the head of the army, a Negro; the chief of the Oriente contingents of the armed forces, a Negro." And, as he shows, this question is not confined to top-level offices; on the contrary, the Cuban Revolution has set itself as one of its most urgent duties the utter extermination of all segregation and racism. This is really tremendous news for the Western Hemisphere in general and for the United States in particular; non-Communist friends of the Cuban Revolution, Mills included, have tended to ignore this at great cost to their full comprehension of the nature of the Revolution and of its challenge to U.S. imperialism.

As a final note on Mills' book, I would remark that it is a tribute to the American people that some 400,000 of them have found their way—through the venomous press, television and radio systems that systematically falsify—to Mills' book. This makes it a consequential social force in its own right; and for the United States today, it is a force overwhelmingly of a positive character.

Very much more limited in circulation, but more profound in analysis, is the work of Professor Paul A. Baran, of Stanford Uni-

versity. In his pamphlet, *Reflections on the Cuban Revolution* (Monthly Review Press, N. Y.), Baran, whose writings are illuminated by the Marxist component, emphasizes the decisive importance of the New Epoch and the new relationship of forces in the world for the nature and success of the Cuban effort. His estimate of the Cuban Communists falls short of the truth, but it is much nearer reality than that offered by Mills and at least denies that the Cuban Communists were foes of the Revolution. Also, while Mills seems to indicate that the Communists' role was diminishing as the Revolution was proceeding, this stark error does not appear in Baran. On the contrary, as Baran sees, the extension of the Revolution—necessary to its preservation—naturally tends to add weight to the role of the working class and the Communists.

But the main point with Baran, as with Mills, is that he has been inspired by the democratic release that the Revolution has meant for the Cuban masses; he is thrilled by the leaps they are making in education, health, culture, standard of living, dignity. He knows that without "the heroism, endurance, and toil of the Russian workers and peasants in the era of the Five Year Plans" these achievements in Cuba would not have been possible, and when it is required in most academic circles in our country to picture the U.S.S.R. as the great obstacle to human progress and freedom, it is important to have a Stanford professor clearly affirm that the truth is the opposite of this stereotype.

Above all, Baran urges the necessity of preventing another Spain or another Algeria in Cuba; such a development may unleash world war. Such a development certainly would throw back the Cuban Revolution many years, if it did not drown it in blood, and it would intensify reaction in our own country as surely as the Algerian war has in France.

An analysis not dissimilar from that of Mills and Baran has also come from Douglas R. Dowd, professor of economics at Cornell. This was published in one of the many new magazines and papers being issued on American campuses as part of the change now well advanced on those campuses; it is called *Controversy* and appears in the fourth number of that magazine (February 8).

Professor Dowd states his position in this way:

I do not believe that Castro and his supporters are angels, nor that their revolution is flawless, or without serious problems; nor do I believe that American actions and attitudes have been those of devils. But I do believe that American values, and American needs, taken in conjunction with the past and present Cuban situation, point to a position sharply opposed to the one we presently hold.

Professor Dowd then proceeds to substantiate this position by a historical and sociological analysis proving the domination of Cuba by U.S. monopoly interests, and showing the exploitative and aggressive character of those interests. He elucidates the abominable and tyrannical conditions established in Cuba under Batista with U.S. approval; he shows that the U.S. press remained other than hostile to Castro—generally speaking—until it became clear that the Revolution he was leading was not a palace one but a real one and that it aimed at the firm independence of Cuba which could not be established without eliminating the alien corporate ownership of Cuba's wealth and resources. The social and economic accomplishments of the Revolution are stated and the vital importance of aid from socialist countries noted. Very important is Professor Dowd's insistence that U.S. policy toward Cuba has hurt the American economy and the American people more than it has the Cuban.

He rejects the monstrous caricatures of a "Communist Cuba" that pass for truth in the U.S. newspapers and he adds, in a most significant paragraph:

Why should there not be Communists participating in Cuban public affairs, as there are in most countries of the world, including most countries of the NATO alliance? The cold war extends throughout the world, but not all countries have seen fit to follow the American example summed up in the term McCarthyism, annoying though such sentimentality must be to J. Edgar Hoover and Senator Dodd.

The writings of Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy on the Cuban Revolution have been very important. Their book, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, published soon after their visit there in March, 1960, established their strong sympathy for that Revolution. Significant areas of disagreement between their interpretation of the

event and the interpretation of Marxist-Leninists were analyzed very ably in the pages of *Political Affairs*, in October, 1960 by James S. Allen.

Since their March, 1960 visit, Huberman and Sweezy were able to visit Cuba again and they have reported on their new findings at some length in their *Monthly Review* for December, 1960. Here, in a footnote (p. 411) they reject the criticisms made by Allen and reiterate that the Cuba they first visited was a socialist society; that the Communist role was a distinctly minor one—if not a negative one—in that Revolution; that the advances made in the months from the Spring to the Winter of 1960 certainly had made Cuba a socialist society and that Communist persistence in denying this was “mere verbal gymnastics” attributable to the ulterior motivation that Communists must not “admit that it is possible for socialism to be built under non-Communist leadership.”

We would remark: In their own December, 1960 article, Huberman and Sweezy emphasize that inside Cuba “events moved with astonishing speed” since their last visit. They go on to state that on their first visit the “private sector of the economy” did in fact predominate, and that the question of planning was still being debated. They note that strong anti-Communist feelings were prevalent; that diplomatic relations had not been established with any of the Socialist countries, and that then “socialism was not even included among the ultimate goals of the Revolution.” They also add, in this December article, that the role and the weight of the urban working class in the Revolutionary movement have increased in the last few months as the revolutionary content deepened.

After saying all this they observe that their idea that the Cuba of March, 1960 was in fact a socialist society was held then to be a “novel idea”; I would suggest, on the basis of what Huberman and Sweezy themselves now say, as to what Cuba was at that time and the nature of the changes they have seen since, not that their idea was so much novel as that it was—as James S. Allen insisted—wrong. If this is not so, then their own testimony as to what existed in March, 1960 and in December, 1960 and what the weight of these changes amounted to, really does not make sense.

Furthermore, it is unworthy of Huberman and Sweezy to attribute differences in analysis between themselves and Communists to ulterior or invidious motives on the part of Communists.

Marxist-Leninists may have held and may still hold that one does not have a socialist society in Cuba for no other reason than that that is what they believe, just as, we suppose, Huberman and Sweezy felt and feel otherwise because that is how they evaluate the evidence for themselves.

Marxist-Leninists—and the most authoritative expression of opinion is that given by Blas Roca in the aforementioned book—see Cuba as a national-democratic country and see this achievement as the result of an anti-imperialist, national-liberating, agrarian, anti-feudal, democratic revolution. Such revolutions always have—and had in Cuba, from the beginning—the full support of Communists—in fact, the essential development of the present Revolution is an unfolding of the program of the Popular Socialist Party as enunciated for a generation. In the battle against the Batista tyranny, in the forging of popular unity in support of the July 26 movement, in direct participation in the guerrilla fighting, in rallying support for the guerrilla fighters among the populace, the Communists were in the forefront. And in doing all this, dozens of Communists paid the supreme sacrifice, yielding up their lives under torture rather than give information to the sadistic lackeys of American monopoly.*

Misestimates were made by Communists, of course, as by others, including those of the July 26th Movement; and these have been noted and analyzed. Thus, on the one hand there was an underestimation of the role of boldness, of the ripeness for dramatic and heroic *action*; on the other there was an underestimation of the requirements of forging real organized mass support and of the need to build such support by long and hard work if one was to accomplish a progressive and democratic revolution. But the chief forces of the Revolution—the July 26th Movement, the Popular Socialist Party, and the March 13 Directory—all played vital parts and there is glory for all and gratification for all in the great achievements of that Revolution. The Revolution was based on unity; its continued success requires that unity. Anything which undercuts it serves reaction.

As the Revolution advances, its social content deepens and less

* Documentation of this may be found in the North book and in the Roca volume. See also the articles in *Political Affairs*, April, 1952, October, 1954, December, 1958, February, 1959. It is distressing that where negative assertions are made concerning Communists—even by such writers as Mills, Huberman, Sweezy—no documentation is offered or, apparently, is felt to be needed.

weight will adhere to the private sector of the economy, both in the cities and in the country; with that, too, undoubtedly, the class content of the State will more and more move to that of the working class and peasant in full and unquestioned control. This, however, is a process and is still unfolding; meanwhile the multi-class nature of the Revolution is a fact and a fact important to the defense of the Revolution; meanwhile the mixed character of the basic economy is a fact and a fact important to the stability of the Revolution. Haste and adventurism can only do harm; indeed, in the face of the highly-organized counter-revolutionary movements now being mounted they can be disastrous.

Guevara himself noted that "the laws of Marxism are present in the events of the Cuban Revolution, independently of what its leaders profess or fully know of those laws from a theoretical point of view"; he went on to define "our national revolution" as "fundamentally agrarian, but with the enthusiastic participation of workers, people of the middle class, and today [early 1960] even with the support of industrialists." He, too, as every bona-fide Cuban Revolutionary leader, ended his analysis with the imperative need for unity, "For the old, the very old imperial maxim of 'divide and conquer' remains, today as yesterday, the basis of imperialist strategy" (*Studies on the Left*, Vol. 1, No. 3).

Again, let us here, where our work is so much less difficult, though, perhaps, not less important, heed the admonition of the magnificent Cuban revolutionaries and concentrate upon those elements that unite us rather than divide us. The crux of the matter was well put by Huberman and Sweezy in the closing sentences of their article in the *Monthly Review* for December:

We are for an end to colonialism, not only in Asia and Africa, but in Latin America, as well. And the success of the Cuban Revolution is the beginning of the end for imperialism in the Western hemisphere.

Only one force seriously jeopardizes the success of that Revolution, and that force is U.S. imperialism. We, here, in its home, must fight unitedly, clearly, and broadly against that force, in favor of our own national interests and, therefore, in behalf of the Cuban Revolution and the heroic Cuban masses.

March-April, 1961

XIX. TODAY'S JAPAN

The two A-bombs that annihilated Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945 were less announcements of the end of World War II than they were heralds of the beginnings of the Cold War. The Japanese suffered the staggering blows; the Soviets were supposed to take heed.

The surprising sweep and rapidity in 1945 of the Soviet Army's successes against the crack Japanese troops in north-east China made all the more important—from the viewpoint of U.S. ruling circles—the swiftest and most devastating possible termination of the war against Japan. That Asian industrial center was to be the exclusive prize of American prowess—no divided occupation there; as soon as possible a separate peace treaty between the United States and Japan was to be signed—something done nine years ago—and this was a unilateral act. If any of the war-time Allies didn't like it, let them complain, but they would have to endure it. To this day, a U.S.-dominated Japan has signed no peace treaty with the U.S.S.R.; but the U.S. Government manages to stimulate fearful *moral* indignation when the Soviet Union insists she plans to sign a peace treaty with the two German states—or with one of them, if the other refuses—more than sixteen years after its armies captured Berlin!

Astride Japan stands U.S. imperialism. Its cities are spotted with the concrete citadels labelled Bank of America and First National City Bank of New York; at street intersections dance the wild horses of the Standard Oil Company; in its industries were invested two hundred and fifty million dollars in 1955 and one billion dollars in 1960. From Japan came to U.S. corporations, in the form of profits and interest, almost \$340 millions from 1950 to 1960; 76 percent of Japan's coal, 70 percent of her oil,

67 per cent of her machinery—as of 1959—were imported from the United States at relatively high prices.

Tied, in a subordinate status, to the American colossus, stand Japanese monopolies, owned by three hundred families. Their wealth has grown fabulously in the past decade: corporation capital in Japan expanded (1950-1959) from 2,476,800 million yen to 20,560,500 million yen.* With this overall expansion has gone intensified concentration: as of 1959, just 214 corporations, constituting half of one-tenth percent (0.05 per cent) of all corporations, possessed over 48 percent of all corporate capital!

The economic picture is encouraging for American monopoly, but the political and military features of Japan are less than satisfactory. Two of the U.S. outposts in the Far East—South Korea and the Chiang gang—are owned body and soul, burdened to the eyes with fantastically huge armies, and sufficiently reactionary to please Senator Goldwater. But both together have a population of some thirty millions, neither is very rich in resources, each lacks industry, and the makeshift character of their governmental structures is plain. Without Japan—a nation of nearly one hundred million people, possessing greater industrial capacity than the rest of Asia put together—the offensive power of the United States in that part of the world is seriously crippled.

Eliminate militarized West Germany from the provocative bloc that is called NATO, and the main fulcrum of U.S. imperialism in Europe—and the heart of the war threat in that Continent—would disintegrate; such a main fulcrum in Asia requires a militarized Japan. For the past ten years a basic element of U.S. foreign policy has been to accomplish with Japan what has been accomplished with West Germany; “progress” has been made, but in Japan the U.S. timetable remains years behind that in West Germany.

Upsetting the timetable have been the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people. These are the people martyred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki; they remember the “glories” of the Tojo era when the “Asian Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere” brought loot to the rich and tears to the poor; they bear as a special sense of shame, knowledge of the unutterable suffering their military imperialism imposed upon China for fifteen years; and with all the “economic

* 360 yen equal one dollar.

miracles" and "prosperity" of the Cold-War years, most Japanese live in awful poverty despite grinding labor.

"Apathy" and Reality

Professor Saul K. Padover—having served one year as a Fulbright Professor at the University of Tokyo and currently lecturing in Japan—contributed an article, "Japan Puts Democracy to the Test," to the *New York Times Magazine* (August 20, 1961). Its accuracy approximates that of the Schlesinger-Draper *White Paper* issued soon after the collapse of the CIA—"freedom fighters" invasion of Cuba.

What difficulties U.S. policy is meeting in Japan are explained by Professor Padover as due to the political backwardness of the Japanese and to verbal ineptness. The first argument appears in Padover's assertions: "The fact is that the Japanese have simply not yet learned how to use the machinery of democracy without doing violence to its spirit"; and, "Among the common people . . . apathy is widespread." The second argument appears in Padover's discovery that there is a common error of "identifying democracy and capitalism," an error, we are told, that is maliciously stressed by Communists—who are, regrettably, neither quoted nor named. The omission is readily understandable, of course, since there is no Communist—neither in Japan nor anywhere else—who identifies capitalism with democracy, a fact so notorious that only an American professor can be oblivious of it.

That Padover urges "a disidentification between the political system of freedom and the economic system of private enterprise" is explicable in view of the fact—as even he discovered—that "Marxism is prevalent among Japanese students and intellectuals." The "system of private enterprise" is therefore in severe disrepute; to identify it with the current U.S. political system—which is called "the political system of freedom" by Padover—puts American liberal propagandists, like himself, at a severe disadvantage.

To illustrate the alleged "apathy" in Japan, Padover writes: "Anyone who has taught in Japan knows how difficult it is to get students to ask questions, to challenge, or to formulate provocative ideas." I suggest Padover confine himself to his own experiences and not assume that these are identical with "anyone's." I was not a Fulbright Professor in Japan, and indeed had some difficulty

getting into the country at all—and then had my visa restricted to fifteen days. But, after duties connected with being a delegate to the Seventh World Conference Against A and H Bombs, and For Total Disarmament,* I did have the pleasure of lecturing at four universities. Never have I met more numerous and more probing questions; for example:

Why does the peace movement lag in the United States? What is the relationship between armaments production and prosperity? Why is there no labor party in the United States? Can the Negro people achieve full equality without socialism? Do the American people understand the nature of Hydrogen and Thermo-nuclear bombs? What were the causes of the American Civil War? What role did the Negro people play in the American Revolution? Are there youth movements in the United States? What has Cuba meant to the American intelligentsia? What is your estimate of the Kennedy Administration? Has the Communist Party been outlawed? What do you think of the writing of Ralph Ellison? Of C. Wright Mills?

Further to bulwark his estimate that apathy characterizes the Japanese people, Professor Padover writes: "The Left lack the power (the Communists have only two members in the Diet) to do anything more effective than to promote rioting." Only the spelling is correct in that sentence.

Marxism in Japan

In the last elections, the Japanese Communist Party received 150,000 *more* votes than earlier, and now has six members in the Diet compared with three previously. The Left in Japan—by no means, of course, limited to the Communist Party—is immensely powerful. The tremendous mass demonstrations it organized kept President Eisenhower from the country, made it necessary for a helicopter to release Hagerty, forced withdrawal of U-2 planes from Japan, seriously delayed ratification of the U.S.-Japan "Security" Treaty for over a year, caused the resignation of the Kishi Government, and prevented the passage of a quasi-fascist Political Activities Control Bill.

* Hiroshima and Tokyo, August 6-14, 1961.

Almost the entire intelligentsia, almost the entire student body and almost the entire teaching profession of Japan are Marxist. In Japan there is no longer any serious debate about Socialism vs. Capitalism; debate revolves around how to get Socialism.

Basic to the thrilling advances of the Left in Japan in the last few years has been the enormous increase of prestige and strength by its Communist Party. That Party—whose ranks had been decimated in the pre-World War II days of underground resistance—suffered severe setbacks and crisis during the 1950's, and, in fact, was split for much of that decade. In 1958, however, at the Party's Seventh Congress, the split was ended, unity was restored, the Moscow Declaration won enthusiastic endorsement, a line seeking the establishment of a united, national democratic front—for peace, independence, democracy, improved living conditions—was adopted and the objective of turning the Party into a mass one was set.

This Party played an honorable role in the colossal mass struggles of the last few years—for example, it was the militant and prolonged demonstrations of over *four million people in the city of Tokyo* that forced the resignation of Kishi. Particularly with its leadership of all efforts at developing unity and its insistence upon a policy of achieving the full national sovereignty of Japan, the Party has leaped forward in influence. As a result, at its Eighth Congress (held in July, 1961), the Communist Party of Japan was able to announce that its membership had doubled between Congresses and now included over 100,000 people; the circulation of its monthly theoretical organ, its daily newspaper, and its Sunday paper also had doubled, reaching, respectively, 45,000, 115,000 and 255,000 copies.

Electorally, despite severe repressions and the notoriously corrupt character of political campaigns in Japan, the Party's advances in the past two years also have been very considerable. In the Diet, as we have noted, Party members advanced from three to six; Party members today hold office in twelve prefectural assemblies rather than ten, in 320 city councils rather than 230, and in 478 town councils rather than 412.

Among the new members a high percentage were industrial workers; this category now comprises 42 per cent of the Party's membership. A large number of women and an encouraging number of peasants were among the recruits also; furthermore, the

average age of Party membership was lowered since many of the newcomers were quite young people. The Democratic Youth League, warmly sympathetic to the Party, has had a sensational growth; it had only 1,500 members in 1958, but today it has over 50,000. It is a main force in the tremendous youth and student movements of Japan.

The Socialist Party of Japan is a powerful force and has particular influence in the trade-union movement. The nearest approximation to it in the non-Asian world would be the Socialist Party of Italy; that is to say, the Japanese Socialist Party is well to the Left of the Second International and consistently has rejected affiliation with the Communist-baiting, anti-class struggle, anti-Marxist orientation characteristic of Social-Democracy. As in Italy, the Right wing in the Japanese Socialist Party has split away and formed, quite recently, the Democratic Socialist Party, but in the recent elections this Party did very poorly. The results, indeed, were so poor that the new Party is already in crisis and elements in it are considering rejoining the Socialist Party.

There are about twenty million workers in Japan; of these about four million are members of the General Council of Trade Unions (SOHYO), about one million are in the Trade Union Congress (ZENRO), about one and a quarter million are members of unaffiliated national unions, and nearly two millions belong to so-called enterprise unions, approximating what we would call company unions. The trade unions are growing quickly; SOHYO gains 100,000 a year. Still, more than half the workers belong to no union; these are made up very largely of the millions of workers laboring in the small, family-operated home-factories, located in ten thousand back-alleys in every city in Japan. Here are produced most of the export commodities of Japan—toys, plastics, small electrical equipment, etc.—in a kind of industrial slavery; the work is mostly subcontracting, with the laborers living and eating with the boss, and getting perhaps twenty-five dollars or thirty per month for a fifty-hour (or more) week. This system, plus the permanent reserve of unemployed—they total about three millions—assures the abysmally low wage level of Japan. Manufacturing workers in Japan are paid less than those in the Philippines or in Algeria; they receive about the same amount as analogous workers in Mexico or Salvador. The productivity of the Japanese worker is higher than that of the French and equal to

that of the British, but his earnings come to one-third that in Britain and one-half that in France. On the other hand, the cost of living is not particularly low: margarine, eggs, sugar are actually cheaper in France than in Japan; electricity and cooking gas are lower in cost in England than in Japan.

The Socialist Party is dominant in SOHYO; the Democratic Socialist Party was largely responsible for forming the disrupting and class-collaborationist ZENRO. Both, however, are committed to Socialism as a goal, and certain of the unions in SOHYO are affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The 17th Convention of SOHYO was held early in August, 1961; it displayed some tendency to move to the Right, especially insofar as it pressed for an anti-fascist united front, excluding Communists. This, however, was not carried through, and the general line of SOHYO remains about one thousand degrees to the Left of the AFL-CIO. It affirms its commitment to Socialism, its reliance upon class struggle rather than class collaboration, its friendliness to the Soviet Union, its desire for the recognition of China and its seating in the UN, its demand for a policy of neutrality on the part of Japan. The clearest mark of its domination by the Socialist Party—in addition to the effort to create an anti-fascist front exclusive of Communists—is its single-minded concentration only upon Japanese monopoly to the exclusion of the decisive role played in Japanese economics and politics today by U.S. imperialism, a point especially stressed by the Communist Party.

In briefest outline, this is something of the economic, political and class realities of present-day Japan; it bears absolutely no resemblance at all to the picture presented by Professor Padover in the *New York Times*. That such articles are written by such authors and published in such vehicles helps explain why the American people are the least informed and the most misinformed people in the world today.

To summarize: the ten greatest facts about Japan are: (1) the martyrdom of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which makes opposition to nuclear war an absolutely national commitment of the fiercest kind; (2) the experience of great torment from war, quite apart from the unique experience of atomic bombing—for instance, 90 percent of Tokyo was destroyed by fire-bombing; (3) the sense of national shame because of the atrocities committed upon the Chinese people, and a national desire for friendship and goodwill

so far as the Chinese people are concerned; this desire is intensified because of the fact that China has been traditionally the main economic tie of Japan; (4) the persistence of widespread poverty both in the countryside and in the cities, with Japan's industry being among the most developed in the world, but her wage level being among the lowest in the world; (5) the tremendous prestige of Socialism and the ideological triumph of Marxism in Japan; (6) the high class consciousness of the working masses in Japan; (7) the great power of the Left in Japan and the remarkable growth of the Communist Party in the past three years; (8) the very high degree of concentration of finance and industry in Japan, with determined, though so far aborted, efforts to re-create a strong military fascist force in the country; (9) the very powerful anti-U.S. imperialism feeling in the country, directed in particular against the presence of 261 military bases in the country—usurping almost 12,000 acres of the crowded land—and the occupation of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands; (10) the existence of the strongest organized peace movement in any non-socialist country which, in particular, has thwarted the American government's policy of making of Japan what she has made of West Germany.

The Meaning of Hiroshima

A few words about the atomic bombings. Most Americans have no way of understanding this at all. Visit the Museum of the Atomic Bombing in Hiroshima, the hospital still devoted entirely to victims of the bombing of sixteen years ago, the wooden shacks that line the rivers of Hiroshima with their scores of inhabitants in various stages of disfigurement and torment. Look again upon the seven rivers of the city and remember that one August morning in 1945 their waters stopped flowing since tens of thousands of burning people had flung themselves therein, screaming with agony. This was a crematoria—a crematoria brought to the people, instead of the people to the crematoria; and here were burnt alive some 240,000 men, women, and children. After the holocaust thousands entered the city—not knowing exactly what had occurred—seeking for loved ones and these thousands likewise became infected with the poison of radioactivity. And this—unlike Hitler's crematoria—still goes on; here is a dispatch from Reuters:

Tokyo, January 31, 1961: An estimated 230,000 persons still suffer from radioactive diseases, ranging from burns and bleeding gums to leukemia and cancer, contracted as a result of the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than fifteen years ago, according to a report by the U.S. Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission.

From 1951 through 1958, in the city of Hiroshima, 7,693 people died from the effects of the atomic bombing of 1945.

Talk to survivors. Here is a father who miraculously escaped serious injury, but his two children suffer horribly, for the bones of each are so fragile that they break when the least pressure is brought upon them. "My children weep and weep and I can only cry with them." How shall an American bear to weep with him?

Visit the Museum. Here are concrete facings three, four, five miles from the bomb's explosion melted together; here are bottles, five, six miles from the explosion melted together; here are photos of acres and acres of buildings smashed to smithereens.

And all this accomplished by just one Bomb, and one bomb that was only a baby, like the cross-bow of the Middle Ages compared to a 155-gun of World War II. The latest models—the "improved" weapons—have fifty, five hundred, one thousand times the power of that primitive thing of 1945; and Free World Statesmen, New Frontiersmen, Churchmen—not to speak of Senators and Generals and other moral idiots—talk of employing these weapons first, of using them in quantity and in the name of FREEDOM! Disarmament Conferences should be held in Hiroshima; and survivors should sit in the front rows and listen to the Statesmen.

Americans know nothing of all this. In the beginning our occupation troops requisitioned all photographs and documents and banned all talk about what really happened. Now there is even a movement—inspired by Washington—to tear down the monument in Hiroshima erected to the Atomic Dead. What is required is national acceptance of the guilt of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; national action to support the thousands of victims; national initiative to develop the best possible research institutes dealing with radioactivity. Delegations of Americans—especially, I think, women—should go to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and see for themselves and talk to the victims. Let the YWCA, the Churches, the Ladies

Auxiliaries, the Veterans Organizations, the Unions send delegations, if only for sweet charity's sake, and help bind up wounds, help relieve awful suffering, help expiate the fearful national sin committed by the United States. What is needed, above all, is a movement in our country that will put an end forever to the nightmare of nuclear warfare, and will make real the pledge inside the tomb of the Hiroshima Dead: "Rest Peacefully; This Crime Shall Never Be Repeated."

Present Realities in Japan

The headlines and featured news stories in Japan during the first three weeks of August, 1961 will convey more precisely and vividly present realities in that nation. The first day of the month, the Associated Press from Washington released this one-line item: *"The State Department said today that Japan had turned down an informal request that American atomic-powered submarines be allowed to visit Japanese ports to give their crews shore leave."* This was a subject of lively discussion and much head-shaking in Japan for days thereafter; the head-shaking came from incredulity at the callousness, insensitivity and downright ignorance that such a request indicated.

The recurrent phenomenon of the suicide of an atomic-bomb victim attracted attention; in this case a 37-year-old man, who had been ill for 16 years, hanged himself in a cemetery near Hiroshima. In his pocket was a note suggesting that "my body be used in research on atomic diseases."

A 13-year-old lad was arrested in Tokyo after having travelled illegally all the way from Okinawa in order to see a ball game; the point was that Japanese living in Okinawa require a special pass from the U.S. authorities if they wish to visit other parts of Japan, and the youngster had no such document. The comments in the press about the occupation of the island where almost one million Japanese live—very much crowded together, since the U.S. military occupy 46 percent of the island—that this story evoked may be imagined.

Hundreds of farmers living near the sacred Fuji Mountain held protest rallies and demonstrations demanding that the land now reserved as a firing range for U.S. artillery forces be returned to their use. In August parades reached a high point; the farmers

had begun their activities in May, since which time, "they have been resorting to sit-down protests by setting up 'observation posts' within the firing range." Folks "sitting down" in Mississippi and Alabama and North Carolina may be particularly interested in this news.

The commanding officer of one of the U.S. Naval Bases in Japan—this one, with a complement of 6,000 men, is the Atsugi Naval Base, south of Tokyo—made headlines when he imposed a midnight curfew on his personnel and controls upon the sale of bottled whiskey. Captain Masterson said he "was fed up with the excessive public drunkenness, increasing venereal disease and barroom brawls involving sailors, marines and Japanese hoodlums." The Captain said he was moved to act when he learned that "we were selling more three-star brandy in a week than the whole base could possibly drink in a year"—the excess was going to the black market; moreover, "the nearby towns were breeding places for crime and prostitution." All this was simply reported straight and without comment, editorial or otherwise, in the Japanese press.

Early in the month a veritable insurrection started among the tens of thousands of slum-dwellers in the city of Osaka; thousands fought the police with sticks and clubs and stones for three days and nights. To see an Asian slum is to get a preview of Hell; mass outbreaks in them in Japan are not at all uncommon. A leading newspaper of the gentle ruling class decided that the police were not sufficiently stern and did not possess enough really modern equipment; in its words: "the conclusion is that local police should organize a more effective network and at the same time be equipped with modern gear."

Also reminding one of Professor Padover's discovery of popular apathy in Japan was the beginning of a strike by 320,000 textile workers, and these were members of the moderate, Right-wing ZENRO labor federation. They were demanding an increase of 3,500 yen per month (not quite ten dollars), over their current pay, which averaged about \$27 a month. After nine days, during which not a spindle turned in the struck plants throughout the country, the demand was granted and the strike concluded.

The growing tendency towards some kind of *rapprochement* with the Chinese People's Republic—which, despite Washington, is an almost irresistible trend for apan, even with a reactionary

government—was reflected in several news items.* Thus, a party of four leading journalists from China arrived in Tokyo early in August for a month's visit as the guests of several leading Japanese organizations of editors and reporters. At the same moment, there was announced in Tokyo the formation of The Association of Ex-Soldiers for Japan-China Friendship; several hundred former Japanese officers and enlisted men—meeting in the building of the Upper House of the National Diet and under the chairmanship of a former Lieutenant-General—pledged themselves "to promote friendship with all neighboring nations, Communist China in particular." It repudiated war and denounced all war preparations, and publicly affirmed a sense of repentance because "former militaristic Japan had inflicted serious injury upon China and its people."

Of tremendous importance for Japan, and the world, was the rejection by a High Court of the 12-year-old labor frame-up known as the Matsukawa Case. In August, 1948, a train of the National Railways was derailed near the town of Matsukawa with the loss of three lives. Twenty militant trade-unionists—of the railway workers and electrical workers unions—were arrested and charged with deliberate sabotage; thirteen of the twenty were Communists. At the time, the Party and the two unions previously mentioned were leading in very militant struggles against wholesale dismissals being conducted by the Yoshida government and the U.S. Occupation authorities.

The commercial press made a sensation of this Case, and the subsequent convictions of the defendants, in December, 1951—with five sentenced to death and the others to life or long-term imprisonment—were the basis for rather successful assaults upon the Party and the Left in general and upon the trade-union movement as a whole. An intense defense effort—with worldwide support—developed. In December, 1953, at the first appeal, three defendants were acquitted, but the convictions of the remaining 17 were upheld, and four were again sentenced to die. Appeals continued and reached the Supreme Court in 1959; in August of that year that Court ordered a retrial to be held before the local Higher Court. In August, 1961, that Higher Court brought in the verdict of NOT GUILTY for each and all of the defendants, thus con-

* See the article, "Japan Reaches Toward Red China," by Arthur P. Crockett, in the Catholic journal, *America*, April 15, 1961.

firming the charge by the Left that the employers and the Japanese Government and the U.S. authorities had been responsible for concocting the frameup in the first place.

The case developed the greatest kind of mass militancy and unity. A total of 750 attorneys were actively associated, at some point in the twelve years, with the defense; the presiding judge of the Higher Court received 550,000 letters in the two years since 1959, demanding justice for the workers. Leading figures of Japanese culture, such as the distinguished writers, Naoya Shiga, Saneatsu Mushakoji, and Kasuo Hirotsu, devoted great time and much labor to the case. As the case was being actively considered beginning this July, two columns of marchers from north and south began to approach the city of Sendai—where the Court sat. Twelve thousand people covered over a thousand kilometers in this march, and every town through which they passed had mass meetings and demonstrations. The verdict of NOT GUILTY was cheered for minutes at a time by tens of thousands gathered in the courtyard and town square. That night of August 8, thousands upon thousands of students and workers, with torches and banners and flags—and with songs, including the *Internationale*—took over downtown Tokyo, marching and dancing and stopping traffic; it was a sight never to be forgotten, a time for tears and laughter, for rejoicing and for rededication. This case was to Japan what the Sacco-Vanzetti and Mooney-Billings Cases were to us, put together; and here was real victory. The Government has since moved before the Supreme Court for another rehearing, and danger still exists; but the back of reaction has been broken in this case, almost certainly.

And then, out of the Soviet Union, four tremendous events stirred Japan from top to bottom. First, the thrilling Draft Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was announced and even the commercial press in Japan took a very sober view of that document. Typically, the *Asahi Shimbun*, one of the most influential daily papers, editorialized on August 2:

That living standards are rising slowly but surely, that the Soviet people are looking to the future with hope, that Mr. Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence has been confirmed and that the people are guided by a sense of duty—these facts must not be overlooked.

Next, came the stunning news of Major Titov and Vostok II. We were in Hiroshima that day, and in the evening at the commemoration ceremonies, before thousands of people, delegates to the Seventh World Conference Against A and H Bombs and For Total Disarmament were being introduced and were speaking briefly. As one of the Soviet delegates—a woman physician—stepped forward to bring greetings, cries went up from the ten thousand throats—"Vostok! Vostok!"—and there behind us and above us rode in the heavens the light of the space ship. The Hiroshima Memorial, the Soviet woman physician, the pledge of no more Hiroshimas, and the thousands of people of Hiroshima gathered together, and Vostok II in the heavens, heralding the Future and coming from the Land of the Future—it was almost too much, it was as though the Master Dramatist of all had fallen for the melodramatic. But that is the way it was, dear reader—even if the *New York Times* did not find this "fit to print."

Then came the visit of Deputy Premier Mikoyan of the U.S.S.R.—the first official of the Soviet Union ever to visit Japan—to open the first Soviet Trade Fair in Tokyo and to discuss increasing trade between his country and Japan. Hopefully, the commercial press, just prior to the visit, published sentences like this one from the *Japan Times*: "Information gathered by police authorities indicated that various Rightist organizations are planning to mobilize about 10,000 persons at Kaneda airport August 14 to demonstrate against Mikoyan's visit." Others published scarcely veiled suggestions as to what might happen to Mikoyan at this or that point along his route from the airport.

But thirty-four mass organizations—including the Socialist and the Communist Parties, together—formed a welcoming group. On the day of Mikoyan's arrival, airplanes dropped leaflets over the city, listing all the welcoming groups and hailing the Deputy Premier's visit, and I myself saw these picked up and read as soon as they alighted. All that could be assembled against his visit were 500 steel-helmeted and jack-booted professional gangsters of terrorist Right-wing groups; as a leading reactionary columnist, Kazushige Hirasawa, explained, "the ultranationalists lack the mass organization to mobilize." On the other hand several thousand people enthusiastically greeted Mikoyan at the airport and hailed him as he rode to the Soviet Embassy. Over twelve thousand Japanese jammed a huge gymnasium to pay their respects

to Mikoyan on the final night of his presence in Japan; the American press, with its conventional lunacy, described these thousands as "Reds," and did not feel it necessary to tell their readers that the Chairman of the evening was a former Prime Minister.

Efforts at Disruption

Several items in the press during August evidenced the developing efforts, no doubt traceable to the U.S. Embassy with its New Frontier Ambassador, to take the tack of diversion and splitting rather than that of frontal assault, in an effort to advance the cause of remilitarization of Japan.

One told of the formation of two Right-wing Teachers' organizations to counter the overwhelmingly dominant Japan Teachers' Union, affiliated to SOHYO and too far to the Left to satisfy either Ikeda's government or Washington. The creation about 18 months ago of the Right-wing splitoff from the Socialist Party—the Democratic Socialists—is also a reflection of the general splitting tactic. The nature of these "Socialists" is indicated in these two pieces of August news: when Eki Sone, the secretary general of the Party, learned of the Matsukawa acquittals he remarked that this "was only a matter of course" since naturally in Japan people would not be convicted "on suspicion only." But what moved him to further remarks in this case was that "lay criticism of this trial had been so rampant that the court had almost the semblance of a 'people's court.' This constitutes a serious threat to the democratic institutions of the nation." And later that month, this Party announced a draft platform; included was the advocacy of rearmament for Japan as "necessary to safeguard its security."

But the main disruptive efforts were directed against the Japanese Peace Council, leader of the enormous mass peace movement in the nation. And it is the activities of that Council which comprise the last item in the news of Japan during that August.

The Japan Peace Council

That Council—now seven years old—has affiliated to it *two thousand* local organizations in every city and town of Japan. The Socialist and Communist Parties, SOHYO, the leading women's,

youth, student organizations are all part of the Council. It conducts nationwide and year-round peace activities, centering around opposition to A and H bombs, to armament programs, to all sources and centers of war danger, to all aggressive military alliances and blocs, to military and naval bases in Japan. The highlight of its activities begins each June when marchers start out from all the extremities of Japan and head for a general convergence upon Tokyo early in August to be on hand for the holding of what has now become a yearly World Peace Conference.

In the year 1961, about *twenty-two million* Japanese people participated at one time or another—from mid-June to mid-August—in these nationwide marches. Thousands of people marched several days and weeks, and some real heroes actually marched for the entire period from June through July through the first two weeks of August. I, myself, had the great honor and experience of joining one of the fifteen columns of thousands of marchers converging on Tokyo in August, and stayed with them until we reached a park. Then we all together joined other columns in a vast stadium holding many thousands. Here, banners and flags streaming, we poured in like a veritable river of determination and passion, singing and glowing and knowing ourselves irresistible.

In this Japan Peace Council are several former Premiers, Foreign Ministers, present Members of the Diet, and dozens of the most distinguished teachers and intellectuals of Japan. The Chairman is Dean of the Law School of the University of Tokyo (and a recent Lenin Peace Prize winner).

This Peace Council is the greatest organization for peace in the non-Socialist world and the peace movement in Japan is the most potent single political force in Japan resisting the reactionary, military, aggressive role that the United States is seeking and has been seeking to impose upon this Asian land.

Naturally, then, great pressures are developing to split and weaken this movement. The pressures come from Right Socialists, from the Democratic Socialist Party, from ZENRO, and from the governments of Japan and the United States. These pressures manifested themselves in the organization of a so-called Second Japan Peace Council, with its first meeting date set for August 15, exactly the day after the meeting of the Japan Peace Council had been scheduled to close. Present at this meeting of the Second

Peace Council was the Prime Minister of Japan who is as much a man of peace and disarmament as is Adenauer of West Germany; others who were there were opportunists of various stripes notable, on the whole, for their lack of any history of participation in the struggle for peace.

The pressures showed themselves also within the Seventh World Peace Conference itself. Some of the Right-wing Socialists there—with encouragement from the Yugoslav delegation and one member of the Indian delegation—and with much publicity garnered for and by Dr. Earle Reynolds, an American living in Japan, tried to develop the maximum discord. This, in addition to normal difficulties that would appear among several thousand delegates, including over 100 from 27 foreign countries, having all sorts of political and religious and ideological differences.

The great fact is, however, that all disruptive efforts were beaten back and that all differences were overcome—through many, many hours of the freest kind of debate—and unanimity was reached (this included all members of all delegations, including the Yugoslav and the Indian, finally) on a Resolution and Declaration and Program which were deeply committed to the struggle for universal disarmament, for the immediate banning of atomic and nuclear weapons, and for the elimination of colonialism and all vestiges of imperialism.

Greetings came to the Conference from the heads of Government of China, Mongolia, Ghana, Guinea, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Iraq, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union. Messages of congratulations came from distinguished people throughout the world, including from our own country, Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt, Dr. Linus Pauling, Professor P. A. Sorokin, Professor William Ernest Hocking.

The Conference itself and the many mass meetings associated with it were drenched in high drama. One of the great moments was when the delegates from the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic publicly embraced and called for an end to German militarism. Probably the highlight of the days together was the moment of the appearance of the three delegates from Cuba; they arrived in the midst of one of the mass meetings of thousands and as they strode down the aisle and then as the delegates from the United States embraced these heroic Cubans, absolute pandemonium broke out.

Still, more than everything, was the Japanese mass; the seas of men and women and youth. Full of charm and courage and love; a great collective force; a will to live and to live peacefully and creatively; a crying out from millions of hearts; a grasping to shake hands, to express all these overwhelming feelings. I'm afraid all this is beyond my powers; I see I have only listed feelings and strung together words, but for this some great poet like Neruda, some master of words like Tolstoy is needed.

Conclusion

Most recently the Japanese government has made several announcements tying itself more explicitly than in the past to the policies of the United States. This has appeared in Japan's official "Blue Book" which affirmed an intention of aligning the country with the "Free World," rather than with any kind of Afro-Asian bloc; somewhat later the Foreign Minister, speaking before an Extraordinary Session of the Diet, assembled three days earlier, emphasized that the Government intended to act "in close concert with the United States and the nations of Western Europe."

Signs multiply that part of the "deal" necessary before the Ikeda government felt it could announce such a policy was a freer hand for Japanese capital in Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam. In addition to the general and intense interest of the U.S. government in bringing Japan as fully as possible within her sphere, a particular motivation of this immediate period appears in the increasingly critical state of "Free World" affairs in Laos and, especially, in South Vietnam. Certainly this was the meaning in the following sentence from an Associated Press dispatch dated Washington, September 8, 1961:

Now when the situation in East Asia is becoming aggravated over the questions of Laos and South Vietnam, an opinion is becoming prevalent in the Pentagon that Japan should be assessed more highly than before in view of her great industrial potential, political stability and high economic level.

American economic pressure upon Japan has been increasing; a recent illustration of this was the fact that Japanese negotiators in Washington, seeking less unfavorable terms for the textile trade,

were forced to sign an agreement that was very far from their desire. Meanwhile, the trade balance of Japan becomes more and more unhealthy; it is this condition, indeed, which was the main reason for the holding of an Extraordinary Session of the Diet, beginning September 25. There, the Finance Ministry submitted figures showing that while in 1960, in foreign exchange, there was an excess of seventy million dollars of payments over receipts, from January through August, 1961, the deficit already amounted to over eight hundred million dollars. Simultaneously, the influence of U.S. monopoly inside the Japanese economy continues to mount; in the last quarter of 1961, U.S. banks invested heavily in Japanese steel and oil corporations, notably the First National City Bank of New York, the Continental Illinois Bank, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and the Bank of America, while Standard Vacuum, Caltex, and Esso International put another fifty million dollars into Japanese oil firms.

In 1957, a Constitution Research Council was established by the Japanese government, charged with the duty of seeing whether and in what ways the National Constitution might need alteration. On September 20, 1961, this Council made a "preliminary report" couched in the form of questions, that suggested strengthening the status and role of the Emperor, abolishing Article 9—which renounces war as an instrument of national policy and severely limits the nature, numbers and powers of armed forces—curtailing the rights of the Diet as the supreme organ of the State, which it now is, and advocating the illegalization of the Communist Party.

Given the relationship of political forces in Japan, all this is put forth very tentatively, of course; still, it clearly indicates the road that Japanese monopolists and U.S. dominating monopolists would like to take.

Japan's economic imbalance is showing itself in a rapidly rising consumer-goods price index; according to the Government, this went up 1.1% in 1959, 3.7% in 1960, and 6% during the first seven months of 1961—a steadily increasing rate of rise, and a total increase already of almost 11% in about thirty months. This is important in explaining the mounting strikes throughout the country; late in 1961 nation wide strikes of railroad workers, coal-miners, truck-drivers, and teachers occurred. These economic protests are merging with more directly political ones, aimed in particular

against plans to alter the present Constitution in a reactionary direction (and demanding instead further democratization), against all moves towards further militarization, against aligning Japan with the NATO and SEATO blocs, for the elimination of U.S. bases from Japan.

A policy which insists on Japanese remilitarization, on making Japan (and especially Okinawa) a major nuclear-launching area, on restoring the Emperor system, on strengthening Japanese cartels (while seeking to keep them subordinate to U.S. trusts) and on crushing labor, socialist, Left, democratic and anti-war sentiments, organizations and programs—such a policy is one that has nothing in common with popular interests, either in the United States or in Japan. It can eventuate only, if not reversed, in renewed national catastrophe for Japan and—this time—for the United States, too.

September, 1961

XX. THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Homer Bigart, the outstanding reporter for the *New York Times*, in a dispatch from Saigon, April 15, 1962, noted as a sign "of deepening U.S. involvement in South Vietnam's campaign against the Communist guerrillas," the arrival in that city of "a Pentagon study group" headed by Karl E. Bendetsen, president of the Champion Paper Company of Hamilton, Ohio, and including Allen W. Dulles, former chief of the CIA. This was to spend all of three days in Saigon in an effort "to determine whether the approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to the South Vietnamese forces . . . really know why they are here and what they are doing."

It is extraordinary that such eminent people should feel it necessary to devote three whole days to such an enterprise; the uncanny capacity of Mr. Dulles to ascertain popular sentiment is certified at the Bay of Pigs, and to have that talent reinforced by the President of what one must assume is a most successful free enterprise corporation, guarantees the mission's success. No doubt, that these busy people gave all of 72 hours—minus 24 for sleeping—to their assignment reflects their conscientiousness.

The Bendetsen-Dulles group might have explained to the American soldiers that they were now treading where—a decade ago—French troops, with generous reinforcements from "former" Nazis, had fought—and lost. The group might have explained to the American soldiers that their predecessors in defending civilization

had been commanded by General Salan, who, losing in Southeast Asia, transferred his code of chivalric behavior to Algeria, and thereafter from a French prison continue his heroic slaughter of the innocents in dedicated service to the "Free World."

Of course, when the French were there, the *New York Times* occasionally let slip motives not quite so sublime. Thus, in its issue of February 12, 1950—part of the Lincoln Day celebration, no doubt—that newspaper observed:

Indo-China is a prize worth a large gamble. In the north are exportable tin, tungsten, zinc, manganese, coal, lumber, and rice, and in the south are rice, rubber, tea, pepper. . . .

One knows what this group hoped to find; that the (now) about fifteen thousand American men believed they were in Southeast Asia—exclusive of the thousands in South Korea—as welcomed co-defenders of freedom, battling hosts of alien interlopers bent on rapine and tyranny. These American marines, airmen, and soldiers are supporting the governments of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, Prime Minister of Thailand, President Ngo Dinh Diem of (parts of) South Vietnam, and General Phoumi Nosavan—Prime Minister Boun Oum of (parts of) Laos. Let us briefly examine each of these statesmen and their governments, in defense of which Americans put their lives on the line, and the Government of the United States pledges its resources and its "sacred honor."

Thailand and the Marshal

The present Prime Minister of Thailand reached his exalted position as the result of a military *coup d'état* in September, 1957. Prior to that moment, he had been the third figure in an American-approved triumvirate which since 1947 had held power—the Prime Minister, Phibun Songkhram, the police chief, Phao Sriyanon and tender Marshal Sarit Thanarat, commanding the army.

Phibun, the former Prime Minister, had been the pro-Axis dictator of Thailand during World War II and was jailed at its close as a war criminal. He was released in March, 1946; there was

some queasiness in the State Department in late 1946 and through 1947 as "the man who declared war on the Allies" was making a political comeback. Early in 1948, the military clique headed by Phibun ousted what was left of the post-war civilian government, and he formally became Prime Minister. In the words of Professor Frank C. Darling of the University of Colorado, who has made a most thorough study of this matter,* "the United States promptly recognized his government and eagerly sought the favor of a man it had previously abhorred."

United States money and influence backed the growth of a vast military machine in Thailand, including an army of 100,000 men by 1960. Starting in 1951, a U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group was stationed inside the country to train that army; and for most of the 1950's training and arms were supplied the Thai police force by the American-owned and imaginatively-named Sea Supply Corporation. In the ten years, 1951-1960, the United States had spent \$500,000,000 in Thailand, with almost the entire sum devoted directly to military matters.

American policy in Thailand, since World War II, states Professor Darling, "has strengthened the forces of absolutism." It has, in fact, "enabled the military leaders to dominate the political life of the nation." Specifically, "the predominant American influence since 1950 has contributed to the forces working for an absolute rule and the stifling of individual liberty." By 1952, this American-sponsored and financed military dictatorial triumvirate had destroyed entirely the power of the National Assembly and had undone the moderately democratic constitution achieved after such struggle back in 1932.

Meanwhile the personal fortunes of Phibun, Phao, and Sarit were waxing on the basis of corruption and profits from commandeered commercial enterprises; James Michener, writing in the *Reader's Digest*, (December, 1954), estimated that 12 percent of the Thai national income was funneled into the strong boxes of these three friends of the "Free World." Not only was the Assembly castrated; the press was utterly dominated and so-called anti-Communist laws that would have satisfied Robert Welch were passed. As a result a reign of terror spread; the jails were crowded, torture was common, and brutal murders of liberals,

* F. C. Darling, "American Policy in Thailand," in *Western Political Quarterly*, March, 1962.

radicals and Communists occurred. Finally, the local assemblies also were abolished.

Discontent grew, and factionalism split the triumvirate. In 1957, Field Marshal Sarit seized absolute, personal power, the two other members of the Big Three fled the country and the severest possible kind of military-fascistic dictatorship was fastened upon the eighteen million people of Thailand. The result—all in the name of anti-Communism, and all supported and financed by the United States Government—is summarized by Professor Darling in this manner:

He [Sarit] promptly banned all political parties, dissolved the half-elected, half-appointed legislature, and abolished the 1952 constitution. Sweeping arrests were made of newspaper editors, writers, labor leaders, Assembly representatives, businessmen, students, and teachers who were accused as Communists. Twelve newspapers were closed and meetings of more than five persons for political purposes were forbidden. Persons arrested since Sarit's assumption of power have been held without recourse to the civil courts, and the new regime has continued to rule the country under martial law.

Of course, mass protests and struggles continue; hence the persistence of the martial law. From time to time, Field Marshal Sarit resorts to personal execution and murder. Instances of this since 1958 have several times been reported in the *Bangkok Post* and the *New York Times*.

The American client state of Thailand—financed, advised, trained, maintained with American money and guns—today is, according to Professor Darling, “one of the most archaic and backward in the entire region” of Southeast Asia. “To a large extent,” adds Darling, “the government of Thailand has become similar to that in such countries as Iran, Jordan, Turkey, South Vietnam, Formosa, and South Korea”—all, all, bastions of freedom.

It was into this Thailand that about 5,000 American men were sent in May, 1962 when the American backed Nosavan army quit the front in Laos and fled across the Thai border. The five thousand Americans were sent in first and then Sarit was “asked” if it was “all right”; he said, yes, but please do not station your

men near any major Thai cities, because it would be better if not too many of the people here actually saw in the flesh their selfless defenders. Since then, the United States has asked other Powers to send token forces into Thailand; Prime Minister Macmillan towards the end of May found enough courage to inform Parliament that at the request of President Kennedy—not Premier Sarit, let it be noted—he had agreed to the sending of British planes to Sarit's bailiwick.

And it was not until June 4, that an Associated Press report from Saigon let the American people know that elements of the troops "protecting Thailand against Communist attack" had been "secretly training in South Vietnam for two weeks in combat training they might have to use"; this "training" for service in Thailand "involves joining Vietnamese units that clash almost daily" in the civil war ravaging *that* country. American troops in a country not at war, whose government had not requested their presence, whose presence was explained on the basis of an alleged threat coming from the Kingdom of Laos, sent secretly out of Thailand to fight in a civil war raging in a third country—South Vietnam! It would be most interesting to sit in on a session as Allen W. Dulles explains to American forces in Thailand not only the purpose and the morality, but also the legality of their presence; recordings of the "pep-talk" should be sent to the wives and mothers of these men, including, if possible, the questions they raised.

South Vietnam—Another "Free World" Pillar

One of the three nations dominated and submerged by the French in what they called Indo-China was that of Vietnam. Throughout the decades of French rule, the peoples of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam kept alive the spark of national reality and resistance. When the French yielded, in World War II, to the Japanese conquerors, again the three nations resisted; in Vietnam, in particular, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, a great war of national liberation appeared. With the surrender of the Japanese, and the return of the French and their expressed intent to regain and retain colonial domination, the Viet Minh rebellion against them began.

That rebellion against France and her puppet Bao Dai—"ruler" of Vietnam from the gaming tables at Monte Carlo—culminated in the defeat and surrender of the French armies in 1954. There, against the will and despite the absence of the United States, a peace was signed; the independence of Cambodia, acknowledged some months before, was confirmed, and the independence of Laos and Vietnam recognized. Neutralization was promised for both; Vietnam was divided, temporarily at the 17th parallel, into a Northern and a Southern republic, with agreement that a nationwide plebiscite for a unified government was to be held in 1956 under United Nations auspices and with an international supervisory team. This 1954 agreement was reached despite the fact that Vice President Nixon that year had stated: "It is impossible to lay down arms [in Vietnam] until victory is completely won."

Throughout the French effort at repression, the United States provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of France and then in a vain effort to bulwark the fatuous Bao Dai. Late in 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem, who had been Bao Dai's Prime Minister, became South Vietnam's President; this was done with American support, confirmed in the first year of Diem's presidency by the gift to him of \$300,000,000.

O. Edmund Clubb—for twenty years an officer in the U.S. foreign service in Asia, and for a time Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the U.S. State Department—has pointed out* that Diem at once moved to "autocratic one-man rule"; prisons were filled with political dissidents, totalling about 30,000, and the peasantry, the workers, and the intelligentsia became more and more alienated from the tyrant. In 1956, with U.S. backing, Diem's government reneged on the 1954 agreement calling for elections; since then, backed with billions of American dollars, and hundreds and then thousands of U.S. military "advisors," "trainers" and "assistants," Diem has maintained his rule.

"Our man," wrote Walter Lippmann, on May 10, 1961, having in mind Diem, "is extremely unpopular, being both reactionary and corrupt." General Thomas R. Phillips wrote more bluntly in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*: "Diem operates a police state, with secret police harassment, arbitrary arrest, police brutality, political prisons, and economic favoritism."

* O. E. Clubb, "Trap in Vietnam," in *The Progressive*, April, 1962.

There is unanimity on the unpopularity of the Diem regime: differences appear only in estimates as to how numerous are his bitter foes, some experts saying that 70 percent of the population detests him, and others writing that the correct figure is 90 percent.

The popular resistance that had overthrown the French domination, paused after the 1954 victory and waited for the consummation of the 1956 agreement. When that agreement was broken and when Diem resorted—with U.S. help—to the policy of terror and massive repression, the popular and organized and militant resistance reappeared. All possibilities of peaceful struggle having been eliminated and the Diem regime having turned to making war upon the populace, that populace made war upon Diem. By 1959 the popular struggle against the Diem tyranny enveloped the entire country and became and continues as full-scale civil war. In May, 1961, Walter Lippmann commented that while Diem still held major cities, he had “all but lost control of the countryside.” Today only Saigon is really Diem’s.

In an article entitled, “The War in Vietnam,” in *The New Republic* (March 12, 1962), an anonymous writer from Saigon—“he has for some years closely followed and written about the struggle in Vietnam,” say the *New Republic* editors, but to disclose his name while he is in Saigon would be “positively dangerous”—begins:

“After fighting with the French for eight years from 1946 to 1954, we got Diem Bien Phu,” said a Vietnamese to an American listener in Saigon recently; “and after eight years of being nursed and trained and led by the United States we’re finally encircled in Saigon.” This was said with a wry smile—unfortunately, it was no exaggeration.

No American may effectively plead ignorance as to the nature of the Diem government that the United States has bolstered and is bolstering today, at the cost of American lives. Chet Huntley, on his coast-to-coast TV program, November 27, 1961, gave visual evidence of the instruments of torture regularly employed by Diem’s police. Huynh Sanh Thong, himself from South Vietnam, and now teaching at Yale, wrote in *The Nation*, February 18, 1961, of how Diem “has antagonized the educated classes and especially the students.” This Diem, this ally of the United States, this

bulwark of American fortunes in Asia—"this greatest little man in Asia," as an admirer wrote in the *Reader's Digest*—"persecutes youngsters in high schools and universities:"

at the least signs of dissent, his secret police descend upon them, manhandle them, and herd them like cattle into 'political re-education camps.'

In South Vietnam there are today twelve such "universities," and their enrollment totals about 40,000; what a friend of education is this Diem!

Robert S. Browne, assistant program director of the U.S. foreign aid mission in South Vietnam from 1958 to 1961, in a letter to the *New York Times* (February 18, 1962), stated that the "rural populace" supported the rebels; that Diem's government is "corrupt" and that far from any "reforms" having been undertaken—as some American newspapers ballyhooed—"my Vietnamese friends write me that, if anything, the atmosphere is getting more oppressive than ever."

So foul is the regime that professors sent from Michigan State University, under contract to that regime to help organize its bureaucracy (including its police), and obviously cleared not only by that regime but of course by the State Department—they held *Smith-Mundt* Professorships at the University of Saigon!—became antagonistic and one actually was held for some weeks as a prisoner by Diem's government! One of them, safely back in Lansing, stated in an interview with a *New York Times* reporter (February 21, 1962) that the Diem regime "is a corrupt and despotic Government . . . it did not have the support of the Vietnamese people."

Jerry A. Rose, a free-lance writer based in Saigon, whose articles have appeared in *The New Leader*, *The Reporter* and the *New York Times* and who—as one would expect from an author with such respectable outlets—favors the U.S. effort to crush the popular forces in the Vietnam civil war, has written openly of the prolonged and systematic torture practiced by Diem's forces (as in the *New York Times Magazine*, April 8, 1962). He adds:

"The Viet Cong comes into the field to work with you," a peasant says. "Or if there is no work to be done, he'll even

wash the rice bowls for you. The Viet Cong live like us, look like us, live in our homes. How can we inform on them?"

On the other hand, from another peasant along the nation's coastal strip: "For three years we've gotten poorer and poorer. The children don't have enough to eat. What can we do?" Rose added:

One might wonder what has happened to the two billion dollars of American aid given to South Vietnam. Scant portions of it have filtered down directly to the peasant; moreover, there have been inefficiency and corruption. Most of it has been put into maintaining the military machine.

In the field the leaders of the national liberation movement had in 1961 perhaps as many as 20,000 fighters; Diem's army numbered about 170,000, plus about 80,000 civil guards. In May, 1961—after the Cuban-invasion fiasco—Vice President Johnson visited Saigon; Diem and Johnson issued a joint communique, agreeing "to extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid." Especially, it was stressed, the armed forces would have to be strengthened. Three months later, an expert, Dr. Eugene Staley of Stanford, visited Saigon, and upon his return he urged that President Kennedy increase Diem's army to 200,000 men and put 100,000 men in the civil guard, with reorganization of that guard along more frankly military lines. To accomplish this, Dr. Staley recommended that the U.S. appropriate \$400,000,000 a year for Diem's use. General Taylor's visit in October, 1961, was for the purpose of implementing the Johnson-Diem communique and the Staley Recommendation.

Nothing of all this was referred to the United Nations; no treaty was submitted to Congress; no one asked the American people what they thought of these communiques and recommendations and implementations. In February, 1962, General Harkins was given command of the U.S. military mission to Saigon; soon thereafter Defense Secretary McNamara announced U.S. full-scale commitment to Diem's victory, and Attorney General Kennedy stated that we were at war and that "our" prestige was involved and

that "we" would fight until victory. Then troops poured in; now—as of June, 1962—about 6,500 military men from the U.S. are in South Vietnam, more are going, the Seventh Fleet is fully committed, and the highest authorities and the most influential publications—the *Wall Street Journal*, *U.S. News & World Report*, the *New York Times*—as at one command, speak of the prospects for a long-drawn-out war, lasting perhaps ten years.

On New Year's Day in 1962, the American people read in a dispatch from Hong Kong, filed by Robert Trumbull of the *New York Times*, that four "new" techniques were to be pressed in the South Vietnam war: (1) chemicals were to be sprayed from airplanes which had the effect of defoliating all vegetation; this would hasten starvation and make concealment difficult; (2) U.S. Army war dogs were being imported in large numbers; these dogs had been especially trained to hunt down and attack men; (3) there was to be intensive development of a plan "to regroup large numbers of the vulnerable rural population" into concentration camps; families were to be brought, forcibly, into barbed wire enclosures, after their homes and possessions had been put to the torch, the better to be guarded and "protected"; (4) there was to be "a greater role for American officers in South Vietnam."

Through 1962 all these four "Free World" efforts have been implemented. The United States government, quite illegally and altogether bypassing any effort to ascertain American public opinion—let alone world public opinion—has embarked upon this frightful and barbarous effort to repress the heroic struggles of a long-suffering people eager for liberation and a decent life. The U.S. is today doing in South Vietnam what the "butcher Weyler" did in Cuba in the 1890's at the behest of the Spanish monarchy; what Americans did in the Philippines from 1899 to 1903; what the Germans did in the Ukraine in the 1940's; what the French did in Indo-China in the 1950's and in Algeria later in the 1950's and until only yesterday. In every case, the harvest was immense suffering and unforgettable bitterness; it brought glory to none and travail to all. Persistence in the present murderous U.S. policy in South Vietnam will have the same harvest for our Government and our people.

The evidence is overwhelming that what one has in South Vietnam, in the words of O. Edmund Clubb, is a major "political and social revolution," whose main features are its "deep, indigenous,

popular roots." This is why, as Peter Paret and John W. Shy, of Princeton's Center of International Studies, state in their book, *Guerrillas in the 1960's*, that the widespread idea that the United States, and its client states can turn the tables on the popular guerrilla fighters by resorting to the same techniques is altogether false. It is false, as Paret and Shy remark, because the essence of successful guerrilla fighting is mass support; without this, it has no prospect of serious impact, let alone success. Similarly, anti-popular counter-guerrilla warfare, fought guerrilla style, is impossible of success, for the style must mirror the content; as the authors note, "only one side fights from an extensive and well-organized popular base, and in most places, that is not our side."

When the *New York Times* stated editorially (April 17, 1962) that "the root cause" of the "troubles in South Vietnam" lie in the "North's campaign of subversion and aggression" it is stating the opposite of the truth. The "troubles" in South Vietnam stem from that regime's refusal to abide by the 1954 agreement, especially that clause of it calling for a popular referendum; the "troubles" reflect a genuine popular explosion inside South Vietnam, against the American-financed Diem regime, whose character is everywhere admitted to be ultra-reactionary, sadistic, and tyrannical. The 1954 agreement especially barred, in any case, intervention into the affairs of Vietnam, as a whole, by any foreign power; and in South Vietnam there has been and there is only one non-Vietnamese power, and that is the United States.

The very course and conduct of the war shows its indigenous character. That is, the main battle-fronts have been in the southern areas of South Vietnam—in a radius about 100 miles around its capital, Saigon, which is at the Southern end of the nation, many scores of miles from the North Vietnam border; and the arms of the popular forces—as all the dispatches in the *Times* have admitted—were French and American and crude self-made weapons, exactly what would be expected from a popularly-based effort. This is why, in the name of "anti-communism," Diem is arresting thousands of people of all social classes and of extremely varied political orientations; this is why Diem's trains may run between major cities only during the daytime—and increasingly are stopped in broad daylight now; this is why Diem's regime is locked up in Saigon, afraid of its own airforce, its own "Ministers," its own shadow.

The Laotian Story

Diem in South Vietnam is rapidly approaching the point already reached by the Boun Oum-Nosavan Right-wing "government" in Laos; that is Boun Oum-Nosavan now have no supporters left, and their Army—the best-paid in Asia, with 100 percent of its funds coming from the United States—simply refuses to fight for them any longer.

The filthy story may be summarized by quoting from the Seventh Report of the Committee on Government Operations, published by the Government Printing Office in Washington, June, 1959. It is entitled *U.S. Operations in Laos*; here are its findings (pp. 7, 13):

Since Laos became independent [in 1954], the United States has supported the total Laotian economy. In round numbers, defense support assistance to Laos ran to \$41 million in 1957 and \$30 million in 1958. The bulk of this was for the support of the 25,000-man army with a military budget that averaged about \$31 million a year. . . . In summary, the aid program in Laos has been directed primarily to the support of the army. Benefits from commodity imports incidental to this effort were limited to relatively few Laotians. . . . There have been only two major projects, involving insignificant amounts of money, calculated to bring about basic improvement in Laos. One of these, a police project, was motivated primarily by the same desire for 'political stability' that sparked the support of the army. The other was directed to the rehabilitation of the roads of the country; it was characterized by corruption, maladministration and poor performance.

Increasingly the country simply fell away from the Right-wing, American-backed gang; as the weeks passed it "governed" less and less of the country and fewer and fewer of the people. In Laos and among Laotians it had really no significance; its only importance came from the fact that it was the U.S.-backed instrument for the maintenance of a pre-World War II status quo that

really was done for and that no power on earth—not even the United States—could long sustain.

Willy-nilly that fact was admitted by President Kennedy when he met with Premier Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961; there the two men agreed that Laos needed an independent, neutralist government. The three leading personalities—Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the national resistance forces, the Pathet Lao movement, Prince Souvanna Phouma, leader of a neutralist, Centrist force, and Prince Boun Oum, of the Right group, agreed that the fighting was to cease, that a neutralist and independent Laos was to be established and that a Government consisting of all three groups—four of the Left, four of the Right, and eleven of the Center—was to be formed, with the Ministries of Defense (Army) and of the Interior (police) to be held by the Center.

Ever since then—as sources like the *New York Times* finally have admitted—the Right has refused to abide by these terms and the creation of a stable, neutral and independent Laos has been delayed. The refusal has been made possible by the behavior of the U.S. government; while cutting off \$3 millions of its subsidy from Boun Oum, it has continued to supply many more millions, and the reduction seems to have been made up by funds coming from the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA and the Pentagon have pursued policies contrary to those announced by the President and the State Department; this may reflect a kind of “French” development, mixed with top-level uncertainty, at best, or it may reflect full governmental complicity in reneging on its own agreements. In any case, it is a most sinister development and what is perhaps worse, a stupid course for it has no chance of success.*

It does express the kind of struggle now going on in top circles of the United States. At the moment the weight seems to have moved to the side pledging American presence in Southeast Asia, as Attorney General Kennedy said, “until we win”; Homer Bigart

* After this chapter was in type, evidence appeared showing that recognition of the hopelessness of the Right cause in Laos seems to have moved the Kennedy Administration to serious effort to implement the Vienna Agreement. The first indication of a top-level intention in this direction came with the speech of Senator Mansfield, the Senate Democratic Leader, delivered on June 10, calling for a thorough re-examination of the entire U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, including the nature of SEATO. On June 11, from Laos was announced agreement among the three Laotian groups for the formation of a neutralist, independent Laos. Cabinet seats were to be distributed in the 11-4-4 ratio and the Army and Police were to be held by the Center; furthermore, Prince Boun Oum, of the Right, was to retire. This is an important victory for the peace forces of the world: those forces must be alerted in seeing to it that the agreement, in form and spirit, is fulfilled.

reported (February 25, 1962) that this meant "the struggle will go on at least ten years." *The New Republic* editors (March 12, 1962) also reported widespread talk in Washington of a "ten-year war"; it added that the U.S. Pacific Naval Commander, Admiral Harry D. Felt, and "some in the State Department" wanted the United States to attack North Vietnam. Harry Gemmill, writing from Washington in the *Wall Street Journal*, March 26, 1962, reported that the official estimates were that the war in Southeast Asia would take many years, that it might well "escalate" into something bigger than Korea, and that the U.S. "ought not" to be restrained from spreading the war into North Vietnam and even into China if "necessary" to "win."

At almost the same moment, on March 25, 1962, the leading English-language paper in Japan, the *Mainichi*, published an article by Mr. E. Hoberecht, Vice-President of the United Press-International (UPI) News Service and its General Manager for Asia, holding that opinion was growing in "Free Asia" and among some Americans that only "getting at the heart of the matter" would resolve the crisis in that part of the world, and Hoberecht made it clear that by the heart of the matter, he—and they—meant China: "Counter attacks by troops in Laos and Vietnam into Red territory, while the South Koreans moved forward and the Nationalists landed at several points would give the Chinese Communists a difficult multiple front to defend. . . . No American troops need get involved."

Hoberecht's article came after an extended tour of "Free Asian" capitals; the newspaper reported that the views he expressed had the support of many anti-Communist leaders in Asia, and of certain U.S. Ambassadors and Intelligence officers.

This is clearly the road to ultimate catastrophe—to World War III. Increasingly, in Right journals, overt propaganda for this appears. Thus, in the extremely influential and very widely-read *U.S. News and World Report*, June 11, 1962, the text of an interview with Father Matt Menger, a Catholic Missionary stationed in Laos and briefly visiting the U.S., is published. This magazine's military expert—Major General M. S. Johnson (U.S.A.-Ret.)—earlier (May 28, 1962)—had urged that the "Reds be driven out of Laos" and suggested that this could be done by simultaneous drives from several directions—and countries—and that it "might take six to eight U.S. divisions," that is, about 80,000 to 100,000 American

soldiers, plus, of course, "allies." Father Menger was asked if he thought U.S. troops might be needed to "clean up" Laos. Yes, he thought they might. The interview continues:

What happens if North Vietnam comes in? In that case the Seventh Fleet could handle Hanoi very easily.

What happens if the Red Chinese come in? Our Air Force could take care of Peiping and Shanghai.

What happens if Russia comes in? Well, the United States Army will take care of Russia.

This kind of madness is going on in top ecclesiastical, journalistic, business, diplomatic, and military circles, and important sections of the American people are being poisoned with such propaganda. The "dirty war" in Indo-China poisoned areas of French political, intellectual and moral life; the poison prepared the way for the bestiality in Algeria. Algerian repression helped destroy the French Fourth Republic; it still threatens decency and democracy inside France. Similar conduct can have the same effect—is having the same effect—upon the United States; and the ruling class here may find its Algeria washed by the Caribbean instead of the Mediterranean.

Of course, given French power, the madness of a French government need not induce world-wide catastrophe; but given American power, madness unchained will not allow the world a second chance.

To Call a Halt

Of decisive importance, in the past year or two, has been the appearance of a bona-fide peace movement in the United States. Three or four years ago it was the aspiration of some; today it exists. It has now enrolled tens of thousands of people in every area of the United States; it is already an important political force; it is growing. Its main strength lies among young people and women; it has, however, increased its influence in the Negro people's movement and in trade-union circles.

Significant expressions of the peace drive appear more and more frequently not only in *The Nation* and *Monthly Review* but in *The Progressive*, the *Christian Century*, the *Commonweal*, and in "Letters to the Editors" printed in dozens of newspapers and magazines throughout the country.

Recent books, as that edited by James Roosevelt, *The Liberal Papers*, and those written by William O. Douglas (*Democracy's Manifesto*), H. Stuart Hughes, of Harvard (*An Approach to Peace*), James J. Wadsworth, (*The Price of Peace*), Amitai Etzioni, of Columbia (*The Hard Way to Peace*), as the essays collected and edited by John C. Bennett (*Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience*)—and I'm citing only works that have appeared since March, 1962—all express sharpest criticism of dominant foreign policy in the United States and make practical suggestions for salutary change.

Organizations and activities—picket lines, demonstrations, petitions, sit-ins, proclamations, delegations—have proliferated and are now truly national. One gets some idea of the great breadth and scope of this effort from examining the very helpful special issue on Peace, published (Spring, 1962) by *New University Thought*.

One of the great needs in all these efforts and directions and groups is some sense of coordination and some feeling of concentration. The fight for peace must be flexible, broad, and specific, with the particular targets shifting as history proceeds. At this moment, the decisive danger spot is Southeast Asia, and it is there that, as Attorney General Kennedy has stated, "a real war" is in progress—a war that is basically American-started, American-financed, American-armed. A model for a successful kind of struggle was the advertisement in the *New York Times* of April 11, 1962, signed by sixteen professors, scientists, lawyers, and ministers, entitled: "An Open Letter to President Kennedy" and directed "against U.S. military intervention in South Vietnam." Here the scholars and scientists summarized the facts, quoted Senator John F. Kennedy, back in 1954, as to the atrocious and hopeless character of France's colonial war in Indo-China, and demonstrated that the present course of the United States in Southeast Asia meant risking a large-scale conflict and perhaps World War. It concluded with an appeal that the United States withdraw its armed forces from South Vietnam, and permit the full implementation of the 1954 Agreements for that entire region; on the basis of such imple-

mentation, peace will return to Southeast Asia, and governments dedicated to neutrality, independence and political, social and economic progress will function there.

On February 25, 1962, the *Washington Post* said: "The real crisis in South Vietnam is not far away in Southeast Asia; it is a crisis of American conscience and will." It urged:

We must ask ourselves if the United States is ready for the great-power burdens which Great Britain carried for so long. We must try to discover if there exists here in this affluent society the patience and fortitude to endure trial and trouble in some part of the world, as our regular lot, year in and year out. . . .

We must take up our great-power burdens and fight our proxy wars with an awareness that the pursuit of these military purposes endangers not only our forces in the field but our institutions and beliefs at home.

I think this analysis and vista exercise potent influences on the present Administration; it has been made explicit by Senator Fulbright, and it has the ring of the "realism" and *hochpolitik* so attractive to A. M. Schlesinger, Jr. It is a fatal course, whatever verbal assurances are offered. The time of Pax Britannica is gone forever; it was a time, in any case, of perpetual "little" wars in Europe, mass murders in the Mid-East, Asia, Africa and Latin America, and of fierce poverty and suffering at home in England. It exploded in the holocaust of 1914, and it was smashed to smithereens in the great revolution of 1917. Attempts to put Humpty Dumpty together again failed; they succeeded only in bringing fascism to most of Europe and Asia and war to the world.

The effort to fashion a Pax Americana—which has been at the heart of American foreign policy since the end of World War II and has been the source of the Cold War and is the root of the danger of a new, and final, World War—has brought the United States from the heights at which she stood—diplomatically, economically, morally—at the end of World War II, to her present position of being without a friend and with only very dubious "allies," of having a foreign policy tied to such cadavers as Franco,

Salazar, Chiang Stroessner, Boun Oum, Sarit, and Diem, of steep relative decline economically and the sharpest actual economic instability, and at its nadir morally. Succinctly, this has been the national cost of the Cold War.

The American people must understand what were the "burdens" of British imperialism; they must understand what an analogous course has meant and will mean for our country in the twentieth century. The greatness of the United States lies in the path of liberation, of human freedom, of economic well-being, of moral purification. That is the road of true national interest. At this moment in history, this means, specifically and precisely, U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and American commitment to support there a policy of genuine neutrality, independence and democratic government.

July, 1962

PART THREE

Other Views: The Truth Remains

XXI. ORCHIDS AND BLOOD

One of the first acts of the new Bolshevik government was to publish the secret documents captured in the Tsar's Foreign Office relevant to the origins of the First World War. Bourgeois historians still are reeling from that blow.

The two volumes under review* similarly consist of secret documents uncovered by those terrible and implacable Bolsheviks. This time it is Hitler's Foreign Office manuscripts and the personal papers of von Dirksen, German Ambassador to Moscow, Tokyo and London, which, having been captured by the Red Army, are offered to the public. These, confined to the years 1936 to 1939, illuminate the origins of the Second World War.

The story they unfold is one of almost incredible treachery and double-dealing; and the nearly unbelievable character of the drama they depict is enhanced by the sanctimonious phraseology with which the most despicable chicanery is decorated.

Quotations alone can do this justice. Late in 1937 the British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, looks Hitler in the eye and intones: "The great services the Fuehrer had rendered in the rebuilding of Germany were fully and completely recognized." The British Ambassador in Berlin assures Hitler in 1938 that His Majesty's Government feels Nazi Germany should share in the governing of Africa since this could only "further the general welfare." Churchill, in the summer of 1938, tells Albert Foerster, Gauleiter of Danzig, that while anti-Jewish legislation was "irritating," still: "It was probably not an absolute obstacle to a working agreement because the reasons for it were understandable."

Chamberlain while burying—temporarily!—Czechoslovakia at Munich feels it necessary to remark that "he had no doubt the Fuehrer would see that order was retained" and that those who objected to the country's immolation "would not be persecuted"!

* *Documents Relating to the Eve of the Second World War* (International Publishers, N. Y., 1949, 2 vols.).

And Lord Halifax tells von Dirksen "it would be the finest moment of his life if the Fuehrer were to drive along the Mall side by side with the King during a visit of state to London."

A month before the invasion of Poland, Lord Kemsley, owner of three London newspapers, informs the same von Dirksen that he has found Alfred Rosenberg, director of the Foreign Office of the Nazi Party, a "charming personality," while Goebbels was "a clever and broadly educated man." Meanwhile, such "broadly educated" Englishmen as the historian and professor, Sir Raymond Beazley, and Sir Arnold Wilson, editor of the influential magazine, *Nineteenth Century and After*, were making pro-Nazi speeches "which were inspired by us," says von Dirksen.

But the climax in this satanic exercise of virtuous phraseology comes with the Nazi Ambassador to Paris, Count von Welczek, reporting to his Foreign Office in December, 1936, offers of rapprochement from Premier Blum. "I learn," writes the Count, "from unimpeachable sources that Blum and (Foreign Minister) Delbos are being very strongly attacked on account of their overtures to us by the radical Lefts who take their instructions from the Soviets . . . it is in our interest to keep these two intelligent and honest men at the helm of state." The friend of these "intelligent and honest men"—both "Socialists"—and one of Jewish descent—ends his letter: "Heil Hitler!"

Running through everything was the conspiracy against the land of socialism, that "barbaric creation, the Soviet Union," in Hitler's choice language. This savage state, he stormed, "should not have been allowed into Europe" and so he proposed—it sounds marvelously contemporaneous—"a union of Europe without Russia." The Polish, English, French rulers all understood that here was the problem; again in Hitler's words: "The only catastrophe was Bolshevism. Everything else could be settled."

"To the east, to the east" was the refrain in the chancellories of the rich. Read these volumes and see from the pens of the conspirators themselves the basic impelling motive of bourgeois foreign policy during the era of Hitler. Having done this, one will grasp with fresh understanding what an inestimable service to all humanity the Soviet Union rendered by its brilliant diplomacy and irresistible strength in the struggle against fascism.

March, 1949

XXII. KAROLYI'S MEMOIRS ..

Among the perhaps dozen books published since World War II which really illuminate the modern history of Europe must be placed this work* from the pen of the late Michael Karolyi. Karolyi was born into the top rung of the families of magnates which, together with the Roman Catholic Church, ruled Hungary for a thousand years up to 1945. After World War I, he broke with his class (as did his remarkable wife, also of the great land-owners), became the first President of the Republic of Hungary, was betrayed by his class brethren, and in the counter-revolutionary Terror that, with the active help of the Allies, overthrew the Bela Kun Communist-Socialist government, was forced into exile.

In exile, Karolyi remained, as a Left-wing Socialist, until Hungary's liberation by the Red Army in 1944-45. Thereafter he returned to the New Hungary, as an honored guest, and from 1947 to 1949 served as Ambassador to France. Convinced, by personal knowledge, of the innocence of Rajk, he tried to prevail upon the Rakosi government to re-examine the evidence by which the Communist leader had been convicted of treason and sentenced to die. After failing to halt what he knew to be a fearful injustice, Karolyi announced his resignation and chose to leave Hungary, returning once again to exile. As an exile, he died early in 1956.

In his second exile, however, Karolyi did not permit himself to become an enemy of Socialism nor did he ever lose the essential

* *Memoirs of Michael Karolyi: Faith Without Illusion* (E. P. Dutton & Co., N. Y., 1957).

perspective of today's world: monopoly capitalism, imperialism, as the fundamental source of reactionary strength and of the danger of war; and the world of Socialism, despite all aberrations, as the basic force making for colonial liberation, social progress and peace.

Eighty percent of the volume deals with the period up to the 1945 liberation, and it is in its presentation of the realities of Old Hungary and the politics of Old Europe that the work makes its greatest contribution.

Here, from the inside, one gets unforgettable pictures of the extraordinary chauvinism of Old Hungary; of the rabid anti-Semitism of the ruling groups and its deep infection of Hungarian life; of the rigid caste system that marked all levels of Old Hungary's life; of the extremes of intense impoverishment for the masses and fantastic luxury for the magnates; of the basic tie between the Catholic hierarchy and the ultra-reactionary ruling cliques. The colossal concentration of land-ownership (extraordinary even for Eastern Europe); the permanent unemployment of the "three million beggars"; the intimate connection between reaction at home and a pro-German (later pro-Nazi) orientation in foreign policy—these and other fundamental attributes of Hungarian history and development, without understanding which one cannot, of course, comprehend post-1945 Hungarian history, are presented in the most convincing manner, and in expert writing.

The aristocratic boy asking his governess if nobility dies, too; the hunting parties where the noblemen are provided stags for their afternoon's pleasure and peasant girls, summarily apprehended, for their evening's diversions; the college student whose monthly allowance exceeds the Prime Minister's salary; the captain going off to the wars, with his Persian carpets, twelve special uniforms, and his private cook; the beating of servants as a matter of course; the purchase of seats in the Parliament (for all the world like the House of Commons in the days of George III)—these are unforgettable etchings, that bring to the reader more about the actuality of pre-1945 Hungary than a dozen tomes.

Here, from the inside, is the old ruling class; degenerate, treacherous, powerful and ruthless. Here, from the inside, is the picture of the Allies' betrayal of democracy; their starvation of the Hungarian masses; their deliberate foisting of a fascist terror upon Hungary in the name of defending democracy and fighting for

freedom. Here, from the inside, is the bestiality of the Horthy White Terror.

Workers and peasants were hurled alive into burning furnaces, a proceeding jokingly called "using them as fuel." Innocent Jews were dragged out of a train and hung on trees. . . . Wives of Communists were raped by officers and then turned over to the ranks. The editor of the Socialist paper, Somogyi, and his associate, Basco, were one day found murdered in the waters of the Danube. Although well known, the murderers were not arrested.

Meanwhile, of course, the rest of the capitalist world was adjusting to these splendid conditions; a British Admiral reports to his Government that "there is nothing in the nature of a terror in Hungary" and that his fellow Admiral—Horthy—is "a man of Liberal tendencies and his Government a Christian Government in a Christian country." And with Herbert Hoover in charge of "relief": "The choice for the needy population was submission to the ruling clique or starvation," writes Karolyi.

The physical annihilation of the Left thereupon proceeds for a full generation, and the official Social-Democratic Party of Hungary, led by Peidl, Peyer, Garami, and Anna Kethly, comes to terms with the Regent. Indeed, as Karolyi writes: "It was the Social Democrats who were the only safeguard of private property." This collaboration continues into and through the years of World War II, when Horthy is fighting side-by-side with Hitler.

Karolyi's book is generous in its praise of the miracles accomplished after World War II in revolutionizing the Hungarian social order and in rebuilding a country which suffered greater physical damage than did any country in Europe. He pays tribute particularly to the leadership of the Communist Party in the heroic years from 1945 to 1949. His leaving at that time is an incident in the developing estrangement between the Party and the people, particularly as the Cold War is intensified. Since Karolyi then left Hungary, his memoirs do not deal with the years from 1950 to 1955, but they are of great consequence in making that exceedingly difficult era comprehensible.

The work does contain some errors, most of them apparently the fault of the American publishers. Thus, the National Associa-

tion for the Advancement of Colored People is rendered as the Union for the Rights of the Colored People, and the American Civil Liberties Union is referred to as the American Civil Liberty Union. Other misstatements of greater consequence in terms of the reader also occur; notable is the confusing of the Premiership of Ferenc Nagy, right after the war, with the name of Imre Nagy.

In a second edition such slips can be remedied. The book itself is of prime importance for anyone seeking a comprehension of post-World War II Europe in general, and of Hungary in particular.

April, 1957

XXIII. KENNAN, SISSON AND GRAND STRATEGY

George F. Kennan's *Russia Leaves the War: Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920* (Princeton University Press, 1956) has been reviewed very extensively; outstanding, I thought, were the remarks by William A. Williams in *The Nation*, Sept. 15, 1956. No reviewer, however, to my knowledge, made reference to Mr. Kennan's fascinating re-telling of the story of the Sisson forgeries, which, as he writes, "added an unnecessary burden of suspicion" to early U.S.-Soviet relations.

Mr. Kennan reminds us that soon after the February, 1917 revolution in Russia, Mr. Edgar Sisson, formerly an editor of the *Chicago Tribune* and of *Collier's*, was placed in charge, within George Creel's Committee on Public Information, of a Russian department, so to speak. Shortly before the Bolshevik Revolution, Sisson went abroad in his official position; by the time he arrived in Europe his problem had become that Revolution and how best to handle it, particularly as war-weariness grew and the Bolsheviks insisted on speaking of the need for peace.

What could more effectively answer Mr. Sisson's problem than proof that the whole Bolshevik movement was one vast German-inspired plot and that the leaders of that movement were in fact agents of the Kaiser? Nothing would be more effective; hence, thanks to a generous supply of dollars, the "proof" was shortly forthcoming in the shape of impressive-looking official documents stating in so many words that the Bolshevik leaders were really German spies.

The British Intelligence Service seems to have been too sophisticated to try to palm these things off as genuine. But the United States Government, through the Committee on Public Information,

published the Sisson documents in September, 1918. What this meant was that the Government itself vouched for their authenticity and to doubt it made one at once a Communist or a sympathizer of the Kaiser—really interchangeable categories anyway. Though there was near-unanimity among organs of public opinion here, there did remain the opposition of the Left, some rumors that the British had doubted the documents, and, finally, an expression of doubt as to their genuineness from the *New York Evening Post*.

The U.S. Government moved to quash the doubts. Through Creel's Committee the National Board of Historical Research was asked to select two outstanding scholars who would be given the documents and would be asked to render an independent and scientific verdict as to their authenticity. The Board selected Professor J. Franklin Jameson, editor of the *American Historical Review* and Director of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution, and Professor Samuel Harper, an expert in the Russian language and in Russian history at the University of Chicago.

In one week these gentlemen were ready with their verdict on the documents: "We have no hesitation in declaring that we see no reason to doubt their genuineness and authenticity." Professor Harper, in his memoirs, published years later, confessed that "the academic man, when called upon to use his academic talents for a war purpose, often faces a problem of duty in two directions and finds difficulty in properly protecting himself." Mr. Kennan tells us that Professor Harper said more than this in the manuscript of his memoirs, but that these passages were excised prior to publication. In these censored passages Harper pointed out that his expertness on Russian affairs made the pressures upon him to come up with a "proper" verdict all the greater since the Bolsheviks in Russia were demanding peace, and since this demand was gaining so warm a response from the people of the world. Hence, he found "it was impossible for a University man not to make a contribution to the development of the war spirit, even if this involved the making of statements of a distinctly biased character."

To the last, Professor Harper could bring himself no further than to speak of his "distinctly biased" finding. Actually, as Mr. Kennan writes: "These documents were unquestionably forgeries from beginning to end." The monstrous crime, of course, was

not the forgery, nor yet the scholar's bulwarking of forgery; the monstrous crime lay in the intent of the rulers who bought and publicized a forgery, knowing they were purchasing lies, and knowing they were purchasing those lies in order to help vindicate the carrying on of a fearful slaughter for profit and power.

* * *

Certain significant revelations appear, also, in the rather unlikely place of one of the volumes in the official British *History of the Second World War*. This volume, entitled *Grand Strategy* (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London), deals with the period from September, 1939 to June, 1941, and is written by J. R. M. Butler, Emeritus Professor of History at Cambridge University, who is also the overall editor of the series.

A prefatory note states that the authors of this series were "given full access to official documents"; how selective they were and what portions thereof they chose not to publish are matters concerning which I know nothing. Yet certain new things do appear and certain additional emphasis is offered to some facts already established.

Among other items, the book reiterates that the supplies Germany received from the U.S.S.R. from 1939 until Hitler's attack in June, 1941 were negligible, and that particularly the export of oil from the Soviet Union to Germany was practically nil. It was, therefore, understood by the highest British circles that "hopes of acquiring the Caucasian oilfields undoubtedly reinforced Hitler's other motives for invading the country"; this at the same time as the anti-Soviet propaganda in Britain and the United States was saying exactly the opposite.

Hints and more than hints are offered in this volume of the mutual agreements, especially between France and Germany, during the "phoney war" period of 1939 and 1940, whereby neither country would seriously war upon the other, and, above all, would refrain from bombing industrial concentrations. At the same time, a good deal of additional material is offered concerning the real efforts by Britain and France to intervene fully in the Soviet-Finnish war, despite the fact that such intervention would undo the neutrality of Sweden and precipitate general war with the USSR. Meanwhile, Hitler's plans to use Finland (and Rumania) as the

main northern (and southern) anchors for the clearly impending attack upon the Soviet Union were also more than suspected by the Anglo-French allies.

By March, 1940, this volume shows, highest authorities in France and Great Britain were preparing plans for attacks upon the Soviet Union to be launched by submarines entering the Black Sea and by aircraft bombing the Baku oilfields. Meanwhile, certainly by July, 1940, Hitler had firmly committed himself to war upon the Soviet Union and had instructed his advisers to draw up the necessary plans.

Quite new, in this book, are the revelations that the British Chiefs of Staff, in June, 1941, had completed arrangements "to enable heavy and medium bombers to operate from Mosul against the Baku oil refineries without delay." These arrangements were completed despite the fact that by that time the British knew that the Germans were fully mobilized for their own assault and that its launching was a matter of days if not hours. The experts on both sides, as this volume reiterates, were sure that the knocking out of the Soviet Union would take from 3 to perhaps 10 or 12 weeks; it almost seems as if there was, for a short time in June, 1941, a race to see which of the contestants could get in the first blows and so have first claims to dividing up the booty within the impotent land of socialism.

Similar plans, perhaps backed by analogous illusions, are clearly in the offing today. It is likely that their shattering will be less catastrophic to a thoroughly aroused mankind that has set its heart and mind upon the avoidance of world war.

June, 1957

XXIV. THE GAME OF WAR-MAKING

War is as old as recorded history; so, too, is the struggle against war. Most people, everywhere, have abhorred war; the literature of the world treats it as the ultimate calamity.

What a paradox! That which is detested as a catastrophe and opposed by myriads nevertheless persists, is engaged in by hundreds of millions and costs the lives of tens of millions!

Was the fervor of the hatred less intense in the past? Were the leaders of the movement against war less devoted, less intelligent, less courageous in the past? To each question there is only a negative answer.

No wonder, then, that many people, knowing all this, and seeing once again the armaments race, the international hostility, the mutual recriminations, the actual resort to weapons of destruction from time to time, come to the conclusion that wars, like death and the weather, shall always be with us. Such people, good and brave as they are, by capitulating to despair, or cynicism, by giving way to acquiescence, by yielding to passivity, feed the war monster's appetite, and help unleash it. Such people, good and brave as they are, are also wrong.

They are wrong because war, unlike death and the weather, is not a natural phenomenon. On the contrary, it is man-made; it is planned, launched, fought, and stopped by men. War is socially produced and state-conducted—"the continuation of politics by other means." It is, therefore, like all social action, like all state conduct, like all politics, subject to and dependent upon human intercession and action and will.

"All history is the history of class struggle"; hitherto, in most of the world, an infinitesimal and exploitative minority has held power and it has had the will, with the power, to make war for

the purpose of maintaining or adding to that power. The vast majority of mankind have had the will to eliminate war, but they have not had the power to do so.

Our era is contrasted with all that preceded, because the consciousness of humanity has been infinitely enhanced. This power is greater than any other. It is greater than the energy resources that the new era, not by coincidence, has released. Mankind stands at the edge of full political sovereignty, complete economic emancipation, and ultimate conquest of energy; all three appear simultaneously because they are related causally.

Therefore, it is our generation that can accomplish that which all preceding generations failed to accomplish—this generation has the capacity to eliminate warfare. That capacity comes with the capacity to annihilate mankind; each of these potentials results from identical historical processes of development. Given each capacity it is the supreme duty of every thinking human being, in every country in the world, to take heart, to muster his energy, to refuse to yield, and to dedicate himself to the achievement of a fullness of human existence as has not yet remotely appeared anywhere.

* * *

As the popular pressures for peace mount, and as actual disarmament talks therefore proceed, an ideological campaign goes forward in our country insisting upon the inevitability of war, the absurdity of "vague dreams" of peace, and the need for a more "realistic" diplomacy based upon these postulates.

We propose to examine some of the recent works which, in one way or another, pay homage to the god of war.

Among these is a book by Alfred Vagts, son-in-law of the late Charles A. Beard. Dr. Vagts produced his *Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations* (Kings Crown Press, N. Y.) for the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Vagts, who in his earlier work had tended to stress the dangers of militarism, in this volume makes the military leader his hero. His basic point is the need, as he sees it, of recognizing the unity of diplomacy and of military strategy, which means, in fact, the acceptance of war's inevitability and the gearing of the Departments of State and Defense for preparing

the ground most favorably and then achieving "success" when the showdown comes.

To Vagts it is the passage, in 1947, of the National Security Act—which institutionalized the Cold War and an aggressive foreign policy for our country—which registered "the fundamental requirements of the post-war diplomatic-military situation—the complete and constant unity of policy, and coordination or integration of means and measures in preparation for total war and in the conduct of the 'cold war.'" While Vagts admits that for over a hundred years "the military had been the embodiment and occasional spokesmen of extreme nationalism," now, because of the identity of realistic diplomacy and sound military strategy, the military have "set the civilians . . . and electorates straight." "Liberalism and Labor" were tardy or faulty in understanding modern reality—especially the need for a rearmed Germany tied to the West; it was the soldiers who have created foreign policy consonant with the American position as inheritor of the duties of Great Britain, as savior of the Free World, and as nemesis of the Enemy—the U.S.S.R.; and all this despite the "blindness" of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Just as the soldier has been the guardian of an effective diplomacy, in Dr. Vagts' view, so in Professor Samuel P. Huntington's book, *The Soldier and the State* (Harvard University Press) he appears as the preserver of the State, itself, despite the pettifogging interferences of civilian liberalism. Mr. Huntington does nothing less than attempt to overturn the entire American premise of the need and desirability of civilian control over the military; and he does this in as basic a way as possible: "the disciplined order of West Point has more to offer than the garish individualism of Main Street."

Professors Masland and Radway of Dartmouth approach the phenomenon of the military with equal sympathy but from another angle. Their work, *Soldiers and Scholars* (Princeton University Press), studies military education and national policy having in mind the fact, as they write, that "the traditional distinction between military and civilian affairs in American life has become less significant."

In this volume is told the story of the enormous expansion of directly military schools and colleges in the United States, as well as something of the penetration of the military—as students and

teachers—within the nominally civilian institutions of higher learning in our country. One finds that in numbers and in money and in influence, the militarization of the higher educational system of the United States is well advanced.

Not atypical of the curriculum of the higher service schools is that of the Command and Staff School of the Air Command, unit 7, phase 2 of which is listed, with refreshing candor and chilling overtones, as follows:

The Enemy (3 weeks). This unit is concerned with the political, economic, social, and military structures and operations of the Soviet Union, its European satellites, and communist China.

The authors, while generally very sympathetic to their subject, lament the strong tendencies towards conservatism and conformity which characterize all aspects of military education. They remark that such tendencies "are operative in higher education generally," but that they—and especially conformity which stifles "bold, independent, and imaginative thinking"—actually threaten national security because of their marked presence in military educational circles.

More significantly, the authors report that in 1955 the Board of Consultants of the National War College "expressed the hope that the college would 'lessen the stress' on the bi-polar nature of the world and upon the sense of the inevitability of conflict"; but, writing as they are in November, 1956 (the date of their preface), they still find that the military institutions "overemphasize this conflict with the Soviet Union." The "dominant theme" throughout "is the Soviet threat" and the authors are forced to conclude "that the colleges do not give sufficient study to international organization and to the peaceful resolution of international conflict." Again, in their conformity and conservatism and acceptance of THE ENEMY and the alleged inevitability of war, the authors find that the military schools do not "concern themselves sufficiently with an understanding of the ideals and practices underlying American society" and particularly with "the basic nature and characteristics of American democracy."

This is something of the actuality behind the education and the policy of the "soldiers" that Messrs. Vagts and Huntington argue

have been handling requirements of the "state" and of "diplomacy" so brilliantly.

Kissinger's Ideas

In dominant organs of opinion, the chief altercation pivots not on the question of war or peace, but rather on what kind of war—global or regional, unlimited or limited. In both the United States and Great Britain, Army leaders tend to favor the concept of limited war, Air Force leaders that of unlimited, and Naval personages to waver from one to the other view. A lesser difference, among the advocates of the limited war concept, is that one school favors the immediate use of nuclear weapons while another believes that such usage guarantees unlimited war, in time, and that limited wars with conventional (that is, non-nuclear) weapons should be the orientation.

The writings of Henry A. Kissinger have been most influential in developing the varied points of view and in arguing for the orientation of policy towards limited nuclear warfare. Mr. Kissinger holds several very responsible positions: he is Director of Special Studies, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund; Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania; Director, Harvard International Seminar. The most significant of his recent essays have appeared in the *Yale Review* (March, 1955), *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1957), and *The Reporter* (June 13, 1957). Now appears a full-length volume, undertaken for the Council on Foreign Relations, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1957).

From these sources let us attempt, first, to summarize some of the essential views put forth by Mr. Kissinger, as far as I understand them. His great theme is the proper use of military power by the United States, in the age of thermonuclear weapons. What he seeks is "an adequate strategic doctrine" at a time when technological advance has produced the fact "that victory in an all-out war has lost its traditional meaning."

The problem is to achieve "the ability to use force with discrimination and to establish political goals in which the question of national survival is not involved in every issue." Since total military victory is now meaningless—i.e., now means the annihilation of humanity—this forces a revolution in military science. Hence

now the goal of war "should be the attainment of certain specific political conditions which are fully understood by the opponent."

This means assurance that the full potential of destruction is not used, by us or by the enemy; this requires "the immunity of the enemy's (strategic) retaliatory forces." Hence, in a rather striking analogy, Kissinger sees his doctrine leading to this:

... in a period of the most advanced technology battles will approach the stylized contests of the feudal period which were as much of a test of will as a trial in strength.

Kissinger concludes:

Limited war and the diplomacy appropriate to it provide a means of escape from the sterility of the quest for absolute peace which paralyzes by the vagueness of its hopes, and of the search for absolute victory which paralyzes by the vastness of its consequences.

He draws certain tactical conclusions that are interesting: there should be one over-all Service for War, with the three current Service divisions remaining as administrative and training units; he wants two Forces only—a Strategic and a Tactical. Kissinger tends to decry civilian control and to deny the capacity of Congress to control the military with any fitness. This, together with his emphasis upon centralization and diluting of division of powers and diminution of civilian authority, certainly adds up to a picture which at least poses the threat* of tyrannical militarized bureaucracy. But this question seems to be outside Mr. Kissinger's ken; he focuses so upon his problem of renovating military (and diplomatic) strategy that he tends to examine these in the abstract, without their intimate connection to the economic, political, constitutional, social and psychological structures of our country.

Ignoring this whole complex of problems, however, and dealing with the Kissinger theses on their own grounds, we offer the following considerations.

* It is worth noting that Vagts closes his volume, discussed earlier, by saying that the United States must see "the preservation of freedom as something no longer possible except by the timely generation and readying of power through the organized unity of foreign and military policy."

That "the search for absolute victory paralyzes by the vastness of its consequences" is true. That Kissinger insists upon this is healthy so long as the Chief of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs of the Air and Naval Arms do not think this way, but rather insist on planning for global, total, nuclear war.

But the quest for absolute peace does not paralyze me by the vagueness of its hopes. The quest for peace (and why modify it?) invigorates me and not me alone, which is why it has more adherents and more passionate adherents—far from paralyzed—than any other movement in the history of mankind. I find its hopes clear and plain; and quite the opposite of vague. I find its hopes to be—peace. Is this something that Mr. Kissinger finds ambiguous or vague or obscure? If so, would it not have helped make his own argument persuasive if he had explained why?

Further, I find Mr. Kissinger's projected plan of limited nuclear warfare exceedingly vague and extremely unpleasant though not the ultimate horror of the extinction of life. Is this the only alternative—that several millions shall be killed in a local, limited nuclear war, or that billions should be slaughtered? Further, in terms of vagueness: Mr. Kissinger projects limited war, rather than unlimited, it is true. *But he projects limited war to recur for an unlimited period of time.*

And Mr. Kissinger, himself, frankly admits that even with his proposals being followed there is absolutely no certainty at all that the nuclear war once begun will remain limited. In the first place, at least two powers, certainly, will be in the war and we will have our hands full limiting our own military, let alone the military of the antagonist upon whom our influence will be at best quite indirect. In the second place, Mr. Kissinger's own plan carries with it the probability of the expansion of a limited war to one encompassing greater and greater areas, until, it is hoped, the enemy is convinced that he has more to lose than to gain from a continuance of the struggle. But whether the enemy will be "reasonable"; whether the expansion of the limited war will reach the point of no return, Mr. Kissinger surely does not know.

Mr. Kissinger says it is more rational to lay out the limits of war prior to its beginning, rather than after it has started. Perhaps. But what assurance is there that the line laid out before the

war will be the line followed when the bombs start falling, the bugles start blowing, and the war-time propaganda starts going full blast? In what war have the promises and the announced plans, preceding the shooting, been the results and the conclusions of the fighting?

From a strictly military point of view, Mr. Kissinger's program is filled with extremely dubious propositions. Some of these have been examined most persuasively by James E. King, Jr., in *The New Republic*, July 15, 1957. Mr. Kissinger assumes the employment of a strictly limited number of personnel in his limited nuclear war, but Mr. King demonstrates that the numbers of conventionally armed and nuclear-armed troops will reach into the millions. This throws askew many of the logistical assumptions of Mr. Kissinger, including especially his idea that cities will not be significant military targets in a limited nuclear war. That, in turn, makes even Mr. Kissinger's "limited" war, right from the start, one that would almost certainly see millions slaughtered and whole nations devastated—and this if his plan holds up and the war remains really "limited."

While Mr. Kissinger raises many problems concerning the enforcement of any disarmament proposal—and generally tends to dismiss this as useless—he is singularly unimaginative in conceiving of difficulties in conducting the limited war he projects. His plan requires that: (1) the antagonists list bases for strategic air forces; (2) that if such bases are 50 miles from the combat zone, and if the antagonists admit inspectors within them, they not be bombed; (3) that all cities 30 miles from the combat zone be immune from attack if they contain no military installation and if within them inspectors are permitted; (4) "dirty" bombs not be used. Any reader examining this will be able to pose numerous and very difficult problems of enforcement, not one whit less numerous or difficult than will face the world trying not to wage limited nuclear wars, but rather to carry out disarmament proposals.

Mr. Kissinger tends to divorce his thesis from the political realities of the world today. Imperialism, class struggle, socialism, the actual nature of the revolutionary national liberation movements in the world—these elude him. They make his proposals less persuasive than they already are, from the purely technical or military viewpoint.

At one point, Mr. Kissinger remarks: "We have had difficulty

in defining our purposes in relation to the revolutionary forces loose in the world." And at another he sees the United States, at present, as a "status quo" power. But these remarks do little more than show the author's inability to even come to grips with the political nature of the world. In his *Yale Review* article, previously mentioned, Mr. Kissinger writes as follows:

Thus, our strategy should have two goals: *in the short run, to prevent a further expansion of the Soviet sphere; in the long term to reduce the Soviet bloc to an extent from which it cannot win an aggressive, conventional war while it will be deterred from a nuclear war by American technological superiority.*

Given this strategy, which is nothing but a combination of Truman's containment and Eisenhower's liberation, it is logical that Kissinger in this article concluded:

And yet nothing will avail, not even undoubted improvement in the flexibility of our diplomacy, unless we increase our military strength . . . [it is] imperative to increase our army, our air defense, our tactical nuclear capacity, and our military expenditures, for the simple reason that no diplomacy is stronger than the power behind it.

No, I fear that this strategy, and this armaments policy is the heart of the Cold War; and I fear that such goals and policies give little assurance that a limited nuclear war would long remain limited. In any case, Mr. Kissinger's idea of limited nuclear warfare is for me too vague in its mode of implementation, and too terrible in its contemplated execution.

King's Proposals

We have also the view urging that we fix our sights on limited warfare, but using only conventional weapons. An outstanding advocate of this idea is James E. King, Jr., engaged in research on military problems at the Johns Hopkins University Operations Office. Mr. King's opinions may be found most conveniently in the critique that he did of the Kissinger book in the *New Republic*, July 1 and July 15, 1957.

This scholar proposes that "war be limited, even between nuclear powers, in important part but not exclusively by eliminating the *use* of nuclear weapons—reserving our nuclear capability to deter the other side from using its nuclear weapons." It seems to me that just as Kissinger's proposal for limited nuclear warfare is to be preferred on its face to the idea of unlimited nuclear warfare, so King's proposal for limited warfare employing conventional weapons is to be preferred over that of Kissinger. The preference is based quite simply and obviously on a desire to keep casualties down, and a non-nuclear limited war will kill fewer people than one where H-bombs are being used.

The King proposal would be easier to enforce than the Kissinger, too, for its limitation is relatively clear—that is, the banning of the use of nuclear weapons. Problems of inspection and control might very well be raised, but, at any rate, that which the inspection and control aimed at would be plain and uncomplicated.

One problem that does arise is this: Highest American and British authorities, including President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan's Minister of Defense, have both been drawing distinctions between what they call "tactical atomic weapons" and "strategic nuclear weapons"; both have tended to identify the former with conventional arms. Whether Mr. King follows this in his definition of conventional weapons is not absolutely clear; if he does, his proposal loses much of its advantage over that of Mr. Kissinger, both in terms of its calamitous potential and in terms of its enforceability.

But I see nothing that does not make Mr. King's proposal possible—let us consider it the banning of the use of all atomic and nuclear weapons—which would not also just as easily make possible the banning of the manufacture or the retention of such weapons. Possibly, however, stages here would be useful; if so, let us have the stage approach—the banning of the use, and then the banning of the manufacture, and then the destruction of current stocks.

It is important to recall and to reiterate that governments have successfully banned the use (though not the manufacture) of poison gas in warfare.* Of course, this banning was done, originally,

* There were exceptions—notably Mussolini's use of mustard gas in his rape of Ethiopia, but there retaliation was not possible.

without the question of the destruction of Socialism before the eyes of imperialism, while the development and use of atomic weapons clearly envisaged them as instruments for the annihilation of a bleeding and allegedly backward Soviet Union.

But plans for one-sided use of this supreme product of the Free World are now outdated, as everyone knows. This not only makes possible as binding an agreement against the use of atomic and nuclear weapons as exists in connection with poison gas; this makes the absence of such an agreement an increasingly impossible situation.

I would add, in my comments on Mr. King's proposal, that once war begins, with whatever weapons, involving major powers, the danger of the use of every potential of destruction is acute. That danger is fully obviated only with real disarmament and with the absence of war.

For Real Disarmament

The compelling appeal of this last view is so great that it is gaining firm adherents not only throughout the world, but also and increasingly in our own country. A carefully argued presentation of the need and the possibility of achieving significant disarmament and attaining firmly grounded international peace will be found in the influential quarterly journal of international relations, *World Politics*, sponsored by the Center of International Studies of Princeton University. The writer of the particular article I have in mind is Professor John H. Herz, of City College of New York; some readers may remember him as the author of the valuable study, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, issued some years ago.

Professor Herz, after an examination of the inherited power concepts of the national state and a comparison of such attitudes with the present-day realities of international inter-dependence and the capacities for mutual annihilation implicit in nuclear energy, concludes that the appearance of effective world-wide agencies for maintaining peace is no longer utopian. We urge that his entire argument be read; here are excerpts from its concluding section:

Since thermonuclear warfare would in all likelihood involve

one's own destruction together with the opponent's, the means through which the end would have to be attained defeats the end itself. Pursuance of the "logical" security objective would result in mutual annihilation rather than in one unit's global control of a pacified world.

If this is so, the short-term objective must surely be mutual accommodation, a drawing of demarcation lines, geographical and otherwise, between East and West, which would at least serve as a stopgap policy, a holding operation pending the creation of an atmosphere in which, perhaps in consequence of a prolonged period of "cold peace," tensions may abate and the impact of the ideologies presently dividing the world may diminish. . . .

Now that destruction threatens everybody, in every one of his most intimate, personal interests, national interests are bound to recede behind—or at least compete with—the common interest of all mankind in sheer survival . . . it is perhaps not entirely utopian to expect the ultimate spread of an attitude of "universalism" through which a rational approach to world problems would at last become possible.

Significant was the article in the influential magazine, *The Progressive* (July, 1957), by Hugh B. Hester, a retired Brigadier General of the U.S. Army, who had held responsible positions in both Europe and Asia during and after World War II. General Hester's analysis is sharply critical of American foreign policy, especially the predominantly military character of its "aid" program. He sees this policy as basically responsible for the Cold War, calls its continuance suicidal and demands its reversal. As Professor Herz, he recognizes the altogether new conditions existing in the present-day world, and writes:

Nations do not have permanent allies, only permanent interests, and those permanent interests now are synonymous with world peace.

Much of the response from responsible American journalists to the Big-Business propaganda about a "clean" bomb, which it was alleged brought us back to the "good old" pre-1945 days when grown men could assemble in millions and slaughter each other

without endangering the existence of life per se on the globe, was quite hostile. True, this glorious vista was hailed with delight by the President, his press secretary, and such savants as David Lawrence. But on the whole the "clean-bomb" boys were bested by American common sense, expressed, for example, by Thomas L. Stokes in his syndicated column of July 15:

We cannot afford to be lulled by the seductive song of the "clean" bomb, nor diverted from the main job by the wistful hope that maybe bombs are not so bad, after all. What we want is the ending of making any more bombs at all.

Norman Cousins, in a *Saturday Review* editorial (July 13) demanded: "What kind of monstrous imagination is it that can connect the word 'clean' to a device that will put the match to man's cities?" And he said:

What the world is waiting for is not a better way to make a "clean" hydrogen explosive, but a better way to get rid of dirty wars.

Most dramatic and heartening was the statement issuing July 11 from twenty world-famous scientists who gathered for mutual discussion at the Nova Scotia home of the Cleveland industrialist Cyrus S. Eaton. These men—from the United States, Austria, Australia, Great Britain, France, Japan, China, Poland and the Soviet Union—agreed on the calamitous nature of continued testing of nuclear weapons and the absolute physical necessity, in the face of imminent peril to human existence, for the securing of firm world peace. If the human race was to be preserved, declared these outstanding figures of world science, "*war must be abolished and not merely regulated by limiting the weapons that may be used.*"

August, 1957

XXV. ON BRITAIN AND FRANCE

The single experience within the memory of the present generation which means most to it is the Second World War. Central to that experience was the Anglo-American alliance and its relationship with the Soviet Union; to the degree that this is comprehended one may more clearly understand salient features of the contemporary world.

A distinct contribution in this vital area has been made by a young assistant professor of history at Hofstra College in Hempstead, New York; I have in mind Trumbull Higgins' *Winston Churchill and the Second Front* (Oxford University Press, N. Y.). The author tells us that he views his volume as "a military approach to the career of Churchill" between the years 1940 and 1943 and that he is not attempting a history of the period either from the viewpoint of the Left (by which he means the writings of Ralph Ingersoll and Elliott Roosevelt) nor from that of the Right (meaning Russell Grenfell and Chester Wilmot).

Higgins is concerned mainly with demonstrating the Mediterranean-oriented strategy of Churchill and tracing the ways in which this thwarted the timely implementation of the trans-Channel attack that offered the only way to establish an effective Second Front—which would guarantee the defeat of Hitler Germany. In the course of doing this, Professor Higgins presents important evidence further confirming the Left view; that he does this despite his explicit disavowal of any such intention demonstrates the essential validity of that view.

This book offers additional data nailing the lie of Soviet "assistance" to Hitler prior to 1941. It shows that, on the contrary, the USSR was balking so strongly against the policy and demands of

Hitler that the latter was convinced—wrongly—that the USSR had entered into a secret agreement with Great Britain. Higgins shows, as have other recent works, that Hitler had decided quite definitely by June, 1940 to attack the USSR, that by July tactical plans for the assault were begun, and that by August, 1940 Hitler had entered into secret commitments with Rumania for this assault, and had already begun to arm "poor little Finland" for this same noble purpose.

Documented afresh is the fact that Hitler meant to concentrate his expansionism against the East, that he saw himself as the destroyer of Socialism and that in this policy he expected and obtained the sympathy of the ruling classes of France and Great Britain. Hitler viewed the British Empire, in his own words, uttered in 1940, as one of the "essential cornerstones in the framework of Western Civilization." That Churchill had a similar view in that respect needs no demonstration; that he passionately desired the destruction of Socialism was reiterated by him; and that he looked with sympathy upon fascism he stated many times.

Professor Higgins makes clear that in the light of this, Churchill's policy of refusing to intervene effectively against Hitler's war upon the Soviet Union is perfectly logical. He demonstrates that nothing but a decision not to so intervene can explain Churchill's repeated refusal to implement explicit promises made to the Americans and the Russians to open up a Second Front in France in 1942 or, in any case, no later than 1943. In this volume those explicit promises, officially made, will be found; and here the reader will learn that Churchill deleted the evidence of this, in his own words, from his book, *The Hinge of Fate*.

On this question, Higgins summarizes his findings, in a manner that is gentle, but nonetheless devastating:

In the light of the evidence available today, it may be concluded that Mr. Churchill's post-war assertion to the effect that his conscience is "clear," since he did "not deceive or mislead Stalin" on this basic issue, is founded upon the hypothesis that notwithstanding repeated American warnings and his own immense experience in war, the Prime Minister had succeeded in deceiving himself so successfully that not until after November 1942 can he be said to have deliberately deceived his Russian ally.

In this volume the readers will find proof that the alleged mighty German fortifications along the west coast of France, making an invasion there impossible, were a fraud. He will learn that British production in planes, trucks, tanks, self-propelled guns was greater than Germany's from 1940 through 1942; that the shortage of landing craft was not the cause for the delay in crossing the Channel, but rather that this shortage existed because Churchill did not want to cross the Channel and therefore thwarted the building of such craft. The reader will learn that while British Intelligence kept on insisting that the Germans were manning the West with excellent and numerous troops, the fact is that they were desperately short in quantity throughout 1942 and 1943, and that in quality their troops on the West were always quite poor; because of this Rundstedt later admitted that an Allied landing in France, especially in southern France, in 1943, would have been practically unopposed.

The reader will learn that it is absolutely clear that "in no year between 1941 and 1944 did the German Army have the resources either in manpower or equipment to fight continental warfare on two fronts for any length of time." He will learn that the much vaunted Allied mass aerial bombings of Germany prior to the 1944 landings—which were cited as justifying a delay in those landings—did not significantly weaken Germany at all; that, in fact, despite these bombings, German munitions production tripled from 1942 to 1944.

Here is underscored the fact that from 1941 to mid-1944 the Anglo-American troops intermittently fought from two to eight German divisions, while the Russians throughout that period were locked in combat with an average of 180 German divisions. And the Anglo-American decision to invade North Africa rather than France enabled Hitler to send 27 fresh divisions from the West to the Russian front; and the same decision led to the Allies sending to Russia via Murmansk in 1943 less than one-third as much material as they had sent in 1942.

Professor Higgins shows that the Mediterranean policy of Churchill did not arise from a desire to "beat the Russians" to the Balkans, as is so often said now. He demonstrates, what is really indisputable, that the military leaders of Britain, France, and the United States (as well as of Germany, of course) fully expected that the Germans would crush Soviet Russia in a matter

of a few months at the most. But Professor Higgins, after showing this, drops the matter and does not press on to explain why Churchill persisted in his strategy.

I would suggest that Churchill's strategy flowed from his political commitment in defense of British imperialism and in opposition to socialism, and from his tactical estimate of the situation, that is, the early defeat of the USSR. Should Germany accomplish this defeat with speed, it would leave that rival imperialism dominant in the Balkans and in the Mid-East; hence Churchill's concentration on that area. Such concentration, rather than a real attack upon Germany across France, would leave Hitler undisturbed in his war of extermination against the USSR, and would, at the same time, place British ships and troops in the eastern Mediterranean area and in the Mid-East, ready to insist upon sharing in the carving up of that sub-continent (not excluding the oil of the Caucasus—which had "belonged" to English capital, anyway).

The successful resistance of the Red Army not only astonished both Hitler and Churchill; it also, for somewhat different reasons, distressed both of them. The precise relationship to all this of American policy is not yet clear; and here Professor Higgins' volume, because of its natural concentration upon Churchill, is not particularly helpful. Certainly, the policy of the United States under Roosevelt, in this regard, is at least ambivalent; it needs further prolonged study, and very likely decisive conclusions will have to wait upon the opening of still barred archives.

Professor Higgins makes explicit a conclusion that he surely did not arrive at easily:

For the policy of concealment of Mr. Churchill and the obstinacy of the United States Army with respect to this so-called eccentric approach many Allied soldiers would die unnecessarily and much time and material would be expended in the mountains of southern and central Italy.

To the Allied losses are to be added the Italian civilian losses; and the postponement of the war's end for, as the author states, at least one year. Consider the slaughter this meant for the Russian soldiers and civilians, not to speak of resistance forces elsewhere in Europe and the millions in Hitler's concentration camps.

Anyone who seeks an understanding of the dynamics of world politics and diplomacy should study Trumbull Higgins' *Churchill and the Second Front*.

Werth on France

As demonstrated anew in Algeria, once more the French Right shames its nation as it seeks to betray her. Strikingly confirmed is the remark made by Alexander Werth, a most perceptive foreign correspondent:

Counter-revolution is a permanent reality in France, and its outwardly complete, though temporary, triumph as Vichy is much more than a historical curio.

This sentence appears in Mr. Werth's splendid volume, *France, 1940-1955* (Henry Holt, N. Y.), an important complement to the Higgins book, both in terms of extending the timescope and in terms of the latter's neglect of France. Werth's volume is a full-bodied and mature work by an author steeped in first-hand knowledge of his subject; it is deepened by prolonged study of its literature and history and ennobled by manifest love for the beauty of France.

Werth's book demonstrates the treason of the Right—how its sympathy for fascism weakened the nation internally and delivered it over to Hitler; how Vichy, intent upon preserving the French Empire, planned to subordinate France to a Nazi-dominated "New Order"; how, with Hitler's defeat, the new trump card of the Right became and remains the "American approach." Again, the Right cynically betrays the national interest, seeks to hold on to as much colonial loot as it can, and acquiesces in making France an instrument of the Cold War policy of the American ruling class.

Werth's documentation of this broad picture is rich and persuasive. The collaborationism of the Church and the civil service and most of the intelligentsia—Gide, Guitry, Bertrand de Jouvenal, Claudel, Maurois—with the fascists is exposed; memorable is Werth's picture of how the French Chamber voted, 569 to 80, for the destruction of the Republic and the establishment of a fascist regime, with 139 out of the 175 Socialist deputies voting affirma-

tively, and only the Communist Party as a bloc—already outlawed—standing firm in opposition.

Americans need to be reminded, if they ever knew, that the opposition of the Communists to Vichy in 1940 was a continuation of the Communists' support of the French Republic throughout 1939—that, for instance, the Communist Deputies did vote for war credits in September, 1939. That the Communists were in the forefront of the Resistance—in which the Germans murdered 100,000 people—is better known; here, too, however, Werth's book is a timely refresher and reminder.

The desire of the French people for Socialism—in the elections of November, 1946 the Communist Party received five and a half million votes, the Socialist Party, three and a half million, while de Gaulle got five million—was thwarted, Werth shows, by the influence of the United States, and especially by the Marshall Plan device.

New evidence is presented concerning the blatant provocations towards the USSR of American officials, especially General Clay in Germany, and proof is offered showing the corruption of the Socialist Party with American money, and the splitting of the French trade-union movement with the same tool.

In these days when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is presented as the Bastion of the Free World, it is important to read Werth's detailed account of its creation as an instrument of reaction and provocation. It is important to recall, too, how France's strong resistance to this Organization was finally overcome by the solemn pledge of the responsible Premier that never, never, never, would Germany be permitted to join this organization. Here are the words of Premier Schuman in the Chamber of Deputies, July 25, 1949:

Germany will not be admitted to the Atlantic Pact. The question cannot even arise. There is no peace treaty; Germany has no army, and cannot have one; she has no arms, and she shall have none.

The next time a French soldier salutes the Commanding General of NATO's land forces—General Hans Speidel, formerly Commandant for Hitler of occupied Paris—he might well try simul-

taneously reciting this little fable from the lips of a Premier of France.

Meanwhile, Americans, whose government bears the major responsibility for this—what shall we say?—embarrassment would do well to ponder its source, the better to terminate its existence. There is no better single-volume introduction to this than Alexander Werth's study of France.

March, 1958

XXVI. PROFESSOR MORRAY ON DISARMAMENT

I have read no more important book, written by an American since World War II, than J. P. Morray's *From Yalta to Disarmament: Cold War Debate* (Monthly Review Press, N. Y., 1961). Joseph Morray is a product of Illinois; he is a graduate of the Naval Academy at Annapolis and of the Harvard Law School. He has practiced law, saw service in World War II, and for five years was Naval Attaché at U.S. Embassies in Paraguay and Spain. After additional study at the Institute of International Affairs of the University of Paris, Mr. Morray became a member of the faculty at the University of California (Berkeley) where he taught international law and diplomatic history. Some time ago, Mr. Morray was invited to be a Visiting Professor at the University of Havana; he is now teaching and studying in Cuba.

This bare summary of Mr. Morray's career—he is but 45 years of age—indicates that here is an individual who has had unique possibilities for grasping and conveying the essentials of the present-day world. In his first book, *Pride of State* (Beacon Press, Boston, 1959), Mr. Morray examined, as he put it, "Patriotism and American Morality"; he found the highest patriotism to be "innovation justified by posterity," which convinced him that radicalism was at the heart of true love of country. Hence, for him, true morality and profound radicalism were closely related; he did not fail, on the basis of this conclusion, to come explicitly and eloquently to the defense of American Communists.

Courage, independence of thinking, and a fresh, incisive style of writing characterized that earlier volume; they are present again in this new and massive work, where Professor Morray has turned his attention to one of the decisive questions of our time: among

the two greatest Powers in the world today, does either one truly want disarmament, and if either of them does, which one is it? The volume consists of Three Parts and eighteen chapters; Part One, in examining the "Origins of the Cold War," concentrates particularly upon the nature of the Yalta agreement, and the content of Churchill's Fulton, Missouri speech in March, 1946. Part Two, recording the efforts made for the "International Control of Atomic Energy," presents a careful analysis of the so-called Baruch Plan, the nature of and reasons for the Soviet objections thereto, and the Soviet plan for the control of atomic energy. Part Three, which forms two-thirds of the volume as a whole, is entitled "Disarmament"; here is studied in detail the actual proposals, objections, and argumentation offered by both the United States and the Soviet Union relative to disarmament from 1946 through January, 1961.

The book's documentation is full and careful. It consists almost entirely of official minutes of Committee Hearings, United Nations proceedings, memoirs and speeches by leading public figures such as Forrestal, Byrnes, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Truman, Lodge, Wadsworth, Stassen, Zorin, Khrushchev, and the actual texts of treaties, resolutions, agreements, both proposed and concluded. In less skillful hands this might have made for dullness; but Morray's apt organization and pointed prose—and the decisive importance of his subject—prevent this. Further, given the intensely controversial character of the topic, it is well that Professor Morray has taken the course of laying the record before the reader, with very generous quotations, and then, in his argumentation, coming to conclusions that quite rightly have an air of inevitability about them.

Let us cull some of the main arguments and conclusions that Professor Morray's careful study has produced. He demonstrates that the early post-war agreements in referring to "democratic" forces indubitably included therein the Communists and clearly and unequivocally and permanently excluded fascists, and he remarks: "From the point of view of those who for strategic reasons want their crusade against Communism to appear a defense of democracy, this pregnant acknowledgement by Churchill and Roosevelt was a damaging error, better forgotten than denied." He proves that the essential purpose of Churchill's Fulton speech—delivered with the President of the United States on the platform

and demonstrating enthusiastic approval—was to repudiate Yalta and thus to formalize the Western Powers' launching of the Cold War.

Of the greatest consequence is Professor Morray's persuasive demonstration of the historic truth that the path of anti-Communism not only is the path of anti-democracy, but that it is a path incompatible with peace. After tracing and documenting this momentous insight, Morray writes:

Americans generally have called the Communist cry of "Peace!" a false one and have been unable to account for its success as a propaganda slogan except with the derisive suggestion that millions of people have allowed themselves to be fooled by a hoax. It must be recalled that fervent anti-Communism, by making Hitler sure of his cause as the self-righteous defender of civilization, helped to bring on World War II. Because of this bitter lesson millions of apprehensive people are suspicious of such sentiments whether spoken in German or English. A nation that spurns co-existence and builds anti-Communist zeal into the structure of its ideology loses credit as a guarantor of peace and makes itself vulnerable to the charge of warmongering. This is no insignificant handicap where love for peace is rightly acknowledged to be a cardinal attribute of all entrants.

The analysis of the Baruch Plan, with its built-in effort at assuring United States domination of the world and its explicit provisions challenging the socialist structure of the Soviet Union, is masterful. This is important not only in terms of keeping the historical record straight; it is important because to this day one finds it referred to, on the highest levels, as though it had been some especially magnanimous offer made by a benevolent United States intent upon sparing the world the cost of an armaments race and the dangers of an atomic holocaust. On the contrary, as Morray sums up the Baruch Plan: "Either the intoxication of self-confidence induced by the bomb gave rise to a dream that the USSR could be hustled into a disadvantageous arrangement, or the [U.S.] government never really made a serious effort, despite the fanfare, to solve the problem of saving the human race from nuclear horror."

In discussing the Soviet alternative to the Baruch Plan—ninety-nine out of a hundred Americans not only do not know the contents of this alternative, they do not know it ever existed—Morrays draws a conclusion that has persisted as a pattern in the disarmament negotiations ever since:*

The Soviet Union said, in effect: Let us agree that atomic weapons are never to be used again, and then wrestle with the problem of controls. The United States said: We prefer to keep our atomic weapons and freedom to use them until you agree to our control system.

Again we are forced to the conclusion that the United States leaders saw their security tied to the atom bomb and preferred that security, with whatever reproach it invited from history, to a renunciation of monstrous weapons when this renunciation implied a descent toward military equality with the USSR. Parity with the Communists was more to be shunned than the risk of condemnation by future generations of mankind.

In addition to the basic fact that U.S. "disarmament" policy has been really a policy aiming at controlled armament, Morrays brings out another limiting feature in that policy with a clarity that no other work has matched. In his own words:

The United States has insisted that international armed forces must be created to take the place of national armed forces. To the United States "disarmament" is "national disarmament." It is to be achieved by transferring the control of armed forces from the state to an international authority by giving the generals new hats and changing the emblems on uniforms. To the Soviet Union "disarmament" is "world disarmament." No armed forces, even international in character, beyond the police and militia forces required to maintain domestic order, are to be left as a coercive power on states.

In no work has this writer seen a clearer expose of the hollowness of the anti-Soviet argument uttered in the name of opposition

* The first break in this pattern came in the momentous joint Statement on Disarmament Principles signed by both the United States and the Soviet Union on September 20, 1961, in a Report to the United Nations. The American press has tended to ignore or minimize this Statement, but it can mean a real leap forward in serious disarmament negotiations.

to appeasement. An essential element of the propaganda line of the United States government, from Truman to the present, has been that only a policy of strength can contain the Soviet Union and that any yielding to its proposals would constitute Munichism or appeasement. On this basis, repeatedly, the United States, and leading propaganda agencies in the United States, have rejected Soviet initiatives towards disarmament. Morray writes on this point:

When the United States, urged by Hitler's victim to join in disarmament, continues the arms build-up with the phrase "Remember Hitler!" it invites the world's condemnation by an attempt at confusion that looks dishonest and by a course of action much closer to Hitler's than to that of Hitler's victims. Hitler proved that a nation that refuses to accept Soviet proposals to disarm, secretly intends to attack when the time seems ripe. The beginning of Hitler's course of aggression lay in a manifest will to arm his state in spite of Soviet offers of complete and general disarmament. He also proved that such a course brings worse disaster for the aggressor than for the victim. If the American people "Remember Hitler" as he really was, they will be suspicious, not of Soviet disarmament proposals, but of excuses evoked by those proposals from governments refusing to disarm.

Other books have demonstrated—usually in the form of apologia—the United States commitment to the use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and bacteriological; they have shown that this commitment is so heavy that it dominates the tactical and strategic disposition of American strength. This has appeared, for example, in the writings of Maxwell Taylor, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn and Henry Kissinger. But this decisive fact in understanding the present-day world is brought out with special impact in Morray's work, because he does it by allowing the State Department's own official record to speak. Thus, when a Congressional Committee directly asked the State Department, as late as November, 1958, whether it was "against United States interests" to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, the Department replied: "A ban on the use of nuclear weapons, taken alone, would be clearly inimical to present U.S. security interests. . . ."

When the same Committee asked the State Department: "Is it to our interest to show that the use of nuclear weapons is no different from the use of other types of weapons in terms of international morality?" the answer from that Department was: "Yes, it is in the interest of the U.S. to have a general public awareness of the fact that nuclear weapons in themselves are no different from other types of weapons in terms of international morality. Since the end of World War II, our military defenses have been reshaped around nuclear weapons. . . ." How many Americans know this? How many Americans would agree with it, if they knew it?

Murray's book is very strong in showing the relationship between the Allies' position on Germany and on disarmament; how, since the Allies hitherto have insisted that there was only one Germany (that of Adenauer) and have pledged to each other and to West Germany the reunification of Germany through the liquidation of the German Democratic Republic, and since they have simultaneously insisted that Germany (their Germany) must remain the fulcrum of NATO, they have in fact, no matter what their words, hitherto made impossible any real progress on disarmament. The United States attitude towards the People's Republic of China has had the same result, whatever its motivation may be; that is, the United States, by refusing to recognize the existence of the most populous State in the world, has made it extremely difficult for the rest of the world to take seriously its protestations in favor of disarmament.

Of utmost interest and great immediate relevance is Murray's demonstration that the much-discussed "troika" proposal for the reorganization of the UN structure developed out of and reflected the Soviet concern about implementing disarmament. The Soviet representative, in suggesting that the UN Secretariat and the Security Council make certain that all three groups of States—Socialist, Western bloc, and neutralist—be represented on these organs with equality, specifically urged that this was necessary at an early date, "in order to create confidence in the correct use of international armed forces of police (militia) and to preclude the possibility of their use in the interests of a particular state or group of states." Let the reader ask himself if he knows of any American publication which has made clear this relationship.

Very clearly, there emerges from Murray's volume another fact

of decisive importance to understanding today's world: this is that the United States has not only refused to agree to the outlawry of the use of weapons of mass destruction, but that she has also refused to agree that she would never use such weapons first.

I have some points of difference with Professor Morray, and the weight of his scholarship is so impressive that this moves me to re-examine my own views on these points with increased care. At one point Morray takes a position of an agnostic as to the accomplishments of the People's Democracies since World War II; my own estimate is more positive and enthusiastic. At another, Morray agrees with the Anglo-American view that disarmament would intensify the dangers of war, in terms of national liberation outbreaks: I think this is a hasty judgment and that the disarming of Portugal, for example, would further the ending rather than the beginning of war. Similarly, I think Morray errs in holding that disarmament might increase the likelihood of socialist revolution being marked by violence; if the source of the violence is seen as being with the exploitative ruling class, it is at least arguable that reducing the weapons in its hands would tend to enhance rather than diminish the possibilities of the peaceful transition to socialism.

These are, however, not central disagreements and the absolutely indispensable character of Professor Morray's work remains.

Though aware that I have quoted from Morray's book at great length, nevertheless I wish to conclude this examination by quoting the last two paragraphs of his remarkable volume:

A close study of the negotiations over the past sixteen years can lead to only one conclusion: the Soviet Union wants our divided planet to be disarmed; the NATO governments do not. This conclusion must be faced with all its alarming implications. The deeply rooted fear of Communism is going to be tapped by Western governments and directed against anyone who argues for an acceptance of the Soviet proposals. This obscurantist tactic is already being employed, and more must be expected. Anyone who wants to enter into the struggle to force the NATO governments to accept disarmament will be helping the Communists achieve a priority objective. He must be prepared, therefore, to hear the charge of "Communist" leveled against himself by those who cannot meet the issue on the plane

of reason. In a society permeated with emotional and unexamined anti-Communism, where the freedom to be a Communist or to agree with the Communist hardly exists or at best is granted on only the severest terms, this charge is bound to be dreaded, if not for himself, then because of hardships to family.

Nevertheless, the cause of disarmament is the cause of humanity. As the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the Western world have a common interest in keeping the nuclear bombs from falling, so they have a common interest in eliminating the possibility of their falling. They therefore have a common interest in discovering which parties in the crucial negotiations are really trying to hold on to the bombs and the means of their delivery and which are trying to have them destroyed. This judgment, if reached accurately and in time by enough people all around the world, can save mankind the awful suffering of another war. This is worth fighting for.

We began our comments on Professor Morray's book by noting that in his earlier volume he had defined patriotism in terms of enlightened radicalism, pursued despite all persecution and all deprivation. On the basis of this severe definition, I think that Professor Morray, in his *From Yalta to Disarmament*, has shown himself to be a splendid American patriot. Our gratitude and congratulations to him, and to his publishers, for producing a great light to help show the way forward for all humanity.

October, 1961

XXVII. PROFESSOR FLEMING ON THE COLD WAR YEARS

It is not often that the present writer finds himself in agreement with the blurbs carried on the covers of books published commercially in the United States. But then, it is rare for Philip J. Noel-Baker to help create such blurbs; in this case he did, and what he wrote is exactly correct:

Professor Fleming has written a great book, the importance of which in 1961 cannot be exaggerated. He has dealt with the relations between Russia and the West in a way that is at once comprehensive, learned, fair and vividly readable. He will shake those who think that, since 1917, only the Russians have been to blame.

If the book is read as widely as it deserves, it should do much to prepare the way for peaceful coexistence and general international disarmament under effective inspection and control.

The book is *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960*, by D. F. Fleming; it was published in London, by George Allen and Unwin some months ago, and later was issued in New York by Doubleday (2 vols., 1,158 pp.). Mr. Fleming is well known in American academic circles; for over thirty years he has been a professor at Vanderbilt University in Tennessee, he was Vice-President of the American Political Science Association in 1943, was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton in 1946 and 1948-49, and was twice a Fulbright Lecturer—at Cambridge, in 1954 and at the Indian School of International Studies, 1959-1960. Five earlier books have appeared from Mr. Fleming;

two are widely considered definitive in their areas: *The U.S. and the League of Nations*, 1918-1920, and *The U.S. and World Organizations*, 1920-1933. With this distinguished academic and scholarly career, Mr. Fleming has managed to combine prolonged experience as a journalist and radio commentator, and service in a public capacity. For several years in the 1930's he was columnist for a Nashville newspaper, and through much of the 1940's was a regular commentator on a Nashville radio station; more recently he has contributed regularly to a leading Methodist paper in the United States and to the *British Weekly*. After World War II, Mr. Fleming served for a time on the staff of Bernard Baruch; at moments of acute crisis, too, he has managed more often than not to be on the spot, as covering the League of Nations debates during the invasions of Manchuria and Ethiopia right in Geneva.

In addition to this very impressive background—unmarred by anything connoting less than complete respectability, not to speak of the faintest hint of what is idiotically termed “Un-American”—Mr. Fleming is an old-fashioned historian. That is to say, he is a rationalist and a humanist; he rejects cynicism; he embraces the idea of progress; he is passionately a democrat; he arrives at conclusions on the basis of exhaustive research, the evidence of which is carefully placed before the reader, and eschews intuitive findings produced through “Foundation Grants” and coincidentally reinforcing the well-known preferences of such scholarly organizations as the National Association of Manufacturers.

Fleming's *The Cold War and Its Origins* is an encyclopedic work in scope and size. Bound in two volumes, the study contains over 600,000 words—the equivalent of six ordinary-sized books. It is divided into four Parts, the titles of which are: *Enemies and Allies*, 1917-1945; *The Cold War in Europe*, 1945-1950; *The Cold War in East Asia*, 1945-1955; *The Second Cold War*, 1955-1960. The work's preface is dated June, 1960; its narrative closes with the Spring of 1960.

The spirit with which Professor Fleming undertook this massive task (he began active work upon it in 1947) may best be expressed in his own introductory remarks, refreshingly straight-forward in their expression of motivation and outlook:

I have sought at every stage to present the other side, how it looks to the “enemy” in the belief that this is essential to

the avoidance of the final grand smash. Of course this has been a difficult undertaking in a time when nearly all of the great organs of public opinion management have been massed to stress the inequity and wickedness of our opponents. Yet it is only by striving constantly to see the other side that we can hope to survive, in the age of push-button ICBM's and beyond.

Fleming continues: "I have also told the story of our anti-Red and anti-liberal hysterias, and of the incalculable damage they have done both to our reputation abroad and to our heritage of freedom of thought and expression at home." And he concludes:

In the years since 1945, all the things which divide us from other great peoples have been magnified fully and too long. Suspicion, hate and fear have ruled our minds. Now it is time to study and emphasize the things which unite us with other peoples. . . . Either we have to learn to live in reasonable amity with them [the nations of Socialism] or we shall all be atomized together.

Colossal as is the scope of Fleming's work, certain significant areas and fundamental considerations are inadequately treated. Areas of neglect, insofar as the diplomatic history of the post World War II epoch is concerned, are Latin America and, particularly, Africa. These are not altogether forgotten—as sometimes happens in "Free World" studies—but their handling is not up to Fleming's work on Europe and Asia, either in fullness or in acuteness of analysis. I think, too, that Fleming shows a certain Western provincialism in his treatment of the Arabic world; his references, for example, to the writings of Arabic scholars—including those readily available in English—are exceedingly few and far between.

The intra-imperialist rivalries are occasionally noted by Professor Fleming, but this is not adequate when dealing with one of the central strands helping to determine the nature of post-1945 world history. The decisive importance of Anglo-French rivalries in the Mid-East, of Anglo-French suspicion of American moves in the same region, in Africa, and South-East Asia is missed; and the actual socio-economic bases for such suspicion are rarely suggested. The significance of the resurgence of Western Germany and its challenge to French, British, and American interests

in Europe and increasingly in Africa and even Latin America also do not appear adequately here. Even given Professor Fleming's purpose to concentrate upon the Cold War, and therefore upon hostilities between the United States and its supporters and the Soviet Union and its supporters, it is distorting to neglect the intra-imperialist antagonisms because these impinge significantly upon the nature and conduct of the Cold War.

Analytically, perhaps the greatest weakness of the Fleming effort is its omission of the monopoly-capitalist structure of the "Free World." In the two volumes there are occasional highly important references to the decisive weight of the leading industrialists and financiers in the formulation of Western policy, and to the fact that it is from them that the push towards fascism came in the past and comes in the present. But these never go beyond references and there is no presentation at all of the actual structure of the Western economy, its extreme monopolization and its intense militarization. In this connection, one may note that Fleming's references never mention any writer to the Left of I. F. Stone; Communist and Marxist publications and analysts here and abroad go unnoticed. Even the work of C. Wright Mills—much of it, such as *The Power Elite* and *The Cause of World War Three*, directly relevant to Fleming's own effort—goes unmentioned. In this connection, the most glaring gap in Fleming's reading—so far as these two volumes show—is the absolutely indispensable production of R. Palme Dutt which has been illuminating diplomatic history for forty years.

Presumably these voids reflect the limitations of a respectable American academic background, which even Professor Fleming has been unable altogether to overcome. This makes all the more remarkable his accomplishment—and perhaps will help make it all the more palatable in the United States.

The Balance of Blame

Professor Fleming's two-volume work demonstrates definitively and conclusively that the onus for the beginnings, continuance and persistence of the Cold War lies with the West and, in the first place, with the United States. He proves that the idea that the fault for the Cold War and the source of the war danger lies with the Soviet Union is the opposite of the truth. Fleming

shows, further, that the concept of "equal blame" for both sides of the two great blocs—which has been advanced by some more enlightened American thinkers, like C. Wright Mills and Robert Oppenheimer—also is false. He states and proves, using throughout official sources or sources absolutely untainted with any hint of Soviet sympathy, that no conclusion is possible for any reasonable human being but that one side—the side of the West—has been the generator of hostility, the source of aggressiveness, the locus of the war threat, and that the other side—the side of the East—has been the source of efforts at agreement, the fount of new initiatives towards peaceful solution, the center of opposition to war.

No single insight is more important to an understanding of the world today, and while comprehension of this truth is of basic consequence to any human being, it is of overwhelming significance for a citizen of the United States. It is a terribly unpleasant truth for such an individual to grasp, and to try to live up to the necessary behavior that must follow mastering that truth is not easy. But the facts are inexorable; Professor Fleming marshals them and documents them. The supreme test of patriotism is so to love one's own country that, knowing its policy to be wrong, to labor to set it right and to persist in this effort no matter what ignominy and no matter what hardship may result and no matter what pressures are exerted for contrary behavior. All will understand that the writing of these two volumes must have been an especially difficult task for Professor Fleming—difficult not only insofar as the production of any massive creative effort is among the most onerous tasks challenging any person, but difficult insofar as Professor Fleming's scholarship and integrity led him to the conclusions which he here announces.

Five Major Areas

In order to convey to the reader as fully as possible, within the limits of an essay, something of the specific content and style of presentation of Fleming's work, I have selected for quotation summarizing statements in five major areas. After detailing the history, in masterful fashion, of the Munich Pact, and the German-Soviet Treaty of 1939, Fleming writes:

It was only when Hitler's mighty Wehrmacht was poised to plunge through Poland to Russia's borders that the Kremlin made the pact which deflected him westward for nearly two years. Up to that moment the Soviet Union did everything that a government could do to form an alliance with the West in order to restrain Hitler, or to defeat him without undue sacrifice, but on each and every occasion her overtures were rebuffed. Time and again Moscow asked for a conference with the Western Powers to initiate collective security measures against Hitler, but without avail. In the end Litvinov was left alone in Geneva to make his valedictory to the League and go home with his failure.

. . . it was not possible for the Western Powers to initiate, support or tolerate a long series of diplomatic steps or open drives toward war and then at the last moment cast the responsibility upon a Power which was reacting defensively against the march of events in the West that it could not control.

Fleming traces very carefully the problems during World War II of keeping intact the Allied coalition; he shows, in particular, the pressures from the Right, as epitomized in Churchill, to undercut unity and to prepare the groundwork for a post-war assault upon the Soviet Union. He convincingly demonstrates the efforts of President Roosevelt to preserve the war-time coalition; he proves that Franklin Delano Roosevelt not only desired a post-war world that would live in peace, but firmly believed that the creation of such a world was possible, and that its foundation was friendship between the USA and the USSR, for the achievement of which the late President spared no effort.

Roosevelt was everlastingly right in his gallant, sustained effort to break out of the ancient cycle of national rivalries—arms race—and war. He saw that there were no objective reasons for the United States and the Soviet Union to fall out immediately and to fight for world mastery. He gave even his last days and hours to preventing that, and he had succeeded up to the moment of his passing. It was not Roosevelt who failed; it was his successors who were unable to keep the peace.

Fleming's treatment of the Far East—including even the Korean War of 1950—is excellent; in this area of the world, the aggressiveness of the United States has been especially blatant. His work devastates the thesis of the China Lobby in the United States—it is one of the fundamental myths of the American Right—to the effect that the decline of the power of the U.S. Government upon the Asian mainland was due to “twenty years of treason” and to “softness towards Communism.” He concludes:

It is necessary to reject the claim of the Chinese Nationalists that their later debacle was due to the Yalta concessions to Russia. The Kuomintang had lost China long before, by its

failure to defend North China or even to organize guerrilla warfare there against Japan, by its abysmal corruption and inefficiency, by its stubborn and futile attempt to maintain a feudal agrarian system. The American Army shipped and flew troops into Manchuria and North China, after the defeat of Japan. It was the decisive lack of support from the Chinese people which made it impossible to remain there.

Fleming's analysis of the years of Dulles' domination of the State Department is masterful and merciless. And he finds that the main thing is that while Dulles brought the world to the “brink” of disaster time after time, the forces of peace were greater than those of war and therefore prevailed. In Fleming's words:

Mr. Dulles had been defeated by the will of the peoples to live, by the continued upsurge of the Communist peoples he sought to confine, his clinging to obviously untenable outposts at the recurrent risk of a world conflagration, and by his defense of the status quo lest any change in it might be Red. Fearing the dominoes of disaster, he created them in each crisis where they would not have existed, but a world in the grip of great social and technical revolution could no longer be held in the vise of containment.

Starting with the fact that the moral prestige and material strength of the United States in 1945 were tremendous, and noting that as his work closes—with mid-1960—that prestige in particular and that strength in considerable part were grossly diminished, Fleming asks why, and answers his own query:

Instead of re-living with all the peoples emerging from colonial rule our own vibrant youth as a nation, we feared revolution of every kind, everywhere. Instead of seeing vividly that all the old feudalistic regimes must go, we put ourselves in the position of seeming to try to save them in East Europe and China and the Arab world, ending by embracing Chiang Kai-shek, Franco, and King Saud. Instead of remembering our own need for neutrality and peace during our national youth, we condemned as immoral the same need in many newly-liberated peoples.

Commitment to War

One of the most valuable features of Fleming's massive effort is the full documentation it offers that the United States Government, at the highest level and repeatedly, and outstanding members of the American ruling class have favored the precipitation of atomic—and later—thermonuclear war upon the Soviet Union. The concept of preventive war, pre-emptive war, of the fullest commitment to the use of atomic and hydrogen bombs, of the "first strike"—all this has dominated military and political thinking in the United States ever since August, 1945 when two A-bombs were dropped without warning upon defenseless Japanese cities, bringing death to scores of thousands of civilians. Both volumes offer repeated evidence, with ample quotations, that for the past sixteen years a basic objective of American ruling class policy was to create the conditions for a devastating, sudden, "first-strike" knock-out blow upon the USSR. *Without understanding this, it is not possible to understand Soviet actions and reactions, from her rejection of the notorious Baruch plan in 1946 to her resumption of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in 1961.*

Fleming notes that it was responsibly reported in Paris in February, 1958, that the Soviet Union was making excellent progress in the development of a new defensive system against the Strategic Air Command of the USA, based upon improved radar and anti-aircraft weapons, with greatly enhanced range; NATO circles feared that this meant the obsolescence of SAC's effectiveness in the near future. It may be added that the shooting down of the U-2 in May, 1960, did much to confirm these projections. Simultaneous with this achievement, the United States undertook

the massive "hardening" of its overseas bases, and concentration upon developing offensive ballistic missiles.

At the same time, the "ban the bomb" efforts and the general disarmament proposals of the USSR were rejected by NATO; on the contrary, France joined the "club," and the Congress of the United States in 1959, and the President in 1960 moved officially towards nuclearizing the armaments of West Germany. The central defense problem of the USSR then became how to protect itself against hundreds of bases—on land and sea—from which massive thermonuclear-armed missile attack could be directed upon her; and this by a Power which not only persisted in maintaining and strengthening these bases outside her own territory, but also persisted in favoring—in her official military literature and leading quasi-official advisory publications (as those coming from the Rand Corporation)—the first-strike theory of making war in the present era.

Towards the close of this second volume, Professor Fleming calls attention to the fact that the dominant view in the West continued to be that "the power to destroy the Soviet Union totally and cheaply must be retained up to the very last moment of total disarmament." This was a view which, Professor Fleming correctly pointed out, "would of course compel the Soviet Union to resume testing and continue it indefinitely to gain the same absolute power over the Americans, thus continuing the arms race into infinity, or until the final explosion."

In other words, the fact is that NATO and the United States, in the first place, have rejected—whatever the words in a particular speech—general and total disarmament; NATO and the U.S. still want a controlled armaments race, and still wish to retain the capacity for total annihilation. This is why—to go past, for a moment, the chronology of Fleming's work—in November, 1961, NATO rejected in the United Nations the African States' proposal that nuclear-weapons testing cease in Africa, and that *all nations renounce as monstrous and promise absolutely never to resort first to the employment of atomic or nuclear weapons.*

Conclusion

The preceding pages have only summarized and highlighted some of the outstanding features of Fleming's history of *The Cold*

War and Its Origins. Their main purpose has been to induce readers to study the volumes and bring their contents to friends and neighbors. Professor Fleming himself writes:

Since cold-war methods are self-defeating there remains the much harder task of accepting competitive coexistence with the Communist world, and of working into policies first of toleration and then of friendliness and cooperation with all peoples.

It augurs well for the achievement of this most urgent task of our time—"friendliness and cooperation with all peoples"—that the immediate past has produced from American scholars two such monumental contributions as Joseph P. Morray's definitive study of disarmament negotiations and D. F. Fleming's history of international relations during the past generation.

November, 1961

XXVIII. JUSTICE DOUGLAS' "MANIFESTO"

William O. Douglas has been a Justice of the United States Supreme Court for over twenty years; during that period he generally has aligned himself with the liberal minority. Simultaneously, he has traveled frequently and widely throughout the world and in numerous books and articles has sought to convey to his fellow-citizens some sense of the realities of today.

His latest effort is *Democracy's Manifesto: A Counter Plan for the Free Society* (Doubleday, N. Y., 1962). As the title suggests, Justice Douglas means his little volume as a reply to the *Communist Manifesto*. He feels that the "Free World" has too long been on the defensive before the challenge from the Socialist World, and that this stance has tended to stultify Western policy.

In developing this position, Justice Douglas pleads eloquently for a line that would emphasize security, equality, democracy at home and maximum effort abroad to align the might of the United States with forces seeking the enhancement of standards of living and democratization of social functioning. In urging this change in U.S. foreign policy, Justice Douglas assumes the necessity for peaceful co-existence; he moves ahead, on the basis of this assumption, to call for active competition as to which of the two world systems can best answer the demands and needs of mankind.

At the same time, in arguing for this change, there are passages in Justice Douglas' volume that represent the most vigorous condemnation of U.S. practices that have ever issued from a leading public figure and a Supreme Court Justice, at that. For example:

He writes that billions of dollars were poured into foreign countries to strengthen them militarily; most of these countries were dominated by extremely reactionary ruling classes, and the funds from the United States were employed to maintain these

classes in power. He reports that in Asia, Latin America and Africa, America was nowhere revered as a symbol of justice or freedom, but rather was thought of as an armed giant "shaking nuclear fists at the world."

In most of these countries, allied to the United States, the majority of the people, says Justice Douglas—who visited all of them—lived in squalor and disease, while a minute upper crust wallowed in Nero-like luxury; it is this *status quo*, he continues, which American money and arms and diplomacy have sought to maintain. Our so-called "aid" programs and Point Four Programs were exercises in deception, for the money went to the rich, to the generals, to the Sultans, but never to the masses who were starving. These "aid" programs have made the rich richer and the poor poorer.

This program, writes Justice Douglas, "was and is untenable." It is untenable, because: "Not all the bombs in the world, not all the wealth of America can maintain that status quo." The systems propped up with our force and money "would collapse" quickly, for "they would not survive the pressures from within." The Justice notes that "Our CIA offered millions of dollars" to overthrow the democratic government of Mossadegh in Iran; he adds, "The agents whom Allen Dulles sent to overthrow the Sukarno regime (in Indonesia) are reminders of how foolhardy those operations are"—and this is one of which the present writer had not heard hitherto.

"Our position in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan is to Russia what Russian air or missile bases in Cuba and Mexico or in Canada would be to us," says this U.S. Supreme Court Justice. He denounces the blatant Pentagon intervention in Laos, and dismisses Chiang Kai-shek with this line: "He is probably the most despised man in Formosa."

Justice Douglas insists that "an overall political settlement with Russia is our foremost need"; those who think that that nation "can be brought to its knees" are thinking "nonsense," because: "Russia today stands on a par with us; she must be treated as an equal if we are to have even a modicum of peace."

Such a political settlement, says the Justice, will require the recognition of two German States and their admission to the United Nations; some form of international guarantee of West Berlin would be needed. The recognition of the Chinese People's

Republic and its admission to the United Nations must be agreed to; and that great nation must be included in any final settlement of the political and military problems confronting the world. On this question of an international detente, Justice Douglas concludes: "Unless a political settlement between the Communist Bloc and the Free World is made, 'brinkmanship' will become more and more perilous as more and more nations acquire the atomic and hydrogen bombs."

Where Justice Douglas writes of "the ideological struggle" he is, I think, altogether wrong. Wherever he finds anything positive in the Marxist theory or program he ascribes this to demagoguery—really an easy and unworthy way to "win" a debate. He accepts as evidence the most incredible testimony; if it is anti-Communist, it is credible. This even included Justice Douglas' taking at face value the fable that Communists conduct schools in which methods of murder are taught and in which fantastic death-weapons—as pencils—are described. This latter concoction was the testimony of one FBI stoolpigeon in the Scales case and was greeted in the courtroom with the hilarity it deserved; yet here is Justice Douglas mentioning it as an established truth!

In developing his "counter plan for a free society" and in arguing against Communism, there is some cause for alarm in observing that Justice Douglas believes that concepts such as "democracy" and "freedom" *"are not ideas for the masses"* (the Justice italicizes these words), but rather "are for the intelligentsia." This certainly is contrary to the Marxist outlook; I think, too, it contradicts the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address. It is an eliteism which, whatever its motives, is anti-democratic; what is more, it is based on a theory of "democracy" and "freedom" which is false, partial, bourgeois.

Towards the close of his work, Justice Douglas writes: "From the China Sea to Africa to South America the external features of the villages are the same: filth and illiteracy that are staggering; disease and malnutrition that are shocking; misery that robs life of much meaning." Nowhere in his book, however, does the Justice explain why this is so; nowhere does he mention the ruling classes of the Western Powers, and the exploitative and parasitic relationship that those classes have fastened and maintained upon those masses, thus making their countries "underdeveloped" (i.e., over-exploited) and thus boosting their own rates of profit.

But the main feature of Justice Douglas' *Manifesto* is not its poorly informed polemic against Marxism; the main feature is its passionate denunciation of dominant American foreign policy since World War II, and its demand that that policy be altered to one seeking a political settlement with the Socialist world.

Justice Douglas' book is a call for the termination of international tensions through the adoption of a mutually acceptable settlement that posits itself upon the necessity for the peaceful co-existence of the capitalist and the socialist systems. Justice Douglas believes that in the competition ensuing in a peaceful world after such a settlement, a more or less modified capitalism will triumph; this author believes that under such circumstances, socialism will triumph. In any case, given peaceful co-existence, mankind will survive and will then work out its future in accordance with reality and with its own needs and desires. Without that, all arguments are sheerest academicisms; and policies not based on this fundamental prerequisite are the crassest fanaticism.

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HERBERT APTHEKER was born in New York City in 1915. Since his first work, *THE NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR*, was published in 1938, he has authored more than a dozen books, many of which have been translated abroad, and scores of pamphlets. Widely regarded as a leading Marxist scholar, Dr. Aptheker served in the field artillery for over four years in the Second World War, rising through the ranks from private to major. He was awarded a prize in history by the Association for the Study of Negro Life in 1939, and was a Guggenheim Fellow, 1946-47. He is presently the editor of *POLITICAL AFFAIRS* and on the editorial board of *MAINSTREAM*. His writings have appeared in many of the leading journals of the United States and of the world. Dr. Aptheker's work has earned him a place as a consequential figure in American intellectual life.

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